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Abstract 
 
This thesis investigates the relationship between investment law and the 
power of states to produce and implement environmental measures. 
Through a strictly legal approach, and by situating the issue within the 
framework of public international law, this project endeavours to find 
avenues for the incorporation of environmental legal obligations within 
the investment legal regime. The thesis examines the main substantive 
protections granted to investors by the system of bilateral and multilateral 
investment instruments, before considering the ways in which, through 
express provisions, general conflict rules, and procedural means, 
tribunals can take environmental law into account. This taxonomy is 
tested in the third part of this work, through the analysis of the 
jurisprudence issuing from investment tribunals in disputes containing an 
environmental element. 
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Part I: The issues 
 
 
The topic of this thesis is the incorporation of environmental legal 
obligations within the framework of investment law. The first part of this 
thesis is divided into three chapters, providing the background to the 
work. In the first chapter, the topic is introduced, as well as the 
methodology adopted in the work, summarised as ‘pragmatic normative 
coherence’. The pragmatism of the methodological approach refers to the 
avoidance of policy appeals and the focus on the legal terrain, and more 
specifically, the search for a normative coherence that is grounded in 
what works in the practice of the law-makers in the international arena, 
the states, and of the investment tribunals charged with applying that law. 
 
The second chapter presents a complex structure, as it seeks to provide as 
comprehensive a view of the normative background of the project as 
possible. There are three main elements, or areas, that the chapter 
endeavours to cover in its first section in an increasingly detailed way: 
the general issue of the fragmentation of international law, the specific 
nature of international investment law, and the legal avenues of redress 
of the negative environmental externalities of investment activities out-
with the framework of investment law. The main argument of this work 
is that investment law’s insular nature jars with the necessity to account 
for diverse legal commitments, and specifically, environmental ones.  
 
Finally, the chapter closes with a section on the role of risk management 
in the decision-making process of the main actors, and more specifically, 
of states. A lot has been written on the role of the ‘regulatory’ and ‘post-
regulatory’ state1 and some of the conclusions and the hypotheses arising 
 
1 See for example Collins, H., ‘Regulating contract law’, in Parker, C. et al. (eds.), 
Regulating Law, Oxford, OUP, 2004: 13, at 28: ‘[...] the state diminishes its reliance 
upon publicly owned assets for the delivery of public services, and rather tries to use 
privately owned companies to provide equivalent services to the public. To ensure 
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for those debates are relevant at the policy level, but with spill-over 
effects at the level of norms production and enforcement2. 
  
Chapter 3 closes the first part and constitutes the necessary stepping 
stone to the second part. The chapter reviews the substantive investment 
obligations contained in international investment agreements, and 
specifically those obligations with regards to the standards of treatment 
and the protection against uncompensated expropriation. The chapter 
describes the ‘orthodox view’ of investment protection, unencumbered 
by extraneous obligations and commitments. It is the view reflected in 
the older bilateral treaties (which do not contain express provisions for 
non-investment obligations) and frequently adopted by tribunals, 
especially before the developments of the NAFTA jurisprudence.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
reliability and fair access to public services, the state often creates an elaborate 
regulatory apparatus...’ Further restrictions come with the post-regulatory state, only 
tasked with providing a framework for the provision of services, with the insertion of 
other forms of controls such as soft law instruments, codes of conduct, voluntary 
business standards, private forms of arbitration and settlement of disputes, etc. 
2 See Black, J., ‘Law and regulation: the case of finance’, in Parker et al., 2004: 33, at 
52: ‘...while law might regulate, it is also seen by the regulatory system as risk...[this 
fact] calls into question all the main formulations of legal theorists as to the relationship 
of law and society. Law is neither a mirror, nor glue, nor order: it is a technical obstacle 
devoid of any normative content which is to be managed or overcome.’ 
. 
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 Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
        
Although titled “bilateral” investment treaties, this case 
makes clear that which has been clear to negotiating States 
for some time, namely, that through the definition of 
“national” or “investor,” such treaties serve in many cases 
more broadly as portals through which investments are 
structured, organized, and, most importantly, encouraged 
through the availability of a neutral forum3. 
 
 
 
1.1 Thesis topic 
 
The statement quoted above, made by the Aguas del Tunari tribunal in its 
Decision on the Objections to Jurisdiction in the course of a very 
contentious case, in many ways served as an inspiration for the topic of 
this thesis. Borrowing apparently from the language of informatics4, the 
tribunal lets us know that we are entering a ‘new world’, where words do 
not mean what they used to mean anymore. Bilateral investment treaties 
are sites that give access to many ‘clickable options’ (or very large 
entrance doors indeed), created for the purpose of encouraging 
investment, not least by the provision of neutral fora for the resolution of 
investment disputes. In this thesis, we aim to find out if, amongst the 
clickable options, a space as been reserved for environmental options, 
and if the doors are wide enough to function as entry points for 
environmental obligations, or if they are moving and adaptable, widening 
and narrowing in response to whoever knocks at the door5. 
 
3 Aguas del Tunari S. A. v. Republic of Bolivia, (ICSID Case ARB/02/3), Decision on 
the Respondent’s Objections to Jurisdiction, 21 October 2005, § 332.  
4 Where it means ‘an Internet site providing access or links to other sites’; the original 
meaning is ‘doorway’ or ‘gate’ (Oxford Dictionary).  
5 In Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain et al., 542 U.S. 692 (2004), the Court had this to say, with 
reference to the possibility of exercising ‘independent judicial recognition of actionable 
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There are many ways in which this topic can be developed, and many 
starting points. It might be easier to start by saying what this thesis will 
not be. This is not an appeal for ‘caring about the environment’ and how 
to do so. There are no policy arguments being brought forward, and no 
analysis of the (infinite) policy discussions. It is not even simply a 
superficial appeal for a ‘balancing approach’ that takes into account the 
legitimate regulatory powers of states6, to the extent that such appeals are 
heavily value-leaden and judgmental7. This is a thesis about law, based 
on how the law acts, and says it acts.  
 
The exclusion of policy discussions extends to the choice of topic to the 
effect that this is not a thesis about ‘law as ought’, legal reform, lege 
ferenda or any of these permutations. This is a project of discovery of the 
law ‘as is’. We are certainly not claiming that there is no point of view 
and no bias in this thesis: however, taking sides, declaring, in unison with 
most of the inhabitants of the investment community, that ‘investment is 
good’, or, more predictably for this thesis, that ‘investment is bad’, does 
not serve any purpose other than weakening any argument one wishes to 
advance. ‘Investment is’ and ‘the environment is’; both exist as realities, 
 
international norms’: ‘judicial power should be exercised on the understanding that the 
door is still ajar subject to vigilant doorkeeping’. (At § 729). We wish to adopt this 
metaphor, mutatis mutandis, aware that the problem, in international investment law, is 
the identity of the doorkeepers. 
6 No negative political judgment is necessarily implied of any such appeals; see for 
example the ‘Public statement on the international investment regime’ of 31 August 
2010, signed by 48 academics (at http://www.osgoode.yorku.ca/public_statement/).  
7 It is precisely the less-than-satisfactory regulatory environment to constitute one of the 
characteristics of many host states: it seems perverse to hold them hostage to externally 
imposed governance standards focussed on the protections guaranteed to investors and 
investments, as a sort of ‘canaries in the coalmine’ test of what constitute a ‘reasonably 
well-behaved regulatory state’ (see Montt, S., State Liability in Investment Treaty 
Arbitration, Oxford and Portland, Hart, 2009: 21) and at the same time, dangle above 
their heads the threat of international arbitration if regulation ‘goes too far’ (in the 
words of Justice Holmes; this statement will be discussed in detail in Chapter 3). 
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one exclusively man-made, one arguably on its own terms (but our 
representation of what environment means just as man-made as the first 
one). The investment community tends to ‘naturalise’ investment, to 
present it as an unavoidable reality with which we have to come to terms 
(like its cognate, the ‘market’). The environmental community tends to 
‘humanise’ the environment, to lead us to believe that there is a lot we 
can do to change it, tame it, ameliorate it. We wish to avoid the pitfalls of 
such stark distinctions and try to take as pragmatic an approach as 
possible.  
 
The third exclusion, the third thing this thesis is not, constitutes also a 
choice of field: this thesis is not about environmental law; after excluding 
policies, and excluding legal reform, we also wish to exclude non-
investment law. This thesis analyses how the investment legal 
community deals with environmental legal obligations. And here lies our 
only, modest, policy argument: that whatever position one takes on the 
necessity of incorporating environmental obligations in the investment 
framework, the possibility to do so is already present in the investment 
law system.  
 
After the exclusions, the inclusions: what is this thesis about then? As we 
have just said at the closing of the previous paragraph, this is a thesis 
about how investment law deals with environmental legal obligations. 
Even so circumscribed, the field of investigation is rich with possibilities. 
Investment law specificity, both in relation to its substantive content and 
its procedural characteristics, makes for an ideal laboratory in which to 
observe how discrete sub-systems of law interact. The specificity of 
investment law is borne out of its historical development and its political 
role. Its current structure developed in the last fifty years, as foreign 
investment became not only a way for companies to profit, but a 
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substitute for state intervention in development policies8. At first, the 
rules of customary law on the protection of aliens and aliens’ property 
were supplemented and to a degree replaced by bilateral treaty 
commitments that tie host states to an international standard of treatment 
of foreign investors, the main elements of which are uncontroversial: 
protection against uncompensated expropriation, non-discrimination and 
international standing against states for breaches of protected treaty 
rights9. Then came the shift to ‘sustainable development policies’10 and 
 
8 See Sornarajah, M., The International Law on Foreign Investment, 2nd ed., Cambridge, 
CUP, 2004: Introduction. As an example of the above-mentioned ‘synergy’, this is how 
the Biwater Tribunal summed up the facts leading to the dispute it was tasked to 
arbitrate: ‘In 2003, the Republic was awarded World Bank, African Development Bank 
and European Investment Bank funding in the amount of USD 140,000,000 for the 
purpose of commissioning a comprehensive program of repairs and upgrades to, and the 
expansion of, the Dar es Salaam Water and Sewerage Infrastructure: the Dar es Salaam 
Water Supply and Sanitation Project (the “Project”). As a condition of the funding, 
[italics added] the Republic was obliged to appoint a private operator to manage and 
operate the water and sewerage system, and carry out some of the works associated with 
the Project.’ Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Limited v. United Republic of Tanzania (ICSID 
Case No. ARB/05/22), Award, 24 July 2008, § 3.    
9 This last element was not present in the older BITs, such as the Germany-Pakistan BIT 
of 1959, the first of the investment protection treaties. Wälde noted that ‘[t]he first 
treaty with a direct investor-State arbitration right has as yet not been identified, but the 
UK BITs of the late 1970s seem to have included the mechanism already, and it was 
accepted subsequently in the seminal AAPL v Sri-Lanka case’. (in ‘Interpreting 
investment treaties: experiences and examples’, Binder et al., 2009: 724 at 729 footnote 
15). Of course, like in a successful chemical reaction, it was the combination of 
international investment agreements (IIAs), ICSID Convention (1965) and New York 
Convention (on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, of 1958) 
to create the conditions for investment arbitrations as we know them today.  
10 While sustainable development principles are not binding  per se, criteria on 
sustainable development are applied by institutions such as the World Bank and its 
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) when funds are released. For 
example, MIGA requires the environmental assessment of proposed projects if 
insurance coverage is to be provided (MIGA Environmental Assessment Policy, Annex 
B of MIGA’s Operational Regulation, at 
http://www.miga.org/policies/index_sv.cfm?stid=1683).  
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states’ renewed anxieties about the reach of investment treaties in areas 
traditionally reserved to state regulatory powers. This thesis analyses the 
ways in which these two opposite forces are brought to bear on 
investment law and investment arbitration, and how investment law 
reacts to them.  
 
The substantive content of investment law, which will be considered in 
more detail in Chapter 3, is in itself a hybrid system of rules, which 
combines elements of customary international law developed for the 
protection of aliens and their property, fundamental rights concerning 
treatment standards which are mirrored in human rights law, public law, 
connected to the presence of the state as one of the parties, and domestic 
property law rules.  
 
The procedural framework of investment arbitration has been universally 
recognised as a sui generis system allowing standing to natural or legal 
persons vis-à-vis host states in a commercial law-inspired setting, and 
guaranteeing compensatory damages for investors successful in their 
claim, enforceable internationally thanks to the widespread acceptance of 
the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Arbitral Awards11.  
 
Two tensions are recognisable in the investment law system itself and in 
its interaction with environmental law: the first one between reciprocity 
and subordination, the second one between symmetry and fragmentation. 
In an influential article Mario Liverani uncovered the hidden message of 
subordination and vassalage contained in an apparently reciprocal treaty 
drafted in Anatolia in the second millennium B.C.12. Investment treaties 
 
11 For the text of the convention, which has been ratified by 145 countries,  see 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/NYConvention.html. 
12 Liverani, M., ‘Storiografia politica hittita – I. Šunaššura, ovvero: della reciprocità’, 12 
Oriens Antiquus (1973): 267. [Hittite political historiography – I. Shunashura, or on 
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are formally reciprocal instruments in which the Parties promise to 
accord each others’ investors a high standard of protection; yet normally, 
the flow of investors is one-directional. Investment law formally situates 
itself within general international law; yet it is often said that investment 
tribunals subordinate any other international commitment to the 
investment protection commitments of the treaty under which they are 
established.  
 
The second tension seems counterintuitive: the correct couplings would 
seem to be symmetry/asymmetry and unity/fragmentation. Human desire 
for symmetry is as primordial as the desire for unity13. Yet no system 
works without the insertion of the capability to asymmetricise itself and 
therefore operate choices, and no reality is un-fragmented. We will see in 
the following chapter the impact the discourse on fragmentation has had 
on investment law; in this context we wish to point out that a lot of 
misunderstandings and misconceptions might be born from reading this 
tension as one between unity and fragmentation. It is instead the way in 
which a fragmented (or differentiated) legal reality interacts with the 
innate need of any (legal) system to asymmetricise itself that results in 
the tensions, or conflicts, that the international legal community seems to 
be seized by.  
 
The impression could be given that these tensions are distinguished by 
their nature: the first could be more correctly described as a legal tension, 
the second as a political one, and this is correct at one level of 
understanding, which will suffice for the purposes of this thesis. This is 
being said without prejudicing the choice of using either tension to 
 
reciprocity]. English translation in Liverani, M., Myth and Politics in Ancient Near 
Eastern Historiography, London, Equinox, 2004.  
13 On the topic the essential reading is Weyl, H., Symmetry, Princeton, Princeton 
University Press, 1952.  My thanks to Joseph Tanega for leading me to the discovery of 
this book.  
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analyse the problems raised by this thesis, even if we restrict ourselves to 
legal problems and legal solutions.  
 
 
1.2 Methodology 
 
The choice of topic (and accompanying exclusions) dictates partially the 
choice of methodology: a pragmatic approach is adopted throughout this 
work. We are interested in ascertaining how the law of international 
investment works, and what works within the law of international 
investment. In practice, this means that the stress will be on the 
‘legislative moment’ and the ‘judicial moment’, with investment 
arbitration chosen as the privileged locus in which investment tribunals 
are asked to interpret investment instruments.  
 
There are political reasons why this is the case, summarised briefly here, 
in order to better situate the topic in its regulatory environment. The 
starting assumption in the international community is that ‘investment is 
good’ and consequently, the adoption of international instruments for the 
protection of investment is necessarily a good thing as well. This 
assumption is derived from classical investment law theory, which 
espouses a view of investment as ‘wholly beneficial for the host 
economy’14, which has been adopted by all the major international 
organisations, such as the World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), and finds its expression at the policy level in the 
‘Washington Consensus’ requirement for the liberalisation of foreign 
direct investment15, and at the legal level, in the language adopted in 
 
14 Sornarajah,, 2004: 57. A very recent expression of this position in Schill, S., Schill, 
S., The Multilateralization of International Investment Law, Cambridge, CUP, 2009: 
Chapter 1.  
15 This term refers to the set of policies adopted by the World Bank and the IMF in 
concert with the United States government in the 1990s, the high water mark of neo-
liberal economic policies. The shifting balance of economic power, from West to East, 
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investment treaties preambles and substantive clauses16. The 
‘dependency theory’, on the other hand, has questioned the efficacy of 
investment in promoting economic development, stressing that17: 
‘...rather than promote development, foreign investment keeps 
developing countries in a state of permanent dependence on the central 
economies of developed states’. 
 
Recent theoretical and practical developments18, trying to find a middle 
ground between the critical approach of the dependency theory and the 
hegemonic weight of the Washington consensus, are indicative of the 
tendency to strive for a balance between competing interests, of which 
the balancing between investment protection and environmental 
regulation is probably the most conspicuous example. From a 
methodological perspective, this work will not follow either the 
dependency theory nor the classical investment theory. One stated reason 
is that this thesis intends to focus on the legal aspects of inter-systemic 
conflicts, not on the policy-making and especially not on the policy 
discussions.  
 
Having overcome the policy choice, this thesis will also avoid taking an 
exclusionary position on the universalistic/particularistic debate (to 
borrow the words of Bruno Simma, ‘whether international law is 
conceived as a unified legal order or as the sum total of loosely 
interrelated subsystems’19). It is submitted here that framing the debate in 
these terms results from the misconception, at least the proposal of a 
 
has not changed the content of the policies, as much as the winners and losers of the 
processes they set into motion. 
16 Some examples of these will be provided in the following chapters.  
17 See for example Sornarajah, 2004: 58. 
18 As this approach is more relevant to the topic of the thesis, references to work 
conducted in this direction will be present throughout this work.  
19 Simma, B. and Pulkowski, D., ‘Of planets and the universe: self-contained regimes in 
international law’, 17 EJIL (2006): 495.  
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misconception, on the nature of the tension, which is not between law as 
a unified (which is another way of saying hierarchical) or fragmented 
system, but between a state of unresolved fragmentation and a state of 
accomplished harmonisation: it is not a return to unity as much as an 
attempt at symmetry (not necessarily a value-driven one20). One cannot 
fail to notice that, in order to bring the argument to its logical conclusion, 
especially if ‘values’ are eschewed, one would have to argue for the 
‘explosion’ of the very idea of investment law. In other words, to the 
extent that the sort of protections accorded by investment law to 
investors can be guaranteed by application of human rights law (due 
process, access to justice and other standards of treatment) and to 
investments by application of commercial law, company law, business 
law, contract law, administrative law (as almost all these fields of law 
have undergone a process of internationalisation and globalisation), the 
need of ‘investment law’ as such is made redundant. But this would be 
taking the argument too far for the sake of the argument. We are not so 
naïve as to believe investment law is mainly about the content of the law 
in itself. It is (mostly) about the arena of contestation, the protections 
offered by the dispute settlement provisions, by the setting, not the words 
(or how the setting determines the words). To the extent that we accept 
this as the legitimate place of contestation, we have already conceded the 
argument: we have to talk about the environment as the ‘intruder’, the 
 
20 On the political contestations taking place in similarly occurring conflicts, see Lang, 
A., ‘Reflecting on “linkage”: cognitive and institutional change in the international trade 
regime’, 70 MLR (2007): 523. The ‘trade and…’ has turned out to be a very active 
forum of debate and criticism; however much this criticism is reconfigured in order to 
make substantive change of the trade regime more difficult (which is Lang’s argument), 
it arguably constitutes a step further compared to the current situation of the investment 
regime, which has hardly being challenged in a similar fashion (where are the 
‘investment and…’ linkages?). The argument will rest on the value one attributes to 
discursive practices, to the extent that rather than as linkages or challenges, the whole 
project can be seen as one of saturation and colonisation (where trade – or investment – 
becomes the dominant element of the linkage and colonises the field with which is put 
in [apparent] conflict).  
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‘outsider’ in the world of the investment. But we accept this and we take 
it to task. In short, if the approach of this thesis could be summarised it 
would be as something resembling ‘pragmatic normative coherence’ 
within the framework as given. 
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Chapter 2: The background  
 
 
The national members of this new international elite, a 
noblesse de robe, by exercising their talents in the major 
trans-national entities, humanitarian organizations, or even 
great legal multinationals, help to bring juridical forms to 
a higher level of universalization in and by a confrontation 
of different and at times opposed visions. Always at play 
in this confrontation, both as a weapon and as stakes, is 
the law (whether the rights of business, the rights of man, 
or the rights of businessmen) – that is, piously hypocritical 
reference to the universal21. 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
For an area of law perceived as secretive and self-contained, investment 
law is not immune from flare-ups of public attention and notoriety. Two 
such moments occurred in the last fifteen years. The first one was in the 
mid-1990s, at the time when the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) launched the negotiations on the 
Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI)22; the following angry 
debates and criticisms, and the outcries from the environmental NGOs, 
effectively contributed to killing the project23. The second episode took 
place ten years later, when the multinational Bechtel was forced to 
 
21 From Pierre Bourdieu’s Introduction to Dezalay, Y. and Garth, B. G., Dealing in 
Virtue: International Commercial Arbitration and the Construction of a Transnational 
Legal Order, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1996 (at viii). 
22 OECD, The Multilateral Agreement on Investment – Draft Consolidated Text, 22 
April 1998; at http://www1.oecd.org/daf/mai/pdf/ng/ng987r1e.pdf.  
23 On the effect of environmental NGOs on the negotiations, see Ward, H. and Brack, 
D., (eds.), International Trade and the Environment, London, Royal Institute of 
International Affairs, 2000. On the failure of the negotiations, see also Kamminga, M. 
T. and Zia Zarifi, S. (eds.), Liability of Multinational Corporations under International 
Law, The Hague, Kluwer Law International (2000): 6. In any case, most of the 
provisions of the MAI have found their way into regional and bilateral treaties. 
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withdraw from arbitration against Bolivia in the Aguas del Tunari case24; 
a negative campaign mounted against Bechtel’s chief executive by 
environmental NGOs was said to have been one of the reasons for the 
corporate retreat. The presence of the investor in the country had been 
accompanied by widespread protests from the local population, which 
provoked the reaction of the police forces and resulted in one death.  
 
Both these episodes concern the relationship of investment law with 
environmental law and public interests issues in general. The first 
episode represents more specifically a legal problem (how legal sub-
systems interact), the second a political one (how does law accommodate 
the public interest and political concerns) or a constitutional one (either 
as a conflict of fundamental rights and interests or of competences and 
powers, namely the legislative and the (quasi) judicial powers). The 
interaction of these two distinct phenomena (normative and political-
constitutional conflicts) is hidden from view by the more immediately 
apparent characteristics of investment law which were brought to the fore 
in the above-mentioned examples, procedural closure and substantive 
isolationism (or structural bias). To the extent that these are allowed to 
dictate the outcome of investment arbitrations, the investment regime 
effectively externalises the conflict between investment and environment, 
to the obvious detriment, at the policy level, to the efficacy of the host 
state’s environmental policies, and at the legal level, to the normative 
 
24 Aguas del Tunari S.A. v. Republic of Bolivia (ICSID Case No. ARB/02/3). The 
dispute regarded the privatisation of water and sewage provision in the city of 
Cochabamba. The tribunal only delivered a decision on the respondent’s objection to 
jurisdiction; the dispute never reached the merits stage because of an international 
campaign against the investor, Bechtel Corporation, which decided to withdraw the 
claim (for a history of the case, see Schneiderman, D., ‘Investment rules, the 
immobilized state, and the difficulties of counter-hegemonic resistance’, Paper 
presented at the annual meeting of The Law and Society Association, TBA, Berlin, 
Germany, 25 July 2007). Of course it could equally be argued that the company just cut 
its losses by not pursuing the arbitration, so if it is a victory of the environmental 
community, it is a shallow one indeed. 
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coherence of the international legal system. Additionally, by conferring 
to arbitrators the power to select which rights to uphold (if one 
conceptualises investment arbitrations as decisional loci of a quasi-
constitutional nature insofar as they assign a priority of applicability to 
conflicting fundamental rights), investment law provides a solution to 
these constitutional dilemmas which risks leaving all parties unsatisfied: 
the investors unhappy with the normative vagueness of the regime, which 
militates against clarity and consistency of awards; the state weary of the 
‘anti-regulatory creep’ of investment law; and finally, the public, as the 
default presence/absence of investment law, misrepresented, 
unrecognised and unheard.   
 
The first problem is a problem of normative dissonance. An analysis 
focussed on the law centres both on the tools to avoid normative conflicts 
(inter-state negotiations, careful treaty drafting and alternative dispute 
settlement) and the tools to manage them in investor-state arbitrations 
(interpretation and conflict resolution). Inevitably, a considerable 
delegation of decisional power has to be conferred to the arbitrators in 
order to deal with these conflicts. Recently, discussions on balancing and 
proportionality approaches to normative, ‘investment and…’ conflicts 
have been developing in the investment community25. While these 
discussions constitute a welcome development in contrast to the default 
isolationism of the investment regime, the consequence of arbitration 
tribunals interpreting non-investment obligations into investment treaties, 
or performing a proportionality analysis, is the discretionary power 
conferred upon them, which is intrinsic to any exercise of 
proportionality. Regardless of the drawbacks, it has been proposed that 
‘…proportionality analysis can constitute a gateway for non-investment 
law principles to enter into the argumentative framework of investment 
treaty arbitration and thereby help to overcome the fragmentation of 
 
25 Most interestingly, the comparative approach advocated in Schill, S. (ed.), 
International Investment Law and Comparative Public Law, Oxford, OUP, 2010. 
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international law into functional and special-interest-related sub-
systems’26. Arguably, the overlap between normative dissonance, to be 
solved by application of a proportionality analysis, and fragmentation, 
for which interpretation and systemic integration (by reference to treaty 
law as codified by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties) are 
proposed as solutions, is not automatic. Be that as it may, inevitably, 
when dealing with the issue of normative conflict in international law, 
the focus turns to the supposed state of ‘fragmentation’ of the 
international legal system.   
 
 
2.2 The fragmentation of international law 
  
In recent years an intense debate has developed on the phenomenon of 
‘fragmentation’ of international law. Here is how the International Law 
Commission introduced the issue in its Report on the subject27: 
  
One of the features of late international modernity has been what 
sociologists have called “functional differentiation”, the increasing 
specialization of parts of society and the related autonomization of those 
parts... The fragmentation of the international social word has attained 
legal significance especially as it has been accompanied by the 
emergence of specialized and (relatively) autonomous rules or rules-
complexes, legal institutions and spheres of legal practice....The result is 
conflicts between rules or rules-systems, deviating institutional practices 
and, possibly, the loss of an overall perspective on the law. 
 
The very use of the term fragmentation implies a previous unity and 
 
26 Schill, 2010: 104. 
27 International Law Commission Study Group, Fragmentation of International Law: 
Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, 
Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission – Finalized by Martti 
Koskenniemi, 13 April 2006, UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.682: 11; at 
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/LTD/G06/610/77/PDF/G0661077.pdf?OpenElem
et. 
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integrity of the international legal system28. Arguably, it was the limited 
number of actors and the relative uniformity of interests (where similar 
interests were shared by actors in competition) to guarantee this unity 
under the overarching principle of sovereignty. The functional 
differentiation of modern international law, accompanied by its non-
hierarchical nature29, the emergence of non-state global legal sub-
systems30 and the multiplication of adjudicating bodies and institutional 
settings have come to be defined as a state of fragmentation and 
 
28 Additionally, the language is indicative of an evaluative judgment: in the coupling of 
unity/fragmentation, it is evident that the attribution of positive/negative is performed. 
The myth of a previous unity is obviously that, just a myth, useful to argue for a 
necessity of return to it and against fragmentation (see also Dünkelsbühler, 
U.,‘Rahmen-Gesetze und Parergon-Paradox: Eine Übersetzungsaufgabe’, in H.U. 
Gumbrecht and K.L. Pfeiffer (eds.) Paradoxien, Dissonanzen, Zusammenbrüche: 
Situationen offener Epistemologie. Frankfurt, Suhrkamp, 1991, 212: ‘It is only the 
assumption of a (deficiency) as a loss which makes it possible that an original 
perfection – as unity – can be presupposed, which can be replaced later on. Thus the 
(metaphysical logic of the) “original” identity can be perfectly reconstituted.’ 
Commenting (somewhat sarcastically) on differentiation, Niklas Luhmann said: ‘It is 
dubious whether the creation of judicial hierarchies can ever overcome a form of legal 
fragmentation that derives from structural social contradictions. Reversal or return to a 
coordinating form of international law, however, and a resurrection of old myths is 
equally foreclosed: The sin of differentiation can never be undone. Paradise is lost.’ 
(Luhmann, N., Die Wirtschaft der Gesellschaft, Frankfurt, 1994 at 344, translated in 
Fischer-Lescano and Teubner, 2004: 1007).   
29 Fischer-Lescano and Teubner, 2004: 1017. See also Luhmann, N., ‘Globalization or 
world society? How to conceive of modern society’, 7 International Review of 
Sociology (1997): 67; but see Koskenniemi, M., and Leino, P., ‘Fragmentation of 
international law? Post-modern anxieties’, 15 Leiden Journal of International Law 
(2002): 553, for a non nostalgic view of the lost unity of international law. 
30 For a review of the issue of legal pluralism within regimes, and especially the 
environmental regime (which in itself is divided, at least at a policy level, in several, 
often conflicting currents, such as ‘deep ecology’, ‘eco-socialism’ etc.), see Perez, O., 
Ecological Sensitivities and Legal Pluralism: Rethinking the Trade and Environment 
Conflict, Oxford and Portland, Hart Publishing, 2004: 12 ff.; Teubner, G., ‘The two 
faces of Janus: rethinking legal pluralism’, 13 Cardozo Law Review (1992): 1419, at 
1459. 
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conceptualised as a problem. What interests us is the way fragmentation 
is perceived as interfering with international law universal applicability 
and coherence31, as concrete examples of how law-making at the 
international level (the proliferation of treaties) and law-enforcing at the 
international level (the proliferation of courts and tribunals) can suffer 
from the perceived dis-unity of international law32.  
 
While much of the debate on fragmentation has concentrated on the 
tension between a general, or universalistic, conception of international 
law and the functionalist, or subject-specific, regimes that have been 
proliferating recently33, this thesis engages more closely with the tension 
between functionalist regimes. It is neither a problem of values (the tired 
debate on universalism versus relativism), nor necessarily of actors34, but 
of tools. System-specific tools, such as ius cogens, erga omnes 
obligations35, Article 103 of the United Nations Charter, seem of little 
 
31 See Simma, B., ‘Universality of international law from a practitioner’s perspective’, 
20 EJIL (2009): 265.  
32 For a positive assessment of institutional fragmentation through the substantive prism 
of regulatory takings jurisprudence, see Ratner, S., ‘Regulatory takings in institutional 
context: beyond the fear of fragmented international law’, 102 AJIL (2008): 475. 
33 As in the whole debate on the nature of lex specialis, for which see Chapter 5.  
34 In the sense that it does not necessarily follow that, because international law actors 
are sovereign equal states, a hierarchy of rules is impossible; see on the opposite, 
Combacau, J., ‘Le droit international: bric-à-brac ou système?’ 31 Archives de 
philosophie du droit (1986): 88. 
35 Not a hierarchical tool as such, rather a categorization tool to attribute the power to 
invoke responsibility for a breach, see Article 42 of the ILC Draft Articles on 
esponsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts. For the concept of obligations 
erga omnes, see the dictum of the ICJ in Case concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light 
and Power Co Ltd (New Application: 1962) (Belgium v Spain) (Second Phase) [1970] 
ICJ Rep 3; see also Tams, C.,  Enforcing Obligations Erga Omnes in International Law, 
Cambridge, CUP 2005. On the role of erga omnes obligations in the resolution of 
normative conflicts, see Simma, B., and Kill, T., ‘Harmonizing investment protection 
and international human rights: first steps towards a methodology’, Binder, C. et al., 
International Investment Law for the 21st Century, Oxford, OUP, 2009: 678. 
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use in the context of international investment law and have been of little 
use in international law in general. On the other hand, lex specialis and 
systemic integration by way of interpretation have been proposed as 
possible solutions endogenous to the field of investment law36. 
Regardless of the position one takes on the impact of the fragmentation 
discourse for international law in general and for investment law 
specifically, it is beyond doubt that the success of the discourse in itself, 
and the way it has been used as an explanation and a short-hand for 
certain recurring phenomena (inconsistency of awards and judgments, 
proliferation of dispute settlement fora, multiplication of instruments), 
demands that due account is given to the way in which it can employed 
as a key to understanding how international law is developing.   
 
 
2.3 The nature of investment law 
  
The fragmentation of the international law system and the distinctiveness 
of the investment regime are a matter of perspective37. However, 
undoubtedly the investment regime presents peculiarities and unique 
characteristics. The first one relates to investment law’s subject matter: it 
is undisputed that investment law concerns the protection of foreign 
investment; however, there is no agreement either on the extent of the 
protection to be granted, or on what ‘foreign’, ‘investment’ or ‘investor’ 
 
36 On the relevance of ‘institutional fragmentation’ and the role of foreign investors in 
determining the legal outcome of the disputes, see van Aaken, Anne, Fragmentation of 
international law: the case of international investment protection, University of St. 
Gallen Law School, Law and Economics Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 
2008-1: 4.  On endogenous solutions, or what Schill refers to as ‘system-internal 
adaptation’, see Schill, S., ‘International investment law and comparative public law – 
an introduction’, in Schill, 2010: 7 ff. On the dangers of interpretation, see our 
comments at the end of Section 3.4 and in Chapter 8. 
37 Equally, the decision of what comes first (if the differentiation or the fragmentation) 
is a matter of ultimately political choices. 
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mean, what do we mean when we say that an investor is ‘foreign’, what 
kind of economic activity qualifies as an ‘investment’ and so on38.  
 
Closely related to the subject matter is the substantive content of 
investment law and its sources. Article 38 of the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice lists the sources of law applicable to 
international disputes and is well known, so there is no need to analyse it 
further here39. However, in international investment disputes the 
 
38 Issues of definition are often discussed at the jurisdictional stage in investment 
arbitrations; see for example Salini Costruttori S.p.A. and Italstrade S.p.A. v. Kingdom 
of Morocco (ICSID Case No. ARB/00/4), Decision on Jurisdiction, 23 July 2001; 
Saipem S.p.A. v. People’s Republic of Bangladesh (ICSID Case No. ARB/05/7), 
Decision, 21 March 2007; Inceysa Vallisoletana S.L v. Republic of El Salvador (ICSID 
Case No. ARB/03/26), Award, 2 August 2006; Tokios Tokéles v. Ukraine (ICSID Case 
No. ARB/02/18), Decision on Jurisdiction, 29 April 2004; Bayindir Insaat Turizm 
Ticaret Ve Sanayi A.Ş. v Islamic Republic of Pakistan (ICSID Case No. ARB/03/29), 
Decision on Jurisdiction, 14 November 2005; FEDAX v. Venezuela (ICSID Case 
ARB/96/3(1), Decision on Jurisdiction, 11 July 1997; Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd. v. 
United Republic of Tanzania (ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22), Award, 24 July 2008; 
Malaysian Historical Salvors, SDN, BHD v. Malaysia (ICSID Case No. ARB/05/10), 
Award, 17 May, 2007; Malaysian Historical Salvors, SDN, BHD v. Malaysia (ICSID 
Case No. ARB/05/10), Decision on the Application for Annulment, 16 April 2009; 
Consortium Groupement L.E.S.I.-DIPENTA v. People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria 
(ICSID Case No.ARB/03/08), Award, 10 January 2005; L.E.S.I. S.p.A. and ASTALDI 
S.p.A v. People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria (ICSID Case No. ARB/05/3), Award, 
12 July 2006; Joy Mining Machinery Limited v. Arab Republic of Egypt (ICSID Case 
No. ARB/03/11), Decision on Jurisdiction, 6 August 2004; Jan de Nul N.V. and 
Dredging International N.V. v. Arab Republic of Egypt (ICSID Case No. ARB/04/13), 
Decision on Jurisdiction, 16 June 2006; Helnan International Hotels A/S v. Arab 
Republic of Egypt (ICSID Case No. ARB/05/19), Decision on Jurisdiction, 17 October 
2006; Československa obchodní banka, a.s. v. Slovak Republic (ICSID Case No. 
ARB/97/4), Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction, 24 May 1999; M.C.I. Power Group, 
L.C. and New Turbine, Inc. v. Republic of Ecuador (ICSID Case No. ARB/03/6), 
Award, 31 July 2007; Pantechniki S.A. Contractors & Engineers v. Republic of Albania 
 (ICSID Case No. ARB/07/21), Award, 30 July 2009. 
39 Statute of the International Court of Justice, annexed to the Charter of the United 
Nations, at http://www.un-documents.net/icj-s.htm.  
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traditional sources of public international law, custom, treaty and general 
principles, representing the ‘public side of investment law’ have to be 
supplemented by the law of the contract where necessary40 and the 
municipal law of the host country where applicable, especially if a claim 
of expropriation is raised41. Some scholars and (to a lesser extent) 
tribunals have also argued for the applicability of trans-national 
commercial norms, so called rules of lex mercatoria42. Additionally, 
disputes are normally governed by procedural rules of international 
commercial arbitration43. The complexity of the rules regarding the 
applicable law in investment arbitrations might bring to mind similar 
problems relating to conflict of laws rules44; however, while the task of 
private international law is to select the law applicable in the 
characterisation of a dispute, the outcome of a similar exercise in an 
investment case is more cumulative, to the extent that, for example, 
 
40 For example, if an incidental question relating to a breach of treaty is raised by an 
investor in a contractual dispute in front of an investment tribunal (where this is 
possible) and the state presents as a defence an environmental regulation, if the tribunal 
establishes that the defence is not valid, the regulation will be null but the remedies will 
be decided according to the governing law of contract, even if it is a tribunal established 
by treaty and the incidental question related to the breach of a treaty-protected right (see 
Douglas, Z., The International Law of Investment Claims, Cambridge, CUP, 2009: 50).   
41 Where the relevant provisions of property law will be applied in order to assess if 
there was a property capable of being expropriated; see for example Douglas, 2009: 51 
ff. See also Section 3.3.1.  
42 On lex mercatoria, see Galgano, F., ‘The new lex mercatoria’ 2 Annual Survey of 
International and Comparative Law (1995): 102; Stone Sweet, A., ‘The new lex 
mercatoria and transnational governance’, 13 Journal of European Public Policy 
(2006): 627; for a more critical approach, Teubner, G.  ‘Global Bukowina: legal 
pluralism in world society’, in Teubner, G. (ed.), Global Law without a State, 
Brookfield, Dartmouth, 1997: 3; G. Teubner, ‘Breaking frames: economic globalization 
and the emergence of lex mercatoria’, 5 European Journal of Social Theory (2002): 
199.  
43 For those disputes that do not take place within the institutional setting provided by 
the International Centre for the Resolution of Investment Disputes (ICSID) for which 
the rules set up in the ICSID Convention apply. 
44 The parallel is drawn amongst others by Douglas, 2009: 45 ff. 
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normally customary law remains in the background even if treaty rules 
apply as lex specialis45. 
 
Finally, while bilateral investment treaties (the most common source of 
investment law) constitute a web of interconnected reciprocal inter-state 
obligations46, the investor possesses limited international personality and 
is therefore endowed with locus standi for the purpose of initiating an 
investment arbitration47. The pyramidal structure put in place by 
international investment law for dispute settlement48, including choice of 
law and of arbitration clauses in contracts, arbitration clauses in national 
 
45 On the different ways in which custom and treaty obligations interact, with reference 
to investment rules, see Gazzini, T., ‘The role of customary international law in the field 
of foreign investment,’ 8 JWI&T (2007): 712; for the approach of investment tribunals, 
see for example ADC and ADC & ADMC v Hungary (ICSID Case No. /ARB/03/16), 
Award, 2 October 2006, § 481: ‘There is general authority for the view that a BIT can 
be considered as a lex specialis whose provisions will prevail over rules of customary 
international law (see, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. Iran v. Iran, 21 Iran-U.S.C.T.R. at 
121); CME Czech Republic B.V. (The Netherlands) v. The Czech Republic 
(UNCITRAL), Final Award, 14 March 2003, § 497-8 (on the standard of 
compensation); a controversial decision in this respect is Sempra Energy International 
v. Argentine Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16), Award, 28 September 2007, 
where the Tribunal  incorrectly, according to the Annulment Committee, allowed the 
customary law criteria on necessity, as codified in Article 25 of the ILC Draft Articles 
on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, to trump the substantive 
provisions of the applicable BIT; see also Decision on Annulment of 29 June 2010 and 
A. Gourgourinis, ‘Lex Specialis in WTO and investment protection law’, Society of 
International Economic Law Second Biennal Global Conference, Barcelona 2010, 
Online Proceedings Working Paper No. 2010/37: 30. 
46 And are to a lesser extent accompanied by regional (such as the NAFTA) and sectoral 
(the Energy Charter Treaty) instruments presenting similar characteristics. 
47 Most BITs contain an open offer to arbitrate which is concluded when the investor 
initiates a dispute by submitting a notice or intention to arbitrate; similar clauses can be 
contained in national investment codes or in the contract between the host state and the 
investor.  
48 See van Harten, G., Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public Law, Oxford, OUP, 
2007: 24 ff. 
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investment codes, arbitration agreements within bilateral or multilateral 
treaties, and finally arbitration rules in the International Centre for the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) Convention49 and the United 
Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) 
Convention50, allows foreign investors to dispense with the requirement 
of the exhaustion of domestic remedies51 and the privity rule52. Once 
consent for arbitration is given, the home state of the investor’s right to 
exert diplomatic protection is normally forgone unless the host state 
refuses to abide by the award53.  
 
49 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals 
of Other States, available at 
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/ICSID/DocumentsMain.jsp. See also Schreuer, C., 
The ICSID Convention: A Commentary, Cambridge, CUP, 2001.  
50 United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards; 330 UNTS 3; text available at 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/NYConvention.html.  
51 Article 26 of the ICSID Convention. 
52 See Asian Agricultural Products Limited v. Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri 
Lanka (ICSID Case No. ARB/87/3), Award 27 June 1990, § 2. See Paulsson, J., 
‘Arbitration without privity’, 10(2) ICSID Review (1995): 232. The concept is not 
universally accepted: see for example Sornarajah, M., The Settlement of Foreign 
Investment Disputes, The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 2000: 308, footnote 6, or 
Orrego Vicuña, F., International Dispute Settlement in an Evolving Global Society, 
Cambridge, CUP, 2004: 66: ‘Although this situation has occasionally been considered 
as an example of arbitration without privity, it is in fact a form of consent given at 
different points in time.’ (The consent of the investor is perfected only at the moment in 
which he submits a dispute). See also Mann, F.M., ‘British treaties for the promotion 
and protection of investments’, in Mann, F.M., Further Studies in International Law, 
Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1990: 244. However, the fact remains that the consent of the 
host state can be construed from an offer contained in a bilateral treaty or domestic 
legislation, that is, in absence of privity with the investor who will start a dispute based 
on that open offer. Privity, which is dispensed with by BITs, allowing for a claim to be 
brought for treaty violation without a contract breach, re-enters by the window, as most 
claims start from a contract breach and the first determination is if the contract breach 
constitutes a violation of the treaty. 
53 Article 27 of the ICSID Convention. 
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The structural characteristics outlined above and the problems resulting 
from them have given rise to debates on a ‘legitimacy crisis’ of 
investment law, which are reflected in the following comment made by 
Gus van Harten54: 
 
 [Investment treaty arbitration] is a method of public law 
adjudication, meaning that it is used to resolve regulatory disputes 
between private parties or between states. [...] the system’s unique use of 
private arbitration in the regulatory sphere conflicts with cherished 
principles of judicial accountability and independence in democratic 
societies; in effect, it taints the integrity of the legal system by 
contracting out the judicial function in public law. 
 
Investment law is often considered to display a significant structural bias 
towards one outcome55, the protection of the investor to the detriment of 
any other competing consideration; more correctly, it can be affirmed 
that many tribunals seem to operate a complete overlap between the 
interests of investors and the public interest56. This is not simplistically 
to state that investors are more likely to win than lose a dispute; rather, to 
affirm that the system is weighed in its substantive content and in its 
interpretative thrust towards the rights and standards of protection 
 
54 van Harten, 2007: 4. See also Atik, J., ‘Repenser NAFTA Chapter 11: A catalogue of 
legitimacy critiques’, 3 Asper Review International Business & Trade Law (2003): 215. 
More recently, see Waibel, M. (ed.), The Backlash against Investment Arbitration, The 
Hague, Kluwer Law International, 2010. 
55 This is a criticism that can be easily moved to any functional regime, and indeed to 
law in general; see for example Koskenniemi, M., From Apology to Utopia, Cambridge, 
CUP, 2006: 606: ‘.... the main political point ... irrespective of indeterminacy, the 
system still de facto prefers some outcomes or distributive choices to other outcome or 
choices... there is a structural bias.’ Simma and Kill refer to: ‘...the tendency towards 
considering international investment law in a vacuum...’ (Simma, B. and Kill, T., 
‘Harmonizing investment protection and international human rights: first steps towards 
a methodology’, in Binder et al., 2009: 679.) 
56 This approach is sometimes explicitly stated by tribunals; see for example, Amco v. 
Indonesia (ICSID Case ARB/81/1), Decision on Jurisdiction, 25 September 1983, 1 
ICSID Reports (1993): 400: ‘To protect investment is to protect the general interest of 
development and of developing countries.’ 
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accorded to investors57: in short, the system displays an investor-centred 
approach58. 
 
The issues of the cross-fertilisation, or conversely of isolationism, of sub-
systems of international law and of the legitimacy of the system, which is 
both procedural (who applies the rules) and substantive (which rules are 
applied) are distinct and require distinct attention and analysis. While the 
tools of systemic integration and interpretation can address problems of 
closure of individual legal regimes and consequent isolationism, they fail 
to account for and address the procedural and substantive legitimacy 
deficit of the regime; to the contrary, as we have previously remarked, 
arguably conferring to arbitrators the power to interpret non-investment 
obligations into the investment regime, and a fortiori to apply the 
principle of proportionality, does nothing to help dispel the perception 
that the systems lacks democratic legitimacy. Luhmann noted that59:  
 
 Formulas of ‘equalizing’, ‘balancing’ or ‘proportionality’ can be 
achieved only arbitrarily. If the law has to resort to such formulas than a 
technically informed arbitrariness is not the worst solution. It is just not a 
specifically legal one.   
 
The advantages of a ‘technically informed arbitrariness’ are appealing to 
a proponent of a pragmatic approach to conflict resolution, and allow for 
 
57 It is especially the ‘interpretative thrust’ that is our concern, if we want to argue, as 
we do, that it is through interpretation that non-investment obligations can be 
incorporated in investment law. The two different approaches, the ‘investor-centred’ 
and the more ‘holistic’ one, will be discussed in Chapter 3 and Chapter 7 respectively. 
On the use of a more holistic approach, the statement of the WTO Panel in United 
States – Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from 
China is to be noted, where the Panel declared that: ‘...the interpretative process under 
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention is a holistic one...’ (At § 8.56, Report of 22 
October 2010, WT/DS379/R). 
58 This is to a certain extent inevitable, as a guarantee of consistency of the investment 
law system. 
59 Luhmann, N., Ecological Communication, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 
1989: 69. 
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a focus on the tools available rather than the policy justifications, easily 
hijacked by competing communities with pretensions of universality and 
embracing the ‘pious hypocritical reference to the universal’ that 
Bourdieu so acutely noted60.  
 
The distinction between substantive isolationism and procedural closure 
can be employed to analyse how the substantive obligations and rights 
provided by investment law are insulated to outside normative 
influences61. Procedural closure (which is still very much evident in 
investment arbitration) can work to reduce substantive openness and 
therefore allow arbitrators to disregard public interest issues. It is not 
argued here that this is the stated reason, or even the underlying rationale, 
for procedural closure, which is based partially on the adoption of the 
commercial arbitration model by investment tribunals and partially on 
reasons of expediency, efficiency and the ‘orderly unfolding of the 
arbitral process …[,] conducive to the maintenance of working relations 
between the Parties’62. However, it is also certainly the case that, once 
the doors are metaphorically as well as literally closed to the outside, 
there is in principle no need to take into account ‘outside’ and ‘outsiders’ 
issues63.  
 
The second aspect of the debate, the ‘constitutional conflict’ between 
fundamental rights, is often presented as one between protection (of 
 
60 In the quote at the opening of this chapter. 
61 We will see in more detail in Chapter 6 how investment law arbitration has 
fundamentally changed its nature from complete closure to relative openness, with 
varying degrees of transparency and publicity allowed by the different institutional 
settings. 
62 Metalclad Corporation v. United Mexican States (ICSID Case ARB(AF)/97/1), 
Procedural Order One (Confidentiality), 27 October 1997, § 10.   
63 The phenomenon might be impossible to prove, as it might take place precisely in 
those disputes that are confidential, and for which therefore we don’t have access to the 
reasoning of the tribunal or the pleadings by the parties, and sometimes even to the 
award rendered. 
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investors) and regulatory powers. On the contrary, the inflow of 
investment is facilitated, not hindered, by the presence of a regulatory 
framework, which includes international investment treaties, national 
investment codes, guarantees by international institutions, insurance 
coverage64 and so on. The extent to which a tension exists concerns the 
objective of the regulation, not the existence of a regulatory framework 
per se65. In analysing this conflict, the default point of view is the one of 
investors, who do not perceive the whole regulatory apparatus set up for 
their protection as over-regulation; a more nuanced and neutral outlook 
would recognise that both investment protection measures and 
environmental measures constitute legitimate exercises of governmental 
policy66. The problem then is to recognise to what extent investment 
tribunals can balance these measures in the context of the dispute, where 
investment treaties normally do not specifically confer to them this 
power67, and how they can do so. 
 
64 Both national insurance programmes, such as the Overseas Private Investment 
Corporation (OPIC) in the United States (at http://www.opic.gov/), or international 
investment guarantees programmes, such as the Multilateral Investment Guarantee 
Agency (MIGA), which is a member of the World Bank Group (at 
http://www.miga.org/).  
65 On the role of states in creating the framework for the protection of investment, see 
Schneidermann, D., ‘Globalisation, governance and investment rules’ in Clarke, J. N. 
and Edwards, G. R. (eds.), Global Governance in the Twenty-First Century, 
Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2004: 67. For the importance of regulation in 
establishing a framework for business expansion and globalisation, see Braithwaite, J. 
and Drahos, P., Global Business Regulation, Cambridge, CUP, 2000, especially 
Chapters 1-7. In general on the role of the state in the development of capitalism and  
market economy, see Polanyi, K., The Great Transformation: the Political and 
Economic Origins of Our Time, Boston, Beacon Press, 1957. 
66 Vaughan Lowe, A., ‘Regulation or expropriation?’, 55 Current Legal Problems 
(2002): 459. 
67 But we will see in Chapter 4 which express means are present in investment treaties 
to incorporate non investment obligations. 
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2.4 Non-investment law approaches  
 
Environmental policies have seemingly become a priority for states. New 
international instruments are been signed all the time68, sometimes with 
legally binding targets, which require states to implement new and ever 
more demanding regulation69. In the developing world this regulation 
might impact foreign investors disproportionately, as they are often 
involved in traditionally highly polluting industries, such as mining and 
oil extraction. The right of states to adopt and enforce environmental 
legislation and their duty to guarantee a certain level of protection to 
foreign investors and their investments are likely to come into conflict, 
for example if the regulation impacts on the profitability or the legal 
status of the investment. If from the vantage point of the investment 
lawyer the problem is the intrusion of environmental obligations in the 
system of protection for the investor and its investment, from the point of 
view of the government lawyer or the legislator, the problem lies in 
dealing with the environmental externalities of investors’ activities.  
 
This thesis does not engage with policy discussions, and this exclusion 
repeats itself once we cross from the investment field to the 
environmental field70. In this section we will consider instead legislative 
 
68 The 2005 UNEP Register of International Treaties and Other Agreements in the Field 
of the Environment lists 272 instruments; register available at 
http://www.unep.org/law/PDF/register_Int_treaties_contents.pdf.  
69 For a good introduction to the topic, see Sands, P., Principles of International 
Environmental Law, 2nd edition, Cambridge, CUP, 2003.   
70 Policy is discussed only to the extent that it crosses into the next category, that of 
‘soft law’. Our exclusion of policy and to a certain extent, of soft law, cuts against the 
grain of most ‘governance talk’, equally adamant about the exclusion of mandatory 
standards (hard law); in its 2004 White Paper on Trade and Investment, Making 
Globalisation a Force for Good, the UK Government proclaimed: ‘We do not believe 
that the WTO should try to impose minimum social standards on investors: trade and 
labour is not [sic] part of the WTO mandate.’ (at 13); text available at  
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.berr.gov.uk/files/file23441.pdf.   
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and judicial means for dealing with environmental problems, both at the 
national and at the international level71. At the domestic level, both 
criminal and civil actions can be used in order to hold investors to 
account for environmentally injurious activities, including, in certain 
countries, civil actions for acts committed abroad or in violation of 
international law. At the international level, courts or arbitration tribunals 
can adjudicate on violations of international environmental law by 
foreign investors.  
 
A lot of quasi-legislative activity takes the form of non-binding, soft law 
instruments. These might include, at the state level, memoranda of 
understanding, global compacts, declarations and resolutions, and at the 
investors’ level, industry standards and codes of conduct, including codes 
on corporate social responsibility (CSR). Given the hybrid nature of soft 
law, half-way between policy and law, its rise to prominence in the field 
of business and its enthusiastic acceptance by governments, the literature 
on the issue is quite vast72 and, to the extent that it rarely enters the world 
of investment arbitration in any significant way, quite irrelevant for the 
purposes of our thesis73.  
 
For the purpose of its efficacy in dealing with environmental negative 
externalities, two main problems are attributable to soft law, lack of 
enforceability and of consistency. Instruments generated through inter-
 
71 See for example the way in which the 1997 Kyoto Protocol to the 1992 UN 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (37 ILM 1998, 22) seeks to harness foreign 
investment to its environmental goals (especially Articles 10 and 11). 
72 See Muchlinski, P., Multinational Enterprises and the Law, Oxford, Blackwell, 1999; 
Muchlinski, P., ‘Corporate Social Responsibility’ in The Oxford Handbook of 
International Investment Law: 637; see also Crane, A.,  McWilliams, A. and Matten, D., 
The Oxford Handbook of Corporate Social Responsibility, Oxford, OUP, 2008.  
73 For a rare mention, thanks to the involvement of NGOs as non-disputing third parties, 
see the use of the UN Millennium Development Goals for assessing the investor’s 
behaviour in the provision of water, Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Limited v. United 
Republic of Tanzania (ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22), Award, 24 July 2008, § 379. 
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state negotiations, such as the Global Compact74 or memoranda of 
understanding75, and those that issue from the world of industry and 
business (codes of conduct, industry standards) share low enforceability 
levels. The level of compliance can vary between low for inter-state 
instruments and higher for industry instruments; however the higher 
compliance results mostly from the fact that the industry issues standards 
at a level it is comfortable with. It is also important to note that the 
relationship between enforceability and compliance is not unproblematic: 
to take an example from the area of human rights law, the recent polemic 
on the memoranda of understanding between the United Kingdom and 
Algeria and Jordan on the detention of foreign nationals convicted of 
terrorism charges can only be understood if one considers these 
instruments to have an effect76; in other words, the problem is not that 
these instruments do not work, but that they do for reasons that have 
nothing to do with their legal force and everything to do with the 
economic or political power that underpins them77.  
 
74 United Nations Global Compact, available at 
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/issues/Environment/index.html.  
75 These are undertaken for many reasons, including environmental co-operation; see for 
example the 2009 Indo-Swedish Memorandum of Understanding on the Environment, 
available at http://www.swedenabroad.com/Page____99265.aspx.  
76 In short, human rights NGOs complained that the non-binding instruments that 
supposedly protected the detainees against torture did not constitute enough protection 
for them; see for example the comments by Liberty and by Justice, two respected UK-
based NGOs, at http://www.liberty-human-rights.org.uk/issues/1-torture/12-deportation-
to-torture/index.shtml, and www.justice.org.uk/images/pdfs/uncatsept05.pdf..The 
problem is precisely the opposite, i.e. that they probably did have an effect, and Algeria 
and Jordan were not going to torture prisoners X and Y sent by the UK, while they 
happily tortured all the other ones. Therefore a soft-law instrument created a 
discriminatory regime of protection against torture. Additionally, by imposing these 
memoranda the UK acknowledged that the hard law Convention against Torture, 
ratified by all countries in question, constituted no protection at all.  
77 One could take a ‘whatever works’ attitude to this and not worry excessively about 
the fact that a memorandum accomplishes what a multilateral treaty does not, but it is 
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Industry standards might result in liability problems in contractual 
disputes where the contract contains a stabilisation clause78, especially 
 
argued here that this sends entirely the wrong message about the binding force of 
international law, if one worries about this of course. 
78 On stabilisation clauses, see Article 3 Institute de Droit International, ‘The parties 
may agree that domestic law provisions referred to in the contract shall be considered as 
being those in force at the time of conclusion of the contract.’ The binding force of 
stabilisation clauses is not undisputed, and can be challenged on three grounds: 
principles of international law, such the doctrine of permanent sovereignty over natural 
resources, which could render the clauses invalid and inapplicable; constitutional 
obligations, such as the UK constitutional principles prohibiting a sitting parliament 
from fettering the action of a future parliament, and connected doctrines of ‘executive 
necessity;’ contract law principles such as imprévision, force-majeure, changed 
circumstances, etc. The case law on stabilisation clauses is extensive; some of the 
awards that dealt with them are: Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co. and California Asiatic 
Oil Co. v. Libya (1977), 53 I.L.R. 389; (1978) 17 I.L.M. 1; Kuwait v. American 
Independent Oil Co. (1982), 21 I.L.M. 976; Amoco International Finance Corp. v. 
Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran (1987), Iran-USCTR 189; Libyan American 
Oil Company v. Government of the Libyan Arab Republic (1981), 20 I.L.M. 1; Revere 
Copper & Brass Inc v. Overseas Private Investment Corp, 56 ILR 258 (1978); Waste 
Management Inc. and the United Mexican States (ICSID Case No. ARB/00/3), Award, 
30 April 2004; SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of the Philippines 
(ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6), Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction, 29 
January 2004; SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Islamic Republic of 
Pakistan (ICSID Case No. ARB/01/13), Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to 
Jurisdiction, 6 August 2003; Eureko B.V. v. Poland, Partial Award, 19 August 2005; 
Siemens A.G. v. the Argentine Republic  (ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8), Decision on 
Jurisdiction, 3 August 2003; LG&E Energy Corp. v. the Argentine Republic  (ICSID 
Case No. ARB/02/01), Award, 25 July 2007; Sempra Energy Int’l v. the Argentine 
Republic ( ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16), Award, 28 September 2007; El Paso Energy 
International Company v. the Argentine Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15), 
Decision on Jurisdiction, 27 April 2007; Enron Corp. v. the Argentine Republic (ICSID 
Case No. ARB/01/3), Decision on Jurisdiction, 2 August 2004; Joy Mining Machinery 
Ltd. v. Egypt (ICSID Case No. ARB/03/11), Award, 6 August 2004; CMS Gas 
Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8), Award, 12 May 
2005; Noble Ventures, Inc. v. Romania (ICSID Case No. ARB/01/11), Award, 12 
October 2005; Aguaytia Energy, LLC v. Republic of Peru (ICSID Case No. 
ARB/06/13), Award, 11 December 2008; Duke Energy International Peru Investments 
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concession contracts for oil and gas exploration (and other activities of 
high environmental impact, such as mining). While these standards are 
applicable to the investor as per contractual agreement, liability can be 
problematic, as the standards-issuing agencies do not accept any liability 
for reliance on them by investors79. Therefore, using these standards as 
‘benchmarks’ for international contracts presents risks for the host state, 
as well as potentially for the investor.  
 
Domestic environmental legislation and ratification of international 
environmental instruments are ways in which host states can regulate the 
activity of investors and reduce negative environmental externalities; 
while not discounting the efficacy of these actions, investors can avail 
themselves of the protection of investment law to counteract potentially 
damaging regulatory intervention by the host state in two ways. The 
already mentioned stabilisation clauses contained in investment 
contracts, especially the so-called ‘freezing clauses’80 can at the very 
 
No. 1 Ltd. V. Republic of Peru (ICSID Case No. ARB/03/28), Award on the Merits, 18 
August 2008.  
79 Cameron, P.D. , ‘Stabilisation in investment contracts and changes of rules in host 
countries: tools for oil & gas investors’, Final report for the Association of International 
Petroleum Negotiators, 5 July 2006.  See also Verhoosel, G., ‘Foreign direct investment 
and legal constraints on domestic environmental policies: striking a “reasonable” 
balance between stability and change’, 30 Law and Policy in International Business 
(1998).   
80 The GOVERNMENT hereby undertakes and affirms that at no time shall the rights 
(and the full and peaceful enjoyment thereof) granted by it under this Agreement be 
derogated from or otherwise prejudiced by any Law or by the action or inaction of the 
GOVERNMENT, or any official thereof, or any other Person whose actions or inactions 
are subject to the control of the GOVERNMENT. In particular, any modifications that 
could be made in the future to the Law as an effect on the Effective Date shall not apply 
to the CONCESSIONAIRE and its Associates without their prior written consent, but 
the CONCESSIONAIRE and its Associates may at any time elect to be governed by the 
legal and regulatory provisions resulting from changes made at any time in the Law as 
in effect on the Effective Date. In the event of any conflict between this Agreement or 
the rights, obligations and duties of a Party under this Agreement, and any other Law, 
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least effectively prevent the progressive interpretation of the law, and, in 
the worst cases, completely relieve investors from compliance with 
environmental legislation above the standard required by the contract81.  
Stabilisation clauses have been proposed as a way to avoid: ‘creeping 
expropriation [such as] progressive labour legislation, [and] change in the 
legal or regulatory requirements [including] changes in environmental 
law…[and political risk including] war, civil unrest, terrorists attack and 
NGO interference with investment or property rights [which] will 
obviously affect the smooth running of the contract and its stability’82. 
From the point of view of the host state, the drawback is in the risk 
 
including administrative rules and procedures and matters relating to procedure, and 
applicable international law, then this Agreement shall govern the rights, obligations, 
and duties of the Parties.’ This clause was from an investment contract with a sub-
Saharan country; text from the International Finance Corporation Report on 
Stabilization Clauses and Human Rights,  published on 11 March 2008;  available at 
http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/enviro.nsf/AttachmentsByTitle/p_StabilizationClausesandHu
manRights/$FILE/Stabilization+Paper.pdf. On stabilisation clauses and the 
environment, see Cotula, L., Regulatory Takings, Stabilization Clauses and Sustainable 
Development, 2008, available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/45/8/40311122.pdf. See 
also, Cotula, L., ‘Pushing the boundaries vs. striking a balance: The scope and 
interpretation of stabilization clauses in light of the Duke v. Peru Award, 11 JWI&T 
(2010): 27 (especially at 42-3, where Cotula mentions the 2007 Model Host 
Government Agreement for Cross-Border Pipelines, drafted by the Energy Charter 
Secretariat, which includes an economic equilibrium clause with an exception for 
environmental standards. Cotula reports that the clause was included ‘following 
proposals from the EU Commission, which was concerned that a broader stabilization 
clause may make it more difficult for EU member states to comply with social and 
environmental measures adopted at the EU level’). 
81 This standard can be tied to industry standards and therefore evolve independently 
from domestic legislation (but with the liability problems outlined in the previous 
section); if not, it will be a standard of decreasing normative value, the more it is left 
behind compared to evolving domestic legislation. Finally, standards can be tied to 
other international standards, for example European Union legislation for concession 
contracts in CIS countries, with an unpleasant element of ‘environmental hegemonism’.  
82 Nwete, B.O.N. , ‘To what extent can stabilization clauses mitigate the investor’s risks 
in a production sharing contract?’, 3 Oil, Gas & Energy Law Intelligence (2005): 12. 
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incurred in case of an environmental disaster in which local citizens 
might have their right to a remedy curtailed by the presence of a 
stabilisation clause of the sort quoted above83, with the consequence that 
the remedies accorded by the legislation applicable at the time of the 
accident might not apply84. The deficiency in remedies is particularly 
troubling since it has been reported that: ‘...contracts from non-OECD 
countries are more likely than those from OECD countries to insulate the 
investor from new social and environmental laws or to provide 
compensation to the investor for compliance with new social and 
environmental laws’85.   
 
Stabilisation clauses can be ‘operationalised’ by treaty-based umbrella 
clauses86. A widely worded umbrella clause, which commits the host 
 
83 On the subject of market allocation of costs, see Oren Perez’s example: ‘The response 
of the lex constructionis to the construction-environmental dilemma is ... based 
primarily on a strategy of deference, which seeks to externalize the responsibility for 
regulating the environmental aspects of the construction activity to the ‘extra-
contractual’ realm of the law of the host-state...The notion of “efficient risk allocation” 
further illustrates how this logic of externalization operates. In order to maximise its 
economic value the contract is expected to provide the parties with an efficient risk 
allocation scheme. This should be achieved by allocating particular risks to the party 
best able to manage them.’ Perez, 2004: 178. On risk management strategies, see 
‘Concluding remarks’ in this chapter.  
84 This very point was brought up in the context of the Production Sharing Agreement 
for the Baku – Tbilisi – Ceyhan Pipeline Project; see Striking a Balance: 
Intergovernmental and Host Government Agreements in the Context of the Baku – 
Tbilisi – Ceyhan Pipeline Project, a publication of the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development,  available at 
http://www.ebrd.com/pubs/legal/lit042e.pdf).  
85 Stabilization Clauses and Human Rights, A research project conducted for IFC and 
the United Nations Special Representative to the Secretary General on Business and 
Human Rights, 2008: xi; at www.ifc.org/ifcext/enviro.nsf.  
86 See for example how Seidl-Hohenveldern, I., International Economic Law, 
Dordrecht, Kluwer Law International, 1999: 154, explains the function of umbrella 
clauses: ‘Investment protection treaties therefore contain a clause whereby the host 
State promises to the home State of the investor that it will respect the agreements 
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state to compliance with any obligation it has entered with respect to the 
investment, can elevate a contractual breach to an actionable breach of 
treaty. There are several objections to the wide applicability of umbrella 
clauses, which need not be reviewed here; but the concern has been 
expressed that umbrella clauses might function as a ‘closet stabilisation 
clause’. While we share the criticism on a simplistic equivalence which 
has been expressed elsewhere87, the fact remains that, if there is an 
express stabilisation in the contract, the umbrella clause can have a 
freezing effect88. In other words, the umbrella clause in the treaty might 
allow the linkage between contract and treaty, to the effect that a 
violation of any of the terms of the contract will entail a violation of the 
umbrella clause in the treaty, with the consequences for the applicable 
law, responsibility of the state and its liability for damages89.  
 
concluded with the investor. These clauses have led such treaties to be called “umbrella 
treaties.” After their conclusion there can be no longer any doubt that any unilateral 
impairment of the economic investment contract concerned will also be an international 
delinquency, as it violates this umbrella treaty.’ 
87 Crawford, J., ‘Treaty and contract in investment arbitration’, The 22  Freshfields 
Lecture on International Arbitration, London, 29 November 2007, at 20. 
nd
88 If it is also accepted that the clause can have the jurisdictional power to elevate the 
contractual claim, and therefore the contractual stabilisation obligation, to the level of 
an international breach. Two conflicting awards on the reach of umbrella clauses are 
SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan (ICSID Case 
No. ARB/01/13), Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction, 6 August 2003, 
and SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of the Philippines (ICSID 
Case No. ARB/02/6), Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction, 29 January 
2004.  
89 The traditional debate over the strength of stabilisation clauses took place in the 
1960s and 1970s in the context of the nationalisation programmes by newly 
independent countries. The debate has now moved to the strength of umbrella clauses; 
given the vulnerability of stabilisation clauses to sovereignty-based exceptions, 
umbrella clauses in BITs have become more popular. Any treaty obligation is legally 
binding on states, as an attribute of their sovereignty, rather than in tension with it, like 
the contract-based stabilisation clauses. Nonetheless, they do have the effect of 
transforming contracts-breaches into treaty-breaches, fulfilling the function of the old 
stabilisation clauses (see Wimbledon Case, PCIJ Series A No.1: ‘The Court declines to 
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International environmental instruments can create enforceable 
obligations, but present problems of compliance and attribution of 
responsibility. Conflicting investment obligations can prevent the host 
states from enforcing the environmental treaty. Furthermore, as treaties 
are binding upon states, attributing responsibility for environmental 
treaty violations on the home state of the investor for the conduct of its 
nationals abroad is problematic. To what extent the home state is 
responsible for breaches of international law by its own nationals is a 
matter of debate: in the first instance, the issue is one of attribution of 
responsibility to the perpetrator, normally a multinational corporation. In 
that case, can investors be prosecuted in their own country? The 
application of the forum non conveniens doctrine could restrict 
prosecution to the host state and might result in a lower quantum of 
damages for the victims90.  
 
Recent developments in the direction of domestic criminal responsibility 
for environmental obligations have been taking place at the European 
level91, with a greater margin of appreciation being granted to states 
using their domestic criminal codes to pursue violators of environmental 
 
see in the conclusion of any treaty by which a State undertakes to perform or refrain 
from performing a particular act an abandonment of its sovereignty … the right of 
entering into international engagements is an attribute of state sovereignty.’). 
90 As was the case for the Bhopal disaster; the literature on this case is quite extensive; 
for a recent, well referenced contribution, see Eckerman, I., The Bhopal Saga - Causes 
and Consequences of the World's Largest Industrial Disaster Hyderabad, Universities 
Press, 2005. For a case in which the doctrine was not applied, and also liability for duty 
of care by a parent company for its subsidiaries abroad was accepted in principle by the 
House of Lords, see Lubbe and Others and Cape Plc. and Related Appeals [2000] 
UKHL 41; [2000] 4 All ER 268; [2000] 1WLR 1545 (20th July 2000). 
91 Convention on the Protection of the Environment through Criminal Law (ETS No. 
172), which has been signed by twelve European countries since 1998, but only ratified 
by one, Estonia, and therefore has not entered into force yet (3 ratifications being 
necessary). 
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law in compliance with their international obligations92. Additionally, 
some national systems allow civil suits to be brought for violations of 
some norms of international law (for example the Alien Tort Claims Act 
[ATS] in the United States93). However, this statute only covers 
 
92 In Mangouras v. Spain, ECtHR, Application No. 12050/04, Judgment, 28 September 
2010, (Mangouras’ ship was involved in an oil spill which resulted in catastrophic 
environmental damage), the Court ruled that a bail amount set at 3 million euros was 
not a violation of Article 5(3) of the Convention; the Court stated that: ‘…the Court 
cannot overlook the growing and legitimate concern both in Europe and internationally 
in relation to environmental offences… It cannot therefore be ruled out that, in a 
situation such as that in the present case, the professional environment which forms the 
setting for the activity in question should be taken into consideration in determining the 
amount of bail, in order to ensure that the measure retains its effectiveness.….the Court 
points out that the facts of the present case – concerning marine pollution on a seldom-
seen scale causing huge environmental damage – are of an exceptional nature and have 
very significant implications in terms of both criminal and civil liability.’ 
93 28 U.S.C. § 1350; see for example John Doe I et al. vs. Unocal Corp. et al. and John 
Roe III et al. vs. Unocal Corp. et al. (Case Nos. BC 237 980 and BC 237 679) Superior 
Court of California; all legal documentation is available at the website of the NGO 
Earth Rights, which acted as counsel for the plaintiffs:  
http://www.earthrights.org/files/Legal%20Docs/Unocal/PlaintiffMSARuling.pdf. The 
plaintiffs made recourse to the Alien Tort Claims Act of 1789 (the case has been settled 
by the parties, see 403 F.3d 708 (2005)). See also Koebele, M., ‘Corporate 
responsibility under the Aliens Tort Statute’, 10 Human Rights Law Review (2010): 
383; Buxbaum, R. M. and Caron, D. D. , ‘The Alien Tort Statute: An overview of the 
current issues’, 28 Berkeley Journal of International Law (2010): 513; see also Beanal 
v. Freeport-McMoran Inc., at the United States District Court, E.D. Louisiana,  969 
F.Supp. 362 (1997), where the court stated: ‘A corporation found to be a state actor can 
be held responsible for human rights abuses which violate international customary law.’ 
(However on the facts the case was dismissed, and the judgment was affirmed by the 
United States Court of Appeal, in Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran Inc., 197 F.3d 161 (5th 
Cir. 1999)). The land-mark case for this Statute is Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 
(2nd Cir. 1980) in which jurisdiction was accepted on the grounds of torture being 
covered by universal jurisdiction. On the issues arising from the applicability of the 
Aliens Tort Statute for international law violations and investors liability in that respect, 
see Ramsey, M. D., ‘International law limits on investor liability in human rights 
litigation’, 50 Harvard International Law Journal (2009): 271. The Supreme Court has 
only heard one Aliens Tort case, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain et al., 542 U.S. 692 (2004). 
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customary law violations; furthermore very recent case law in the United 
States suggests that the courts have become much less willing to find 
against corporations in civil liability suits under the ATS94.  
 
Sornarajah argued that, ‘... in circumstances in which the environmental 
harm is prohibited both by the host state’s law and by international 
environmental law, there arises a duty on the part of the home state to 
ensure that there is compliance by its corporate national making the 
foreign investment’95. The argument rests both on the obligation of the 
foreign national to respect the laws of the host state and of the duty of the 
home state to withdraw its protection (including diplomatic protection 
and espousal of claim96) from its national guilty of causing 
environmental harm. The United States regularly applies extra-territorial 
jurisdiction in cases of anti-trust or trade law97 but no general rule of 
 
94 See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, United States Court of Appeal, 06-4800-cv, 
06-4876-cv, (2nd Cir.17 September 2010), in which the Court argued that: ‘Because 
customary international law consists of only those norms that are specific, universal, 
and obligatory in the relations of States inter se, and because no corporation has ever 
been subject to any form of liability (whether civil or criminal) under the customary 
international law of human rights, we hold that corporate liability is not a discernable—
much less universally recognized—norm of customary international law that we may 
apply pursuant to the ATS. Accordingly, plaintiffs’ ATS claims must be dismissed for 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction.’  
95 Sornarajah, 2004: 180. 
96 To the extent that it is relevant in investment law, where diplomatic protection is at 
most considered residual with respect to the system of independent investors’ standing 
guaranteed by investment treaties.  
97 For example through The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 
1996 (Helms–Burton Act, Pub.L. 104-114, 110 Stat. 785, 22 U.S.C. § 6021–6091) and 
the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 (D’Amato Act, Pub. L. 104–172, 110 Stat. 
1541, 50 U.S.C. § 1701); see also Sornarajah, 2004: 184 ff. The Helms-Burton Act was 
invoked against Costa Rica in the Santa Elena Case, which resulted in the delay of an 
Inter-American Development Bank loan to the country until it consented to arbitration, 
see Compañia del Desarrollo de Santa Elena S.A. v. Republic of Costa Rica (ICSID 
Case No. ARB/96/1), Award, 17 February 2000: §§ 24-25.  
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international law has developed in the field of human rights, labour or 
environmental law to assure respect of home state norms by 
multinational corporations. In some environmental law instruments, 
responsibility for the conduct of nationals abroad is accepted. An 
example is the Basel Convention98, which holds the home state of the 
carrier of hazardous waste responsible for breaches of the treaty. The 
jurisdictional objection can be resolved for violations of ius cogens rules, 
where universal jurisdiction is applicable, but no norms of international 
environmental law are considered to have this status.  
 
Finally, the role of home states in ensuring compliance with their own 
environmental legislation abroad is equally problematic99. There is in 
principle no bar in international law to the home state applying the 
nationality principle of jurisdiction to hold a corporation accountable for 
violations of domestic environmental legislation100. However, several 
difficulties arise: for example, corporate nationality cannot always be 
easily ascertained101. Furthermore, jurisdictional conflicts might arise: 
 
98 Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes 
and Their Disposal (1989) 28 ILM 657.  
99 The issues arising from alleged violations of human rights laws are different: in the 
case of environmental law violations we are usually dealing with direct liability of the 
investor for domestic law violations (and sometimes environmental treaties) and the 
problem might be in the inadequacy of the domestic standards of remedies on one side 
and the reach of the stabilisation clause in the concession agreement on the other; for 
breaches of human rights law usually it is indirect liability of the investors for violations 
of international law to be raised, as human rights law violations are governmental in 
character.  
100 See Sands, 2003: 239. 
101 The first ICSID case in which a jurisdictional objection based on the nationality of 
the investor was raised is Holiday Inns v. Morocco (ICSID Case No. ARB/72/1); the 
award has not been published, but for a review, see Lalive, P., ‘The first World Bank 
Arbitration (Holiday Inns v. Morocco) – Some legal problems’, 51 BYIL (1980): 123. 
Some other older awards dealing with nationality are Amco v. Indonesia (ICSID Case 
No. ARB/81/1), Decision on Jurisdiction, 25 September 1983, 23 ILM 351 (1984); 
Klöchner v. Cameroon (ICSID Case No. ARB/81/2), Award, 21 October 1983, 19 
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the host state might also want to assert jurisdiction if the investor’s 
actions are unlawful under domestic law. Issue of anti-competitive 
practices might be raised, as well as of trade-distorting practices. Finally, 
as a matter of political expedience, the home state might have no interest 
in pursuing a claim against a powerful multinational corporation for the 
violation of an environmental regulation that has no detrimental effect in 
its own territory.   
 
A potential remedy to the problems of prosecuting foreign investors 
domestically for violations of international environmental law, applicable 
in case of trans-boundary environmental damage, is the recourse to 
 
Revue de l'arbitrage (1984) (excerpts); see also Decision of the Ad Hoc Committee, 3 
May 1985 (at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/); Letco v. Liberia (ICSID Case No. 
ARB/83/2), Award, 31 March 1986 and Rectification, 17 June 1986, 26 ILM 647 
(1987); SOABI v. Senegal (ICSID Case No. ARB/82/1), Award, 25 February 1988 and 
its attachments, 117 Journal du droit international (1990): 192 (excerpts); see also 
Sinclair, A. C. , ‘Nationality of individual investors in ICSID arbitration’, 6 
International Arbitration Law Review (2004): 194: ‘Investment promotion and 
protection treaties are designed to create a mechanism of direct recourse to arbitration 
against the host state, independent of any need for further intervention by the investor’s 
home state. The bond of nationality appears to have diminished in significance to a 
mere formality.’ A relevant application of this is in Aguas del Tunari S.A. v. Republic of 
Bolivia (ICSID Case No. ARB/02/3), Decision on Respondent’s Objection to 
Jurisdiction, 21 October 2005, 20 ICSID Rev (2005): 450. See also Wagui Elie George 
Siag and Clorinda Vecchi v. Arab Republic of Egypt  (ICSID Case No. ARB/05/15), 
Award, 1 June 2009; for the opposite approach, see the Dissenting Opinion of Prosper 
Weil in Tokios Tokéles v. Ukraine (ICSID Case No. ARB/02/18), Decision on 
Jurisdiction, 29 April 2004; TSA Spectrum de Argentina, S.A. v. Argentine Republic 
(ICSID Case No. ARB/05/5), Award, 19 December 2008 and Concurring Opinion of 
Judge Abi-Saab; the more restrictive approach proposed by Weil and adopted by the 
TSA Tribunal was rejected in The Rompetrol Group N.V. v. Romania (ICSID Case No. 
ARB/06/3), Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 18 April 2008, and Victor Pey 
Casado and President Allende Foundation v. Republic of Chile (ICSID Case No. 
ARB/98/2), Award, 8 May 2008. 
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tated that104: 
                                                
international arbitration102. There is an historic precedent to this, the 
Trail Smelter Case103, which involved the effect in the State of 
Washington of the fumes discharged from smelting activities taking 
place across the border in British Columbia. The Tribunal, constituted by 
agreement of the parties to the dispute, famously s
 
 [...] under the principles of international law, as well as of the law 
of the United States, no State has the right to use or permit the use of its 
territory in such a manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the 
territory of another or the properties or persons therein, when the case is 
of serious consequence and the injury is established by clear and 
convincing evidence. 
 
While according to Sands105, ‘...there is growing evidence to support the 
view that states view arbitration as an attractive means of resolving 
international disputes’, they certainly do not run in the numbers we have 
grown accustomed to for investment arbitration. Since the acknowledged 
weakness of the international environmental regime is in its enforcement 
power, there should be space of arbitrations to take place in order to 
remedy the damage caused by violations of environmental law. There 
will be differences in the applicable law (the Trail Smelter Tribunal 
applied only general principles of international law, as also reflected in 
US law) but these need not influence the choice of remedies, provided 
there is agreement between the parties and the treaty allows for 
 
102 See for example Rosenberg, M. and Cheah, M., ‘Arbitrating environmental 
disputes’, 16 ICSID Review (2001): 39.   
103 Trail Smelter Arbitration (1938/1941), 3 R.I.A.A. 1905.  
104 Ibidem: 1965. The Tribunal established the ‘polluter pays principle’ for which see 
also Principle 16 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development of 1992: 
‘National authorities should endeavour to promote the internalization of environmental 
costs and the use of economic instruments, taking into account the approach that the 
polluter should, in principle, bear the cost of pollution, with due regard to the public 
interest and without distorting international trade and investment.’ Available at 
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/conf151/aconf15126-1annex1.htm.  
105 Sands, 2003: 213. 
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arbitration106. A recent arbitration that included an environmental 
element resulted in the Iron Rhine Award107, where the applicable law 
was international law and European law, and where the Tribunal 
accepted that international environmental law principles (which it held to 
be part of general international law) have a role to play in ‘the 
interpretation of those treaties in which the answers to the Questions may 
primarily be sought’108. However, this arbitration, as well as the MOX 
Plant Case109, which was suspended awaiting the decision at the ECJ110, 
initiated pursuant to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea (UNCLOS), contains an environmental element, rather than being 
based on an alleged breach of an environmental instrument111. 
 
Institutional settings, such as international courts, also have their 
drawbacks. There is not at present an international court with exclusive 
 
106 Movements in this direction are the adoption in 2001 of the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration’s Optional Rules for the Arbitration of Disputes Relating to the 
Environment and/or Natural Resources (at http://www.pca-
cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1058) and the establishment in 2003 of the International 
Court of Environmental Arbitration and Conciliation (http://iceac.sarenet.es/) in 
Mexico. Numerous environmental treaties contain an arbitration clause (for list, see 
Sands, 2003: 212).  
107 Iron Rhine (Ijzeren Rijn) Railway (Belgium v. Netherlands) 24 May 2005, Permanent 
Court of Arbitration, Award available at http://www.pca-
cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1155.  
108 Award, § 60.  
109 Ireland v. United Kingdom, Permanent Court of Arbitration, proceedings available at 
http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1148. 
110 Commission v. UK and Ireland, Case C-459/03. Judgment was rendered on 30 May 
2006. The proceedings at the PCA were officially terminated, by request of Ireland, on 
6 June 2008, see Press Release at http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1148.  
111 However artificial this distinction might be: Sands argued that it is better to talk 
about disputes having an environmental component rather than environmental disputes, 
see ‘Litigating environmental disputes: courts, tribunals and the progressive 
development of international environmental law’, OECD  Global Forum on 
International Investment, 27-28 March 2008: 6, at www.oecd.org/investment/gfi-7.  
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jurisdiction for violations of international environmental law112; there are 
arguments pro- and against the existence of such a court and especially 
the extent of its jurisdiction, given the risk of overlap with other courts, 
inconsistency of judgments, with resulting fragmentation and lack of 
coherency, and also more practical problems of ‘forum shopping’113. 
These might of course all be ‘straw men’ or in other words, false 
problems, based on the premise that fragmentation is in principle bad. 
Opposite arguments could be made in defence of the proliferation of 
courts as a guarantee of the dynamism and diversity of the international 
legal system, with specialised expertise developing and coherence 
guaranteed by the deference international courts and tribunals normally 
grant each other (if nothing else based on a shared background)114, even 
if the argument cannot carry on itself the weight of the opposite criticism 
of structural bias of the individual functional regimes115. The 
International Court of Justice, which is empowered to hear ‘all legal 
disputes’ concerning international treaties and any question of 
international law116, established a Chamber for Environmental Matters in 
July 1993117; however, this specialised chamber has never had a case 
 
112 See Hinde, S. M.,  ‘The international environmental court: its broad jurisdiction as a 
possible fatal flaw’, 32 Hofstra Law Review (2004): 727. 
113Fragmentation Report: 247; see also Simma, B., ‘Universality of international law 
from the perspective of a practitioner’, 20 EJIL (2009): 278 ff.  
114 For a sociological analysis of the commercial arbitration community and how legal 
institutions can work to internationalise law (or a certain version of it), see Dezalay and 
Garth, 1996.  
115 A positive appraisal of the ‘specialisation’ of international law also in Wälde, T., 
‘Interpreting Investment Treaties, Experiences and Examples’, in: Binder et al., 2009: 
724, at 769 ff. See also Gaffney, J.P., ‘Going to Pieces without Falling Apart: Wälde’s 
Defence of  “Specialisation” in the Interpretation of Investment Treaties’, in Werner, J., 
Ali, A.H., (eds.), A Liber Amicorum: Thomas Wälde, London, CMP Publishing, 2009: 
55, at 56.   
116 Statute of the Court of International Justice, Article 36, available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/documents/index.php?p1=4&p2=2&p3=0.  
117 Pursuant to Article 26(1).  
 
 
 
46
                                                
brought before it118 and seems now not to have a role anymore. The ICJ 
has yet to issue a judgment for a breach of an environmental treaty 
obligation119, but there have been cases in which the Court has been 
asked to consider environmental issues relevant to the dispute. We will 
analyse one recent case in Chapter 5; in here we would like to point out a 
more general issue that arose from the latest ICJ Judgment in the Pulp 
Mills Case120: this case raised very complex issues of fact around the 
scientific evidence presented by the Parties in connection with the 
construction of the pulp mills by Uruguay and the supposed 
environmental damage claimed by Argentina. In their Joint Dissenting 
Opinion, Judges Al-Khasawneh and Simma argued that the Court should 
have availed itself of the help of experts, as allowed by Article 50 of the 
Statute of the Court121, in order to assess the reliability and soundness of 
the scientific evidence. The Opinion correctly pointed out three problems 
resulting from the approach of the Court: the tension between scientific 
 
118 On the role of the ICJ in the development of international environmental law, see 
Viñuales, J. E. , ‘The contribution of the International Court of Justice to the 
development of international environmental law: a contemporary assessment’, 32 
Fordham International Law Journal (2008-2009): 232; Sands, P., ‘Litigating 
environmental disputes: courts, tribunals and the progressive development of 
international environmental law’, OECD Global Forum on International Investment, 
27-28 March 2008, available at www.oecd.org/investment/gfi-7.  
119 But this will change with two new cases to be decided by the Court: in Aerial 
Herbicide Spraying (Ecuador v. Colombia), Ecuador instituted proceedings on 1 April 
2008 against Colombia for  ‘aerial spraying of toxic herbicides at locations near, at and 
across its border with Ecuador’ which ‘has already caused serious damage to people, to 
crops, to animals, and to the natural environment on the Ecuadorian side of the frontier’ 
(Aerial Herbicide Spraying (Ecuador v. Colombia), Order of 30 May 2008, I.C.J. 
Reports 2008, p. 174); in Whaling in Antarctic (Australia v. Japan), Australia instituted 
proceedings on 1 June 2010 against Japan for an alleged breach of the International 
Convention for the Regulation of Whaling and other international conventions for the 
preservation of the marine environment (at http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=3&k=64&case=148&code=aj&p3=6).  
120 Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Uruguay v. Argentina), Judgment, 20 April 2010.  
121 See § 8 of the Opinion. 
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facts and the standard of legal evidence in environmental cases; the role 
of the Court in tackling this tension in a transparent way; and the 
relationship between procedural and substantive obligations. The tension 
between legal facts and scientific facts is real and ought to be taken into 
account, even if not too much faith should be uncritically given to 
‘experts’ or to the ‘objective’ nature of scientific facts122; even then, it 
certainly cannot be summarily dismissed as the Court seems to have 
done123. On the second point, the judges argued that the court did not 
engage in good practice and that ‘[t]ransparency and procedural fairness 
are important because they require the Court to assume its overall duty 
for facilitating the production of evidence and to reach the best 
representation of the essential facts in a case, in order best to resolve a 
dispute’124. Finally, on the third point, the dissenting judges noted125:  
 
122 The political use of scientific facts in never more evident that in the application of 
the ‘precautionary principle’ (Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development); for an interesting account of how these issues are dealt with in practice, 
see Castleman, B., ‘WTO confidential: the case of asbestos’ at http://hesa.etui-
rehs.org/uk/default.asp).  
123 As seems to transpire from § 168 of the Judgment: ‘As for the independence of such 
experts, the Court does not find it necessary in order to adjudicate the present case to 
enter into a general discussion on the relative merits, reliability and authority of the 
documents and studies prepared by the experts and consultants of the Parties. It needs 
only to be mindful of the fact that, despite the volume and complexity of the factual 
information submitted to it, it is the responsibility of the Court, after having given 
careful consideration to all the evidence placed before it by the Parties, to determine 
which facts must be considered relevant, to assess their probative value, and to draw 
conclusions from them as appropriate. Thus, in keeping with its practice, the Court will 
make its own determination of the facts, on the basis of the evidence presented to it, and 
then it will apply the relevant rules of international law to those facts which it has found 
to have existed.’ 
124 At § 14. 
125 At § 26. See also the illuminating comments by Simma and Pulkowski, 2006: 503 at 
footnote 96: ‘In an attempt to maximise its own rationality, the legal system attempts to 
resolve conflicts within its own operation, at the expense of, say, the political 
system…..the crux of the fragmentation of international law lies precisely in this inner 
tension.’  
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 … in matters related to the use of shared natural resources and the 
possibility of transboundary harm, the most notable feature [...] is the 
extreme elasticity and generality of the substantive principles involved. 
Permanent sovereignty over natural resources, equitable and rational 
utilization of these resources, the duty not to cause significant or 
appreciable harm, the principle of sustainable development, etc., all 
reflect this generality. The problem is further compounded by the fact 
that these principles are frequently, where there is a dispute, in a state of 
tension with each other. Clearly in such situations, respect for procedural 
obligations assumes considerable importance and comes to the forefront 
as being an essential indicator of whether, in a concrete case, substantive 
obligations were or were not breached.  
 
Similarly, the generality and vagueness of the substantive provisions 
relative to investment protection is sometimes decried as introducing an 
unwelcome element of uncertainty in the law, especially because, 
contrary to the statute applied by the court in this case, investment 
treaties normally accompany the vagueness of the substantive provisions 
with an absence of specific procedural obligations126. The vagueness and 
indeterminacy of the substantive obligations must be taken as intentional 
(which does not mean that it cannot have unintended consequences) and 
is made to work to the advantage of the investor more often than not; 
however, the same indeterminacy brings with it the possibility to 
incorporate, by means of interpretation and systemic integration, non-
investment obligations127.  
 
126 With some exceptions, for example the establishment of ‘contact points’ as a way to 
implement the transparency obligations with respect to investors, see Article 11(1) of 
the US Model BIT 2004, at www.state.gov/documents/organization/117601.pdf.   
127 The openness of the system has to allow for rules that are not necessarily to the 
advantage of the investor to be taken into account; for the argument that either all is in, 
or nothing is (except of course expressed exclusions in the treaty), see van Aaken, art. 
cit., 5. Also Klabbers, J., ‘Reluctant grundnormen: Articles 31(3)(c) and 42 of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and the fragmentation of international law, 
in Craven, M., Fitzmaurice, M. and Vogiatzi, M. (eds.), Time, History and International 
Law, Leiden, Brill, 2007: 141, at 161: ‘...the interpreter can literally include anything – 
or, as the case may be, exclude things’. Of course this is the risk of openness, that is, 
that it is a two-way street. When substantive exclusion is accompanied by procedural 
opaqueness, the risks are even higher.  
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2.5 Regulation as risk 
 
What do we mean when we talk about ‘greening investment law’? It 
really depends on who does the greening.... States can do this, by 
implementing environmental legislation or concluding investment 
treaties that incorporate their environmental commitments; investors 
could do this, by taking the environment into account in their 
practices128; tribunals should do this, if they are serious about their 
obligation to apply investment law ‘in context’, that is, within the 
framework of general international law, including environmental 
instruments and principles. 
 
There are risks involved in regulating investment and environment, and 
to the extent that host states are free to take political decisions (if one 
disregards political and economic constraints to act one way or the other, 
that is, the pressure to enter into bilateral investment agreements, on one 
side, or conversely, to sign up to international environmental agreements 
or respect environmental standards tied to the release of investment funds 
by the World Bank), they also need to adopt risk management 
strategies129. Both sets of decisions, by definition, involve an element of 
risk taking (if risk, as opposed to danger, is defined as what happens 
when ‘losses that may occur in the future are attributed to decisions 
made’130). 
When states decide whether to conclude a BIT, they have to weigh the 
 
128 As we have previously noted that investors are rules producers as well as rules 
followers. For a policy centred approach, see Neumayer, E., Greening Trade and 
Investment: Environmental Protection without Protectionism, London, Earthscan 
Publications, 2001. 
129 For risk management as the underlying rationale of regulatory expropriation cases, 
see also Newcombe, A., ‘The boundaries of regulatory expropriation in international 
law’, 20 ICSID Review (2005): 1.  
130 Luhmann, N., Risk – A Sociological Theory, 4th edition, London, Aldine Transaction, 
2008: 101.  
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risk of international arbitration (with associated costs) against the risk of 
a reduction of investment flows131; this second risk is more difficult to 
assess, as even in the absence of a BIT there can be an increase of 
investment flows, provided other elements are in place, such a wealth of 
natural resources132.  In deciding to implement environmental regulation, 
 
131 Investors also have to balance the risk of investing in a particular country against 
those same regulatory elements (presence/absence of a good regulatory framework for 
investment protection, presence/absence of an effective environmental regulatory 
framework with connected costs). At least some tribunals have included the element of 
‘commercial risk’ in the definition of investment for jurisdictional purposes (see for 
example Bayindir Insaat Turizm Ticaret Ve Sanayi A.Ş. v Islamic Republic of Pakistan 
(ICSID Case No. ARB/03/29), Decision on Jurisdiction, 14 November 2005, § 134. 
There is a considerable literature on the supposed effect of BITs on investment flows; 
for a positive appraisal, see Banga, R., Impact of Government Policies and Investment 
Agreements on FDI Inflows, Indian Council for Research and International Economic 
Relations, New Delhi, 2003; Neumayer, E. and Spess, L., ‘Do bilateral investment 
treaties increase foreign direct investment to developing countries? 3 World 
Development (2005): 31; for a more sceptical approach see Tobin, J. and Rose-
Ackerman, S., ‘Foreign direct investment and the business environment in developing 
countries: the impact of bilateral investment treaties’, Yale Law and Economics 
Research Paper No. 293 (2005); Gallagher, K. P. and Birch, M.B.L., ‘Do investment 
agreements attract investment? evidence from Latin America’, 7 JWI&T (2006): 961; 
Guzmán, A. T., ‘Explaining the popularity of BITs’, Jean Monnet Programme Papers, 
1997/12; Yackee, J. W., “Are BITs such a bright idea: exploring the ideational basis of 
investment treaty enthusiasm’ 12 University of California Davis Journal of 
International Law & Policy (2005-06): 195; Salacuse, J.W. and Sullivan, N.P., ‘Do 
BITs really work? An evaluation of bilateral investment treaties and their grand 
bargain’, 46 Harvard International Law Journal (2005): 67; Montt, S., 2009: Chapter 2. 
132 According to UNCTAD, International Investment Rule-setting: Trends, Emerging 
Issues and Implications, 2007: 6 (at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/c2d73_en.pdf), 39% 
of BITs concluded as of June 2006 involved a developed and a developing country 
pairing; 26%, two developing countries; 13% developed countries and countries of 
South-Eastern Europe (SEE) and of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS, 
former Soviet Union); 10% developing countries and SEE-CIS countries; 4% SEE-CIS 
countries; only 8% developed countries signed treaties amongst themselves. Recent data 
on inflows of foreign investment (UNCTAD Investment Brief, No. 1 2007, Foreign 
Direct Investment surged again in 2006, at 
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host states have to assess the risk of lack of regulation, namely the risk of 
environmental damage mitigation133 against the risk of regulation, 
specifically, the possible conflict with investment protection obligations; 
furthermore, environmental regulation might incur in the ‘regulatory 
trilemma’: regulation being ineffective, or destroying the regulated 
system (for example, by making economic development impossible) or 
destroying the regulatory system (for example, by creating a system of 
rules so complicated as to be impossible to implement, and therefore 
causing the regulatory system to seize up134). Therefore, the tension 
between the economic and the social is reflected in the incapacity of the 
regulatory system to translate legitimate social needs into enforceable 
norms against a hostile economic system, which reads everything in 
terms of profit (similarly, the commercial logic underlying investment 
arbitration fails to appreciate the difference between economic damage 
and ecologic damage135). Consequently, the structural coupling between 
law and investment reads any intervention in the social field as an 
 
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/iteiiamisc20072_en.pdf) show that the largest single 
recipient for foreign investment in 2006 was the United States, with the developed 
world experiencing a 48% increase; the European Union accounted for 46% of total 
investment inflows. While investment to the developed world was $800 billion, for 
African countries was $38 billion, mostly to oil-rich countries. The trend is for more 
investment in a developed-to-developed pairing than in a developed-to-developing one; 
in the first case, BITs make no difference, as there are few if any treaties signed 
between developed countries; in the second case, the flow of investment seems to 
follow resources and not BITs (as in the case of sub-Saharan countries). 
133 Deriving from the unintended consequences that flow from unregulated economic 
development.  
134 See Teubner, G., ‘Juridification: Concepts, Aspects, Limits, Solutions’, in Baldwin, 
R., Scott, C. and Hood, C. (eds.) Socio-Legal Reader on Regulation, Oxford, OUP, 
1987. 
135 In a similar fashion, in the Dissenting Opinion issued with the Judgment in the Pulp 
Mills Case, Judges Simma and  Al-Khasawneh noted: ‘the Court must remain aware, 
when confronted with challenges of risk of environmental pollution and endangerment 
of ecosystems, of the inherent weaknesses and flaws of the traditional retrospective 
judicial process and its compensatory logic.’ (At § 24). 
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economically disadvantageous proposition, which is then translated into 
a request for compensation, to re-establish the economic equilibrium of 
the investment136. Regulatory failure137 here goes beyond inefficacy: it is 
not simply the case that environmental regulatory costs are passed on to 
the consumer without an improvement of the environment138; instead, the 
foreign investors externalise the cost of regulation by requiring to be 
compensated139. The tension is then interpreted as a cost allocation 
 
136 This term is not used casually: the new-style stabilisation clauses in investment 
contracts are used to re-establish the economic equilibrium that might have been 
disrupted or negatively affected by regulatory action: what this means in practice is that 
a decrease in profit because of stricter regulation has to be compensated monetarily by 
the state. See for example the HGA (Host Government Agreement) for the Baku-
Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline Project: ‘The State Authorities [i.e. the host government, local 
authorities and state controlled or owned entities] shall take all actions available to them 
to restore the Economic Equilibrium established under the Project Agreements if and to 
the extent the Economic Equilibrium is disrupted or negatively affected, directly or 
indirectly, as a result of any change (whether the change is specific to the Project or of 
general application) in Azerbaijan Law (including any Azerbaijan Laws regarding taxes, 
health, safety and the environment) occurring after [date of the HGA or its 
ratification]…’ in Striking a Balance: Intergovernmental and Host Government 
Agreements in the Context of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline Project, a publication of 
the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, available at 
http://www.ebrd.com/pubs/legal/lit042e.pdf.  
137 As discussed in this section. 
138 Because foreign investors continue environmentally unsafe practices and pay a fine; 
this can be charged to the consumers through an increase in the price of the final 
product. 
139 Why regulatory risk should be compensated can be justified by appealing to fairness, 
risk allocation, cost internalisation and investment promotion (where cost internalisation 
refers to the internalisation of the regulatory costs by the state, not of environmental 
costs by the investor; risk allocation, or insurance rationale, allowing the investor to 
invest in a risky enterprise knowing that some of the risk is amortised through 
compensation; fairness, connected to the cost internalisation rationale, in the sense that 
the investor does not bear the exclusive burden of the developing regulatory 
framework). A good review of the issue is in Been, V. L. and Beauvais, J. C., ‘The 
global Fifth Amendment? Nafta’s investment protections and the misguided quest for an 
international ‘regulatory takings’ doctrine’, 78 New York University Law Review 
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exercise, instead of a goal allocation one.  
 
The risks undertaken in regulating investment are manageable to the 
extent that they are by and large predictable. On the other hand, 
environmental risk is unmanageable to the extent that environmental 
damage can result from a functioning as well as a failing regulatory 
framework and, more importantly, independently from economic 
decision-making (in other words, economic development can cause 
environmental damage when it fails, as well as when it succeeds), and 
that it can have consequences that are not predictable. Therefore, it is, 
politically, a difficult risk to manage, as inaction and action can both 
have negative consequences140.   
 
Seen from the angle of risk-avoidance strategies, the tension between 
protecting the investment and protecting the environment takes on a 
different meaning. Risk management strategies also account for the 
opposite phenomena of ‘regulatory chill,’ where states refrain to 
implement non-investment regulation (either in the hope to attract further 
investment or to avoid costly arbitrations) and of ‘investment chill’, that 
is, a reduction of the investment flows to countries perceived to impose 
 
(2003): 30.  On the application of these principles in cases of regulatory expropriation, 
see Section 3.3.2. 
140 For this, see also Luhmann, N., Ecological Communication, Chicago, University of 
Chicago Press, 1989, at 73: ‘Ecological problems are simply too complex, 
interdependent, circumstantial, unpredictable, determined by the ‘dissipative structures’ 
of thermodynamic systems, the abrupt disturbances of stability (catastrophes) and 
similar structural changes...; and at 74-5: ‘...the legal system reacts to the desideratum of 
an environmental law with a considerable increase and complication of the regulation 
apparatus. ...The political system finds itself in the need of having to profess and to cope 
with the desire to decrease and increase the scope of laws at the same time. ...One can 
observe therefore that ecological communication deforms classical structures of the 
legal system, and how it does this, on more than just the level of the content of norms.’ 
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an excessive regulatory burden141. The consequence of the ‘regulatory 
chill’ effect are the phenomena of the so-called ‘pollution havens’, where 
‘countries with lax pollution standards attract industry and jobs away 
from countries with high standards’142 or ‘stuck at the bottom’ 
countries143’; however it is probably more correct to assume that what 
actually takes place is not necessarily that industries with high 
environmental impact migrate to less regulated countries, but that they  
will use more polluting and cheaper technologies, processes and products 
in the countries that allow them to and where they already have a 
presence. Therefore, products and processes that are banned in one 
country will be used in another if the ban is not (yet) in place, with the 
option of initiating an investment dispute if the host state tries to impose 
a similar ban, even if the ban is in place in the home state of the 
investor144. In addition, industries with a higher environmental impact 
are more likely to be established in countries with lower environmental 
 
141 For a sceptical view, see Schill, S., ‘Do investment treaties chill unilateral state 
regulation to mitigate climate change?’ 24 Journal of International Arbitration (2007): 
469; more accepting, Mann, H. and von Moltke, K., ‘NAFTA’s Chapter 11 and the 
environment: addressing the impacts of investor-state process on the environment’ 
(IISD Working Paper 1999), http://www.iisd.org/pdf/nafta.pdf. 
142 Matsushita, M., Schoenbaum, T. J. and Mavroidis, P. C., The World Trade 
Organization: Law, Practice and Policy, Oxford, OUP, 2006: 468, state that there is no 
empirical evidence for this phenomenon. See also Tienhaara, K., ‘Mineral investment 
and the regulation of the environment in developing countries: lessons from Ghana’, 6 
International Environmental Agreements (2006): 371; and Zarsky, L., ‘From regulatory 
chill to deepfreeze?’ ibidem, 395. 
143 Where environmental standards do not evolve in response to changed circumstances 
or are not enforced; see Mann, H. and van Moltke, K., ‘Protecting investor rights and 
the public good: assessing NAFTA’s Chapter 11: 8, at 
http://www.iisd.org/trade/ILSDWorkshop; Porter, G., ‘Trade competition and pollution 
standards: “race to the bottom” or “stuck at the bottom”?’, 8 Journal of Environment 
and Development, (1999): 133. 
144 See S.D. Meyers Inc. v. the Government of Canada, Damages Award, 21 October 
2002; see also Chemtura Corporation v. Canada (UNCITRAL) PCA, Award, 2 August 
2010.  
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compliance. It is the cost of clean up and liability for damage that is high 
in developed countries, not necessarily the preventive costs of regulatory 
compliance145.  
 
If risk management strategies are a reason for states to avoid regulation 
or not is probably a question too difficult to answer; we have sketched 
above what the possible repercussions for states are: regulatory chill and 
pollution havens in cases in which states choose high levels of 
investment protections and low levels of environmental protection, 
investment chill if the opposite is the case. 
 
 
2.6 Concluding remarks 
 
This chapter has been about choices. We have stated at the beginning that 
this thesis does not intend to engage with policy discussions, and that the 
focus will be pragmatically on the ways in which investment tribunal can 
take environmental obligations into account. However, there is the matter 
of choices: the choices the state makes in balancing its commitments to 
 
145 In the Trafigura Case the Amsterdam District Court fined the Trafigura company £ 
840,000 for illegally transporting and dumping hazardous waste to the Ivory Coast, 
which resulted not only in environmental damage but also in several thousands citizens 
of the Ivory Coast needing medical treatment and in sixteen deaths (see 
http://www.business-
humanrights.org/Categories/Lawlawsuits/Lawsuitsregulatoryaction/LawsuitsSelectedca
ses/TrafiguralawsuitsreCtedIvoire). Apparently, the company decided to transport and 
dump the waste in the Ivory Coast to avoid the higher costs of disposal in the 
Netherlands (€ 750 per tonne, as opposed to the € 27 per tonne the company paid to a 
local African operator; see http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/trafigura-
found-guilty-of-toxic-waste-offence-2034313.html)  The judgment was appealed by the 
Dutch Public Prosecutor on the grounds of the insufficient amount of the fine; the 
company keeps a page on its version of the events on its website: 
http://www.trafigura.com/our_news/probo_koala_updates.aspx#k77L1kkLS2UF. In the 
end the case proves that even marginally lower clean up costs will be decisive for 
multinationals in selecting their course of action.  
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the investors and its obligations to the defence of public goods; the 
choices the investors make, and how they are informed by risk 
assessment of the quality of the investment environment in the host 
country; the choices of remedies, when high environmental impact 
activities go wrong; and we will explore in the next chapters how 
investment tribunals deal with choices. So, while we can avoid the policy 
discussions, we cannot pretend that there aren’t political choices being 
made all the time, at all levels. It is commonly believed that political 
considerations can be avoided by recourse to arbitration between the host 
state and the investor, where the dispute settlement process is 
‘depoliticised’146. But political issues do not disappear so easily. It is a 
fact that by signing an investment treaty which allows for independent 
dispute settlement, the home state renounces the political discretion that 
is part of its sovereign powers; the dispute is not depoliticised as such, 
but the terrain of politics is shifted and privatised147. The decision to 
initiate a dispute is left to the political discretion of the investor. As 
 
146 See Schreuer, C., The ICSID Convention: A Commentary, Cambridge, CUP, 2001: 
398: ‘The individual or corporation has no right to diplomatic protection under 
international law but depends on the political discretion of his government...As soon as 
the national State has taken up the claim, it becomes part of the foreign policy process, 
with all the attendant political risks.’; Shihata, I.F.I., ‘Towards a greater depoliticization 
of investment disputes: the role of ICSID and MIGA’, 1 ICSID Review (1986): 1.  See 
also the Tribunal in Enron Corporation and Ponderosa Assets LP v The Argentine 
Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3), Decision on Jurisdiction (Ancillary Claim) of 2 
August 2004, § 37: ‘….[the] greatest innovation of ICSID and other systems directed at 
the protection of foreign investments is precisely that the rights of the investors are not 
any longer subject to the political and other considerations by their governments, as was 
the case under the old system of diplomatic protection, often resulting in an interference 
with those rights. Investors may today claim independently from the view of their 
governments.’ 
147 International legal firms are well aware of the importance of political power in 
investment arbitration; here is how the firm Crowell & Moring describes its 
international arbitration team: ‘Our lawyers are well-schooled in the art of leveraging 
political power to resolve complex cross-border commercial and investment disputes.’ 
At http://www.crowell.com/PracticeAreas/PracticeArea.aspx?id=126 
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remarked by Dezalay and Garth in their sociological study on 
commercial arbitration148: 
 
 A coincidence of interests...between the holders of economic 
power and the lawyer-representatives has accounted for an evolution that 
has allowed the seemingly irreconcilable to be reconciled. A conflict 
determined in critical respects by political and economic conditions can 
be re-enacted on the legal stage as independent of political and economic 
power. 
 
In many ways, the legalisation of the relationship between host states and 
private investors is a consequence of the shifting balance of power away 
from states and represents a return to the past, when companies exercised 
political power on behalf of their home country. Now, however, it is 
more likely that companies exercise political power independently (it is 
common place to note that companies do not require the approval of their 
home country to initiate a dispute149, and, in the case of multinationals, 
the very issue of what constitutes the home country, in other words, the 
 
148 Dezalay and Garth, 1996: 70. 
149 Up to the point of the home state actively opposing the investors’ claim, as was the 
case in GAMI Investments Inc. v.United Mexican States, UNCITRAL, Final Award of 
15 November 2004 (see USA – Article 1128 submission on jurisdiction of 30 June 
2003, available at 
http://naftaclaims.com/Disputes/Mexico/GAMI/GAMIus1128Jurisdiction.pdf); see also 
Mondev International Ltd v. United States of America (ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/99/2), Award of October 11, 2002, 42 ILM 85 (2003); The English Court of 
Appeal in Occidental v. Republic of Ecuador noted: ‘Where a dispute arises out of or 
relates to a commercial agreement made with the investor, it would seem to us both 
artificial and wrong in principle to suggest that the investor is in reality pursuing a claim 
vested in his or its home State, and that the only improvement by comparison with the 
traditional State protection for investors is procedural. It would potentially undermine 
the efficacy of the protection held out to individual investors, if such protection was 
subject to the continuing benevolence and support of their national State. Douglas, at 
p.170 in the article already cited [citation omitted], draws attention to arbitrations where 
the national State by intervention or in submissions opposed its investor’s claims or the 
tribunal's jurisdiction to hear them; but, if the claims were the State’s, such opposition 
should have been of itself fatal.’ ([2005] EWCA Civ 1116 Case No: A3/2005/1121: § 
17). 
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issue of nationality, is controversial): in this sense we can talk about a 
‘privatisation of politics,’ accomplished through law (increasingly, 
private law, or better, a hybridisation of private and public law). If before 
there was an ‘order without law’150, now law has acquired a more 
relevant role, to the detriment however of states’ control over the way 
private actors use the law. If political roles are restricted to certain actors, 
and if international relations and foreign policy are the domain of states, 
it is correct to refer to the investment arbitrations as depoliticised, insofar 
as the host state does not have a counterpart with which to interact.  
 
In the following chapters we will assess how investment law can address 
the normative dissonance, which is both internal (inconsistency of 
awards, vagueness of substantive content) and external (conflicts 
between investment and non-investment obligations). This thesis argues 
for ‘system-internal’ approaches for the resolution of these conflicts, 
especially of the second kind151. Having accepted this approach as 
theoretically more feasible, as well as politically more likely152, we will 
next consider the main substantive facets of the investment law system. 
 
 
150 Ellickson, R., Order without Law, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1991. 
151 Not least because of the adoption of Luhmann’s systems theory as the theoretical 
grounding for this project; see especially Luhmann, N., Social Systems, Stanford, 
Stanford University Press, 1995, and Luhmann, N., Law as a Social System, Oxford, 
OUP, 2004. See also Teubner, G., ‘Substantive and Reflexive Elements in Modern 
Law’ 17 Law & Sociology Review (1983): 239, in which Teubner proposes the 
reflexivity of the law (or its proceduralisation) as a solution for problems of structural 
coupling; in other words, law acting as a trigger for self-regulation within the sub-
systems, according to their own internal logic. 
152 Withholding judgment on its political intrinsic value. 
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Chapter 3: Substantive investment obligations 
 
 
It is not easy to define the exact dividing line, just as it is 
not easy in twilight to see the divide between night and 
day. Nonetheless, whilst the exact line may remain 
undrawn, it should still be possible to determine on which 
side of the divide a particular claim must lie.153 
 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Investment law is in a state of flux: the ever increasing case law of 
investment tribunals, the proliferation of BITs and FTAs, the debates on 
the standards of protection available to investors, the relationship with 
other areas of law, all contribute to give the impression of a field of law 
in constant development. This activity concerns both the procedural154 
and the substantive aspects of the law. In this chapter we have chosen to 
concentrate on two areas of substantive law, standards of treatment and 
expropriation. This choice is dictated not only by the fact that it is here 
 
153 Methanex v. United States of America, (UNCITRAL), Preliminary Award on 
Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 7 August 2002, § 139. The tribunal was here referring to 
competing interpretations as to the connection between the investor and the impugned 
measure for the purpose of the admissibility of a claim, but this statement can easily be 
extended to the general task of tribunals (and of law) in drawing lines. More often than 
not, it seems that this task is performed in the twilight.  
154 The procedural aspects that impact significantly on the relationship with non-
investment obligations will be tackled in Chapter 6. Other procedural developments 
have taken place recently, which have a closer relationship with general concerns about 
the role of states in arbitration. For example, Rule 41(5) adopted by ICSID in 2006 
allows for the summary dismissal of claims patently without merits; this Rule has been 
invoked by respondent states already three times since its adoption; see Trans-Global 
Petroleum, Inc., v. Jordan (ICSID Case No. ARB/07/25), Decision, 12 May 2008; 
Brandes Investment Partners LLP v. Venezuela (ICSID Case No. ARB/08/3), Decision, 
2 February 2009; RSM Production Corporation and others v. Grenada (ICSID Case 
No. ARB/10/6), Award, 10 December 2010.   
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that the intersection between investment protection and environmental 
regulation can create the most friction and where the boundaries are 
undefined and fluctuating155. It is also because these two areas define and 
demonstrate what is peculiar about the way investment law exists as a 
discrete area of law in its substantive aspects. We opened the chapter by 
remarking on the investment regime’s state of flux. It is equally 
important not to underestimate a certain rigidity of the system, which 
works in unison with assumptions made by investors and tribunals alike 
as to the goal of the whole system of investment arbitration.  This chapter 
considers the ‘orthodox’ approach to investment protection, that is, the 
maximisation of the protections accorded to the foreign investors by a 
generous application of the provisions contained in the treaties.  
 
There are issues of internal coherence in the investment regime, resulting 
from the vagueness of the provisions, the possibility of inconsistency of 
the awards and the limited grounds of appeal and review of the decisions. 
And then there are the issues of external coherence, or inter-regime 
consistency, which form the focus of this project. The interaction 
between  these levels (internal and external) brings its own difficulties 
and consequences: for example, the vagueness in the language of the 
treaties can work both to increase the level of protection for investors as 
well as well as to incorporate non-investment commitments.  
 
This review of substantive obligations has to be put into the context of a 
wider analysis on the feasibility of introducing non-investment 
obligations as interpretative aids for determining the extent of the 
protection accorded to investors. Several elements have to be kept in 
 
155 Performance requirements provisions are also intrinsically subject to this sort of 
balancing exercise and therefore could have been included in the analysis; however they 
do not seem to be invoked in arbitrations as often as the other two (this in itself might 
be an issue worth investigating) even if their potential effect on environmental measures 
is significant. Additionally, they do not share the same level of normative convergence 
as standards of treatment and expropriation provisions in the investment agreements.  
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mind: firstly, few of these provisions at present explicitly impose 
environmental obligations upon the state or the investors156. Secondly, 
these provisions do not normally spell out in detail the extent of the 
protection to be accorded, preferring to refer to vague ‘fair and equitable’ 
treatment, ‘measures ‘tantamount to expropriation’ and similarly worded 
obligations. Thirdly, because of their open-textured nature, these 
provisions are subject to interpretation by tribunals to a greater extent 
than precisely worded provisions. Fourthly, the applicable rule for treaty 
interpretation being Article 31 of the VCLT, its clause 31(3)(c) ‘any 
relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the 
parties’ has to be taken into consideration by tribunals when interpreting 
the substantive protections. Fifthly and lastly, evolving social, political 
and legal standards have a bearing both on the substantive content of 
these outside ‘relevant rules’ and on the way interpretation itself is 
brought to bear on them.  
 
Investment law is set up as a means of international protection and 
enforcement of property rights and the right to equality and non-
discrimination, developed in their modern form in the Enlightenment 
era157, which became part of the newly drafted constitutions, following 
the French and the American revolutions, as rights of citizens.  The 
development of human rights law following the Second World War 
resulted in the transposition on the international plane of these rights as 
rights of men rather than of citizen, as expressed for example in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights158, the International Covenants 
on Civil and Political Rights159 and Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights160, the European Convention on Human Rights161 and so on. 
 
156 With a few exceptions that will be considered in Chapter 4. 
157 Locke, J., 1690, Two Treaties of Government, Cambridge, CUP, 1963. 
158 http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr. 
159 http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/ccpr.htm.  
160 http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/cescr.htm.  
161 http://www.hri.org/docs/ECHR50.html.  
 
 
 
62
                                                
However, while equality rights found expression in international human 
rights law, the protection of property rights remained by and large the 
domain of domestic legal systems, not least because of different 
approaches to property in different economic systems, and consequent 
disagreements at the international level as to the extent to which there 
should be an international standard of protection for property162. 
 
The customary rules on the protection of aliens and their property had 
developed independently163 at a time in which a system of international 
protection of fundamental rights was non-existent and national standards 
varied considerably. And this brings us back to the observation that 
investment law is not only procedurally different from other areas of law, 
but also that it developed independently a set of standards of protection 
for foreign investors the content of which, while sharing a parallel 
development with human rights standards164, has limited convergence in 
substantive content, procedural rights or choice of remedies165. 
 
162 The right to property is recognised at the European level (Article 1 of Protocol 1 of 
the ECHR) at the American level (Article 21 of the ACHR) and at the African level 
(Article 14 of the Banjul Charter), but not at the international level generally in legally 
binding instruments (it is contained in Article 17 of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, at http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/). . 
163 For a general review of the history, see Sornarajah, 2004, especially 18 ff. and 37 ff.  
164 DiMascio and Pauwelyn argued that the rise in importance of national treatment 
provisions in investment law is a sign of the ‘substantive convergence between trade 
and investment law’; see DiMascio, N. and Pauwelyn, J., ‘Non-discrimination in trade 
and investment treaties: worlds apart or two sides of the same coin?’, 102 AJIL (2008): 
48, at 59. On the relevance of human rights remedies for investment protection, see 
Tomuschat, C., ‘The European Court of Human Rights and investment protection’, 
Binder, C., et al., International Investment Law for the 21st Century, Oxford, OUP, 
2009: 636. 
165 Douglas argued that: ‘The investment treaty obligations of states are not coterminous 
with their human rights obligations. Human rights deserve a special status; they are 
inalienable because their protection is fundamental to the dignity of every human 
being.’ Douglas, Z., ‘Nothing if not critical for investment treaty arbitration: Occidental, 
Eureko and Methanex’, 22 Arbitration International (2006): 27, at 37. The cross-
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3.2 Standards of treatment 
 
It is an accepted rule of customary international law that aliens are 
subjected to the host country’s laws166. Host states can establish entry 
requirements, limit admission and expel foreigners, unless prohibited to 
do so by a specific commitment in a treaty167. The standards of treatment 
to which aliens are subject vary from country to country, as do the 
remedies available to those aggrieved by the treatment received. There 
has been a ‘paradigm shift’ in the way international law deals with the 
consequences of this diversity of treatment and the resulting possible 
claims of mistreatment or injury168. Exhaustion of local remedies, 
 
fertilization of criteria on regulatory expropriation between American takings 
jurisprudence and the European Courts of Human Rights case law on expropriation will 
be analysed in Section 3.3.2 and in Chapter 7.  
166 Higgins, R: ‘The taking of property by the state: recent developments in international 
law’, Recueil des Cours, Hague Academy of international Law, Vol. 176, 1982-III, 285: 
‘It is generally accepted that an individual submits himself to the local jurisdiction of a 
foreign state when he chooses to reside or conduct his business there’; Mann, F. A.,’ 
The doctrine of jurisdiction in international law’, 11 Recueil des cours Vol. III (1964); 
Brownlie, I., Principles of Public International Law, 5  Edition, Oxford, OUP, 1998: 
Chapter 24; Amerasinghe, C. F., State Responsibility for Injuries to Aliens, Oxford, 
Clarendon Press, 1967; Borchard, E.M., Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad, New 
York, Kraus Reprint, 1970; Dunn, F. S .,The Protection of Nationals: A Study in the 
Application of International Law, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1932; Eagleton, C., 
The Responsibility of States in International Law, New York, New York University 
Press, 1928; Freeman, A. V., The International Responsibility of States for Denials of 
Justice, London and New York, Longmans, Green & Co., 1938; Jessup, P. C., A 
Modern Law of Nations: An Introduction, New York, Macmillan, 1949; Lillich, R. B. 
(ed.) The International Law of State Responsibility for Injuries to Aliens, 
Charlottesville, VA, University Press of Virginia, 1983.  
th
167 Article I:2(c) of the GATS (provider’s commercial presence in the user’s country) 
‘essentially amounts to an international agreement to liberalize investment.’ 
(Matsushita, Schoenbaum and Mavroidis, 2003: 237).  
168 As also noted by Schreuer; see Schreuer, C., ‘Paradigmenwechsel im Internationalen 
Investitionsrecht’, in Hummer, W. (ed.) Paradigmenwechsel im Völkerrecht zur 
Jahrtausendwende, Vienna, Manz, 2002: 237. One wishes not to overstate this shift, 
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diplomatic protection169 and denial of justice170 claims constituted the 
bulk of cases until well into the post-war era171 while now they have 
receded into the background and diplomatic protection is considered to 
fulfil merely a residual role amongst the remedies provided by 
international investment law172. Innovations in international law in the 
 
which concerns the issues of standing and remedies. The substance of investment law, 
the treaties, is still a product of inter-state negotiations and as such, a purely public 
international law matter. 
169 For the right of diplomatic protection, see The Case of the Mavrommatis Palestine 
Concessions (1924) PCIJ Rep Series A, No. 2: ‘It is an elementary principle of 
international law that a State is entitled to protect its subjects, when injured by acts 
contrary to international law committed by another State, from whom they have been 
unable to obtain satisfaction through the ordinary channels. By taking up the case of one 
of its subjects and by resorting to diplomatic action or international judicial proceedings 
on his behalf, a State is in reality asserting its own rights – its right to ensure, in the 
person of its subjects, respect for the rules of international law.’ A recent review of the 
topic in the context of investment law in Muchlinski, P., ‘The diplomatic protection of 
foreign investors: a tale of judicial caution’, Binder, C., et al., 2009: 341. 
170 One wonders what significance the denial of justice doctrine has in the context of a 
system of secondary rules that has for the most part dispensed with the exhaustion of 
local remedies rule. See also Loewen Group Inc. & Raymond L. Loewen v. United 
States of America (ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3), Final Award, 26 June 2003. For a 
recent treatment of the issue, see Francioni, F, ‘Access to justice, denial of justice and 
international investment law’, 20 EJIL (2009): 729. 
171 All these issues generated a vast case law and literature, which would be impossible 
to quote comprehensively; see for example Sohn, L. B. and Baxter, R. R., 
‘Responsibility of states for injury to the economic interests of aliens’, 55 AJIL (1961): 
545; see also Vattel, E. Le droit des gens ou principes de la loi naturelle appliqué à la 
conduit et aux affairs des nations et des souverains, Washington DC, Carnegie 
Institution of Washington 1916;  for diplomatic protection, see also the International 
Law Commission’s Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection, 
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft%20articles/9_8_2006.pdf:  
172 On the residual character of diplomatic protection, see Case Concerning Ahmadou 
Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the Congo), ICJ, 
Preliminary Objections, 24 May 2007, 88: ‘The Court is bound to note that, in 
contemporary international law, the protection of the rights of companies and the rights 
of their shareholders, and the settlement of the associated disputes, are essentially 
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area of human rights have revolutionised concepts such as the 
international minimum standard of treatment and injury to aliens. The 
standards contained in international investment agreements have arisen to 
prominence in recent years, when claims arising from these treaties are 
increasingly structured around an alleged violation of a standard of 
treatment obligation rather than (or in addition to) alleging expropriation 
of the protected investment. 
 
Standards of treatment can be comparative or absolute173 and have their 
source in customary law or exist independently as treaty standards. The 
national and most-favoured-nation (MFN) standards are considered 
comparative (or contingent), while the international minimum standard 
(IMS) and the fair and equitable treatment (FET) standard do not per se 
contain a comparative element and are therefore absolute (non-
contingent) standards. The national and the international minimum 
standard were developed in customary law, and have been received in 
treaty law (where the national standard is accompanied by the MFN 
standard and has been transformed from a provision against positive 
discrimination in favour of aliens into a provision against negative 
discrimination); the FET standard is a creature of treaty law and, as we 
shall see, its relationship with the international minimum standard has 
given rise to a heated debate in the investment community.  
 
 
governed by bilateral or multilateral agreements for the protection of foreign 
investments... In that context, the role of diplomatic protection somewhat faded, as in 
practice recourse is only made to it in rare cases where treaty régimes do not exist or 
have proved inoperative.’ The Court has delivered its Judgment on the case on 30 
November 2010, founding in favour of Guinea and granting reparation in the form of 
compensation, to be settled by the Court failing agreement by the parties. 
173 See for example Grierson-Weiler, T. and Laird, I. A., ‘Standards of treatment’, 
Muchlinski, P., Ortino, F., and Schreuer, C., The Oxford Handbook of International 
Investment Law, Oxford, OUP, 2008: 261 ff.; Newcombe, A. and Paradell, L., Law and 
Practice of Investment Treaties: Standards of Treatment, Alphen Aan den Rijn, Kluwer 
Law International, 2009.  
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3.2.1 Comparative standards 
 
3.2.1.1 Most-favoured-nation standard 
 
The cardinal non-discrimination principle of international trade law174, 
the MFN standard is incorporated into most investment treaties175. Its 
formulation in the NAFTA, as contained in Article 1103, is as 
following176: 
 
 1. Each Party shall accord to investors of another Party treatment 
no less favorable than that it accords, in like circumstances, to investors 
of any other Party or of a non-Party with respect to the establishment, 
acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation, and sale or 
other disposition of investments177. 
2. Each Party shall accord to investments of investors of another Party 
treatment no less favorable than that it accords, in like circumstances, to 
investments of investors of any other Party or of a non-Party with respect 
to the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, 
operation, and sale or other disposition of investments. 
 
174 See the ILC Draft Articles on Most-Favoured-Nation Clauses, with Commentary, 
Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1978, vol. II, Part Two; Report of the 
Working Group on Most-Favoured-Nation Clauses, A/CN.4/L.719 20 July 2007; 
Matsushita, Schoenbaum and Mavroidis, 2003: 143. 
175 See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Most-Favoured-Nation 
Treatment, UNCTAD Series on Issues in International Investment Agreements, United 
Nations Publications, New York 1999, UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/10(Vol. III). As the MFN has 
been incorporated into BITs from their inception, it has a longer pedigree in investment 
treaty law than, for example, the national treatment standard (see UNCTAD, 1999: 12); 
it is therefore appropriate to open the chapter with its analysis. For a recent brief review 
of the standard, see also Acconci, P. ‘Most-favoured-nation treatment’, in The Oxford 
Handbook of International Investment Law: 363.   
176 Available at http://www.naftaclaims.com/commission.htm. The International Law 
Commission’s definition is as following: ‘…a treaty provision whereby a State 
undertakes an obligation towards another State to accord most-favoured-nation 
treatment in an agreed sphere of relations.’ See ‘Final draft articles on most favoured 
nation clauses’, 2 Yearbook of International Law Commission (1978): 16. 
177 Similarly to the other standard of treatment clauses contained in the NAFTA, the 
MFN clause includes pre-entry treatment, forbidding any discrimination with regards to 
‘market access’ for investors and investments.  
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Not all MFN clauses are the same, firstly as, even within a general non-
discrimination goal, exceptions are common178; secondly because the 
wording varies markedly and has evolved over time179. Nonetheless, in 
general terms the function of this clause is to equalise treatment, creating 
a ‘level playing field’180 by guaranteeing that new commitments made by 
states in successive investment treaties will be extended to investors 
covered by previous treaties181. In this way the MFN clause 
multilateralises investment commitments182 and harmonises treatment 
upwards (by ‘ratcheting up’ towards higher standards of protection)183. 
The RosInvest Tribunal boldly stated that: ‘the very character and 
 
178 See Newcombe and Paradell, 2009: 231 ff. 
179 With more specific clauses being introduced in treaties, also in response to the 
inconsistent jurisprudence of the tribunals as to the reach of the clause into procedural 
rights (see Article 3(3) of the United Kingdom Model BIT). 
180 See Schill 2009: 123. However, it could be argued that MFN clauses act as a 
constraint to a greater diversity of provisions to reflect the diversity of economic and 
social conditions (with the slippage between reciprocity and subordination outlined in 
Chapter 1). It seems reasonable to presume, for example, that developing countries 
would be weary of signing BITs amongst themselves that offer better treatment than 
what is available on the ‘investment treaty market’, because investors from third, 
developed countries, could use the MFN clause to take advantage of those benefits. As a 
consequence, there will be very similar BITs across the board, giving the false 
impression that there is a consensus on the content of these treaties, with the MFN 
clause acting as an effective stoppage for any real diversity. 
181 See Berschader v. Russia, SCC Case No. 080/2004, Award of 21 April 2006, § 179: 
‘It is universally agreed that the very essence of an MFN provision in a BIT is to afford 
to investors all material protection provided by subsequent treaties.’  For the MFN 
clause as a tool for evolutionary interpretation, see also RosInvest v. Russian 
Federation, SCC Case No V079/2005, Award on Jurisdiction, 5 October 2007, at § 40: 
‘….so far as the treaty parties foresaw and wished to  admit an evolutionary 
development at all, the MFN clause in Article 3 was their chosen vehicle for doing so.’  
182 Schill, 2009; Schill, S., ‘Multilateralizing investment treaties through most-favoured-
nation clauses’, 27 Berkeley Journal of International Law (2009): 496.  
183 The first investment treaty arbitration in which this principle was affirmed was Asian 
Agricultural Products Limited (AAPL) v. Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka 
(ICSID Case No. ARB/87/3), Award, 27 June 1990, § 54. 
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intention [of MFN clauses] is that protection not accepted in one treaty is 
widened by transferring the protection accorded in another treaty’184.  
 
As a form of comparative standard, MFN clauses do not contain any 
substantive element: their function is purely as ‘containers’ of whatever 
treatment the investor claims to be more favourable than the one 
accorded to him in the circumstances. Consequently, the task of the 
arbitral tribunal is to assess if the facts of the case, and the application of 
the limiting provisions when applicable, warrant the acknowledgment 
that the investor was unfairly discriminated under the basic treaty185 by 
failure to grant the more favourable treatment accorded to third party 
nationals (either de jure or de facto). Jurisprudence under the NAFTA 
has proven that the incorporation of more favourable treaty provisions is 
undertaken with caution, at least within the NAFTA regime. While the 
Pope & Talbot tribunal accepted in principle that the MFN Article 1103 
in the NAFTA could be used to import more favourable provisions with 
respect to the ‘fair and equitable’ treatment from other BITs signed by 
Canada, in the end it did not examine the behaviour of Canada under 
Article 1103186. On the other hand, in MTD v. Chile187 the tribunal 
 
184 At § 131, for the argument that the tribunal ‘[upheld] jurisdiction … by allowing a 
British investor to invoke a dispute settlement clause with a wider substantive scope. 
This seems to be so far the only existing decision where the tribunal accepted the import 
of a procedural aspect of a dispute settlement provision other than the waiting period’, 
see Herrmann, C. and Terhechte, J. P., 2010 European Yearbook of International 
Economic Law, Berlin, Springer, 2010: 98.  
185 The treaty containing the MFN clause is designated as the basic treaty; the more 
favourable treatment might not necessarily be treaty-based, therefore there might or 
might not be another treaty for tribunals to consider. The repercussions on the burden of 
proof for the investor in relation to the existence of the more favourable treatment are 
beyond the scope of this project. 
186 Its argument being dependent on the scope of the fair and equitable treatment under 
Article 1105 following the Interpretative Note of the FTC.  See Pope & Talbot v. 
Canada, Award in Respect of Damages, 31 May 2002, § 12. Normative overlap 
between the standards has attracted the attention of the NAFTA parties; the United 
States made a submission to the Chemtura Tribunal, to the effect that: ‘the most-
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applied the MFN clause of the basic treaty; as this one explicitly pegged 
the MFN to the fair and equitable treatment standard188 all the tribunal 
said it had to consider, in dealing with the MFN breach claim, was 
‘…whether the provisions of the Croatia BIT and the Denmark BIT 
[third party treaties invoked under the MFN] which deal with the 
obligation to award permits subsequent to approval of an investment and 
to fulfilment of contractual obligations, respectively, can be considered 
to be part of fair and equitable treatment.’ Equally, the Rumeli tribunal 
held that a breach of the fair and equitable treatment standard could be 
found by application of the MFN clause which imported that obligation 
from third treaties into the basic treaty189. The linkage between MFN and 
FET was equally sought by the claimant and examined by the tribunal in 
the Parkerings Case190, a case in which ultimately the tribunal found 
against the claimant also by application of the limiting clause (‘in like 
circumstances’ provision).   
 
There are two ways in which this clause can be used to maximise the 
protections accorded to the investor: by express inclusion of the pre-
establishment phase within the reach of the clause191 and by a wide 
 
favored-nation (“MFN”) obligation under Article 1103 does not alter the substance of 
the fair and equitable treatment obligation under Article 1105(1).’ (Submission of 31 
July 2009, at http://www.state.gov/s/l/c29737.htm). This is a restatement of what 
already submitted by the parties to the Pope & Talbot tribunal.   
187 MTD Equity Sdn. Bhd. and MTD Chile S.A. v. Republic of Chile (ICSID Case No. 
ARB/01/7), Award, 25 May 2004, §§ 100 ff. 
188 The article read as follows: ‘Investments made by investors of either Contracting 
Party in the territory of the other Contracting Party shall receive treatment which is fair 
and equitable, and not less favourable than that accorded to investments made by 
investors of any third State.’ 
189 Rumeli Telekom A.S. and Telsim Mobil Telekomunikasyon Hizmetleri A.S. v, 
Kazakhstan, (ICSID Case No. ARB/05/16), Award, 29 July 2008, § 575. 
190 Analysed in Section 7.4.2.  
191 As in the NAFTA clause and in most recent Free Trade Agreements (see Report of 
the MFN Working Group, at 9). 
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interpretation of the ‘treatment’ and ‘in like circumstances’ terms (for 
example to include procedural rights in the treatment, or by application 
of the WTO definition of likeness192). In short, the clause can work on 
three levels, extending substantive protections, procedural avenues to 
redress (by-passing admissibility criteria) and the arbitral ‘reach’ (the 
state’s consent to arbitration). Recent jurisprudence of arbitration 
tribunals has generated a considerable debate on the procedural aspects 
of the clause193; however, it is the extension (or restriction) of 
 
192 For the ‘like products’ clause (GATT I:I), see Appellate Body Report, Japan – Taxes 
on Alcoholic Beverages; Canada/Japan – Tariff on Imports of Spruce, Pine, Fir (SPF) 
Dimension Lumber, 19 July 1989, GATT B.I.S.D.(36th Supp.): 167 (1990). This 
approach was rejected by the Occidental Tribunal, with regard to the interpretation of 
the national treatment: ‘…it [the national treatment] is to avoid exporters being placed 
at a disadvantage in foreign markets because of the indirect taxes paid in the country of 
origin, while in GATT/WTO the purpose is to avoid imported products being affected 
by a distortion of competition with similar domestic products because of taxes and other 
regulations in the country of destination’. (Occidental Exploration and Production 
Company v. Ecuador, LCIA (UNCITRAL), Award, 1 July 2004: § 176). Divergent 
interpretation is also advocated by the Methanex Tribunal, Methanex v. United States, 
Award, 3 August 2005: Part IV, Ch. B, §§ 30-35. 
193 Cases in which the jurisdictional extension argument was rejected include the Anglo-
Iranian Oil Company Case (United Kingdom v. Iran) 1952 I.C.J. Rep 93; Plama 
Consortium Ltd. v. Republic of Bulgaria (ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24) Decision on 
Jurisdiction, 8 February 2005, § 214 (the Tribunal also argued on the back of the 
‘generally accepted principle of the separability… of the arbitration clause’, at § 212); 
see also Telenor Mobile Communications AS v. Republic of Hungary (ICSID Case No. 
ARB/04/15), Award, 13 September 2006, § 95. Cases in which the clause was intended 
to extend to such matters include Ambatielos Case (Greece v. United Kingdom), 1953 
I.C.J. Rep. 10; Emilio Agustín Maffezini v. Kingdom of Spain (ICSID Case No. 
ARB/97/7), Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction, 25 January 2000, § 50; Siemens AG 
v. Argentine Republic (ICSID Case ARB/02/8), Decision on Jurisdiction, 3 August 
2004, § 109.  For a taste of the ensuing debate, see Chukwumerije, O., ‘Interpreting 
most-favoured-nation clauses in investment treaty arbitrations’, 8 JWI&T (2007): 35-36; 
Freyer, D., and Herlihy, D., ‘Most-favored-nation treatment and dispute settlement in 
investment arbitration’, 20 ICSID Review (2005): 67; Gaillard, E., ‘Establishing 
jurisdiction through a most-favored-nation clause’, 233 New York Law Journal (June 2, 
2005): 7; Hsu, L., ‘MFN and dispute settlement – when the twain meet’, 7 JWI&T 
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substantive protection by application of the clause that has a more 
immediate relationship with conflicting obligations undertaken
st
 
While the extension of the treaty protections to investors in the pre-
establishment phase constitutes in absolute terms the most significant 
change, we are more interested in the interpretative work of tribunals 
applying the MFN clause by reference to the ‘treatment’ and ‘in like 
circumstances’ provisions194. As it is uncontroversial that the function of 
the MFN clause is to optimise the treatment of investors, a lot rests on 
how the term ‘treatment’ is interpreted; in other words, beyond the 
application of the ejusdem generis principle195, what kind of treatment is 
covered by the clause. Is treatment accorded to an individual investor the 
same as treatment accorded to investors as a group (national v. foreigner, 
or country A investor(s) v. country B investor(s)?) The answer lies in 
                     
e also 
SID Case No. ARB/03/24), Decision on 
Ju
. 
y 
D 
-
ntaries, Yearbook of the International Law 
many 1998 Model BIT) 
or clauses that contain the ‘in like circumstances’ restriction.  
(2006): 29; Radi, Y., ‘The application of the most-favoured-nation clause to the dispute 
settlement provisions of bilateral investment treaties’, 18 EJIL (2007): 771-73. Se
Plama Consortium Ltd. v. Bulgaria, (IC
risdiction, 8 February, 2005, § 221.  
194 Taking into consideration that, for example, there are no NAFTA cases in which a 
successful claim for violation of the MFN clause was made; see for example ADF v
United States of America (2002) and Pope & Talbot Inc. v. Canada (2001, 2002).  
195 ‘The ejusdem generis principle is the rule according to which a MFN clause can onl
attract matters belonging to the same subject matter or the same category of subject to 
which the clause relates.’ OECD, International Investment Perspectives, Paris, OEC
Publications, 2004: 151. See Articles 9 and 10 of the ILC’s Draft Articles on Most
Favoured-Nation Clauses with Comme
Commission, 1978, Vol.II, Part Two. 
196 There is quite a difference between a wording such as ‘Neither Contracting State 
shall subject investments in its territory owned or controlled by investors of the other 
Contracting State to treatment less favourable than it accords to investments of its own 
investors or to investments of investors of any third State’ (Ger
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taken by the tribunal197. The interpretation of what constitutes treatment 
for the purpose of the clause is essential to determine its applicability,  
keeping into consideration that certain ‘treatments’ might not be easy to 
ascertain: for example, favourable concessions contained in a contract 
might be covered by commercial confidentiality.  
 
Conversely, there are two ways in which the reach of the clause can be 
limited: express restrictions and exceptions198, or restrictions by the 
language of the treaty, mainly by inclusion of the ‘in like circumstances’ 
limiting clause, as is the case in the NAFTA199. The similarly worded 
principle in GATT rests on a competitive, market-based test to establish 
likeness200 and it’s circumscribed by the accompanying exceptions; in 
 
197 The general approach is to consider the clause applicable to de jure and de facto 
treatment; see the Commentary to Article 8 in the ILC Draft Articles on the MFN 
clause: ‘The rule is important and its validity is not dependent on whether the treatment 
extended by the granting State to a third State, or to persons or things in a determined 
relationship with the latter, is based upon a treaty, another agreement or a unilateral, 
legislative, or other act, or mere practice.’ For its application in trade law, see also 
Appellate Body Report, Canada–Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive Industry, § 
78, T/DS139/AB/R, WT/DS142/AB/R (WTO) (May 31, 2000).   
198 For example, for taxation measures or customs unions or other similar regional 
arrangements; see OECD report: 5 ff. On the conflict between the MFN clause and 
European Union law, see Schill, 27 Berkeley Journal of International Law (2009): 496, 
at 525 ff. 
199 As in US and Canadian BITs. The ‘in like circumstances’ provision is not common 
in European BITs; see OECD study, at 6 and footnote above for one example. 
200 See for example Bronckers, M., A Cross Section of WTO Law, Cameron May, 
London, 2000, at 18: ‘What the Liquor Taxes cases have done is emphasise that what 
counts in defining ‘like’ or ‘directly competitive or substitutable products’ is 
competition in the market place, which is determined from the consumer’s perspective.’ 
Again, at page 50: ‘It is not sufficient for a WTO member to make a political statement 
that consumers want, or should want, to make a distinction between different products 
out of environmental or other concerns. ‘Like’ products are not determined by 
legislative command; they are created by market perceptions.’ It is part of the ‘political 
choices’ theme that we introduced in the previous chapter to note that, according to 
Bronckers’ interpretation, supported by Appellate Body case law (see Japanese Liquor 
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investment law, the clause’s application is in principle absolute in scope 
(there are normally no exceptions) so it is only through reference to the 
‘circumstances’ in which investors find themselves (this extent 
comparable to a ‘regulatory context test’201) that the clause is amenable 
to be interpreted as to allow for lawful discrimination based on the 
regulatory element of the treatment (where high environmental impact 
industries, subjected to a different regulatory regime compared to low 
impact ones, cannot claim a breach of a non-discrimination standard with 
respect of the low impact industries because the ‘in like circumstances’ 
clause is not applicable)202.  
 
 
3.2.1.2 National treatment standard  
 
The national treatment standard, developed as part of the customary rules 
on the treatment of aliens203, is included in most investment treaties204. 
 
Taxes II, Appellate Body Report, § 20), market based evidence trumps democratic votes 
in establishing the will of the ‘consumers’ (who are also voters). See however European 
Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos Containing Products, Report 
of the Appellate Body, WTO, AB-2000-11, March 2001, where the AB accepted that 
environmental factors can be taken into account in determining ‘likeness’ between 
products. (But see ‘WTO Confidential’, at footnote 121, for an insider’s, more nuanced 
view of this apparent victory for environmentalists).  
201 See DiMascio, N. and Pauwelyn, J., ‘Non-discrimination in trade and investment 
treaties: worlds apart or two sides of the same coin?’ 102 AJIL (2008): 81. 
202 See Baetens, F., ‘Discrimination on the basis of nationality: determining likeness in 
human rights and investment law’, in Schill, 2010: 279 at 310, quoting the statement of 
the US representative at the MAI negotiations to the effect that the ‘in like 
circumstances’ clause serves the purpose of allowing for all the circumstances to be 
taken into consideration (including limiting ones) in order to establish likeness. 
203 For the content of the standard in trade law and its relationship with the investment 
law version, see DiMascio and Pauwelyn, 2008: 48. 
204 A review of the standard in United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 
National Treatment, UNCTAD Series on Issues in International Investment 
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As intended by those countries that championed it, this standard 
prohibited preferential or privileged treatment of foreigners: in the words 
of Carlos Calvo, the Argentine publicist who contributed to the 
development of the doctrine205: ‘Aliens who established themselves in a 
country are certainly entitled to the same rights of protection as nationals, 
but they cannot claim any greater measure of protection.’ In the 
translation from customary to treaty law, the national standard of 
treatment has been re-conceptualised as a classic non-discrimination 
provision206. Similarly to the MFN standard, the national standard acts as 
a comparing standard, where the treatment granted to the foreigner is 
compared to that of nationals, usually to the effect that the treatment 
should be ‘same as’ or ‘no less favourable than’ that granted to nationals. 
As an example of a far-reaching national treatment clause207, we refer to 
the NAFTA provision, at Article 1102 of Chapter Eleven208: 
 
Agreements, United Nations Publications, New York 1999, UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/11 (Vol. 
IV).   
205 See Dolzer, R., National Treatment: New Developments, OECD Symposium, 12 July 
2005, at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/5/53/36055356.pdf.;  
206 To this extent, a comparison between the classic customary notion of the standard 
and its modern treaty version could be considered inappropriate; see  Weiler, T., 
‘Saving Oscar Chin [sic]: non-discrimination in international investment law’, in Horn, 
N. (ed.), Arbitrating Foreign Investment Disputes, The Hague, Kluwer Law 
International, 2004: 159. To note that the ‘in like circumstances’ clause is applied by the 
PCIJ, which established, at 23, that: ‘The special advantages and conditions resulting 
from the measures of June 20th, 1931, were bound up with the position of Unatra as a 
Company under State supervision and not with its character as a Belgian Company. 
These measures, as decreed, would have been inapplicable to concerns not under 
government supervision, whether of Belgian or foreign nationality. The inequality of 
treatment could only have amounted to a discrimination forbidden by the Convention if 
it had applied to concerns in the same position [italics added] as Unatra, and this was 
not the case.’ On this case see also Lauterpacht, H., The Development of International 
Law by the International Court, Cambridge, CUP (Reprint) 1996: 262. 
207 As we have seen already for the MFN standard, clauses that include so-called ‘pre-
entry’ rights are considered particularly favourable, as they extend the reach of the 
clause to admission of investors, prohibiting discrimination at this level as well, 
contrary to customary law but in line with the principles as  used in trade law (where it 
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 1. Each Party shall accord to investors of another Party treatment 
no less favorable than that it accords, in like circumstances, to its own 
investors with respect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion, 
management, conduct, operation, and sale or other disposition of 
investments. 
2. Each Party shall accord to investments of investors of another Party 
treatment no less favorable than that it accords, in like circumstances, to 
investments of its own investors with respect to the establishment, 
acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation, and sale or 
other disposition of investments. 
 
An example of a national treatment clause that does not include pre-entry 
rights is Article 10(7) of the Energy Charter Treaty209: 
 
 Each Contracting Party shall accord to Investments in its Area of 
Investors of other Contracting Parties, and their related activities 
including management, maintenance, use, enjoyment or disposal, 
treatment no less favourable than that which it accords to Investments of 
its own Investors or of the Investors of any other Contracting Party or 
any third state and their related activities including management, 
maintenance, use, enjoyment or disposal, whichever is the most 
favourable. 
 
As the MFN standard with which it is usually coupled, the standard rests 
on a two-steps test for applicability210: if the foreign investor and the 
 
is border restrictions that need to be eliminated). On the right of establishment, see 
Sacerdoti, Recueil des Cours, 1997. 
208 Available at http://www.naftaclaims.com/commission.htm.  
209 Available at http://www.encharter.org/index.php?id=178. The clause also includes 
the MFN element.  
210 The standard case for the ‘in like circumstances’ provision in the NAFTA is Pope & 
Talbot, Inc. v. Canada, NAFTA/UNCITRAL, Damages Award, 31 May 2002; see also 
Marvin Feldman v. United Mexican States, (ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/1), Final 
Award, 16 December 2002; ADF Group Inc. v United States of America (ICSID Case 
No. ARB(AF)/00/1) Final Award, 9 January 2003; for a different, contrary, approach, 
see Raymond Loewen and the Loewen Group v. United States of America, (ICSID Case 
No. ARB(AF)/98/3) Final Award, 26 June 2003. A violation of Article 1102 was 
claimed also in Ethyl Corporation v. Canada (UNCITRAL), Award on Jurisdiction, 24 
June 1998; S.D. Meyers v. Canada (UNCITRAL), Partial Award on the Merits, 13 
November 2000; Mondev International Limited v. United States of America (ICSID 
Case No. ARB(AF/99/2), Award, 11 October 2002; GAMI Investments v United 
 
 
 
76
clause212.  
                                                                                                                                                   
domestic investor are ‘in like circumstances’ (as this restriction normally  
applies) and if the treatment to which the domestic investor is subject is 
more favourable than the treatment accorded to the foreign investor211. In 
other words, tribunals are required to perform a test of ‘likeness’ (to 
ascertain that the circumstances of the two groups of investors are the 
same) and a test of ‘difference’ (to ascertain if their treatment differs, and 
if so, if the treatment is less favourable, as per treaty standard).  For the 
purpose of protection, it could therefore be the extension, or conversely, 
the restriction of the comparing circumstances, to determine the extent to 
which the foreign investor will benefit from the coverage of the 
 
d 
 
s (ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/04/01) 
e 
t,’ this 
if 
n investors claim against the 
tr
 in a 
 
Mexican States (UNCITRAL), Final Award, 15 November 2004; Methanex 
Corporation v. United States of America (UNCITRAL), Final Award on Jurisdiction 
and Merits, 9 August 2005; Softwood Lumber Cases (Canfor, Tembec and Terminal v. 
United States of America), (UNCITRAL), Decision on Jurisdiction, 6 June 2006; Unite
Parcel Service of America v. Canada, Final Award on the Merits, 24 May 2007; Corn
Products International v. United Mexican State
Decision on Responsibility, 15 January 2008.  
211 A separate issue is the applicability of the clause to sub-national entities. If the 
foreign investor is given the ‘best national treatment’, this can be either a) if the sam
conditions apply (in like circumstances provision applied in the strictest sense); b) 
regardless (for example, even if they are not investing in a deprived area, in which the 
best conditions apply, but they invest in the same industry: lax application of the ‘in like 
circumstances’); if the foreign investor is given the ‘minimum national treatmen
can also be 2 ways, a) if the conditions do not apply (opposite of 1a), b) even 
conditions apply (opposite of 1b); in case 2a, can foreign investors claim for 
anticompetitive policy by the State? In case 2b, can foreig
eatment given to national investors for discrimination? 
212 Incidentally, the value of the national treatment clause is directly proportional to the 
standard of treatment granted to national investors: consequently, the NAFTA national 
treatment clause will be more valuable than the national treatment clause contained
BIT which pairs up a developed and a ‘least developed’ country, structurally and 
economically ill-equipped to provide what would be considered a high standard of
treatment. Equally, better business conditions might be accompanied by a stricter 
regulatory regime: since ‘national treatment’ is an all-encompassing term’, in principle 
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The circumstances can be restricted to the economic or business 
circumstances (i.e. investors operating in the same economic sector, in a 
strict application of the clause213, or without sectoral limitations, in a lax 
application) or include the regulatory circumstances, which ultimately 
requires the tribunal to examine the intent of the state in differentiating 
treatment on the basis of a legitimate exercise of the public interest 
rationale214. Even when tribunals are willing to take ‘regulatory likeness’ 
into consideration, not necessarily this will work to exonerate the state 
from a finding of violation of the national treatment clause: in this case, 
both intent and the burden of proof then become relevant to the analysis 
of the tribunal: as intent can also include other, non legitimate grounds 
for action (such as protectionist intent), the tribunal might still find 
against the state, even if there were other, legitimate grounds for treating 
the foreign investor ‘unlike’ the national one (as was the case in S.D. 
Myers); additionally, the measures might still be subjected to a WTO-
style proportionality test, with only the least restrictive measures being 
allowed. As for the burden of proof, it will matter at which stage of the 
process (as we have seen that there are at least two steps in establishing 
likeness) which party has the burden to prove discrimination: a prima 
facie claim of discrimination might be met by a defence of legitimate 
regulation. It will then be up to tribunals to consider if, even with a 
successful defence of legitimate exercise of the public interest, the 
claimant can counter-claim that: either the legitimate exercise masks a 
hidden protectionist intent; or, least restrictive measures were available to 
achieve the same goal.  
 
all elements of the treatment can be used as comparators, even if the investor only claim 
tates 
tes, UNCITRAL/NAFTA, Final award, 9 August 2005, 
ers and Parkerings Tribunals; analysis and full 
references for both cases in Chapter 7. 
a violation of the clause with reference to one of the elements. 
213 As done for example by the tribunals in Martin Feldman v. United Mexican S
(ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/1), Final award, 16 December 2002, § 171; and 
Methanex Corp. v. United Sta
Part IV, Chapter B, §§ 17 ff. 
214 As done for example by the S.D. My
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bsolute standard’ route, as we shall see in the following section216.  
.2.2 Absolute standards  
.2.2.1 International minimum standard  
guaranteeing a minimum standard of treatment for aliens, regardless of 
                                                
 
Overall, tribunals, most of them established under the NAFTA215, have 
been cautious in assessing claims of violation of national treatment 
standard; proportionality analysis is not the norm in investment law in 
general and all the more in claims arising from comparative standards 
violations. The complexity of the WTO texts and jurisprudence on 
comparative standards, either MFN or national, is not matched by the 
minimalist, some could say deficient, language of the investment treaties 
and the underdeveloped case law and reasoning of investment arbitration 
tribunals, not helped, it is submitted, by the structural differences 
between the trade and the investment legal regimes. Additionally, for 
historical, economic and political reasons, investors in general prefer 
‘a
 
 
3
 
3
 
This standard of treatment was developed in customary law as a way of 
 
215 As noted by Grierson-Weiler and Laird: ‘Thus far [2008], we have only a clutch
NAFTA awards addressing the meaning of a “proper” national treatment or MFN 
provision ...Virtually no other awards are publicly available addressing what “treatment 
no less favourable” means outside the GATT/WTO and NAFTA context.’ (in Oxfor
Handbook of International Investment Law: 259, at 290-1). It is submitted that, the 
greater the economic and governance divide between the parties, the less likely that a 
claim for violation of the comparative standards will be raised, therefore it is no surpri
that most of the claims arise from the NAFTA,
 of 
d 
se 
 where two of the three parties share a 
treatment in international investment law and the WTO’, in Schill, 2010: 243, at 250.  
very similar level of economic development.  
216 As also noted by Kurtz, J., ‘The merits and limits of comparativism: national 
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the level of the national standard217. Capital exporting states championed 
the international minimum standard (IMS) as capable of guaranteeing an 
acceptable standard of protection for aliens across the board218. The 
criteria for its application were established by the Neer Claim 
Commission and have been used ever since219. They establish quite a 
high threshold for an investor to meet in his claim (or conversely, subject 
the states to quite low obligations with respect to foreigners) and it has 
been argued that investment law has developed an independent, higher 
standard of treatment decoupled from the minimalist approach of the 
 
217 Rousseau, C., Droit International Public, Paris, Siray, 1970: 46; OECD, Fair and 
Equitable Treatment Standard in International Investment Law, OECD Working Papers 
on International Investment, No. 2004/3, Paris, OECD, 2004: 8-9. 
218 As noted by the S.D. Myers tribunal: ‘The minimum standard of treatment provision 
of the NAFTA is similar to clauses contained in [bilateral investment treaties]. The 
inclusion of a “minimum standard” provision is necessary to avoid what might 
otherwise be a gap. A government might treat an investor in a harsh, injurious and 
unjust manner, but do so in a way that is no different than the treatment inflicted on its 
own nationals. The “minimum standard” is a floor below which treatment of foreign 
investors must not fall [italics added], even if a government were not acting in a 
discriminatory manner.’ S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Government of Canada, Award, 13 
November 2000, § 259. 
219 L.F.H. Neer and Pauline Neer (USA) v. United Mexican States, U.S.-Mexican 
General Claims Commission, 4 RIAA 60. The Commission required that, in order for 
there to be ‘an international delinquency’, ‘the treatment of an alien ... should amount to 
an outrage, to bad faith, to wilful neglect of duty, or to an insufficiency of governmental 
action so far short of international standards that every reasonable and impartial man 
would readily recognize its insufficiency.’ (At :1). The Commission found the facts of 
the case did not support such a claim, which was therefore disallowed. It might also be 
opined that the criteria have been given more weight than they are able to carry. The 
standard is already mentioned in the Sicilian Sulphur Monopoly Case in 1838 (see 
British and Foreign State Papers, Vol. 28: 1166 ff., especially 1202, 1215 and 1218), as 
quoted by Herz, J.H. , ‘Expropriation of foreign property’, 35 AJIL (1941): 243, at 257: 
‘there [in the Sicilian Sulphur Case] for the first time, the principle of equal treatment of 
aliens as the maximum of what foreigners could claim in this respect was opposed to 
that of an international standard of justice which, under certain circumstances, would 
give foreigners more than equality with nationals’.  
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Neer standard. In its 2001 Interim Award,220 the Pope & Talbot Tribunal 
read an additional requirement of fairness in the international minimum 
standard of treatment (contained in Article 1105 of the NAFTA) thanks 
to the developments of treaty law, and more specifically, the 1987 US 
Model Bilateral Investment Treaty. The tribunal’s interpretation 
provoked the response of the Free Trade Commission, which issued a 
binding interpretative note to the effect that the Article 1105 standard 
‘does not require treatment in addition to or beyond that which is 
required by the customary international law minimum standard of 
treatment of aliens’221. The Mondev tribunal went even further, rejecting 
the Neer standard as outdated and inadequate to cover the rights of 
individuals against state action222 and arguing for the status of the IMS as 
lex specialis. 
 
With respect to the relationship between the treaty standard and 
customary international law two currents can be identified: tribunals 
arbitrating disputes on a violation of NAFTA Article 1105 will pay 
greater attention to the content of the customary standard, with more or 
less deference paid to the Interpretative Note of the FTC223; tribunals 
 
220 Pope & Talbot v. Government of Canada, Interim Award on Merits, Phase 2, 10 
April 2001, § 111. 
221 In its subsequent Interim Award on Damages, the Pope & Talbot Tribunal, while 
accepting the note, defended its Award as consistent with it; see Pope & Talbot, Interim 
Award on Damages, 31 May 2002, §§ 49 ff. The Tribunal rejected a ‘static 
interpretation’ of customary international law, ‘frozen in amber’ at the time of the Neer 
Claim, stressing again the influence of treaty law’s developments on customary 
obligations. However it went on to remark that the behaviour of the defendant state in 
any case rose to the level of the Neer standard. 
222 See Mondev International Ltd v. United States of America (ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/99/2), Award, 11 October 2002, §§ 116-118. 
223 See ADF Group Inc. v. United States of America (ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/1), 
Award, 9 January 2003, § 183: ‘We are not convinced that the Investor has shown the 
existence, in current customary international law, of a general and autonomous 
requirement (autonomous, that is, from specific rules addressing particular, limited, 
contexts) to accord fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security to 
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arbitrating disputes arising under other investment agreements will refer 
to general rules of treaty interpretation in order to give content to the 
standard in the context of the treaty224, to the extent that they recognise, 
first, that CIL and treaty standard differ, and, second, that the treaty 
standard requires treatment in addition to what is provided in CIL225.  
3.2.2.2 Fair and equitable treatment standard 
 
The FET standard has been transformed from ‘sleeping beauty’226 to 
‘workhorse’ of investment law227. The case law on it is increasing228, as 
 
foreign investments. The Investor, for instance, has not shown that such a requirement 
has been brought into the corpus of present day customary international law by the 
many hundreds of bilateral investment treaties now extant.’ 
224 See Técnicas Medioambentales (Tecmed) S. A. v. United Mexican States, ICSID 
Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2, Award, 29 May 2003, § 155. The Tecmed Tribunal gave a 
comprehensive account of what it considered the content of the FET standard in the 
previous paragraph.   
225 See also Kläger, R., ‘Fair and equitable treatment: a look at the theoretical 
underpinnings of legitimacy and fairness’, 11 JWI&T (2010): 436, referring to the plain 
meaning approach (FET as a free-standing standard) and the equating approach (FET 
equivalent to the IMS). Kläger, however, argues that contemporary tribunal practice is 
overcoming the controversy around this distinction, at 439.  
226 Schreuer, C., ‘The FET standard as “sleeping beauty”’, in Ortino et al., 2007: 92. 
227 OECD, Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in International Investment Law, 
OECD Working Papers on International Investment, No. 2004/3, Paris, OECD, 2004; 
Ortino, F. et al., Investment Treaty Law – Current Issues II, British Institute of 
International and Comparative Law, London, 2007 (Part II); Tudor, I., The Fair and 
Equitable Treatment Standard in the International Law of Foreign Investment, Oxford, 
OUP, 2008; Yannaca-Small, ‘Fair and equitable treatment standard: recent 
developments’, in Reinisch, 2008: 111; McLachlan, C., Shore, L. and Weiniger, M., 
International Investment Arbitration – Substantive Principles, Oxford, OUP, 2009 (Part 
III.7). 
228 Schreuer cites 13 claims of violation of the FET standard between 2006 and 2008; 
see Schreuer, C., ‘Introduction: interrelationship of standards’, Reinisch, A. (ed.), 
Standards of Investment Protection, Oxford, OUP, 2008: 2. For a comprehensive list of 
awards, see footnote 256, infra. 
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is the literature on its wording and its content229. Its relationship with the 
IMS230 has provoked disagreements between states and investors and 
resulted in conflicting awards by tribunals, with some arguing for its self-
standing, autonomous nature as a treaty-based standard, and some 
insisting on its linkage with the customary law international minimum 
standard. As Zachary Douglas remarked: ‘The complex issue is the 
technique by which, and the extent to which, general international law 
can be relied upon to give more specific content to the legal standard 
created by the investment treaty obligation’231. 
 
These disagreements notwithstanding, tribunals and commentators have 
found agreement on a series of elements included in the terms ‘fair and 
equitable’ as an independent treaty standard, taking into consideration the 
context in which the terms appear. The elements have been summarised 
in the OECD study232 as follows: a) obligation of vigilance and 
protection233; b) due process (to include protection against denial of 
justice and arbitrariness); c) transparency; d) good faith; and e) 
autonomous fairness elements. A definition that has been quoted and 
 
229 The terms ‘fair’ and ‘equitable’ are normally considered separately; see however the 
suggestion that they might be interpreted as a sort of hendiadys, Wälde, in Ortino et al., 
2007: 140, or, as also suggested, as a reference to ‘law and equity’ familiar to common 
law practitioners.   
230 Already established in the OECD Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign 
Property of 1967, 13-15, and confirmed in Article 1105 of the NAFTA. 
231 Douglas, 2009: 81. In other words, here, as often, the proposed approach is not of a 
binary choice, but of a balancing exercise. The conflict between the need to reconcile 
conflicting interests, or interpretations, and the binary structure of law results in the 
inevitable tensions and contestations.  
232 Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in International Investment Law, OECD 
Working Papers No 2004/3: 26 ff., at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/22/53/33776498.pdf.  
233 Also part of the usual accompanying standard of ‘full protection and security’. 
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relied upon by several tribunals234 was provided by the Tecmed 
tribunal235: 
 
 ... [the FET standard], in light of the good faith principle 
established by international law, requires the Contracting Parties to 
provide to international investments treatment that does not affect the 
basic expectations that were taken into account by the foreign investor to 
make the investment. The foreign investor expects the host State to act in 
a consistent manner, free from ambiguity and totally transparently in its 
relations with the foreign investor, so that it may know beforehand any 
and all rules and regulations that will govern its investments, as well as 
the goals of the relevant policies and administrative practices or 
directives, to be able to plan its investment and comply with such 
regulations. [...] The foreign investor also expects the host State to act 
consistently, i.e. without arbitrarily revoking any preexisting decisions or 
permits issued by the State that were relied upon by the investor to 
assume its commitments as well as to plan and launch its commercial and 
business activities.  
 
It is particularly within the context of NAFTA arbitrations that the 
content of the standard has resulted in disagreements and contestation236, 
as a result of some awards, which the NAFTA member states felt went 
too far in extending the standard to cover wide ranging protections, such 
as the transparency requirement advocated by the Metalclad tribunal237, 
or the requirement of fairness proposed by the Pope & Talbot tribunal. 
The FTC Interpretative Note can be seen as symptomatic of the attempt 
 
234 Eureko BV v. Republic of Poland, UNCITRAL (PCA Case No. 2008-13), Partial 
Award, 19 August 2005, § 235; Occidental Exploration and Production Co. v. Republic 
of Ecuador (ICSID Case No. ARB/06/11) Final Award, 1 July 2004, § 185; MTD 
Equity Sdn Bhd and MTD Chile SA v. Republic of Chile (ICSID Case No. ARB/01/7), 
Award, 25 May 2004, § 114. 
235 Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, SA v.United Mexican States (ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/00/2) Award, 29 May 2003, § 154. 
236 See especially Pope & Talbot, Interim Award on Damages, 31 May 2002, §§ 49 ff; 
Free Trade Commission Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11 Provisions 
(NAFTA Free Trade Commission, July 31, 2001) (On Article 1105).  
237 Metalclad Corporation v. United Mexican States (ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1), 
Final Award, 30 August 2000, §§ 76 ff. This criterion was rejected in the judicial 
review of the award by the Supreme Court of British Columbia, The United Mexican 
States v. Metalclad Corporation 2001 BCSC 664, §§ 69 ff.  
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made by the NAFTA states parties to anchor the IMS/FET standard to 
the supposedly stricter customary law provision238. Similar steps have 
been taken by the NAFTA parties in the re-drafting of their model 
investment treaties. For example, the US 2004 Model BIT provides that, 
‘The concepts of “fair and equitable treatment” and “full protection and 
security” do not require treatment in addition to or beyond that which is 
required by that standard, and do not create additional substantive 
rights’239. The recent debates on the relationship between the IMS and 
 
238 From the Interpretative Note of the FTC: ‘The concepts of “fair and equitable 
treatment” and “full protection and security” do not require treatment in addition to or 
beyond that which is required by the customary international law minimum standard of 
treatment of aliens.’ (At 
http://www.naftaclaims.com/files/NAFTA_Comm_1105_Transparency.pdf). It is 
submitted that the Note was meant to remind the tribunals ‘who is the boss’ in the 
NAFTA system, that is, the states. Especially in the context of the Pope & Talbot 
arbitration, the dual role of the involved state party (Canada) provoked criticism, as the 
Note was issued before the final award was delivered by the Tribunal. Equally, the 
tension between the rights of NAFTA investors v. rights of US investors underpinned 
the debate at the time when former President Bush requested Trade Promotion 
Authority, when Senators Kerry, Baucus and Grassley presented amendments trying to 
restrict the President’s power to approve trade and investment agreements which 
guaranteed rights to investor beyond what is available to US investors; see D. 
Schneiderman, 2008: 241 note 2.   
239 Article 5 [Minimum Standard of Treatment]. This amendment has been criticised for 
restricting unduly the scope of the standard; see for example Schwebel, S., ‘The United 
States 2004 model bilateral investment treaty: an exercise in the regressive development 
of international law’, Global Reflections on International Law, Commerce and Dispute 
Resolution, Liber Amicorum for Dr. Robert Briner, Paris, ICC Books, 2005: 815; 
Schwebel, S., ‘The United States 2004 model bilateral investment treaty and denial of 
justice in international law’, in Binder et al., 2009: 519. The restrictive interpretation 
was accepted by the Glamis tribunal, See Glamis Gold Ltd. v. United States of America, 
Counter-memorial of the Respondent, September 19 2006, §§ 218 ff. In short, this 
would imply the adoption of the US Supreme Court ‘minimum rationality’ standard of 
review for economic legislation, as articulated by the Court in United States v. Carolene 
Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938). This standard is comparable to the international 
standard expressed in the Neer Claim. The position of the United States was accepted 
by the Tribunal, see Glamis Gold Ltd. v. United States of America, Award, June 8 2009, 
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the FET, between custom and treaty based standards, fail to address 
satisfactorily both the disagreements on the content and the function of 
the FET standard, and on its relationship with applicable criteria for 
expropriation240. In any case, outside the independently-developing case 
law of the NAFTA241, investment jurisprudence seem to be moving 
 
§ 22. A critical review of this case by Schill, S., in 104(2) AJIL (2010): 253. In the 
opposite direction, the awards in Waste Management, Inc. v. United Mexican States 
(No. 2) (ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/3), Award, 30 April 2004, § 93. The Waste 
Management Tribunal also provided its own detailed interpretation of the standard, at § 
98: ‘....the minimum standard of treatment of fair and equitable treatment is infringed by 
conduct attributable to the State and harmful to the claimant if the conduct is arbitrary, 
grossly unfair, unjust or idiosyncratic, is discriminatory and exposes the claimant to 
sectional or racial prejudice, or involves a lack of due process leading to an outcome 
which offends judicial propriety – as might be the case with a manifest failure of natural 
justice in judicial proceedings or a complete lack of transparency or candour in an 
administrative process. In applying this standard it is relevant that the treatment is in 
breach of representations made by the host State which were reasonably relied on by the 
claimant.’ A much wider reach for the obligation is given by the Tecmed Tribunal, by 
extension of the standard to include a stable framework for the investment, see footnote 
224; this is accepted also in Bayindir Insaat Turizm Ticaret Ve Sanayi A.S. v. Islamic 
Republic of Pakistan (ICSID Case No. ARB/03/29) Decision on Jurisdiction, 14 
November 2005, § 240: ‘….a State can breach the ‘stability limb’ of its obligation 
through acts which do not concern the regulatory framework but more generally the 
State’s policy towards investments.’ 
240 Due process and non discrimination, which are elements of the FET standard, are 
also criteria for lawful expropriation. This could have repercussions for the assessment 
of a claim for compensation, as noted by Grierson-Weiler T. and Laird, I. A., ‘Standards 
of treatment,’ The Oxford Handbook of International Investment Law, 2008, Grierson-
Weiler and Laird, at 266: ‘...many of the expropriation provisions found in investment 
protection treaties indicate that state responsibility is incurred when due process is 
denied during the taking of a property. Surely this cannot mean that denials of due 
process do not constitute a breach of the minimum standard unless a taking is involved. 
And if it is accepted...that the obligation to provide full, fair, and effective 
compensation for expropriation is a matter of customary international law, is it really 
necessary to include the...rather ubiquitous expropriation provision in treaties that 
already contain a minimum standard provision?’ 
241 Exemplified by the Glamis Award, see infra. 
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beyond the controversy, as observed by the Saluka Tribunal: [....] it 
appears that the difference between the Treaty standard and the 
customary minimum standard, when applied to the specific facts of a 
case, may well be more apparent than real.’242 
 
Functionally, the FET standard is developing as the counterpart of the 
expropriation clause to cover all those cases short of an expropriation, in 
which the investor claims to have suffered a harm. This is now accepted 
by many investment scholars243 and informs the reasoning of tribunals. 
 
242 Saluka Investments BV v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Partial Award, 17 March 
2006, § 291. However, the Tribunal makes it clear in the following paragraphs that, in 
order for a violation of the treaty standard to be found, a ‘lower level of 
inappropriateness’ of the state’s behaviour might be sufficient, as compared to the 
customary standard, because of the purpose of BITs, which is the promotion of foreign 
investment, which requires a more pro-active and positive attitude from states. 
243 As noted by Grierson-Weiler and Laird, 1999, 268: ‘... a “fair and equitable 
treatment” provision can be construed broadly enough to cover all of the obligations in 
most conceivable investment disputes.’ See also See Schneiderman, 2008, 96; Dolzer, 
R., ‘Fair and equitable treatment: A key standard in investment treaties,’ 39 
International Law (2005): 87; On the relevance of the ‘legitimate expectations’ element 
of the FET standard and its relationship with expropriation claims, see International 
Thunderbird Gaming Corporation v. United Mexican States (UNCITRAL), Separate 
opinion of Thomas Wälde, 26 January 2006, § 37: ‘ One can observe over the last years 
a significant growth in the role and scope of the legitimate expectation principle, from 
an earlier function as a subsidiary interpretative principle to reinforce a particular 
interpretative approach chosen, to its current role as a self-standing subcategory and 
independent basis for a claim under the “fair and equitable standard” as under Art. 1105 
of the NAFTA. This is possibly related to the fact that it provides a more supple way of 
providing a remedy [italics added] appropriate to the particular situation as compared to 
the more drastic determination and remedy inherent in concept of regulatory 
expropriation. It is probably partly for these reasons that “legitimate expectation” has 
become for tribunals a preferred way of providing protection to claimants in situations 
where the tests for a “regulatory taking” appear too difficult, complex and too easily 
assailable for reliance on a measure of subjective judgment.’ 
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For example, the PSEG tribunal, in a case regarding a privatisation 
project in the energy sector, stated244:  
 
 The standard of fair and equitable treatment has acquired 
prominence in investment arbitration as a consequence of the fact that 
other standards traditionally provided by international law might not in 
the circumstances of each case be entirely appropriate. This is 
particularly the case when the facts of the dispute do not clearly support 
the claim of direct expropriation, but when there are notwithstanding 
events that need to be assessed under a different standard to provide 
redress in the event that the rights of the investor have been breached.  
 
A claim for breach of the FET standard, based on the violation of the 
principles of good faith and protection of legitimate expectations245 can 
 
244 PSEG Global Inc. and Konya Ilgin Elektrik Üretim ve Ticaret Limited Sirketi v. 
Republic of Turkey (ICSID Case No. ARB/02/5), Award, 19 January 2007, § 238.  
245 See Grierson-Weiler and Laird, 2008, at 272: ‘As an elemental principle in the 
ordering of relations between states, good faith provides the glue that holds the 
international order together.’ See also Schreuer, C., ‘Fair and equitable treatment in 
arbitral practice’, 6 Journal of World Investment & Trade (2005): 357 at 384; for the 
principle in awards, see AMCO Asia v. Indonesia, (ICSID Case No. ARB/81/1), Award, 
5 June 1990, 1 ICSID Reports 377, at 490 and 493; Tecnicas Medioambientales 
Tecmed, SA v. United Mexican States (ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2) Award, 29 May 
2003, §§ 153-4; Waste Management, Inc. v. United Mexican States (No. 2) (ICSID Case 
No. ARB(AF)/00/3), Award, 30 April 2004, § 138; MTD Equity Sdn Bhd & MTD Chile 
SA v. Republic of Chile (ICSID Case No. ARB/01/7) Award, 25 May 2004, § 109; 
Saluka BV v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Partial Award, 17 March 2006, § 303; 
Sempra Energy v. The Argentine Republic (ICSID Case No ARB/02/16) Award, 28 
September 2007, §§ 300-01; EDF (Services) Limited v. Romania (ICSID Case No. 
ARB/05/13), Award, 8 October 2009, § 216: ‘The Tribunal shares the view expressed 
by other tribunals that one of the major components of the FET standard is the parties’ 
legitimate and reasonable expectations with respect to the investment they have made’; 
Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona, S.A. and Vivendi Universal v. 
Argentine Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19), Decision on Liability, 30 July 2010 
(this case is interesting as Argentina, on top of using the necessity defence for its 
actions, also appealed to its human rights obligations in guaranteeing its citizens’ ‘right 
to water’; this argument was rejected by the Tribunal, which stated that Argentina had a 
duty to respect both its investment and human rights obligations equally, at § 262. For 
this case, see also the Separate Opinion of arbitrator Pedro Nikken, based on a 
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be successful with a lower standard of proof246 than a claim for indirect 
expropriation247. As noted by Dolzer, ‘...the principle [FET standard] has 
the potential to reach further into the traditional “domain réservé” of the 
host state than any one of the other rules’248. It is evidently for this 
reason that virtually all treaty claims include an alleged violation of the 
standard, as the casuistic approach advocated for its application allows 
for the elasticity of the system which makes a claim more likely to be 
successful.  
 
Recent scholarly developments have advocated a comparative approach 
that takes into account public law principles and standards for 
administrative conduct derived from liberal legal systems as an 
expression of the ‘rule of law’. Schill summarises the elements 
 
disagreement with the Tribunal on the inclusion of the ‘legitimate expectations’ of the 
investor in the substantive protections guaranteed by the FET standard.)  
246 The statement that: ‘the Chorzów Factory principle of full recovery of losses would 
equally apply to breach of fair and equitable treatment and expropriation’ might be a bit 
too optimistic (see Paradell, L., ‘The BIT experience of the fair and equitable treatment 
standard’, in Ortino et al., 2007: 118). The Chorzów Factory standard, which is much 
repeated in investment law, was linked in that particular case to express treaty 
commitments forbidding expropriation. A helpful survey on the topic in Wälde, T. and 
Sabahi, B., ‘Compensation, damages, and valuation’, in The Oxford Handbook of 
International Investment Law, 2008: 1049. For tribunals accepting the Chorzów 
standard for non-expropriation treaty breaches (including FET standard) see S. D. 
Myers, Inc. v. Canada, Award, 13 November 2004, § 304; Metalclad Corp. v. United 
Mexican States, Award, 30 August 2000, § 122. But for cases in which tribunals 
reduced the quantum in consideration of the legality of the states’ measures, see MTD 
Equity Sdn Bhd and MTD Chile SA v Republic of Chile, Award, 25 May 2004, §§ 242-
6; Iurii Bogdanov, Agurdino-Invest Ltd and Agurdino-Chimia JSC v. Republic of 
Moldova, Award 22 September 2005, § 5.2. 
247 See UNCTAD, Latest Developments in Investor-State Dispute Settlement, United 
Nations, New York and Geneva, 2009 (UNCTAD/WEB/DIAE/IA/2009/6/Rev1) at 8: 
‘[...] FET remains the most relied upon and successful basis for a treaty claim.’ 
248 Dolzer, R., ‘The impact of international investment treaties on domestic 
administrative law’, 37 NYU Journal of International Law and Policy (2005): 953 at 
964. 
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comprising the standard as follows: ‘[...] stability, predictability and 
consistency of the legal framework; the principle of legality; the 
protection of legitimate expectations;  procedural due process and denial 
of justice; substantive due process and protection against discrimination 
and arbitrariness; transparency; and the principle of reasonableness and 
proportionality’249. The principles, comprising substantive and 
procedural protection, absolute and balanced provisions, and pitched at a 
high level of abstraction, can work both to confer an unreasonably high 
level of protection against legitimate public interest intervention (for 
example, by a myopic reading of the stability requirement250) or allow 
for the appropriate balancing of conflicting, legitimate regulatory 
commitments (via the judicious application of the principle of 
proportionality). Recent arbitral awards reflect the developing consensus 
around this cluster of inter-related principles, which reveals more the 
common political and jurisprudential culture of the arbitrators251 than 
provides a faithful interpretation of the vague and almost content-free 
language of the treaties252. This is said without prejudice to the effective 
 
249 Schill, S., ‘Fair and equitable treatment, the rule of law, and comparative public 
law’, in Schill, 2010: 151, at 159-60.   
250 Such as the inflexible standard adopted by the Metalclad Tribunal; see Metalclad 
Corporation v. United Mexican States (ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1), Award, 30 
August 2000, § 76. It seems almost ironic that it is the FET standard, whose vagueness 
and uncertainty of application are common knowledge, to be dictating clarity, 
predictability, transparency etc. 
251 And of the investment community in general, including practitioners, public 
international lawyers, commercial lawyers and academics. 
252 A part from the awards already quoted in this section, see also the following: Ronald 
Lauder v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Final award, 2 September 2001; Occidental 
Exploration and Production Co. v. Republic of Ecuador, UNCITRAL, Final Award, 1 
July 2004; GAMI Investments Inc. v. United Mexican States, UNCITRAL/NAFTA, 
Final award, 15November 2004; CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic 
(ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8), Award, 12 May 2005; Noble Ventures, Inc. v. Romania 
(ICSID Case No. ARB/01/11), Award, 2 October 2005; International Thunderbird 
Gaming Corp. v. United Mexican States, UNCITRAL/NAFTA, Award, 26 January 
2006; Azurix Corp. v. Argentine Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB/03/30), Award, 14 
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relationship between rule of law, economic policy, political risk 
management, development programmes and so on, on which there is an 
immense literature, which we purposefully avoided in this work. 
 
 
3.3 Expropriation 
 
Moving from standards of treatment to expropriation results in a 
considerable shift of perspective. From claims based on alleged unlawful 
governmental action (standards of treatment which might, however 
peculiarly expressed in investment law, find their basis on general human 
rights obligations and customary law principles) we move to claims that 
are borne out of legitimate measures, accepted as lawful in customary 
international law, treaty law and domestic codes the world over, which 
can be distilled in a general principle of lawfulness of expropriation 
against the payment of compensation. Secondly, from standards of 
 
July 2006; LG&E Energy Corp. LG&E Capital Corp. and LG&E International Inc. v. 
Argentine Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1), Decision on Liability, 3 October 
2006; PSEG Global Inc. and Konya Ilgin Elektrik Üretim ve Ticaret Limited Sirketi v. 
Republic of Turkey (ICSID Case No. ARB/02/5), Award, 19 January 2007; Enron Corp. 
and Ponderosa Assets LP v. Argentine Republic (ICSID Case No. RB/01/3), Award, 22 
May 2007; Compañía de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. and Vivendi Universal S.A. v. 
Argentine Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3), Award, 20 August 2007; Parkerings-
Compagniet AS v. Republic of Lithuania (ICSID Case No. ARB/05/8), Award, 11 
September 2007; Metalpar S.A. and Buen Aire S.A. v. Argentine Republic (ICSID Case 
No. ARB/03/5), Award on the merits, 6 June 2008; Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Limited v. 
United Republic of Tanzania (ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22), Award, 24 July 2008; 
Rumeli Telekom A.S. and Telsim Mobil Telekomunikasyon Hizmetleri A.S. v. Republic 
of Kazakhstan (ICSID Case No. ARB/05/16), Award, 29 July 2008; Duke Energy 
Electroquil Partners and Electroquil S.A. v. Republic of Ecuador (ICSID Case No. 
ARB/04/19), Award, 18 August 2008; Continental Casualty Company v. Argentine 
Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9), Award, 5 September 2008; Jan de Nul N.V. and 
Dredging International N.V. v. Arab Republic of Egypt (ICSID Case No. ARB/04/13), 
Award, 6 November 2008; Bayindir Insaat Turizm Ticaret Ve Sanayi A.S. v. Islamic 
Republic of Pakistan (ICSID Case No. ARB/03/29), Award, 27 August 2009.  
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protection grounded directly in international law, we move to property 
law principles and concepts, rooted in domestic law253. While in 
principle standards of treatment can be enforced by reference to treaty 
based obligations exclusively (with claims based on a treaty protected 
right such as the FET standard), expropriation claims will necessarily 
find their basis on domestic law-protected rights. It will be the conduct of 
the host state with respect to the protected property right to constitute the 
breach254, but the legal basis of the claim will be a property right 
 
253 On the global constitutional nature of property rights protection, and in general on 
investment law as ‘global constitutional law’ (GCL), see Montt, S. State Liability in 
Investment Treaty Arbitration, Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2009: 12 ff., at 17: ‘...the 
principle of no expropriation without compensation, and its corresponding focus on the 
scope of property rights and investments, is defined here as the ‘centre of gravity’ of 
GCL...’. Montt notes though, at 173, that property rights do not tend to have a 
constitutional basis and quotes Fishel (at footnote 30) to the effect that the Takings 
Clause in the US Constitution has to be assessed with reference to other sources, such as 
statutes and common law. To this extent, American takings jurisprudence mirrors the 
way in which expropriation clauses are established with reference to domestic norms of 
property law; for this, see for example the Separate Opinion of Judge Morelli in 
Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. Ltd. (Belgium v. Spain) Second Phase, [1970] 
ICJ Rep.4, 234: ‘As will be observed, the fact that the rules of international law in 
question envisage solely such interests of foreigners as already constitute rights in the 
municipal order is but the necessary consequence of the very content of the obligations 
imposed by those rules; obligations which, precisely, presuppose rights conferred on 
foreigners by the legal order of the State in question.’ This might be taken as a further 
indication of the ‘constitutional status’ of the expropriation standards in international 
investment law (just as the takings clause has constitutional status with respect to 
domestically guaranteed property rights), especially in view of the ‘normative creep’ of 
the standards to cover rights which might not be recognised property rights domestically 
(‘investment access’ to a foreign market, for example [exercising ‘conceptual 
severance’], see Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. The Government of Canada (UNCITRAL), 
Interim Award – Phase One, 26 June 2000, § 96).  
254 Regardless of its legality in the municipal law of the host state: see Article 27 of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. See also Crawford, J. (ed.), The 
International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility: Introduction, Text 
and Commentaries, Cambridge, CUP, 2002 at 61: ‘The characterization of an act of a 
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established in the municipal property law or contract law (for 
expropriation of contract rights) of the host state255. As noted by 
Douglas256, ‘general international law contains no substantive rules of 
property law’; what it does contain, however, is substantive rules on the 
taking of property, and, more specifically, a set of criteria on lawful 
expropriation. It is a well-established principle of customary international 
law257 that the state has the power to take private property258 in certain 
 
State as internationally wrongful is governed by international law. Such characterization 
is not affected by the characterization of the same act as lawful by internal law.’ 
255 See Douglas, 2009: 52. His ‘Rule 4’ is as follows: ‘The law applicable to an issue 
relating to the existence or scope of property rights comprising the investment is the 
municipal law of the host state, including its rules of private international law.’ For a 
more ‘aggressive’ approach in defining what constitutes a ‘possession’ for the purposes 
of protection, see the Grand Chamber Judgment in Broniowski v. Poland, Appl. No. 
31443/92, 22 June 2004, § 129: ‘The concept of “possessions” in the first part of Article 
1 of Protocol No. 1 has an autonomous meaning which is not limited to the ownership 
of material goods and is independent from the formal classification in domestic law.’ 
256 Ibidem. 
257 The literature on the subject is understandably wide; see by way of introduction 
Herz, J. H., ‘Expropriation of foreign property’, 35 AJIL (1941):243; Christie, G. 
C.,‘What constitutes a taking under international law’, 33 BYIL (1962): 307; Fatouros, 
A. A., Government Guarantees to Foreign Investors, New York, Columbia University 
Press, 1962; Lillich, R., The Protection of Foreign Investment, Syracuse, Syracuse 
University Press, 1965; Schachter, O.,  ‘Compensation for expropriation’, 78 AJIL 
(1984): 121; see also Garcia Amador, F. V., Special Rapporteur’s Fourth Report on 
International Responsibility, A/CN.4/119, 26 February 1959, § 41:  ‘The right of 
“expropriation” ... is recognized in international law, irrespective of the “patrimonial 
rights involved or of the nationality of the person in whom they are vested.” ... 
Traditionally, this right has been regarded as a discretionary power inherent in the 
sovereignty and jurisdiction which the State exercises over all persons and things in its 
territory, or in the so-called right to “self-preservation,” which allows it, inter alia  to 
further the welfare and economic progress of its population.’  
258 Property is here intended as a set of legal rights and obligations that connect a 
person, natural or legal, to a certain good, tangible or intangible. The tension between 
property rights as  fundamental rights beyond the reach of state’s interference and 
property rights as creatures of the state (which is a classic constitutional dilemma) is 
noted by many; see for example Higgins, 1982, 274: ‘...the innate tension between 
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circumstances259. Customary law recognises that property taken by a 
state in the exercise of its “police powers” constitutes a non-compensable 
act260, but in all other cases, compensation needs to be paid in order for 
the expropriation to be considered lawful. Expropriation is therefore a 
lawful action sub modo, conditioned by the requirements that it is carried 
out for a public purpose, in a non discriminatory manner, according to 
 
private property (given its attributes) and the State seems undeniable. It is a function of 
the law to reconcile these: and it is a function of international law to reconcile these 
elements when they occur across State boundaries. ... While virtually all nations ... 
recognize the right to hold property, these same constitutions also envisage that this 
established right may be limited by community interests.’ See also Schneiderman, D., 
‘Property rights and regulatory innovation: comparing constitutional cultures’, 4 
International Journal of Constitutional Law (2006): 371. 
259 The consequences of expropriation in customary law have been discussed at the 
Permanent Court of International Justice, the International Court of Justice and at Mixed 
Claim Commissions, including the decisions of the Iran-US Claims Tribunal;  for the 
jurisprudence of the last one, see amongst others, Khan, R., The Iran-United States 
Claims Tribunal: Controversies, Cases, and Contribution, The Hague,  Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1990; Mapp, W., The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal: The First Ten Years, 
1981-1991: An Assessment of the Tribunal’s Jurisprudence and its Contribution to 
International Arbitration,  Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1993; Brower, C. 
N., ‘The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal’ Recueil des Cours, The Hague, Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 1993: 123-396;  Aldrich, G. H., The Jurisprudence of the Iran-
United States Claims Tribunal, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1996; Lillich, R. and 
McGraw, D. B. (eds.), The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal: Its Contribution to the 
Law of State Responsibility, Irvington on Hudson, Transnational Publishers, 1998; 
Mohebi, M., The international Law Character of the Iran-United States Claims 
Tribunal,  The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 1999; Caron, D. D. and Crook, J. R. 
(eds.) The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal and the Process of International Claims 
Resolution: A Study by the Panel on State Responsibility of the American Society of 
International Law,  Irvington on Hudson, Transnational Publishers, 2000.  
260 See also Reinstatement of the Law of Foreign Relations (Third), n 195, 200-2001, § 
712.  The difficulties of keeping this distinction have been outlined by many; see mainly 
Michelmans, F., ‘Property, utility and fairness: comments on the ethical foundations of 
“just compensation” law’, 80 Harvard Law Review (1967): 1165. For the principle in 
international law, see also Brownie, I., Public International Law, 6th Ed., Oxford, OUP, 
2003: 509. 
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due process, and against payment of compensation261. The most 
important protection traditionally granted to aliens (in customary law) 
and investors (in treaty law) and their property and investments was 
against uncompensated direct expropriations and nationalisations. These 
forms of state interference with property rights reached their peak in the 
1970s, as a result of the de-colonisation process and the accompanying 
elaboration of alternative models of economic development at the United 
Nations level, including the debates around the New Economic Order, 
culminating in a series of resolutions passed by the General Assembly262. 
At the time, the basis upon which a state based its claim on property did 
 
261 The public purpose criterion is normally treated with a high level of deference by 
tribunals, being a prerogative of states to establish the content and extent of the public 
interest (for a recent review, see Reinisch, A., ‘Legality of expropriations’, in Reinisch, 
2008: 178 ff.). On the burden of proof to be placed on the investor to show that there is 
no public purpose, see American International Group Case (1983) 4 Iran-USCTR 96, at 
105. A recent discussion in the controversial Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 
(2005). See also ADC Affiliate Limited and ADC & ADMC Management Limited v. 
Republic of Hungary (ICSID Case No. ARB/03/16), Award, 2 October 2006, § 476, 
where the tribunal found that: ‘the expropriation of the Claimants’ interest constituted a 
depriving measure under Article 4 of the BIT and was unlawful as: (a) the taking was 
not in the public interest; (b) it did not comply with due process, in particular, the 
Claimants were denied of “fair and equitable treatment” specified in Article 3(1) of the 
BIT and the Respondent failed to provide “full security and protection” to the 
Claimants’ investment under Article 3(2) of the BIT; (c) the taking was discriminatory 
and (d) the taking was not accompanied by the payment of just compensation to the 
expropriated parties.’ The discriminatory character of the host state action needs to be 
examined in conjunction with the standard of treatment accorded to the investor. The 
chronological element (how timely does the compensation has to be paid, and when 
does the state cross the line and finds itself in violation of this obligation?) has been 
considered by the Tribunal in Antoin Goetz and Others v. Republic of Burundi, (ICSID 
Case No. ARB/01/2) Award, 10 February 1999, 15 ICSID Review (2000) 457, § 131.  
262 Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, 14 December 1962; Permanent 
Sovereignty over Natural Resources, 17 December 1973; Declaration on the 
Establishment of a New International Economic Order, 1 May 1974; Charter of 
Economic Rights and Duties of States, 16 September 1975. All UNGA Resolutions are 
available on the United Nations website at http://www.un.org/documents/resga.htm.  
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not attract as much as attention as the issue of compensation for the 
taking of that property263. The standard of compensation became a matter 
of debate: the disagreements between capital-importing and capital-
exporting states focussed on the appropriate quantum, especially for 
large-scale nationalisation programmes implemented as part of a 
decolonisation process264. The classic rules on compensation for 
expropriation had been developed in the nineteenth century, both as a 
result of diplomatic exchanges, especially between the United States and 
the Latin American states, and later in a series of arbitrations and cases at 
the Permanent Court of International Justice. It was US Secretary of State 
Cordell Hull, in response to a note by the Mexican Foreign Secretary on 
the existence in international law of the requirement of compensation for 
“expropriations of a general and impersonal character”, to reply:  ‘Under 
every rule of law and equity, no government is entitled to expropriate 
private property, for whatever purposes, without provision for prompt, 
adequate and effective compensation’265. The United States, together 
with several other capital exporting countries, have always maintained 
the customary character of this formula266, but since the beginning there 
 
263 See Seidl-Hohenveldern, 1992, at 137: ‘The debate on the legitimacy of taking 
measures almost exclusively concerns this problem of compensation. Of course, any 
taking, in order to be justifiable under international law, must also be for a public 
purpose. Yet this condition has not been the object of much judicial scrutiny.’  
264 On the standard of compensation for unlawful expropriation (damages), see The 
Factory at Chorzów (Indemnity) (Germany/Poland) PCIJ 1928; Lighthouses Arbitration 
(1956) 23 ILR 299; Sapphire Int. Petroleum v. NIOC (1967) 35 ILR 136; BP 
Exploration Co. (Libya) Ltd. v. Government of the Libyan Arab Republic (1973) 53 ILR 
297; Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co. and California Asiatic Oil Co. v. Libya (1977) 53 
ILR 389; (1978) 17 ILM 1; AGIP Company v. Popular Republic of Congo (1982) 21 
ILM 726; (ICSID Case No. ARB/77/1); SEDCO Inc. v. Iran  (1986) 10 Iran-USCTR 
180; Amoco International Finance Corp. v. Iran (1987) 15 Iran-USCTR 189; Sociedad  
Minera el Teniente SA v. Aktiengesellschaft  Norddeutsche Attinerie (Chilean Copper 
Case) (1973) 12 ILM 251; LETCO v. Liberia (1986) 26 ILM 647.  
265 Whiteman, 8 Digest 1020, quoted in Sornarajah, 2004: 438 n. 2.  
266 The formula is repeated in the US DoS, Statement on Foreign Investment and 
Nationalization, 15 ILM (1976): 186.  
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has been resistance to this position267. However, its inclusion in bilateral 
investment treaties signals the acceptance of the standard as the standard 
applicable in the relationship between the contracting parties268.  
 
The protection against uncompensated expropriation is the cornerstone of 
the substantive content of international investment treaties; however, a 
claim of expropriation has to be based on the existence of a property 
right in the domestic law of the country269. Only the extent to which 
property rights are protected against expropriation is determined with 
reference to international law: by way of example, investment tribunals 
normally acknowledge that contractual rights can be expropriated and 
therefore states are liable to pay compensation270. Where public law 
 
267 See for example Schachter, O., ‘Compensation for expropriation’, 78 AJIL (1984): 
121; Dolzer, R., ‘New Foundations of the Law of Expropriation of Alien Property’, 75 
AJIL (1981): 553; Friedman, S., Expropriation in International Law, London, Stevens 
& Sons, 1953: 206. 
268Two conflicting interpretations are given for this: either that treaties are signed 
because the status of customary law does not guarantee an adequate level of protection 
for foreign investors (Sornarajah, 2004: 206; Kishoyian, B., ‘The utility of bilateral 
investment treaties in the formulation of customary international law’ 14 Northwestern 
Journal of International Law & Business (1994): 327; Baxter, R. R., ‘Treaties and 
customs’, 129 Recueil des Cours  (1970-1): 27, at 83-4. More recently, see also Doak 
Bishop, R., Crawford, J. and Reisman, M., Foreign Investment Disputes, Leiden, 
Kluwer Law International, 2005: 1007; or, that treaties reinforce the traditional 
standards of customary law; see Denza, E. and Brooks, S., ‘Investment protection 
treaties: the United Kingdom experience’, 36 ICLQ (1987): 908, at 913; Mann, F. A., 
‘British Treaties for the promotion and protection of investment’, 52 BYIL (1981): 241; 
Brownlie, 1998: 520; Schachter, O., ‘International law in theory and practice: general 
course in public international law’, 178 Recueil des cours (1982): 299. 
269 See for example Alasdair Ross Anderson and others v. Republic of Costa Rica 
(ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/07/3), Award, 19 May 2010, where property obtained 
illegally according to the municipal law of Costa Rica was not covered by the BIT 
protection (lack of due diligence on the part of the claimants). 
270 See Libyan American Oil Co. (LIAMCO) v. Government of the Libyan Arab 
Republic, 62 ILR 140 (1980); Starrett Housing Corp. et al. v. Islamic Republic of Iran 
(Interlocutory Award) (1983), 4 Iran-USCTR, 122, 156-7; Phillips Petroleum Co. Iran 
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obligations and issues of contractual performance intersect, it is difficult 
to establish to what standard the state should be held to vis-à-vis the 
investors. Investors can bring an international claim only if the 
substantive obligations on expropriation have been violated. A simple 
breach of contract will not suffice to trigger the arbitration clause in the 
treaty, as a contractual claim is subject to the privity rule and might have 
to be litigated domestically, depending on the arbitration clause 
contained in the contract, which cannot be bypassed by the equivalent 
treaty clause. For contractual breaches resulting in economic loss, the 
determining factor is if the state is acting iure imperii271. As Reinisch put 
it: ‘The guiding principle in locating an expropriation appears to be 
whether a state has acted in its sovereign capacity, exercising its 
governmental or public power or authority’272. Expropriations, of 
whatever kind, are ‘inherently governmental acts’273, therefore, the 
 
v. Islamic Republic of Iran, The National Iranian Oil Co. (1989), 21 Iran-USCTR 79, 
106. See also Consortium RFCC v. Kingdom of Morocco (ICSID Case No. ARB/00/6), 
Award, 22 December 2003: § 60. 
271 See Schreuer, C., ‘The concept of expropriation under the ECT and other investment 
protection treaties’, at http://www.univie.ac.at/intlaw/pdf/csunpublpaper_3.pdf; see also 
Brownlie, 1998: 550: ‘A breach of contract is an expropriation if it is confiscatory….if 
the State exercises its executive or legislative authority to destroy the contractual rights 
as an asset.’ As recognised by Higgins, 1982, 298: ‘The more that a concession contract 
had been assimilated to the civil law concept of “administrative contract”, the more 
opportunity will there be for government to claim to reserve to itself powers to rectify 
and amend the arrangements entered into.’ See also Campbell, E., ‘Legal problems in 
government participation in resource projects’, 126 Australian Mineral and Petroleum 
Association Yearbook (1984): 144, as quoted by Sornarajah, M., The Settlement of 
Foreign Investment Disputes, The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 2000, at 87: 
‘Those who enter into agreements with governments and government agencies are 
always at risk that the performance of the agreement may be rendered wholly or 
partially impossible by either supervening legislation or by ... statutory power.’ 
272 Reinisch, A., ‘Expropriation’, in The Oxford Handbook of International Law: 418. 
273 Waste Management, Inc. v. United Mexican States (ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/3), 
Award, 30 April 2004, § 174.  
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simple non-performance of a contractual obligation, however detrimental 
to the protected property rights, will not qualify as an expropriation274. 
 
While the international law rules pertaining to direct expropriations are 
relatively clear, indirect interference with the property rights of the 
investor, where no title to property is taken and there is not necessarily a 
transfer of value between the investor and the state, has been met with a 
considerable degree of normative uncertainty. These days, states rarely 
carry out extensive nationalisation programmes or directly expropriate 
property. Therefore, tribunals are confronted normally with claims of 
indirect expropriations. 
 
  
3.3.1 Regulatory expropriation 
 
The ways in which property rights and governmental policy intersect are 
numerous and constantly evolving: environmental and zoning regulation, 
health and safety measures, labour standards, taxation can all have an 
effect on the property rights and the profit expectations of investors. 
Legislators can hardly keep up with them and account for all the possible 
harms that can result from regulatory interference with property rights. 
Equally, when signing investment protection treaties, states do not 
usually give substantive content to the provisions against unlawful 
expropriation, preferring to restrict themselves to the criteria of a lawful 
expropriation. Therefore, what constitutes a measure ‘tantamount to 
expropriation’275 is left to the tribunals to decide276.  
 
274 See also Schwebel, S. M., International Arbitration: Three Salient Problems, 
Cambridge, CUP, 1987, 111: ‘…it is generally accepted that, so long as it affords 
remedies in its Courts, a State is only directly responsible , on the international plane, 
for acts involving breaches of contract, where the breach is not a simple breach….but 
involves an obviously arbitrary or tortious element…’ 
275 This term is taken from Article 1110 of the NAFTA. While NAFTA tribunals have 
clarified that ‘tantamount’ has to be interpreted as ‘equivalent’, and therefore should not 
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Policy reasons for measures that can cause individual harm in the pursuit 
of a common good are many and have given rise to a considerable 
amount of theoretical reflection. Basic principles of distributive justice 
dictate that the benefits of the majority cannot be bought at the expense 
 
be used to extend the definition of expropriation (Pope & Talbot v. Canada, Interim 
Award, 26 June 2000: §104; S.D. Myers Inc. v. Canada (1st Partial Award, 13 
November 2000), 40 I.L.M. 1408: § 286), it has been argued that: ‘[t]he major 
achievement of the “tantamount” clause, found in substance in almost all BITs, … 
consists in extending the scope of indirect expropriation to an egregious failure to create 
or maintain the normative “favourable” conditions in the host state.’ (Reisman, W. M 
and Sloane, R. D., ‘Indirect expropriation and its valuation in the BIT generation’, 74 
BYIL (2003): 115, at 117). We will see in Chapter 6 how NAFTA states have dealt with 
the issue by way of clarification. 
276 The literature on the subject is vast: see for example Westberg, J. A., ‘Applicable 
law, expropriatory takings and compensation in cases of expropriation; ICSID and Iran-
United States claims tribunal case law compared’, 8 ICSID Review (1993): 1; Vaughan 
Lowe, A., ‘Regulation or expropriation?’ 55 Current Legal Problems (2002): 447; 
Dolzer, R., ‘Indirect expropriations: new developments?’, 11 New York University 
Environmental Law Journal (2002): 64; Been, V., ‘Does an international “regulatory 
takings” doctrine make sense?’ 11 New York University Environmental Law Journal 
(2002): 49; Brunetti, M.,‘Indirect expropriation in international law’, 5 International 
Law FORUM du Droit International (2003): 150; Dolzer, R. and Bloch, F., ‘Indirect 
expropriation: conceptual realignments?, 5 International Law FORUM du Droit 
International (2003): 155; Been, V. and Beauvais, J. C., ‘The global fifth amendment: 
NAFTA’s investment protections and the misguided quest for an international 
“regulatory takings” doctrine’, 78 New York University Law Review (2003): 30; Fortier, 
L. Y. and Drymer, S. L., ‘Indirect expropriation in the law of international investment: I 
know it when I see it or caveat investor’, 19 ICSID Review (2004): 29; Paulsson, J. and 
Douglas, Z., ‘Indirect expropriation in investment treaty arbitration’, in Horn, N. and 
Kröll, S., eds. Arbitrating Foreign Investment Disputes: Procedural and Substantive 
Legal Aspects, The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 2004: 145; Heiskanen, V., ‘The 
doctrine of indirect expropriation in light of the practice of the Iran-United States claims 
tribunal’, 7 JWI&T (2007): 215;  Kriebaum, U., ‘Partial expropriation’, 8 JWI&T 
(2007): 69; Kriebaum, U., ‘Regulatory takings: balancing the interests of the investor 
and the state’, 8 JWI&T (2007): 717; Ratner, S., ‘Regulatory takings in institutional 
context: beyond the fear of fragmented international law’, 102 AJIL (2008): 475; 
Hoffmann, A. K., ‘Indirect expropriation’, in Reinisch, 2008:  151.  
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of the minority277. The ‘socialization of the losses’ consequent to a 
taking implies that a loss by a private has to be socialised by the 
imposition of compensation, which is borne ultimately by the 
community278. There are problems inherent with this approach: for 
example, how to keep the distinction between individual and community 
interests, if the individual is also a member of the community, and how 
to quantify the loss accordingly279. Can efficiency tempered by fairness 
act as guiding principles?280 And is it up to courts or tribunals to 
establish how these principles should find application in individual 
cases? These are crucial questions, which go to the core of the interaction 
between individual rights and social goods. To focus on the matter of 
‘just compensation’281 is immensely reductive and yet still highly 
 
277 If one is accounting for the distribution of the burdens rather than of the benefits. 
Shifting the focus on the distribution of burdens reveals the deficiency of distinguishing 
between the state as purchaser and as regulator in order to determine if compensation is 
due or not. 
278 See Armstrong v. US (1960) 364 US 40, 49: ‘The Fifth Amendment’s guarantee that 
private property shall not be taken for a public use without just compensation was 
designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens 
which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.’ 
279 See for example Justice Brandeis dissenting opinion in the landmark case 
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.  Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922): ‘Reciprocity of advantage 
[italics added] is an important consideration, and may even be an essential, where the 
state’s power is exercised for the purpose of conferring benefits upon the property of a 
neighborhood… [citations omitted]. 
280 On the difficulties of applying the efficiency, or cost internalisation, rationale to the 
international context, see Been, V., ‘Does an international “regulatory takings” doctrine 
make sense?’, 11 NYU Environmental Law Journal (2003): 49 at 53 ff. On a positive 
account on how the principle of efficiency can help in drawing the line between 
uncompensated regulation and indirect expropriation, see Gazzini, T., ‘Drawing the line 
between non-compensable regulatory powers and indirect expropriation of foreign 
investment – an economic analysis of law perspective’, 7 Manchester Journal of 
International Economic Law (2010): 36. 
281 This is taken from the language of the Fifth Amendment of the US Constitution, 
which states: ‘No person ... shall be deprived of ...property, without due process of law; 
nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.’ 
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complex and frustratingly imprecise. But that is also where our analysis 
concentrates, as that is where investment tribunals have focused their 
attention282. Two questions are relevant to our enquiry: what measures 
give rise in law to a claim for compensation? And which ones can be 
implemented with no compensation, without thereby losing their 
legitimacy283? Frank Michelman, in his seminal 1967 article284, 
articulated very clearly the nature of the problems arising from tryin
a
 
 ....legislators and administrators are likely to regard prevention of 
capricious redistribution not as a “policy” element to be weighed in 
arriving at decisions, but rather as a technical adjustment to be made by 
courts after policy decisions have been made. Let it be determined what 
measures “in the public interest” requires; and, if, in the course of 
carrying out those measures, it appears that someone is sustaining 
unacceptable harm, the court can always award just compensation. It is in  
 
282 Undoubtedly, the commercial bias of investment tribunals and the scarce attention 
traditionally paid to public law issues have played a part in this concentration on the 
compensatory aspect. 
283 Or, ‘whether a given measure would be in order assuming it were accompanied by 
compensation payments; and...whether the same measure, conceding that it would be 
proper under conditions of full compensation, ought to be enforced without payment of 
any compensation.’ (Michelman, 1194). 
284 Michelman, 1248. 
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e failure of judicial capability to jibe with this implicit legislative and 
285
 i  
286.  
              
th
administrative referral that the special danger lies . 
 
As a consequence, to divine what is meant by indirect expropriation, t is
necessary to refer to the pronouncement of the courts or the tribunals
                                   
285 The downsides of this approach (judicial activism, democratic deficit, inconsistency 
of judgments) are magnified in the international context. Courts themselves  have 
pointed at a political solution as the only one possible in certain circumstances: this 
T., 
: 
ve due 
 
 
ally 
been 
d] 
than the effects of the measures on the owner, and the form of the measures of control 
‘subsidiarity’ which is nothing more than deference of the judiciary to the legislative, 
and executive, power, has been suggested in the context of the WTO to deal with 
similar problems of ‘legitimacy deficit’ (Howse, R., and Nicolaidis, K., ‘Legitimacy 
through “higher law”? Why constitutionalizing the WTO is a step too far’, Cottier, 
and Mavroidis, P.C. (eds.) The Role of the Judge in International Trade Regulation. 
Experiences and Lessons for the WTO, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 2003
307). For the problems of judicial encroachment over the legislature, see Justice 
Stevens’ dissent in Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 406-07 (1994): ‘The so-called 
“regulatory takings” doctrine ... has an obvious kinship with the line of substanti
process cases that Lochner exemplified. Besides having similar ancestry, both doctrines 
are potentially open-ended sources of judicial power to invalidate state economic 
regulations that Members of this Court view as unwise or unfair.’ See also City of 
Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 377 (1991): ‘[the] 
determination of “the public interest” in the manifold areas of government regulation 
entails not merely economic or mathematical analysis but value judgment, and it was 
not meant to shift that judgment from elected officials to judges and juries.’ 
286 Case law on indirect expropriation goes back at least to the Norwegian Shipowners’
Claim (Norway v. United States of America), PCIA, Award, 13 October 1922, 1 RIAA
307 (which recognised that property rights could be expropriated); see also the Chorzów 
Factory Case (Case concerning certain German interests in Polish Upper Silesia) 
(Germany v. Poland), Judgment, 25 May 1926, PCIJ Ser A, No. 7 (1926); Oscar Chinn 
Case (United Kingdom v. Belgium), Judgment, 12 December 1934, PCIJ Ser A/B, No. 
63 (1934); several cases of the Iran Claims Commission are also relevant: see especi
Starrett Housing Corporation v. Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 4 Iran-US 
CTR 122, 156 (1983); Sea-Land Service Inf. V Iran, 6 Iran-USCTR 149 (1984); 
Tippetts, Abbett, McCarthy, Stratton v. TAMS-AFFA, 6 Iran-USCTR 219 (1984)  Amoco 
International Finance Corp v. Iran, 15 Iran-USCTR 189 (1987) (this award has 
much cited in support of the ‘sole effects’ doctrine of regulatory expropriation; however 
what the Tribunal said was: ‘The intent of government is less important [italics adde
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There is a considerable lack of agreement on the boundaries of any 
proposed definition of regulatory expropriation287. It is useful in this 
context to quote the definition adopted in Article 11(a)(ii) [Covered 
Risks] of the Convention Establishing the Multilateral Investment 
Guarantee Agency288: 
 
 … [regulatory expropriation could be defined as] any legislative 
action or administrative action or omission attributable to the host 
government which has the effect of depriving the holder of a guarantee of 
his ownership or control of, or a substantial benefit from, his investment, 
with the exception of non-discriminatory measures of general application 
which the governments normally take for the purpose of regulating 
economic activity in their territories… 
 
 Hu
tember 1982, Series A No. 52 p. 24; James v. 
 
tte 
ts 
 state practice 
 New York 
not 
state’s 
288
or interference is less important that the reality of their impact’ [at 225-226]); Phillips 
Petroleum Co v. Iran, 21 Iran-US CTR 79 (1989) (however the standards applicable by 
that tribunal are different, as ‘all measures affecting property rights’ come within the 
jurisdiction of the tribunal, see Article II, ‘Declaration of the Government of the 
Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria Concerning the Settlement of Claims by 
the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran, 1 Iran-USCTR 9. Also relevant is the case law of the European Court 
of Human Rights under Article 1 of Protocol 1 of the European Convention on man 
Rights; see Handyside v. United Kingdom, 7 December 1976, 24 ECtHR, Series A; 
Sporrong and Lönnroth v. Sweden, 23 Sep
United Kingdom, 21 February 1986, 98 ECtHR, Series A, p. 9; Lithgow v. United 
Kingdom, 8 July 1986, 102 ECtHR, Series A, p.1; Fredin v. Sweden, 18 February 1991,
192 ECtHR, Series A; Pine Valley Development Ltd. and Others v. Ireland, 29 
November 1991, 222 ECtHR, Series A, p.1; Matos e Silva, Lda. and others v. Portugal, 
16 September 1996, 24 EHRR 573. For the European Court of Justice, see Liselo
Hauer v Land Rheinland-Pfalz, Judgment of 13 December 1979, Case 44/79, in Repor
of Cases before the Court, 1979, S. 3727. 
287 R. Dolzer identified this as ‘the single most important development in
[indirect expropriation]’ (‘Indirect Expropriation: New Developments?’, 11
University Environmental Law Journal (2002): 65.). It is worth noting in passing that it 
is not necessarily state practice to have changed  (trends of more or less interventionist 
state policies having developed in the course of the last century), as much as the 
response of the law: regulatory expropriation is a legal category, a legal concept, 
state practice. It is the way an investment tribunal or a court categorizes 
intervention by application of a standard of treatment devised by law. 
 At http://www.miga.org/news/index_sv.cfm?stid=1506&aid=1347#3.  
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regulatory expropriation claim289. 
, courts and tribunals have considered as the indispensable 
              
 
There are two elements in the MIGA definition, the legal (‘ownership or 
control’) and the economic (‘substantial benefit’), presented as discrete 
(non cumulative) elements for a 
Traditionally
element the interference with property rights, economic damage alone 
not being sufficient to sustain a claim of regulatory expropriation290. This 
is consistent with the perception that certain economic advantages, such 
as goodwill and a customer base, do not constitute ‘stand-alone vested 
                                   
289 See also AES Summit Generation Limited AES-Tisza Erömü KFT v. The Republic of 
ngary (ICSID Case No. ARB/07/22), Award, 23 September 2010, § 14.3.1: ‘For an 
n 
 
o. ARB/03/5) 
ase No. ARB 
United 
ology Holding AB v. Latvia, (SCC Case No. 118/2001), 
Hu
expropriation to occur, it is necessary for the investor to be deprived, in whole or in 
significant part, of the property in or effective control of its investment, or for its 
investment to be deprived, in whole or in significant part, of its value.’ 
290 This approach is taken also in recent instruments, see for example Annex B 
(Expropriation) of the 2004 US Model BIT, 4(a)(i): ‘the economic impact of the 
government action, although the fact that an action or series of actions by a Party has a
adverse effect on the economic value of an investment, standing alone, does not 
establish that an indirect expropriation has occurred.’ For the case law, see AWG Group
Ltd. v The Argentine Republic (UNCITRAL), Decision on Liability, 30 July 2010; 
Metalpar S. A. and Buen Aire S. A. v. Argentine Republic (ICSID Case N
Award, 6 June 2008; Société Generale v. The Dominican Republic (LCIA Case 7927 
UN), Award on Preliminary Objections to Jurisdiction, 19 September 2008; LG&E v. 
Argentina (ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1), Award, 25 July 2007; M.C.I. Power Group 
L.C. and New Turbine, Inc. v. Ecuador (ICSID Case No. ARB/03/6), Award, 31 July 
2007; Sempra Energy International v. Argentine Republic (ICSID Case 
No.ARB/02/16), Award, 28 September 2007; Archer Daniels Midland Company and 
Tate & Lyle Ingredients Americas, Inc. v. United Mexican States (ICSID C
(AF)/04/5), Award, 21 November 2007; (BG Group plc v. The Republic of Argentina 
(UNCITRAL), Final Award, 24 December 2007; Waste Management, Inc. v. 
Mexican States (Number 2) (ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/3), Award, 30 April 2004; 
Nycomb Synergetics Techn
Award, 16 December 2003; CME Czech Republic B.V. v. Czech Republic 
(UNCITRAL), Partial Award, 13 September 2001; Wena Hotels Ltd. v. Arab Republic 
of Egypt (ICSID Case No. ARB/98/4), Award on Merits, 8 December 2000.  
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nn Case, affirmed that292: 
 
nd this is how the Biwater tribunal recently framed the issue in its 
l Tribunal’s view, the absence of economic 
loss or damage is primarily a matter of causation and quantum – rather 
 
een 
ich, 
             
rights’291. Already the Permanent Court of International Justice, in the 
Oscar Chi
 
Favourable business conditions and goodwill are transient 
circumstances, subject to inevitable changes… No enterprise … can 
escape from the chances and hazards resulting from general economic 
conditions. Some industries may be able to make large profits during a 
period of general prosperity, or else by taking advantage of a treaty of 
commerce or of an alteration in customs duties; but they are also exposed 
to the danger of ruin or extinction if circumstances change. Where this is 
the case, no vested rights are violated by the State. [Italics added] 
 
A
award293: 
 
 ... whilst accepting that effects of a certain severity must be shown 
to qualify an act as expropriatory, there is nothing to require that such 
effects be economic in nature. A distinction must be drawn between (a) 
interference with rights and (b) economic loss. [Italics added] A 
substantial interference with rights may well occur without actually 
causing any economic damage which can be quantified in terms of due 
compensation....In the Arbitra
than a necessary ingredient in the cause of action of expropriation itself. 
In practice, tribunals, in assessing whether an investment has b
indirectly expropriated, apply the ‘substantial deprivation test’294, wh
                                    
291 Merrill & Ring Forestry L.P. v. Canada (UNCITRAL), Award, 31 March 2010, § 
141 (citing Oscar Chinn). 
 The Oscar Chinn Case, PCIJ, Ser. A./B., No. 63, 1934, 26. A similar sentiment wa
expressed by the Tribunal in Emilio Maffezzini v. The Kingdom of Spai
292 s 
n (ICSID Case 
L), Award, 2 August 
 No. 
No ARB/00/3), Award, 13 November 2000, § 64: ‘IIAs [international investment 
agreements] are not insurance policies against bad business judgments.’ 
293 Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd v. Tanzania (ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22), Award, 24 
July 2008, § 464-5. 
294 Merrill & Ring Forestry L.P. v. Canada (UNCITRAL), Award, 31 March 2010; 
Chemtura Corporation v. Government of Canada (UNCITRA
2010; AWG Group Ltd. v The Argentine Republic (UNCITRAL), Decision on Liability, 
30 July 2010; CMS Gas Transmission Company v. Argentine Republic (ICSID Case
ARB/01/08), Award, 12 May, 2005; Occidental Exploration and Production Co. v. 
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conomic deprivation test : 
.... but also covert or incidental 
hole or in significant part, of the use or reasonably-to-be-
expec
                           
while taking into consideration economic deprivation, gives prevalence 
to the interference with property rights, with few exceptions295. The 
Metalclad Tribunal, for example, pushed the boundaries of the definition 
of a regulatory expropriation precisely by extending the import of the 
296e
 ...expropriation under NAFTA includes not only open, deliberate 
and acknowledged takings of property,
interference with the use of property which has the effect of depriving the 
owner, in w
ted economic benefit of property even if not necessarily to the 
obvious benefit of the host State297.  
 
                                                                                                                         
(LCIA Case No. UN 3467), Award, 1 July 2004; Pope & Talbot Inc. v. The 
rnment of Canada (UNCITRAL), Interim Award, 26 June 2000. 
296
e 
 
 a 
(The United Mexican States v. Metalclad 
, 
unts to a lasting 
e 
propriate to view a deprivation 
E
Gove
cuador 
295 See for example Técnicas Medioambentales (Tecmed) S. A. v. United Mexican 
States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2, Award, 29 May 2003; Telenor Mobile 
Communications AS v. Republic of Hungary (ICSID Case No. ARB/04/15), Award, 13 
September 2006; Parkerings-Compagniet AS v. Republic of Lithuania (ICSID Case No. 
ARB/05/8), Award, 11 September, 2007. But see Biwater Gauff for non compensatory 
damages for expropriation not resulting in economic loss. 
 Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States (ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1) Award, 
30 August 2000, § 103. This award has been much criticised; Justice Tysoe, of the 
Supreme Court of British Columbia, which judicially reviewed some aspects of th
award, but not its finding on expropriation, nonetheless noted that: ‘The Tribunal gave
an extremely broad definition of expropriation for the purposes of Article 1110. ....This 
definition is sufficiently broad to include a legitimate rezoning of property by
municipality or other zoning authority.’ 
Corporation, 2001 BCSC 664, § 100). For a positive appraisal of the award’s definition
see Paulsson, J. and Douglas, Z., ‘Indirect expropriation in investment treaty 
arbitration’, Horn and Kröll, 2004: 149. 
297 Equally, the Tribunal in S. D. Myers v. The Government of Canada, Partial Award, 
13 November 2000, at § 283, stated that: ‘An expropriation usually amo
removal of the ability of an owner to make use of its economic rights although it may b
that, in some contexts and circumstances, it would be ap
as amounting to an expropriation, even if it were partial or temporary.’ 
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si
nding that a regulation that eliminates completely any 
economic use and value for the property owner is to be classified as a 
se 
riteria might seem to be, it is not devoid of difficulties; 
ed 
 the 
                                                
The Chemtura Tribunal reiterated the interpretation of the kind of work it 
is tasked with, when it affirmed that298: 
  
The determination of whether there has been a ‘substantial 
deprivation’ is a fact-sen tive exercise to be conducted in the light of the 
circumstances of each case.... One important feature of fact-sensitive 
assessments is that they cannot be conducted on the basis of rigid binary 
rules. 
 
From the traditional position that only an interference with property 
rights qualified as an expropriation, courts and tribunals have moved to 
the understa
taking299, as well as regulation that effectively results in ‘physical 
invasion of the property300. However simple the application of the
‘categorical’ c
namely, how to calculate what constitutes a ‘total’ (the so-call
‘denominator’ problem301), that is, against which total should
 
298 Chemtura Corporation v. Government of Canada (UNCITRAL), Award, 2 August 
 
of all economically beneficial use, we think it may resist compensation 
on t 
, 27 October 1989, 95 ILR 184, 211 (1990). 
upreme Neglect. How to Revive 
, 
2010, § 249. This case will be reviewed in Chapter 7. 
299 In American jurisprudence, the landmark case is Lucas (David H) v. South Carolina
Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015, 1029 (1992). Importantly, the following 
exception was applied by the Court: ‘[w]here the State seeks to sustain regulation that 
deprives land 
ly if the logically antecedent inquiry into the nature of the owner’s estate shows tha
the proscribed use interests were not part of his title to begin with.’ For NAFTA, see 
Pope & Talbot Inc. v. The Government of Canada (UNCITRAL), Interim Award, 26 
June 2000, § 96. 
300 For the US Supreme Court, see Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 
458 U.S. 419 (1982); see also Biloune and Marine Drive Complex Ltd. v. Ghana 
Investments Centre and the Government of Ghana (UNCITRAL), Award on 
Jurisdiction and Liability
301 See Epstein, R. A., Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain, 
Harvard, Cambridge, CUP, 1985 and Epstein, R. A., S
Constitutional Protection for Private Property, New York, OUP, 2008: 124. For 
American case law, see again Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 US 1003
1016 (1992). 
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s an issue of nomenclature: an 
‘expropriation’ is bound to attract the duty to pay compensation (unless 
                                                
substantial or total deprivation be calculated302; if there is no total taking, 
or there is no agreement as to the totality, what level of interference 
qualifies as a taking303 (this is also referred to as ‘conceptual severance’, 
which allows, through the ‘fragmentation’ of the property rights into 
discrete strands, to classify as an expropriation the taking of each of these 
strands304).  
A test for categorization of state measures as regulatory takings involves 
several steps: in the first instance, it i
 
302 See Chemtura Corporation v. Canada (UNCITRAL-NAFTA), Award, 2 August 
2010, § 263; EnCana Corporation v. Ecuador (UNCITRAL), Award, 3 February 20
§§ 172-8; Occidental Exploration and Production Co. v. Ecuador (LCIA Case
3467), Award, 1 July 2004, §§ 86-9; GAMI Investments Inc. v. United Mexican States 
(UNCITRAL), Award, 15 November 2004, § 126; Waste Management Inc. v. Unite
Mexican States II (ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/3), Award, 30 April 2004, § 141; 
Feldman v. United Mexican States (ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/1), Award, 16 
December 2002, § 152. 
06, 
 No. UN 
d 
 
 ‘... government regulation – by 
de t 
 
nt, 
 
enial of 
” of the 
e 
h a 
 him to 
insist that it shall remain unchanged for his benefit.’ 
303 The ‘partial regulatory taking’ test as devised in the Penn Central Transp. Co. v. 
New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978), see infra.   
304 In American takings jurisprudence, ‘conceptual severance’ has been rejected by the 
Supreme Court; see Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65-66 (1979), and more recently
Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 
302, 327 (2002). The Court in Andrus had this to say:
finition – involves the adjustment of rights for the public good. Often this adjustmen
curtails some potential for the use or economic exploitation of private property. To
require compensation in all such circumstances would effectively compel the 
government to regulate by purchase. Government hardly could go on if, to some exte
values incident to property could not be diminished without paying for every such 
change in the general law... The Takings Clause, therefore, preserves governmental
power to regulate, subject only to the dictates of “justice and fairness”. …  the d
one traditional property right does not always amount to a taking. At least where an 
owner possesses a full “bundle” of property rights, the destruction of one “strand
bundle is not a taking, because the aggregate must be viewed in its entirety... When w
review regulation, a reduction in the value of property is not necessarily equated wit
taking...’ Additionally, in New York Central R.R. v. White, 243 US 188 (1917), the 
Court affirmed that: ‘[n]o person has a vested interest in any rule of law, entitling
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ad hoc adjudicatory determination307; 
eneral measures directly affecting the economic value of the investment, 
             
covered by the usual exceptions such as confiscation, forfeiture, or 
seizure for recovery of taxation or other fiscal duties), a ‘government 
measure’ raises a presumption of non-compensation, with the duty 
shifted to the property owner/investor to prove that expropriation of the 
protected property right is involved305.  
Regulatory measures claimed to effect an indirect expropriation can 
include ad hoc measures affecting the property rights of the investor, 
such as the withdrawal of a licence, the change of the terms of the 
concession agreement306, or an 
g
such as taxation measures targeted to a class of investors, or zoning 
                                    
305 It has been proposed that for a regulatory taking to require compensation, the state 
has to derive a benefit from the ‘taking’ (as a form of unjust enrichment); see for 
example Olguín v. Paraguay (ICSID Case No. ARB/98/5), Final Award, 26 July 2001, 
at § 84: ‘For an expropriation to occur, there must be actions that can be considered 
ose actions will acquire, 
di
ns, 
 regulatory expropriation in international law’, 20 
ICSID Review
 
ses are not considered properties for the purposes of the takings 
clause in US .C. Cir. 
o. 
 
reasonably appropriate for producing the effect of depriving the affected party of the 
property it owns, in such a way that whoever performs th
rectly or indirectly, control, or at least the fruits of the expropriated property. 
Expropriation therefore requires a teleologically driven action for it to occur; omissio
however egregious they may be, are not sufficient for it to take place.’; Nykomb 
Synergetics Technology Holding AB v. Latvia, (SCC) Award, 16 December 2003: § 
4.3.1. However, this approach has been generally rejected by tribunals. See though 
Newcombe, A., ‘The boundaries of
 (2005): 1 at 33; Rose Ackerman, S. and Rossi, J., ‘Disentangling 
deregulatory takings’, 86 Virginia Law Review (2000): 1435; Sax, J. L., ‘Takings and
the police power’, 74 Yale Law Journal (1964-65): 36.   
306 Permits and licen
jurisprudence; see Mobile Relay Assocs .v.FCC, 457 F.3d 1 (D
2006); Conti v .United States, 291 F.3d 1334, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Bronco Wine C
v. Jolly, 29 Cal. Rptr. 3d 462, 494 (Cal. App. 2005); contra, State Bd. of Education v. 
Drury, 437 S.E.2d 290 (Ga. 1993); Pre-Need Family Services v. Bureau, 904 A.2d 996, 
1003 (Pa. Commonwealth. 2006). 
307 Judicial decisions are ‘measures’ for the purposes of the NAFTA, see Been, V. L., 
and Beauvais, J. C., The global Fifth Amendment: NAFTA’s investment protections
and the misguided quest for an international ‘regulatory takings’ doctrine, 78 NYU Law 
Review (2003): 30. 
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restrictions; general measures indirectly affecting the economic value of 
the investment, such as environmental or labour legislation raising the 
running costs of the investment.  
 
The character of the measures as outlined above can also take into 
consideration the intent of the state. In international law, tribunals have 
oscillated between the ‘sole effect’ and the ‘effect and purpose’ 
approaches in considering claims of indirect expropriation308. The most 
clear example in investment case law of the sole effect doctrine is the oft-
quoted statement of the Metalclad tribunal, namely its reference to 
‘covert or incidental interference [italics added].... which has the effect of 
depriving the owner, in whole or in significant part, of the use 
or....economic benefit of property...309. In an older, ad hoc UNCITRAL 
arbitration, Biloune v. Ghana310, similarly the tribunal established that, in 
assessing the facts having the ‘effect’ of a ‘constructive expropriation’, 
the tribunal needn’t concern itself with the ‘motivations for the actions 
and omissions of the Ghanaian governmental authorities’311. On the 
opposite side, the clearest early articulation in investment jurisprudence 
of the ‘effect and purpose’ doctrine came from the SD Myers tribunal312, 
specifically its assertion that ‘...a tribunal [should]  look at the substance 
                                   
308 It was Rudolf Dolzer to introduce the term ‘sole effects’ to describe this 
interpretation of indirect takings (see also Starrett Housing Corporation v. Islamic 
Republic of Iran (1983) Iran-USCTR 122, 154); Dolzer, R., ‘Indirec xpropriation: new t e
developments’, 11 NYU Environmental Law Journal (2002): 64 at 79. For the principle 
in le v. Chevron USA Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005); this decision 
w he 
eff e ordinance does not substantially advance legitimate state interests 
[i se of the land…’  
309
lex Ltd. v. Ghana Investment Centre, 
UNC
 US jurisprudence, see Ling
ent explicitly against Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980), where t
Court had held that; ‘The application of a general zoning law to particular property 
ects a taking if th
talics added] or denies an owner economically viable u
 Metalclad Award, § 103. 
310 Antoine Biloune and Marine Drive Comp
ITRAL, Award on Jurisdiction and Liability, 29 October 1989, 95 ILR 183 (1993). 
311 95 ILR, at 209. 
312 This case will be analysed in detail in Section 7.5.1. 
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ion if certain conditions apply: measures that 
prevent an illegal or noxious use of the property are exempt from the 
t they 
 
ate for the harm caused to property rights316. 
              
of what has occurred and not only at form. A tribunal should not be 
deterred by technical or facial considerations from reaching a conclusion 
that an expropriation or conduct tantamount to an expropriation has 
occurred. It must look at the real interests involved and the purpose and 
effect of the government measure’ [italics added]313. More recent case 
law arising mostly from the NAFTA, and from some BITs, and the 
‘legislative’ work of states ratifying investment treaties and/or drafting 
new investment instruments and FTAs, confirms the trend towards 
tempering the strict ‘sole effect’ approach by way of introduction of 
balancing or proportionality analysis which inevitably has to consider the 
purpose and the context of the governmental measures314. For example, 
even measures that result in total deprivation can be exempted from the 
payment of compensat
obligation to pay compensation315. Police powers, to the extent tha
are exercised in order to prevent such use, are a legitimate excuse from
the obligation to compens
                                   
313 SD Myers Inc. v. Government of Canada, UNCITRAL/NAFTA, Partial Award on 
the Merits, 13 November 2000, § 285. 
314 See for example Saluka Investments BV v. The Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Partial
Award, 17 March 2006, § 255: ‘It is now established in international law that States are 
not liable to pay compensation to a foreign investor when, in the normal exercise of 
their regulatory powers, they adopt in a non-discriminatory manner bona fide 
regulations that are aimed at the general welfare.’ 
 
red property, which also does not 
e that a State does not commit an expropriation and is 
tates” 
zurix 
310: 
 a 
should give rise to a compensation claim.’ 
315 This is not the same as a seizure of illegally acqui
attract the duty to compensate. 
316 See Saluka Investments BV v. the Czech Republic (UNCITRAL), Partial Award, 17 
March 2006, § 262: ‘the principl
thus not liable to pay compensation to a dispossessed alien investor when it adopts 
general regulations that are “commonly accepted as within the police power of S
forms part of customary law today.’ (Relying on the Methanex Award). Contra, A
Corp. v. Argentine Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12), Award, 14 July 2006, § 
‘...the issue was not so much whether the measure concerned is legitimate and serves
public purpose, but whether it is a measure that, being legitimate and serving a public 
purpose, 
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ry measures partially 
ffecting property rights finds support in the jurisprudence of the 
              
However, police powers can also be exercised to prevent a legal use, 
depending on the circumstances, or, more importantly for our purposes, a 
use that conflicts with an equally legally conferred right or with public 
interest measures317; in that case, it becomes a matter of categorical 
distinction: if the measure is classified as a taking, then compensation is 
due; if it is classified as a regulatory measure, then compensation in 
principle is not due318.  
The problem of how to draw the line between expropriation and 
regulation319 can benefit from a comparative analysis of domestic and 
other international law approaches320. A comparative approach of the 
criteria to ascertain the liability of states for regulato
a
Supreme Court following Penn Central and the proportionality test 
                                   
317 The categorical exclusion does not completely negate the possibility of balancing 
between individual harm and public gain: the higher the magnitude of harm, the smaller 
the scope of the police powers. 
 As noted by Higgins, 1982, 278: ‘A tribunal can decide to let the loss fall where it 
lies by one of two ways: either it can decide that, notwithstanding the taking of 
property, no compensation is due. Or, alternatively, it can find that no ‘taking’ as 
actually taken place.’ And added, ibidem: ‘...in many cases not involving outright 
nationalization or expropriation, the central question is whether the alteration to the 
bundle of rights that the corporation or individuals owns is in fact a “taking” of
318
 his 
319 ot 
n 
he public interest on the one side and those protecting the 
d 
vironmental Law, Books 
propriation cases 
under U.S. investment treaties – a threat to democracy or the dog that didn’t bark?’, 18 
ICSID Review (2003): 1. 
rights.’  
 See most recently, the Continental Tribunal, which noted: ‘[....]the distinction is n
always easy’ and ‘[...] in different historical and social contexts the line has been draw
differently and that different international tribunals, including arbitration tribunals under 
various BITs, have relied on different criteria and have given different weight to them, 
such as those recognizing t
integrity of property rights on the other”; Continental Casualty Company v. Argentine 
Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9), Award, 5 September 2008, § 277. 
320 Specifically, on the influence of American takings jurisprudence on the NAFTA an
on the other NAFTA parties, see Kinvin Wroth, L., ‘Lingle and Kelo: the accidental 
tourist in Canada and NAFTA-land’, Vermont Journal of En
and Reports, April 2006: 62. See also Sampliner, G., ‘Arbitration of ex
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al v. New York322 rejected the application of eminent 
he Court did not elaborate on the criteria, which since then have been 
adopted and adapted in successive judgments323. The criteria have also 
                                                
adopted by the European Court of Human Rights321. The Supreme Court 
n Penn Centri
domain compensation requirement to regulatory actions that affect only 
some property interests. The Court’s judgment did not set a rule for what 
constitutes a regulatory taking, simply stating that:  
 
 In engaging in these essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries, the 
Court’s decisions have identified several factors that have particular 
significance. The economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and, 
particularly, the extent to which the regulation has interfered with 
distinct investment-backed expectations are, of course, relevant 
considerations.  So, too, is the character of the governmental action. 
[Italics added] 
 
T
 
321 See Ruiz Fabri, H., ‘The approach taken by the European Court of Human Rig
the assessment of compensation for “regulatory expropriations” of the property of 
foreign investors’, 11 NYU Environmental Law Journal (2002): 148; Mountfield, H., 
‘Regulatory expropriations in Europe: the approach of the European Court of Human 
Rigths’, 11 NYU Environmental Law Journal (2002): 136. 
hts to 
94); 
o its 
 
g so, the 
h 
egesis of regulatory takings 
ju : 63.    
322 Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York, 438 U.S. 104 1978. 
323 United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985); Nollan v. 
California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); First English Evangelical 
Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles County, 482 U.S. (1987); Lucas v. South Carolina 
Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (19
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001). In Lingle v. Chevron, U.S. 544 at 539, 
The US Supreme Court has recently introduced the ‘functional equivalence test’ t
armoury of interpretative tools used in adjudicating regulatory takings claims, at the 
same time rejecting the so-called ‘substantially advances test’, which had introduced
intent and rationality as elements for assessing governmental measures. In doin
Court firmly entrenched the sole effects doctrine in its jurisprudence, stating that: ‘[a 
compensable taking is] functionally equivalent to the classic taking in whic
government directly appropriates private property or ousts the owner from its domain’.  
See also Kent, M. B., ‘Constructing the canon: an ex
risprudence after Lingle v. Chevron’, 16 NYU Environmental Law Journal (2008)
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The eco
e, isolating the discrete elements of the bundle of 
              
been included in several international investment agreements324; through 
this inclusion, the criteria, and with them the influence of American 
jurisprudence on takings, are spreading to BITs concluded by India, the 
US, Canada, etc325. Their application, in an international as well as in a 
domestic setting, is problematic to the extent that it comes into conflict 
with other principles or legitimate reasons. Let’s consider them in 
order326: 
 
nomic impact. Analyzing the economic impact of state measures 
brings us right back to the denominator and conceptual severance 
problems327. Investments lend themselves particularly well to exercises 
of conc ptual severance
property rights for the purpose of claiming the totality of the taking of the 
                                   
324 Annex B of the 2004 US Model BIT; Annex B.13(1) of the 2004 Canada Model 
BIT; Annex B of the India-Singapore Comprehensive Economic Cooperation 
greement; Annex 10-C of the CAFTA-DR; Article 5(b) of the Indian Model BIPA; 
327 For conceptual severance, see Radin, M. J., ‘The liberal conception of property: 
ms 
roach of 
t 
ill, T., 
A
Annex 10-D of the Chile-US FTA; Annex 11-B of the Australia-US FTA. 
325 On the influence of takings jurisprudence and its constitutionalisation on even wider 
criteria, see Schneiderman, 2008, especially Ch.2.   
326 Arguably the first and second test are to be considered jointly, as evident by the 
language used by the Court (‘particularly’). 
crosscurrents in the jurisprudence of takings’, in Radin, M. J., Reinterpreting Property, 
Chicago, Chicago University Press, 1993. The Supreme Court, in its Tahoe-Sierra 
Preservation Council v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002) see
to have put to rest the conceptual severance, or ‘parcel of the whole’ doctrine, to the 
effect that assessing the impact of the regulation has to concern the whole of the 
affected property, and not simply the parcel interested by the regulation (this is 
obviously a test that applies eminently to real estate), against the more open app
the Lucas Court. However, the recognition of property rights more commonly 
associated with forms of investment rather than with core rights (such as interes
accrued on trust funds, see Philips v. Washington Legal Foundation, 524 US 156 
(1998)) has been interpreted as ‘an egregious form of conceptual severance’, Merr
‘The Landscape of Constitutional Property’, 86 Virginia Law Review (2000): 885 at 900 
(see Schneiderman, 2008: 53). 
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329
ts of detrimental reliance and 
d 
tual 
e state, might successfully bring a claim for 
              
relevant element. In the Chemtura Award, the tribunal dealt with the 
issue in the following way: 
 
The Tribunal gathers from this evidence that the sales from 
lindane products were a relatively small part of the overall sales of 
Chemtura Canada at all relevant times. Under these circumstances, the 
interference of the Respondent with the Claimant’s investment cannot be 
deemed ‘substantial’. 
 
If the tribunal had accepted that the sales of lindane constituted the total 
of the investment for the purposes of calculating the denominator, the 
deprivation could have been deemed to be substantial. 
 
The investment-backed expectations. The Supreme Court introduced the 
concept of distinct investment-backed expectations, with reference to the 
Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon Case, but once again, did not elaborate. In 
investment arbitrations, the issue of legitimate expectations has arisen 
most often in the context of claims of violation of the FET standard328. 
The application of the same criterion for claims of regulatory 
expropriation brings into focus the circularity and conceptual overlap of 
investment protection provisions . Investment-backed reliance 
(associated with the contractual concep
promissory estoppel330) can arise in three sets of situations. The first kin
is contract-based reliance: an investor relying on a contrac
agreement (including its stabilisation clause) which is later rescinded 
unilaterally by th
                                   
 The latest, comprehensive treatment in Glamis Go328 ld Ltd. v. United States of America 
329
ates 
(UNCITRAL), Award, 16 May 2009: §§ 619 ff.  
 On legitimate expectations in connection to regulatory expropriation and standards 
of treatment (with an eye to domestic law approaches), see also Orrego Vicuña, F., 
‘Regulatory authority and legitimate expectations: balancing the rights of the state and 
the individual under international law in a global society’, 5.3 International Law Forum 
(2003): 188, at 193 ff. 
330 See for example International Thunderbird Gaming Corp. v. United Mexican St
(UNCITRAL), Award, 26 January 2006, §§ 145 ff.  
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would hardly be committing 
emselves by way of treaty to the kind of regulatory stability that 
              
expropriatory breach of contract. The second kind, treaty based reliance, 
is based on the expectation of compliance with a treaty obligation with 
respect to certain criteria for regulatory expropriation (rarely), or (more 
often) an umbrella clause giving ‘bite’ to the contractual stabilisation 
clause. Also in this case, a claim for violation of the treaty obligation 
might be successful in establishing that an indirect expropriation has 
taken place. Finally, for the third kind, regulatory stability reliance, it is 
submitted that a claim for compensation should be unsuccessful if based 
on regulatory expropriation331. There is no scope in international law for 
contesting general bona fide measures implemented in the public interest 
on the basis of ‘distinct investment-backed expectations’ of regulatory 
stability, unless reliance was placed on reassurances by government 
officials, but even then, it would probably be more correct to present the 
claim as a violation of the FET standard. In summary, the strictest 
approach would consider only an expectation based on a contractual 
obligation to sustain an actionable claim for regulatory expropriation; at a 
higher level, the claim could be sustained for reliance by the investor on 
a treaty based promise (but states 
th
investors would want to raise in an arbitration, so, residually this would 
apply to umbrella clauses, which are still dependent on reliance to a 
contractual obligation, which falls again under the first kind); at the 
highest level of generalisation, which we argue is unsustainable, reliance 
would be placed on a general expectation of regulatory stability. It is here 
that the expropriation obligations ‘seep into’ the FET standard 
                                   
331 This proposed distinction seems to have informed the reasoning of the Glamis 
Tribunal, which rejected the claim of violation of Article 1105 of the NAFTA (and the 
accompanying claim of indirect expropriation), on the basis that, in order for legitimate 
expectations to have been upset, ‘[there has to be] as a threshold circumstance, at least a 
quasi-contractual relationship between the State and the investor, whereby the State has 
pu s, 
e also Continental Casualty Company v. Argentine 
rposely and specifically induced the investment.’ Glamis Gold Ltd. v. United State
Award, 8 June 2009, § 766. Se
Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9), Award, 5 September 2008, § 261.   
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legitimate expectations of the investor and reliance on public officials 
raise a higher 
 this 
             
obligations, which place great emphasis, as we have seen, on the 
legitimate expectations of the investor.  
 
The character of the governmental action. It is presumed that 
government measures will be implemented for a public purpose and in 
the public interest. Indeed, this is one of the criteria allowing us to 
discriminate between lawful and unlawful expropriation. Consequently, 
the character of the action does not include such things as intent and 
purpose332. But if, arguendo, it does, how deep must a tribunal probe into 
the so-defined character of the action? Since motives for action can be 
several, does an illegitimate purpose vitiate a legitimate environmental 
concern? In the SD Myers Case333, the disguised protectionist intent of 
the Canadian environment minister was determinative in the success of 
the claim334. Governments are made of people, who might advance 
different aims and defend different interests, some of them legitimate 
(the protection of the environment), some of them less so (protectionist 
motives, personal enrichment). While a case like S.D. Myers is relatively 
simple, in that the disguised protectionist motive and the overt 
environmental rationale were advanced by the same individual in 
different settings, cases in which there are different messages coming 
from different people might more easily be analysed with reference to the 
representations335. Measures can also be characterised by their 
generality: a measure of universal application will 
presumption of non-compensation than a more limited measure, and
                                    
332 What in American jurisprudence would be the purview of the due process clause 
rather than the takings clause. 
333 S. D. Myers Inc. v. The Government of Canada (UNCITRAL), Partial Award
November 2000. 
, 13 
sis 334 But not for indirect expropriation, which was unsuccessful. For an in-depth analy
of this case, see Section 7.5.1. 
335 As we shall see when discussing the third criterion, expectations. 
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it’s essential in determining the ripeness of the claim. Even 
iscounting the problem of conferring to investment tribunals the power 
the measure, claims of regulatory expropriation would by definition 
never be ripe, unless the claim
             
one in turn a higher presumption than an ad hoc measure336. Finally, the 
way in which the measure is applied is also determinative of its character 
and therefore can aid the tribunal in its assessment of the state’s action. 
The transfer of this criterion from the jurisprudence of the US Supreme 
Court to the language of international treaties, which guarantee, together 
with protection from expropriation without compensation, access to 
international arbitration without the need to exhaust domestic remedies, 
is particularly troubling. As noted by the Supreme Court337, ‘… [a] court 
cannot determine whether a regulation goes “too far” unless it knows 
how far the regulation goes.’ The Court mentioned this famous dictum in 
the context of application of the Penn Central test, which includes the 
character of a governmental action, arguing that the way in which a 
measure is implemented is part of the assessment of the character of the 
measure and 
d
of judicial review that, according to the Penn Central Court, was 
intended for domestic courts338, tribunals are not capable of applying 
fully and correctly the provisions of the treaty with respect of the 
‘character’ of the measure. When it comes to assessing the character of 
ant has exhausted the domestic 
                                    
336 This is not as unproblematic as it seems: a law might apply to such a restricted 
nu old 
e 
ompany, even if it purported to be of general 
ap  
ue 
mber of people as to put into question its generality. See for example Glamis G
Ltd. v. The United States of America, UNCITRAL, Award, 16 May 2009, § 793, wher
the Claimant had argued that California Bill SB22 would in effect only outlaw the 
operations of the Glamis mining c
plication. The Tribunal made the distinction between the ‘on its face’ and ‘in reality’
application, and it argued that, even if in the present the bill only in reality targeted 
Glamis, this could not be affirmed with certainty for the future, and that the company 
had not proven that the bill exclusively targeted Glamis’ activities.   
337 Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. (2001). 
338 And the possible confusion between compensation for takings and remedy for d
process violations which is extant in US jurisprudence and is reflected in the overlap 
between expropriation and FET standard clauses in investment law. 
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available to 
.S. citizens340. Be that as it may, it certainly constitutes an attempt by 
on claims arising from Article 1, Protocol 1 of the European Convention 
              
administrative and judicial remedies, which he is not required to do 
anymore339. 
 
It has been argued that the Penn Central criteria found their place in U.S. 
investment instruments in order to minimise the risk that foreign 
investors would have access to higher protection than that 
U
the U.S. legislature to ‘imprint’ constitutional jurisprudence into 
international protections against regulatory expropriations, where these 
might affect the rights of American citizens against the rights granted to 
foreigners. But we have already noted how these provisions, and the 
accompanying criteria, are also seeping into non-U.S. investment 
instruments directly through adoption of the same language. 
 
The second strand of jurisprudence influencing conceptions of regulatory 
takings at the international level, including investment tribunals, 
originates from the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) decisions 
on Human Rights (ECHR)341. It is sufficient to point out the most 
                                   
339 he 
L, 
09, § 330 ff.  
 
l negotiating objectives of the United States regarding foreign investment 
ar
se that 
lic interest 
 On the tension between the ‘ripeness requirement’ in US takings law and t
procedural requirements of NAFTA, see Been and Beauvais, 51 ff. See also what the 
Tribunal had to say in Glamis Gold Ltd. v. The United States of America, UNCITRA
Award, 16 May 20
340 In compliance of the Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002, according to which: 
‘....Recognizing that United States law on the whole provides a high level of protection
for investment, consistent with or greater than the level required by international law, 
the principa
e to reduce or eliminate artificial or trade-distorting barriers to foreign investment, 
while ensuring that foreign investors in the United States are not accorded greater 
substantive rights with respect to investment protections than United States investors in 
the United States, and to secure for investors important rights comparable to tho
would be available under United States legal principles and practice...’ (19 USC 3801, § 
2012(b)(3). 
341 ‘Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his 
possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the pub
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governments by the Court342, 
nd the concept of ‘control of use’ to cover de facto expropriations. The 
ng at 
distinct rules: “the 
rst rule, set out in the first sentence of the first paragraph, is of a general 
                          
relevant elements arising from the jurisprudence of the Court, that is, the 
principle of ‘proportionality’, accompanied by the customary margin of 
appreciation usually granted to national 
a
first element (proportionality) is interpreted by the Court as requiri  th
there ought to be ‘[a] reasonable relationship of proportionality between 
the means employed and the aim sought to be realised by any measure 
depriving a person of his possessions’343. 
 
The Court established a 3-steps test for the application of Article 1344: 
 
… Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 comprises three  
fi
nature and enunciates the principle of the peaceful enjoyment of 
                                                                                                                          
 control the use of property in accordance 
 the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or 
enalties.’ 
e national 
at 
 established by the 
end, the 
 
r 1982, Series A no. 52, § 61; The Holy Monasteries v. Greece, Judgment, 
9 December 1994, Series A no. 301-A, § 56; Iatridis v. Greece [GC], no. 31107/96, § 
55, ECHR 1999-II; and Beyeler v. Italy [GC], no. 33202/96, § 106, ECHR 2000-I. 
and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of 
international law. 
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a state to 
enforce such laws as it deems necessary to
with
p
342 Restated by the Court in Jahn v. Germany (see footnote 350, infra) in the following 
terms: ‘…because of their direct knowledge of their society and its needs, th
authorities are in principle better placed than the international judge to appreciate wh
is “in the public interest”. Under the system of protection
Convention, it is thus for the national authorities to make the initial assessment as to the 
existence of a problem of public concern warranting measures of deprivation of 
property. Here, as in other fields to which the safeguards of the Convention ext
national authorities, accordingly, enjoy a certain margin of appreciation.’ 
343 Jahn and Others v. Germany, (Grand Chamber), Judgment, 30 June 2005, § 93. This 
case is ‘exceptional’ in that the Grand Chamber accepted that ‘exceptional 
circumstances’ justified the taking of the land without compensation, against the 
previous judgment by the Chamber of 22 January 2004. 
344 Most recently in Jahn and Others v. Germany, (Grand Chamber), Judgment, 30 June
2005, § 78; see also James and Others v. the United Kingdom, Judgment, 21 February 
1986, Series A no. 98, § 37; Sporrong and Lönnroth v. Sweden, Judgment, 23 
Septembe
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ect deprivation, 
bstantive content to investment treaty protections in regulatory 
h Court itself considered how the protection 
347
 more vulnerable to domestic legislation: 
nlike nationals, they will generally have played no part in the election or 
uiring nationals 
tionals. 
              
property; the second rule, contained in the second sentence of the first 
paragraph, covers deprivation of possessions and subjects it to certain 
conditions; the third rule, stated in the second paragraph, recognises that 
the Contracting States are entitled, among other things, to control the use 
of property in accordance with the general interest ...  
 
The ‘control of use’ clause covers cases not involving dir
that can therefore be equated to ‘de facto’ or regulatory expropriation. 
The application of the proportionality principle will typically result in 
granting compensation for a deprivation of possession but not, with 
exceptions, for a control of use345. 
 
We are interested here in the extent to which investment tribunals have 
availed themselves of the jurisprudence of the ECtHR in order to give 
su
expropriation claims346. T e 
granted by Article 1 might extend to foreign investors : 
  
Especially as regards a taking of property effected in the context of a 
social reform, there may well be good grounds for drawing a distinction 
between nationals and non-nationals as far as compensation is concerned. 
To begin with, non-nationals are
u
designation of its authors nor have been consulted on its adoption. 
Secondly, although a taking of property must always be effected in the 
public interest, different considerations may apply to nationals and non-
nationals and there may well be legitimate reason for req
to bear a greater burden in the public interest than non-na
 
                                   
345 See Baughen, S., ‘Expropriation and environmental regulation: the lessons of 
NAFTA Chapter Eleven’, 18 Journal of Environmental Law (2006): 207, at 213 ff. It is 
worth noticing that the test established by the Court does not in itself leave a carve out 
from the application of Article 1 Protocol 1: every governmental measure is in principle 
nter-
 cases in 
e Protection of Property in the 
subject to the proportionality test, with the margin of appreciation acting as a cou
balance. 
346 A recent review of the jurisprudence of the ECtHR in expropriation
Wildhaber, L. and Wildhaber, I., ‘Recent Case Law on th
European Convention on Human Rights’, in Binder et al, 2009: 657.  
347 James v. United Kingdom (1986) 8 EHRR 123, § 63. 
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while the other one rejected it . James Fry noted that the second 
acto 
R351 and suggested that 
 the dispute invite caution in attributing the diverging 
                 
The Court also added that348: 
 
 The inclusion of the reference [to general principles of 
international law] …enables non-nationals to resort directly to the 
machinery of the Convention to enforce their rights on the basis of the 
relevant principles of international law, whereas otherwise they would 
have to seek recourse to diplomatic channels or to other available means 
of dispute settlement to do so.  
 
This is important as it establishes an alternative forum for investment 
disputes within the jurisdiction of the ECtHR, but with general principles 
of international law as the governing law of the dispute.  
 
As for the cross-fertilisation between investment and European human 
rights regimes of protection, the relevant question is if investment 
tribunals extend or restrict the scope of substantive protections against 
indirect expropriation by reference to the jurisprudence of the Court. 
Two parallel cases involving the Czech Republic generated conflicting 
awards and consequent widespread criticism: one of the tribunals found 
on the facts that the claim of indirect expropriation could be sustained349, 
350
tribunal relied, in its analysis and classification of formal and de f
expropriation, on the jurisprudence of the ECtH
this reliance might have influenced the judgment, effectively implying 
that the application of the ‘human rights test’ might have restricted in this 
case the scope of protection against regulatory expropriation352. The 
complexities of
                                
348 At § 62. The Court also concludes that: ‘general principles of international law are 
not applicable to a taking by a State of the property of its own nationals.’ (At § 66). 
349 CME Czech Republic B.V. v. Czech Republic (UNCITRAL), Partial Award, 1
September 2001, §§ 591 ff; Final Award, 14 March 2003. 
3 
. 
 International Law 
(2007): 77, at 84. 
350 Lauder v. Czech Republic (UNCITRAL), Final Award, 3 September 2001, § 200
351 Specifically in Mellacher v. Austria, 169 ECtHR (Ser. A) (1989).  
352 See Fry, J. D., ‘International human rights law in investment arbitration: evidence of 
international law’s unity’, 18 Duke Journal of Comparative &
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rly 
ough is that the second tribunal relied more explicitly on an 
the tribunal expressly 
ade use of the proportionality test in order to assess if the Mexican 
proportionality principle and its corollary, that the principle has to be 
                                                
decisions on a ‘background’ factor such as the influence of human rights 
jurisprudence on the reasoning of the two arbitral tribunals, also in 
consideration of the fact that the disputes arose under different BITs, and 
therefore the tribunals were tasked with interpreting and applying 
different, and differently worded, provisions353. What emerges clea
th
‘interference with property rights’ approach, while the first one 
considered the effect on value as the determining factor354. We have seen 
already that both approaches have been taken by courts (specifically, the 
US Supreme Court) and tribunals. To the extent that the ECtHR case 
relied on by the Lauder Tribunal adopted the first approach to define an 
indirect expropriation, it restricted the scope of indirect expropriation. 
 
Probably the most relevant case in which the jurisprudence of the ECtHR 
was explicitly relied upon is Tecmed, in which 
m
government’s measures amounted to a compensable expropriation355. 
Specifically, the tribunal referred to the James Case’s articulation of the 
 
353 The CME Tribunal noted that: ‘The Treaty [US – Czech Republic BIT] avoids any 
narrow definition of expropriation in part by avoiding the use of that word altogether. 
T
he investment to the State, by prohibiting “deprivations” rather than 
onstituted under 
th
 
 
 involve 
in 
he Treaty focuses on the interference in the investor’s ownership, rather than any 
transfer of t
“takings”.’ (At § 151). On the other hand, the Lauder Tribunal was c
e Netherlands – Czech Republic BIT, which explicitly refers, at Article III(1) to 
‘measures tantamount to expropriation and nationalization’. While one can disagree on
too sharp a distinction to be made between deprivation and taking, undoubtedly the two
tribunals were faced with distinctively different provisions.  
354 ‘De facto expropriations or indirect expropriations, i.e. measures that do not
an overt taking but that effectively neutralize the benefit of the property of the foreign 
owner [italics added], are subject to expropriation claims.’  
355 As this case concerns environmental measures, it will be discussed in more detail 
Chapter 7. 
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he following fashion359: 
 
’t need to 
hearse the argument here, but only to note additionally that it cannot be 
              
applied more restrictively to non-nationals356; effectively, by doing so 
the Tribunal rejected the proportionality test on the terms devised by the 
Court for cases decided under the Convention357.  
 
Finally, in his dissenting opinion in the Thunderbird Award358, Thomas 
Wälde more forcefully argued not simply for using human rights 
jurisprudence as an interpretative aid in order to give substantive content 
to the vague provisions of bilateral investment treaties, but that 
nvestment arbitration must be seen in ti
   
 … more appropriate for investor-state arbitration are analogies 
with judicial review relating to governmental conduct – be it 
international judicial review (as carried out by the WTO dispute panels 
and Appellate Body, by the European- or Inter-American Human Rights 
Courts or the European Court of Justice) or national administrative courts 
judging the disputes of individual citizens’ over alleged abuse by public 
bodies of their governmental powers.  
 
We have already argued elsewhere against too easy an analogy between 
judicial review and investment arbitration360 and we don
re
the perceived weakness of one of the contracting parties to dictate the 
selective injection of criteria devised for a different setting altogether 
                                   
356 James v. United Kingdom, 98 ECtHR (ser. A) §§ 50, 63 (1986). 
357 Tellingly, the Tribunal in Fireman’s Fund Insurance Company v. United Mexican 
States (ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/02/01), Award, 17 July 2006, in footnote 161 to § 
176, noted that: ‘The factor [proportionality] is used by the European Court of Human 
Rights, [citation omitted], and it may be questioned whether it is a viable source of 
interpreting Article 1110 of the NAFTA.’ The Siemens Tribunal also rejected 
Argentina’s argument based on the ECHR, on the basis that the margin of appreciation 
doctrine used by the European Court is not recognised in customary law or in the treaty 
applicable to the dispute: Siemens A.G. v. The Argentine Republic (ICSID Case No. 
ARB/02/8), Award, 6 February 2007, § 354.   
358 International Thunderbird Gaming Corp. v. United Mexican States (UNCITRAL), 
Dissenting Opinion attached to Final Award, 26 January 2006. 
359 At § 13. 
360 Considering that the only straight analogy is the presence of the state.  
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R, its reliance on the 
argin of appreciation doctrine makes it an unsuitable source of 
btain judicial review. In other 
ords: the analogy holds only for the usual administrative law remedies 
gainst irrationality, arbitrariness, illegality, but not for general bona fide 
uthority in pursuance of the common good, 
ere even the Court stops short of adjudicating, having resorted to the 
the intent (if it results in a substantial deprivation, it is expropriation and 
                                                
(judicial review as opposed to commercial arbitration), while the general 
setting is not questioned with reference to other, more pressing, 
weaknesses (lack of democratic control chief amongst them). 
 
As for the scope of enlarging the protections offered by investment treaty 
by reference to the jurisprudence of the ECtH
m
inspiration in the context of investment law, where tribunals tend not to 
want to defer to systems of national law towards which they have neither 
allegiance nor connection to the extent done by the European Court. The 
layering of competencies in the European polity might create 
circumstances in which states implement regulation deemed to have an 
expropriatory effect in pursuance to European directives: it is to be 
expected that the Court would exercise a high level of deference for this 
sort of regulations. This is another argument against a simple analogy on 
the supposed role of the Court as a tool to o
w
a
exercises of governmental a
w
construction of the margin of appreciation doctrine precisely to avoid 
what some investment lawyers are advocating361. 
 
In summary, in the matter of regulatory expropriations, it is the tension 
between the effect (expropriation) and the intent (regulatory) to be the 
crux of the problem. As we will see again in Chapter 4 and then in 
Chapter 7, it is either an issue of exceptions/carve outs or of balancing: in 
other words, either the intent supersedes the effect (if it is regulation, it is 
not expropriation, and compensation is not due) or the effect supersedes 
 
361 See for example Wälde’s dissenting opinion in the Thunderbird Award, infra. 
 
 
 
126
.4 Concluding remarks 
emergence of the ‘legitimate expectations’ of the investor as the 
 
 
              
compensation is due), or, finally, intent and effect interact with each 
other by way of a proportionality analysis.  
 
 
3
 
This chapter brought into focus the normative background in which non-
investment obligations constitute an ‘interference’. Several issues have 
arisen already in this review, which will be important in our assessment 
of the extent of the conflicts and their possible resolution: the redundancy 
of the investment protection provisions; the shift to the Respondent to 
justify the legitimacy of the regulation against a claim, if not of 
regulatory expropriation, of standard of treatment violation (through the 
controlling standard362) and the resulting effective coincidence between
the criteria for ascertaining a regulatory expropriation and a breach of the 
FET standard363; on the opposite end of the scale, a more frank
                                   
362 See Wälde’s already mentioned dissenting opinion in Thunderbird, with extensive 
comparative analysis of human rights law and varied domestic administrative law 
systems, see especially, at §30, the assertion that: ‘under developed systems of 
administrative law, a citizen – even more so an investor - should be protected against 
unexpected and detrimental changes of policy if the investor has carried out significant 
 such 
 an 
 
he Tribunal nevertheless recognizes the economic 
investment with a reasonable, public-authority initiated assurance in the stability of
policy. Assurance on a particular interpretation of often open-ended statute against
unexpected detrimental change of such interpretation is in this context particularly 
relevant...’ [italics added]. He then immediately adds that: ‘Such protection is, however, 
not un-conditional and ever-lasting. It leads to a balancing process between the needs 
for flexible public policy and the legitimate reliance on in particular investment-backed
expectations.’ We have already argued against this balancing between policy and law, 
where policy inevitably loses out.  
363 In LG&E Energy Corp., LG&E Capital Corp. and LG&E International Inc. v. 
Argentine Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1), Decision on Liability, 3 October 
2006, § 139, the Tribunal stated: ‘T
hardships that occurred during this period, and certain political and social realities that 
at the time may have influenced the Government’s response to the growing economic 
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recognition of the existence of the conflicts and of the role played by 
investors’ behaviour364.  
 
In the second part of this project we will consider the tools available to 
the actors in investment law and arbitration, but more specifically to 
states and tribunals, that allow them to incorporate non-investment 
obligations in the development and application of the law. This review of 
the substantive obligations contained in investment treaties has to be read 
as the necessary background to that analysis. Inevitably, it is the 
obstacles to a holistic approach by states and tribunals in creating and 
applying investment law that come to the fore. If the ambiguity and 
vagueness of the investment treaties is a drawback, it is to be imputed to 
the states responsible for drafting the relevant provisions (and only 
secondarily to the tribunals that interpret them). The clearer and more 
precise the language of a treaty, the smaller the scope for interpretation 
and ‘judicial activism’ by arbitration tribunals365. Conversely, the more 
open and ambiguous the language, inevitably the greater the scope for 
tribunals to give substantive content to the provisions on a more ad hoc 
basis, with the risk of them getting perilously close to delivering 
decisions ex aequo et bono. Given the wide powers of interpretation 
granted to arbitrators, much of the responsibility rests with them for the 
approach they take to non-investment obligations and their relevance 
within investment law. The traditional, orthodox approach of investment 
tribunals, which can be distinguished procedurally by a strict adherence 
                                                                                                                          
.S. at 
§ 415: ‘...while property might be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far 
stor?: The relevance of the conduct of 
difficulties. Certainly, LG&E was aware of the risks inherent in investing in a foreign 
State. But here, the Tribunal is of the opinion that Argentina went too far by completely 
dismantling the very legal framework constructed to attract investors.’ This reasoning 
mirrors Justice Holmes famous dictum in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U
it will be recognized as a taking.’ 
364 See for example Muchlinski, P., ‘Caveat inve
the investor under the fair and equitable treatment standard’, in Ortino et al., 2007: 205.  
365 See Section 5.4.1 for a review of treaty interpretation by international courts, in 
connection with the issue of intertemporal law. 
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roach that underestimates, miscontrues and disapplies public 
interest concerns and demands. To the extent that tribunals do not 
 
las 
e 
              
to the commercial arbitration model and substantially by faithfulness to 
an insular view of investment law, has been the object of this chapter. In 
many cases, one can speak of a sort of ‘tunnel vision’ adopted by 
investment arbitration tribunals. It is a tunnel vision that works on two 
levels: firstly, a commercial law bias to the exclusion of public law 
traditions and practices; second, and connected to the first, an investor-
centred app
concern themselves with these matters, they exclude or diminish their 
value as defences that can be raised by the state. In other words, in this 
way tribunals effectively close the doors of investment arbitrations to 
non-investment general measures. This refusal to let non-investment 
measures to be taken into due account can be contrasted with tribunals’ 
eagerness to interpret investment treaties in favorem investor on the basis
of vague policy statements evinced from the preambles of BITs366.  
We do not aim to argue that environmental policy considerations should 
work as ‘trumps’ in the interpretation of the treaty. Just as Doug
argued that ‘where there is no specific rule of decision to apply... th
                                   
366 As done by the tribunal in SGS v. Philippines (ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6) Deci
of the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction, 29 January 2004, § 116: ‘The BIT is a 
treaty for the promotion and reciprocal protection of investments. According to the 
preamble it is intended ‘to create and maintain favourable conditions for investments by
investors of one Contract
sion 
 
ing Party in the territory of the other. It is legitimate to resolve 
pretation so as to favour the protection of covered investments’ 
 
h, 1982, 
 
sh 
uncertainties in its inter
[italics added]. For a more balanced approach, see also Saluka Investments B. V.  v. 
Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, PCA, Partial Award , 16 March 2006, § 300 (while still
accepting that BITs, being designed to promote foreign investment, should provide ‘a 
positive incentive’, including a lower standard of ‘inappropriatness’ of behaviour in 
order to trigger a violation of the FET standard [at § 293]). For a previous example of 
the investor-centred approach, see Kuwait v. AMINOIL, Final Award, 24 Marc
21 ILM, 976, 1033. It should be stressed that, in the context of mixed arbitrations, 
adopting the traditional international law approach of interpreting treaties in favorem 
state sovereignty (as argued by the United States in Methanex Corp. v. United States of
America, UNCITRAL, 1st Partial Award, 7 August 2002, § 103) would not accompli
a balanced result either. 
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In the next three chapters we will turn our attention to the ways in which 
investment law expressly deals with non-investment obligations (Chapter 
4), what tools are available in general international law when express 
means of incorporation are not available (Chapter 5) and, finally, what 
procedural means of incorporation are at the disposal of investment 
tribunals (Chapter 6), before finally zooming into investment arbitrations 
to see how all these tools play out in actual investment cases (Chapter 7). 
                                                
tribunal should search for principles of law’367, equally it is submitted 
that tribunals ought to consider conflicting legal obligations of states368 
in accordance with existing rules of treaty interpretation and conflict 
resolution. 
 
367 Douglas, 2009, 84. 
368 All the ways in which this can be done are discussed in the following chapters. The 
distinction between rules and principles, which we take from Dworkin (Dworkin, R., 
‘The Model of Rules?’, 35 University of Chicago Law Review (1967-68): 14, reprised as 
chapter 2 in Taking Rights Seriously, London, Duckworth, 1978) might not be as useful 
as it has been argued. Even if rules are applied in an all-or-nothing fashion, while for 
principles it is a matter of degree or balancing, principles alone will not allow 
proportionality to ‘work its magic’, because in the end it is still the matter of deciding 
which rule will be dis-applied in the particular case. While it is true that principles can 
help tip the balance in the decision, their unfortunate tendency to be ‘regime-specific’ 
(or too vague to be of any help) might result in the regime-bias to dictate the choice 
between competing principles.  
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Part II: The tools 
 
This is the central section of this work, and appropriately, it examines the 
practicalities of dealing with non-investment obligations in the context of 
investment law. There are three main means of accomplishing this, each 
analysed in a separate chapter: express provisions in investment 
instruments (chapter 4); conflict rules derived from general international 
law (chapter 5) and procedural means (chapter 6). The part is essentially 
descriptive in its structure and normative in its approach. Chapter 4 
especially aims to provide a taxonomy of all the possible ways in which 
non-investment commitments are included in investment treaties. To a 
certain extent, it is a picture of ‘il buon governo’, i.e., the ideal way of 
dealing with conflicting obligations by way of careful drafting and 
attentive choice of language. As is often the case, reality is quite far from 
this ideal and most treaties do not measure up to this standard of careful  
calibration of regulatory commitments, either because the express 
provisions are not included at all, or because of the vagueness of the 
language or the ‘soft law’ nature of the clauses. It is important to stress 
that chapter 4 does not aim to ‘test’ these provisions. This will be done in 
chapter 7, to the extent that the reality of the investment disputes will 
reflect the drafting of the treaties. The aim of chapter 4 is simply to 
provide a comprehensive review of the available tools.  
 
Chapter 5 deals with a very complex issue, that has attracted the attention 
of publicist (less so of treaty drafters and state officials), namely, the 
resolution of normative conflicts in international law. The argument is 
that, even when express provisions have not been included in the 
applicable treaty, investment tribunals can still resort to the conflict rules 
available in general international law (as codified in the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties) in order to avoid the conflict, if 
possible, or solve it in accordance with generally accepted rules. The 
chapter includes examples taken from the jurisprudence of the 
International Court of Justice and the panels and Appellate Body of the 
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WTO. Also this was a conscious choice, as the application of the conflict 
rules in investment disputes will be examined in Part 3 of this work.  
 
Finally, chapter 6 reviews the procedural means of incorporation. These 
should not be considered as a ‘weapon of last resort’; instead, it is 
advisable for investment tribunals to adopt as their default position 
openness of proceedings, publicity of materials and awards, and 
participation of non-disputing parties, regardless of what other means are 
available to them as outlined in the two preceding chapters. 
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Chapter 4: Non-investment obligations in investment 
instruments 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
In Chapter 3, we reviewed the main obligations to which the host state is 
subject with respect to the investor. In the next three chapters we will 
examine how tribunals can take into account the host state’s non 
investment obligations. There are principally four ways in which non-
investment obligations can be taken into consideration: policy initiatives, 
such as inter-state consultations369; procedural means, such as publicity 
of materials, openness of proceedings and amicus curiae briefs; conflict 
resolution techniques derived from general international law principles 
and rules; and finally the recourse to express provisions in investment 
instruments. In this chapter we will concentrate on the last one of these 
means, keeping in mind that both policy and procedural means can find 
their way into the express provisions of the investment treaty370. Only the 
conventional sources of investment law, that is bilateral and multilateral 
treaties, will be considered, both for ease of analysis and for statistical 
reasons, as most of the investment disputes now take place under the 
umbrella of an investment treaty. There are five ways in which 
substantial non-investment obligations are incorporated into the treaties: 
 
1. The preamble of the treaty itself. Preambles do not contain binding 
obligations, but they can be used by tribunals in aiding the interpretation 
of the treaty’s substantive norms, and as a source for the scope and 
purpose of the treaty; 
 
369 These will not be examined in this chapter or elsewhere, because of the exclusion of 
policy analysis from this work. 
370 Respectively through the incorporation of clauses on the duty of inter-state 
consultation or the acceptance of third parties submissions. 
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2. Specific exception clauses. These clauses explicitly incorporate 
extraneous obligations in the treaty, and relieve the state from the 
performance of investment protection obligations to the extent of their 
applicability. Exception clauses can be of a general or a specific nature 
(there are no examples of environmental exception clauses in treaties 
ratified so far, with the possible exception of the exception clauses 
modelled on Article XX of the GATT). 
3. ‘Balancing clauses’, such as articles of the BITs titled 
‘Environment’ or even more specifically ‘Investment and Environment’. 
While these clauses do not provide an exception to the investment 
obligations of the treaty, and cannot therefore be raised as a defence for 
non performance, they can be used, through interpretation, to balance the 
obligations of the treaty against other obligations; 
4. Carve-out clauses and more general clarifications, by way of 
annexes, circumscribing either the extent of regulatory takings or the 
applicable standard of treatment, in order to take into consideration non 
investment obligations. Clarifications on the extent of the regulatory 
powers of states more correctly belong to this category, as we consider 
them neither exception clauses (where the state is relieved from an 
obligation that would normally be applicable because of the exception), 
nor balancing clauses (where two conflicting obligations are balanced by 
the tribunal, both remaining applicable), but a carve-out clause (where 
the obligation is not applicable to the situation, therefore there is no need 
for an exception)371.  
 
371 See also Mann, H., ‘Investment agreements and the regulatory state: can exception 
clauses create safe havens for governments?’, 2007, at 
http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2007/inv_agreements_reg_state.pdf, at 6: ‘For clarity, it is 
important to note that the reason such measures are not compensable is that they do not 
fall within the definition or scope of expropriation. It is not about an expropriation that 
is non-compensable. Rather, it addresses a measure that is not compensable because it is 
not an expropriation. The distinction is not just esoteric, but impacts significantly on the 
burden of proof and other factors in arbitrations around this issue.’  
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5. Conflict clauses, either specifically establishing a conflict rule for 
particular environmental instruments, or general conflict clauses. 
 
Not all investment treaties are the same, as the protagonists of the debate 
on their role in the development of customary law know well, and 
different treaties accord different weight to non-investment obligations. 
There has been a diachronic change, with a more frank recognition of the 
role to be attributed to these obligations (paradigmatic in this sense is the 
change in the US Model BIT); there is an economic divide, with least 
developed countries more willing to relinquish their non-investment 
regulatory rights. This divide tends to be made invisible though, as more 
often then not, this ‘regulatory deficit’ is implemented at the level of the 
concession contracts, through stabilisation clauses which exclude the 
investor from changes in the regulatory environment of the host state.  
 
Each treaty can contain one, more, all or none of these express 
provisions, with the presence of two or more pointing to a higher level of 
awareness of the potential environmental fall-outs of investment 
activities, especially in certain sectors, such as energy and mining. The 
taxonomy presented here has to be contextualised in the reality of treaty 
drafting, where the distinctions might not be clear, the categories might 
overlap, especially where complex clauses might be structured as 
containing exception, conflict and carve-out provisions (or where the 
language of the treaty is vague enough as to allow tribunals to interpret 
these clauses differently), and different express tools are supposed to 
operate differently, as will be shown in chapter 7. 
 
 
4.2 Preambles to investment treaties 
 
Preambles can be of varying length and level of detail. They can refer to 
the object and scope of the treaty as instruments for the protection and 
promotion of investments or can include other considerations in their 
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text, from a reference to economic development, to a reference to other 
obligations. The point has been made that it is inappropriate to use the 
policy declarations contained in preambles to treaty to construe legal 
obligations372.  However much one accepts this criticism, it is important 
to point out that it is an accepted rule of treaty interpretation to refer back 
to the language of the preamble in order to ascertain the scope and 
purpose of the treaty373. To this extent, any reference to non-investment 
obligations in the preamble does not of course create a free standing legal 
obligation nor it gives the tribunal jurisdiction over a dispute on the 
compliance with these obligations (except to the extent that they are 
referred to in specific exception clauses in the body of the treaty), but 
only aides in the interpretation of the legal obligations contained in the 
treaty proper. As we said, some treaties contain a very short preamble, 
which only refers to the strict scope of the treaty. An example of this is 
the United Kingdom-Argentina BIT:  
 
 The Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland and the Government of the Republic of Argentina;  
Desiring to create favourable conditions for greater investments by 
investors of one State in the territory of the other State; 
Recognising that the encouragement and reciprocal protection under 
international agreement of such investments will be conducive to the 
stimulation of individual business initiatives and will increase prosperity 
in both States; 
Have agreed as follows....  
 
 
372 Z. Douglas, 2009, §§ 147-8. See also, interestingly, the Tribunal in Bayindir Insaat 
Turizm Ticaret ve Sanayi AS v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan (ICSID Case No. 
ARB/03/29), Decision on Jurisdiction, 14 November 2005, quoting the text of the 
preamble of the Pakistan – Turkey BIT, at §§ 229-230: ‘ “The Islamic Republic of 
Pakistan and the Republic of Turkey...agree that fair and equitable treatment of 
investment is desirable in order to maintain a stable framework for investment....” 
...Despite the use of the verb “agree”, it is doubtful that, in the absence of a specific 
provision in the BIT itself, the sole text of the preamble constitutes a sufficient basis for 
a self-standing fair and equitable treatment obligation under the BIT.’ 
373 See Article 31(2) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 
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Other treaties, while maintaining the basic structure adopted above, 
include a reference to international law, therefore situating more 
explicitly the treaty within the framework of general international law. 
The BIT between Sweden and Argentina includes the following 
preamble: 
 
 The Government of the Kingdom of Sweden and the Government 
of the Republic of Argentina,  
desiring to intensify, in conformity with the principles of international 
law, economic cooperation to the mutual benefit of both countries and to 
maintain fair and equitable conditions for investments by investors of one 
Contracting Party in the territory of the other Contracting Party,  
recognizing that the promotion and protection of such investments favour 
the expansion of the economic relations between the two Contracting 
Parties and stimulate investment initiatives,  
have agreed as follows... 
 
Equally, the preamble can contain a reference to the respective domestic 
laws of the Parties to the treaty, and in general deference to 
sovereignty.374 These preambles can be contrasted with the long text of 
the Norway Draft Model BIT (2007), which includes the following 
language: 
 
  The Kingdom of Norway and the................................., hereinafter 
referred to as the “Parties”; 
Desiring to develop the economic cooperation between the Parties; 
Desiring to achieve these objectives in a manner consistent with the 
protection of health, safety, and the environment, and the promotion of 
internationally recognized labour rights; 
........................................................... 
Emphasising the importance of corporate social responsibility; 
Recognising that the development of economic and business ties can 
promote respect for internationally recognised labour rights; 
Reaffirming their commitment to democracy, the rule of law, human 
rights and fundamental freedoms in accordance with their obligations 
under international law, including the principles set out in the United 
Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights;  
Recognising that the promotion of sustainable investments is critical for 
the further development of national and global economies as well as for 
 
374 An example of this in the Preamble of the Egypt-Nigeria BIT 
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/Egypt_Nigeria.pdf).  
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the pursuit of national and global objectives for sustainable development, 
and understanding that the promotion of such investments requires 
cooperative efforts of investors, host governments and home 
governments;  
Recognising that the provisions of this agreement and provisions of 
international agreements relating to the environment shall be interpreted 
in a mutually supportive manner; 
.................................. 
In the end the Norway Model BIT was not adopted, because of 
opposition to it from different quarters, as reported at the time375: 
  
 ... despite efforts to achieve a model BIT that balanced investor 
protections with consideration of public goods, a number of 
nongovernmental organizations and businesses charged that the proposed 
model agreement was imbalanced. Indeed, public feedback fell broadly 
in two categories, said a Norwegian government official: groups that felt 
the model did not provide investors with enough protection, and those 
that felt the model would restrain governments’ ability to regulate in the 
public interest. The feedback was so polarized that Norway “decided that 
achieving a proper balance was too difficult,” said this person.’  
 
The US 2004 Model BIT also refers to environmental and other 
obligations in its preamble:376 
 
 The Government of the United States of America and the 
Government of [Country] (hereinafter the “Parties”);  
Desiring to promote greater economic cooperation between them with 
respect to investment by nationals and enterprises of one Party in the 
territory of the other Party;  
Recognizing that agreement on the treatment to be accorded such 
investment will stimulate the flow of private capital and the economic 
development of the Parties;  
Agreeing that a stable framework for investment will maximize effective 
utilization of economic resources and improve living standards;  
Recognizing the importance of providing effective means of asserting 
claims and enforcing rights with respect to investment under national law 
as well as through international arbitration;  
Desiring to achieve these objectives in a manner consistent with the 
protection of health, safety, and the environment, and the promotion of 
internationally recognized labor rights;  
 
375 ITN, 8 June 2009 (http://www.investmenttreatynews.org/).  
376 As well as the Preamble of the Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) 
includes the United States and is also modelled on the NAFTA with some differences. 
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Having resolved to conclude a Treaty concerning the encouragement and 
reciprocal protection of investment;  
Have agreed as follows... 
 
Certain sectors of investors’ activities are more prone to environmental 
negative externalities, and it is no surprise that the only sectoral 
multilateral treaty containing an investment chapter, the Energy Charter 
Treaty, contains all of the expressed provisions listed in the introduction, 
starting with the last two paragraph of its preamble, which state: 
 
 Recalling the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, the Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution 
and its protocols, and other international environmental agreements with 
energy-related aspects; and 
Recognizing the increasingly urgent need for measures to protect the 
environment, including the decommissioning of energy installations and 
waste disposal, and for internationally-agreed objectives and criteria for 
these purposes, 
have agreed as follows.... 
 
Here the reference is not generically to international law or domestic law, 
or even environmental considerations in general, but specifically to two 
environmental agreements, and to the measures necessary to mitigate the 
damages created by energy extraction and production activities. In this 
case it could be argued that the preamble does not simply constitute a 
source for the object and purpose of the treaty, or an aid for the 
interpretation of its substantive provisions, but it refers directly to the 
environmental obligations of the state parties. This preamble should also 
be read in conjunction to Article 18 of the Treaty (Sovereignty over 
Energy Resources), which also contains programmatic and objective 
elements, including its paragraph (3), which states: 
 
 Each state continues to hold in particular the rights to decide the 
geographical areas within its Area to be made available for exploration 
and development of its energy resources, the optimalization of their 
recovery and the rate at which they may be depleted or otherwise 
exploited, to specify and enjoy any taxes, royalties or other financial 
payments payable by virtue of such exploration and exploitation, and to 
regulate the environmental and safety aspects of such exploration, 
development and reclamation within its Area, and to participate in such 
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exploration and exploitation, inter alia, through direct participation by the 
government or through state enterprises. 
 
To summarise, preambles can vary in their wording from restricting the 
focus of the treaty to the protection and promotion of investment, to the 
inclusion of either international law or municipal law as backgrounds 
upon which the investment obligations contained in the treaty are to be 
implemented, to the acknowledgment that investment protection has to 
be balanced against other public policy obligations of the contracting 
parties. The language of the preamble can aid tribunals in ascertaining 
the scope of the treaty and in interpreting its substantive provisions. The 
interpretation ‘in light of’ other non-investment obligations of the state 
can allow the tribunal to apply the substantive clauses of the treaty taking 
into consideration the obligations that the state has in the defence of the 
public interest. 
 
 
4.3 Exception clauses 
 
Investment treaties can contain specific exception clauses. Normally 
these refer to taxation or national security or cultural preservation; 
NAFTA Article 1108 allows the State Parties to provide a negative list of 
exemption and non-conforming measures. There are no investment 
instruments in force at the moment, either bilateral or multilateral, that 
allow exceptions based on environmental regulations. The only example 
are clauses partially allowing health, safety and environmental (HSE) 
exceptions, based on Article XX of the GATT. The relevant section of 
the GATT Article, targeted at general exceptions, states: 
 
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a 
manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a 
disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agreement 
shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any 
contracting party of measures:  
(a)        necessary to protect public morals;  
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(b)        necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health;  
(c)        relating to the importations or exportations of gold or silver;  
(d)        necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which 
are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement....  
 
Similarly, the US Model BIT of 2004 contains the following exception 
clause as part of Article 8 on Performance Requirements – Article 
8(3)(c): 
 
 Provided that such measures are not applied in an arbitrary or 
unjustifiable manner, and provided that such measures do not constitute a 
disguised restriction on international trade or investment, paragraphs 
1(b), (c), and (f), and 2(a) and (b), shall not be construed to prevent a 
Party from adopting or maintaining 
measures, including environmental measures: 
(i) necessary to secure compliance with laws and regulations that are not 
inconsistent with this Treaty; 
(ii) necessary to protect human, animal, or plant life or health; or 
(iii) related to the conservation of living or non-living exhaustible natural 
resources. 
 
This clause appears also in the NAFTA, Article 1106 on Performance 
Requirements, as well as in the Canadian Model BIT, Article 10. The 
NAFTA contains two exceptions that might allow for non investment 
obligations to be used as defences against a claim; the first one is 
contained in Article 1106(2), which is worded more specifically as a 
conflict clause: 
 
 A measure that requires an investment to use a technology to meet 
generally applicable health, safety or environmental requirements shall 
not be construed to be inconsistent with paragraph 1(f). For greater 
certainty, Articles 1102 [National Treatment] and 1103 [Most-favored-
Nation Treatment] apply to the measure. 
 
The second, the GATT-style exception clause, is in Article 1106(6): 
 
 Provided that such measures are not applied in an arbitrary or 
unjustifiable manner, or do not constitute a disguised restriction on 
international trade or investment, nothing in paragraph 1(b) or (c) or 3(a) 
or (b) shall be construed to prevent any Party from adopting or 
maintaining measures, including environmental measures: 
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(a) necessary to secure compliance with laws and regulations that are not 
inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement; 
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health; or 
(c) necessary for the conservation of living or non-living exhaustible 
natural resources.  
 
The concern has been expressed that the presence of this clause within 
the article on Performance Requirements can be construed as restricting 
its applicability to that article and not to the totality of the treaty, 
therefore not influencing, for example, the standards of treatment or 
expropriation clauses377. The article differentiates between measures 
adopted or maintained in compliance with legislation, in which case the 
measures have to be consistent with the obligations contained within the 
treaty (this provision would cover measures which would be subject to 
compensation if non-compliant) and measures taken to protect human, 
animal or plant life and health, or related to the conservation of natural 
resources; in this second instance, there is no obligation of compliance 
with the investment obligations, so this is a true exception clause, 
preventing wrongfulness.  
 
Article 14 of the US Model BIT – Non-conforming Measures, carves out 
the fields excluded from the application of the treaty, with the negative 
list approach typical of bilateral investment treaties (as opposed to the 
WTO less demanding system of positive lists). The Canadian 2004 
Model BIT contains a similar GATT-style provision, as does the draft 
Norwegian Model BIT of 2007, which explicitly mentions the 
environment, at Article 24 of Section 5: 
 
 Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a 
manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination between investments or between investors, or a disguised 
restriction on international [trade or] investment, nothing in this 
 
377 See Report of the Subcommittee on Investment of the Advisory Committee on 
International Economic Policy Regarding the Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, 
Collective Statement from Sarah Anderson, Institute for Policy Studies and others, Part 
IV, available at http://www.state.gov/e/eeb/rls/othr/2009/131118.   
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Agreement shall be construed to prevent a Party from adopting or 
enforcing measures necessary378: 
i. to protect public morals or to maintain public order;379 
ii. to protect human, animal or plant life or health; 
iii. to secure compliance with laws and regulations that are not 
inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement;  
iv. for the protection of national treasures of artistic, historic or 
archaeological value; or 
v. for the protection of the environment 
 
The Energy Charter Treaty has a general non-derogation clause from the 
GATT (Part I – Article 4), but the General Exceptions provision, which 
is very detailed, is contained in Article 24, the first part of which covers 
environmental exceptions with reference to Part III of the Treaty (the 
investment chapter)380: 
 
 (1) This Article shall not apply to Articles 12 [Compensation for 
Losses], 13 [Expropriation] and 29 [Interim Provisions on Trade-Related 
Matters]. 
(2) The provisions of this Treaty other than (a) those referred to in 
paragraph (1); and 
(b) with respect to subparagraph (i), Part III of the Treaty shall not 
preclude any Contracting Party from adopting or enforcing any measure 
(i) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health; 
(ii) essential to the acquisition or distribution of Energy Materials and 
Products in conditions of short supply arising from causes outside the 
control of that Contracting Party, provided that any such measure shall be 
consistent with the principles that 
(A) all other Contracting Parties are entitled to an equitable share of the 
international supply of such Energy Materials and Products; 
and 
(B) any such measure that is inconsistent with this Treaty shall be 
discontinued as soon as the conditions giving rise to it have ceased to 
exist... 
 
 
378 For greater certainty, the concept of  “necessity” in this Article shall include 
measures taken by a Party as provided for by the precautionary principle, including the 
principle of precautionary action. 
379 The public order exception may be invoked only where a genuine and sufficiently 
serious threat is posed to one of the fundamental interests of society. 
380 For the relationship between the Article 4 and Article 24, see the Final Act of the 
European Energy Charter Conference, Understanding no. 15 with respect to Article 24.   
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It is worth noting that the exceptions do not apply to Article 13 on 
expropriation, with the effect of preventing the application of the listed 
exceptions if the measures as for subparagraph (i) have ‘effect equivalent 
to nationalization or expropriation’ (Article 13(1)). 
 
The presence of GATT-style general exception clauses in investment 
agreements can be problematic. In the context of WTO law, an inter-state 
system based on positive lists, trade-offs, and interstate disputes, a clause 
worded such as Article XX of the GATT is coherent with the system. 
Where the consequence of a breach of the GATT consists in repealing 
the offending legislation, it is reasonable to state that nothing in the 
agreement shall be construed as preventing a Party from adopting or 
enforcing a certain measure. In the WTO system, measures can be 
unlawful if they are in breach of a trade obligation381. Investment law on 
the other hand possesses its own system of secondary rules which 
constitute a lex specialis regime dealing with consequences of 
breaches382. In an investment agreement, a lawful measure does not 
become unlawful and therefore subject to the obligation of repeal if it is 
expropriatory (even if the expropriation is unlawful); it only carries with 
it the obligation to compensate for the loss if so established by the 
tribunal. In other words, when cessation or restitution are not the 
expected remedies, it is unhelpful to grant the state a power that the 
investment agreement per se is not supposed to touch. The risk is also 
that, given the very similar wording, the investment tribunal might be 
tempted to interpret the exception clauses similarly to how this has been 
interpreted by the Dispute Settlement Panels and Appellate Body of the 
WTO, without taking in due consideration the differences between the 
two systems, including the differences in remedies383. 
 
381 See DiMascio, N., and Pauwelyn, J., ‘Nondiscrimination in trade and investment 
treaties: worlds apart or two sides of the same coin?’, 102 AJIL (2008): 48. 
382 See Rule 12 and related discussion in Douglas, 2009: 94 ff. 
383 See Muchlinski, P., ‘Corporate social responsibility’, in The Oxford Handbook of 
International Investment Law: 637 at 670.  
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Nonetheless, this clause explicitly reaffirms the regulatory space 
necessary to implement public interest measures. There are three levels 
of restrictions applicable to the clause: firstly, and most generally, the 
measures have to be applied in a non-discriminatory manner and not 
constitute a disguised restriction of investment; secondly, if the measures 
are adopted or enforced in compliance with legislation, the article 
establishes a conflict rule to the effect that the measures cannot be 
inconsistent with the investment treaty (which will therefore prevail to 
the extent of the inconsistency); and thirdly, only if certain conditions are 
met (public order preservation etc) the article has the effect of a proper 
exception clause, precluding wrongfulness. It is to be presumed that only 
emergency measures will be covered by this exception, as ordinary 
measures enforced in compliance with legislation (for example, the 
requirement to conduct an environmental impact assessment) will be 
covered by the conflict rule as expressed for example in Article 
1106(6)(a) of the NAFTA.   
 
 
4.4 ‘Balancing’ or regulatory measures clauses 
 
When treaties do not create express exceptions from the obligations 
contained therein, they might nonetheless expressly mention the non-
investment obligations of the contracting parties, in ‘balancing’ clauses. 
The new generation of BITs has seen the multiplication of this kind of 
clauses, which can take different forms and express different levels of 
commitment to non-investment obligations. We refer to them as 
balancing clauses for two reasons: the first one is that they are not 
exception clauses, relieving the state from its investment obligations to 
the extent of the exception; the second one is that they contain the 
‘otherwise consistent with this agreement’ proviso. It has been argued 
that this proviso renders the clauses meaningless384; after a review of a 
 
384 See Mann, H., 2007, at http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2007/inv_agreements_reg_state.pdf.  
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few of these clauses, we will see that their presence, albeit of limited 
scope, is not futile. Probably the first of this kind of clauses is Article 
1114 of the NAFTA – Environmental Measures, which provides as 
follows: 
 
 1. Nothing in this Chapter shall be construed to prevent a Party 
from adopting, maintaining or enforcing any measure otherwise 
consistent with this Chapter that it considers appropriate to ensure that 
investment activity in its territory is undertaken in a manner sensitive to 
environmental concerns. 
2. The Parties recognize that it is inappropriate to encourage investment 
by relaxing domestic health, safety or environmental measures. 
Accordingly, a Party should not waive or otherwise derogate from, or 
offer to waive or otherwise derogate from, such measures as an 
encouragement for the establishment, acquisition, expansion or retention 
in its territory of an investment of an investor. If a Party considers that 
another Party has offered such an encouragement, it may request 
consultations with the other Party and the two Parties shall consult with a 
view to avoiding any such encouragement. 
 
The first paragraph, similarly to Article 1106(6)(a), establishes a conflict 
rule: while the sovereign power of the state to regulate in response to 
environmental concerns is reaffirmed, the power is limited by the 
requirement to act consistently with the investment protection obligations 
of the agreement. The second paragraph of the Article is worded in 
hortatory terms, which contrast unfavourably with the mandatory 
language of the rest of Chapter Eleven, and seems on the face of it to be 
unenforceable385. By way of illustration, let’s assume that a Canadian 
investor is offered a waiver of environmental measures by Mexico if he 
is willing to invest in Mexico: according to the Article, the investor 
should then notify his government (Canada; otherwise, how else would 
Canada ‘consider’ that such an offer has been made?) so that Canada 
 
385 On the enforceability of the environmental provisions of the NAFTA in general, see 
Banks, K., ‘NAFTA’s Article 1110 – Can regulation be expropriation? 5 Law & 
Business Review (1999): 499; Charnovitz, S., ‘NAFTA: green law or green spin?’ 26 
Law & Polity International Business (1994): 1; Wickham, J., ‘Toward a green 
multilateral investment framework: NAFTA and the search for models’, 12 Geographic 
International Law Review (2000): 617.   
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could request consultations with Mexico, with a view of withdrawing this 
offer. Does this put the investor under an obligation to report such an 
offer? Arguably, it only means that the investor is estopped from using 
this promise as an ‘investment backed expectation’ in a claim against the 
host state, were the offer to be withdrawn. Alternatively, can we say that 
this Article establishes a duty for Canada to ascertain if this is going on? 
Of course not. The only (soft) obligation is on Parties to refrain from 
lowering their environmental standards. However, since this course of 
action is economically beneficial to both the investor and the host state 
(which is why it is undertaken by the host state) and since there is no 
duty on the home state of the investor to ascertain that this is taking 
place, the possibility that these consultations could ever be requested is 
very low indeed, and in fact this has never happened386. Its logical 
limitations notwithstanding, this provision is repeated in the US Model 
BIT, Article 11, the Canadian Model BIT, Article 11, the Rwanda-United 
States BIT, Article 12. More recently adopted instruments have expanded 
the scope of the environmental exception, both by clarifying the language 
and by ever so slightly increasing the ‘bite’ of the clause, even if staying 
within the confines of the hortatory language adopted in previous 
treaties. We will present three clauses from treaties concluded by Libya, 
 
386 See also the comments of the Australian Network of Environmental Defender’s 
Offices in occasion of the consultations on the Australia-US Free Trade Agreement 
(AUSFTA) which contained in its draft stage a similar provision. In their letter to the 
US FTA Task Force they stated: ‘First, a provision such as Article 1114 is patently 
unenforceable. While the aspiration contained within it is laudable, it should be 
strengthened considerably to ensure that (present and prospective) environmental and 
public health and safety laws are not compromised in the name of investment. Second, 
it is unlikely that one party would complain if the other party sought to encourage 
investment. For example, if Australia was to induce US investors through lowering its 
standards (environmental or otherwise), it seems a fanciful scenario that the US would 
seek to invoke the consultation provisions’ (available at 
http://www.edo.org.au/policy/ausftasub.htm). In final draft, the second part of article 
1114 was dropped. The treaty came into force on 1 January 2005, see 
http://www.fta.gov.au/default.aspx?FolderID=160.   
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respectively with Spain and with Belgium, and the treaty between 
Nicaragua and El Salvador. Article 8(4) of the 2009 Spain-Libya BIT 
states387: 
 
 Recognising the right of each Contracting Party to establish its own 
level of domestic environmental protection and environmental 
development policies and priorities, nothing in this present Agreement 
shall be interpreted as to prevent the Contracting Parties from modifying 
or adopting measures, otherwise compatible with the present Agreement, 
for guaranteeing that investment activities are carried out with 
consideration for environmental concerns, provided that these measures 
are not applied in an arbitrary or unjustified manner and do not 
undermine the substance of the rights provided for in the present 
Agreement. Consequently, each Contracting Party shall strive to ensure 
that its laws provide for high levels of environmental protection and shall 
strive to continue to improve these laws388. 
 
In the Libya-Belgium BIT, Article 1 (Definitions), includes, at paragraph 
5, the following: 
 
 The terms “environmental laws” shall mean the laws and 
regulations, or provisions thereof, in force in the Contracting Parties, the 
primary purpose of which is the protection of the environment, or the 
prevention of a danger to human, animal, or plant life or health, through: 
a) the prevention, abatement or control of the release, discharge, or 
emission of pollutants or environmental contaminants; 
b) the control of environmentally hazardous toxic chemicals, 
substances, materials and wastes, and the dissemination of information 
related thereto; 
c) the protection or conservation of wild flora or fauna, including 
endangered species, their habitat, and specially protected natural areas in 
the Contracting Party’s territory. 
Article 5 (Environment) is as following: 
 
387 The BIT is only available in Spanish (and Arabic), from which it has been translated 
by the author. 
388 A similar provision is contained in Article 17.1 [Levels of Protection] of the CAFTA 
and in Article 3 of the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation: 
‘Recognizing the right of each Party to establish its own levels of domestic 
environmental protection and environmental development policies and priorities, and to 
adopt or modify accordingly its environmental laws and policies, each Party shall 
ensure that its laws and policies provide for and encourage high levels of environmental 
protection, and shall strive to continue to improve those laws and policies.’ 
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 For the purpose of this Agreement, the Contracting Parties shall 
strive to apply the following principles: 
1. Recognising the right of each Contracting Party to establish its own 
levels of domestic environmental protection and environmental 
development policies and priorities, and to adopt or modify accordingly 
its environmental laws, each Contracting Party shall strive to ensure that 
its laws provide for high levels of environmental protection and shall 
strive to continue to improve those laws. 
2. The Contracting Parties recognise that it is inappropriate to 
encourage investment by relaxing domestic environmental law. 
Accordingly, each Contracting Party shall strive to ensure that it does not 
waive or otherwise derogate from, or offer to waive or otherwise 
derogate from, such laws as an encouragement for the establishment, 
maintenance or expansion in its territory of an investment; 
3. The Contracting Parties reaffirm their commitments under 
international environmental agreements, which they have accepted. They 
shall strive to ensure that such commitments are fully recognised and 
implemented by their domestic laws. 
4. The Contracting Parties recognise that co-operation between them 
provides enhanced opportunities to  improve environmental protection 
standards. Upon request by either Contracting Party, the other 
Contracting Party shall accept to hold expert consultations on any 
investment matters involving investors of the Contracting Parties and 
falling under the purpose of this Article. 
 
The scope of these articles is still somewhat limited, the language mostly 
hortatory and aspirational, but there are some innovations: 
1) The reference to the continuous improvement of environmental 
legislation favours a stricter interpretation of the requirement for stability 
of the regulatory framework: confronted with a claim for regulatory 
taking, the state can rely on the environmental clause of these BITs to 
argue against the expectation of stability of its environmental legislation 
in the absence of specific commitments to the contrary; 
2) The inclusion in the definitions section of the treaty (in the Libya-
Belgium BIT), while it can be considered a limitation of the scope of the 
environmental article (expressio unius principle) nonetheless clarifies the 
applicability of the measures; 
3) The inclusion of a clause on compliance with environmental 
legislation in the Libya-Belgium BIT, albeit in hortatory language, is a 
perfect example of a balancing clause. It also includes a commitment to 
recognising and implementing international environmental commitments 
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in domestic legislation. This can also be interpreted as a conflict clause, 
to the extent that domestic law is the standard fall-back governing law of 
any investment agreement; 
4) The increased role of the home state of the investor, through the 
device of the ‘expert consultations...on investment matters...falling under 
the scope of the [Environment] article’.  Again, this is an example of a 
balancing measure, using inter-state co-operation to minimise the 
occurrence of normative conflicts.  
 
Finally, it is no surprise that the Energy Charter Treaty contains a 
detailed provision on the environment, Article 19, and that it is 
accompanied by the Protocol on Energy Efficiency and Related 
Environmental Aspects (PEEREA). Article 19 states: 
 
 (1) In pursuit of sustainable development and taking into account 
its obligations under those international agreements concerning the 
environment to which it is party, each Contracting Party shall strive to 
minimize in an economically efficient manner harmful Environmental 
Impacts occurring either within or outside its Area from all operations 
within the Energy Cycle in its Area, taking proper account of safety. In 
doing so each Contracting Party shall act in a Cost-Effective manner. In 
its policies and actions each Contracting Party shall strive to take 
precautionary measures to prevent or minimize environmental 
degradation. The Contracting Parties agree that the polluter in the Areas 
of Contracting Parties, should, in principle, bear the cost of pollution, 
including transboundary pollution, with due regard to the public interest 
and without distorting Investment in the Energy Cycle or international 
trade. Contracting Parties shall accordingly: 
(a) take account of environmental considerations throughout the 
formulation and implementation of their energy policies; 
(b) promote market-oriented price formation and a fuller reflection of 
environmental costs and benefits throughout the Energy Cycle; 
(c) having regard to Article 34(4), encourage co-operation in the 
attainment of the environmental objectives of the Charter and co-
operation in the field of international environmental standards for the 
Energy Cycle, taking into account differences in adverse effects and 
abatement costs between Contracting Parties; 
(d) have particular regard to Improving Energy Efficiency, to developing 
and using renewable energy sources, to promoting the use of cleaner 
fuels and to employing technologies and technological means that reduce 
pollution; 
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(e) promote the collection and sharing among Contracting Parties of 
information on environmentally sound and economically efficient energy 
policies and Cost-Effective practices and technologies; 
(f) promote public awareness of the Environmental Impacts of energy 
systems, of the scope for the prevention or abatement of their adverse 
Environmental Impacts, and of the costs associated with various 
prevention or abatement measures; 
(g) promote and co-operate in the research, development and application 
of energy efficient and environmentally sound technologies, practices 
and processes which will minimize harmful Environmental Impacts of all 
aspects of the Energy Cycle in an economically efficient manner; 
(h) encourage favourable conditions for the transfer and dissemination of 
such technologies consistent with the adequate and effective protection 
of Intellectual Property rights; 
(i) promote the transparent assessment at an early stage and prior to 
decision, and subsequent monitoring, of Environmental Impacts of 
environmentally significant energy investment projects; 
(j) promote international awareness and information exchange on 
Contracting Parties’ relevant environmental programmes and standards 
and on the implementation of those programmes and standards; 
(k) participate, upon request, and within their available resources, in the 
development and implementation of appropriate environmental 
programmes in the Contracting Parties. 
(2) At the request of one or more Contracting Parties, disputes 
concerning the application or interpretation of provisions of this Article 
shall, to the extent that arrangements for the consideration of such 
disputes do not exist in other appropriate international fora, be reviewed 
by the Charter Conference aiming at a solution. 
(3) For the purposes of this Article: 
(a) “Energy Cycle” means the entire energy chain, including activities 
related to prospecting for, exploration, production, conversion, storage, 
transport, distribution and consumption of the various forms of energy, 
and the treatment and disposal of wastes, as well as the 
decommissioning, cessation or closure of these activities, minimizing 
harmful Environmental Impacts; 
(b) “Environmental Impact” means any effect caused by a given activity 
on the environment, including human health and safety, flora, fauna, soil, 
air, water, climate, landscape and historical monuments or other physical 
structures or the interactions among these factors; it also includes effects 
on cultural heritage or socio-economic conditions resulting from 
alterations to those factors; 
(c) “Improving Energy Efficiency” means acting to maintain the same 
unit of output (of a good or service) without reducing the quality or 
performance of the output, while reducing the amount of energy required 
to produce that output;  
(d) “Cost-Effective” means to achieve a defined objective at the lowest 
cost or to achieve the greatest benefit at a given cost. 
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The very structure of the Article illustrates its complexity, with a 
preambular section, stating object and purpose, appealing to 
environmental law-inspired principles, such as sustainable development, 
precautionary and ‘polluter pays’ principles389, and to principles derived 
from economic and investment law, such as economic efficiency, cost-
effectiveness and the importance of the application of the least distorting 
measures in the field of trade and investment390; the middle section 
contains the substantive provisions, and the last section the definitions 
applicable to the body of the Article. While the structure is impressive, 
the content is disappointing391, with most provisions having little force, 
with a ‘best-effort’ soft law approach to environmental commitments, 
mostly being directed to the promotion of environmental concerns, co-
operation, dissemination of information etc; the only provision which 
refers to actual legal obligations, paragraph (1)(i) on environmental 
impact assessments, is qualified by Understanding no. 13 of the Final 
Conference, as follows: 
 
 It is for each Contracting Party to decide the extent to which the 
assessment and monitoring of environmental impacts should be subject 
to legal requirements, the authorities competent to take decisions in 
relation to such requirements, and the appropriate procedures to be 
followed392. 
 
389 For an expression of the precautionary principle, see for example Principle 15 of the 
1992 of the Rio Declaration on the Environment and Development, at 
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/conf151/aconf15126-1annex1.htm; for the ‘Polluter 
Pays’ principle, see Principle 16 of the Declaration (Internalization of Environmental 
Costs). 
390 On the nature of principles as ‘regime-specific’, see the discussion of the Beef 
Hormones Case at Section 5.4.2.1.1. 
391 On the relationship between the ECT and sustainable development, see  Chalker, J., 
‘Making the investment provisions of the Energy Charter Treaty sustainable 
development friendly’, 6 International Environmental Agreements (2006): 435; Wälde, 
T., ‘Investment arbitration and sustainable development: good intentions – or effective 
results?’, 6 International Environmental Agreements (2006): 459.  
392 There could be other obligations with respect to the production of environmental 
assessments: for example, in order for MIGA to provide investment protection 
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4: 
e Parties, after the date of entry into 
                                                                                                                               
Additionally, at Article 19(2), a separate dispute settlement regime is set 
up for disputes on the interpretation or application of the Article, with a 
‘softer’ approach compared to the binding arbitration procedures 
available to investors393. The Final Conference of the Energy Charter 
approved at the same time as the Charter also the Protocol on Energy 
Efficiency and Related Environmental Aspects (PEEREA); this protocol 
contains mostly policy provisions on international co-operation, 
promotion of energy efficiency and best practice; its Article 13(1) 
provides: ‘In the event of inconsistency between the provisions of this 
Protocol and the provisions of the Energy Charter Treaty, the provisions 
of the Energy Charter Treaty shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, 
prevail.’ Separate environmental chapters or protocols are also contained 
in the NAFTA and the CAFTA. The last one contains a very detailed 
provision, Article 17.2 [Enforcement of Environmental Law], which puts 
together provisions that are presented separately in similar 
agreements39
  
1. (a) A Party shall not fail to effectively enforce its environmental 
laws, through a sustained or recurring course of action or inaction, in a 
manner affecting trade between th
force of this Agreement. 
                     
A 
perational Regulations, at 
ht
insurance for certain investments, an environmental assessment has to be carried out, 
with only environmentally sound and sustainable project receiving coverage; see MIG
Environmental Assessment Policy, Annex B of MIGA’s O
tp://www.miga.org/policies/index_sv.cfm?stid=1681.   
 See Konoplyanik, A. and Wälde, T., ‘Energy Charter Treaty and its role in 
international energy’, 24 Journal of Eenrgy & Natural Resources Law (2006): 523, at 
547. On the ‘synergy’ between the ECT and climate change remediation, see Sussm
E., ‘The Energy Charter Treaty’s investor protection provisions: potential to foster 
solutions to global warming and promote sustain
393
an, 
able development’, 14 ILSA Journal of 
ce 
 
rom the NAFTA legitimacy 
crisis’, 8 U.C. Davis Business Law Journal (2007): 103. 
International & Comparative Law (2008): 391. 
394 On the political background of the adoption of the CAFTA, with particular referen
to the apprehensions raised about the ability of governments to enact environmental 
regulations, see Byrnes, S., ‘Balancing investor rights and environmental protection in
investor-state dispute settlement under CAFTA: lessons f
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(b) The Parties recognize that each Party retains the right to exercise 
discretion with respect to investigatory, prosecutorial, regulatory, and 
compliance matters and to make decisions regarding the allocation of 
resources to enforcement with respect to other environmental matters 
determined to have higher priorities. Accordingly, the Parties understand 
that a Party is in compliance with subparagraph (a) where a course of 
action or inaction reflects a reasonable exercise of such discretion, or 
results from a bona fide decision regarding the allocation of resources. 
2. The Parties recognize that it is inappropriate to encourage trade or 
investment by weakening or reducing the protections afforded in 
domestic environmental laws. Accordingly, each Party shall strive to 
ensure that it does not waive or otherwise derogate from, or offer to 
waive or otherwise derogate from, such laws in a manner that weakens or 
reduces the protections afforded in those laws as an encouragement for 
trade with another Party, or as an encouragement for the establishment, 
acquisition, expansion, or retention of an investment in its territory. 
3. Nothing in this Chapter shall be construed to empower a Party’s 
authorities to undertake environmental law enforcement activities in the 
territory of another Party. 
 
As for the value of these balancing clauses, we have already anticipated 
that they have been criticised for being ‘toothless’, flawed or 
meaningless. Partially this can be explained by the mistaken assumption 
that these are exception clauses, which they are not, or carve-outs, which 
they are not either395. While in practice they could have the same effect, 
if the tribunal decided that, as a consequence of its environmental 
obligations, the state was either not in breach of the particular provision 
invoked by the claimant or excused from the breach, the particular 
system of investment disputes could allow for a third solution, a 
balancing of the damages reflected in the amount of compensation 
granted to the investor. The incorporation of non-investment obligations 
in the calculation of the quantum of damages is a contentious issue and 
presents several legal obstacles. A tribunal is mostly bound not to deliver 
an award ex aequo et bono, unless authorised to do so396. Most 
 
395 In fact most of them are worded as to invite the Parties not to use investment norms 
as excuses for non compliance of non-investment obligations. If carve-outs and 
exception norms constitute different ways of creating discrete fields of application, 
these norms are balancing norms. 
396 See Article 42(2) of the ICSID Convention.  
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investment treaties do not allow for this, and it is not envisioned that 
states would be willing to insert a clause to this effect. Lacking this 
power, tribunals are bound to grant compensation based on the 
assessment of the damages, striking a balance between the assessment 
provided by the claimant and by the defendant397, but without having the 
power to go below the lower limit provided and respecting the ‘just 
compensation’ or Hull standard of prompt, adequate and effective 
compensation common in investment treaty law. However, while the 
rules on compensating for direct expropriation are comparatively clear, 
damages for violations of lesser obligations, such as standard of 
treatment, but possibly also including regulatory expropriation, could 
allow the tribunal the leeway necessary to account for the role of non 
investment obligations in the quantification of the damages, as a 
mitigating circumstance. 
  
 
4.5 Carve-out clauses and clarifications 
 
This section deals with clauses that, by their application, create a carve 
out from a rule, typically allowing the host state the regulatory space 
necessary to exercise its functions in the public interest. The distinction 
between carve-out and exception, where for the first wrongfulness is 
precluded, while for the second it is excluded, can be more easily 
conceptualised (if not resolved) in cases involving claims of ‘regulatory 
expropriation’. American jurisprudence involving the takings clause 
constitutes a good example of the difficulties of keeping these 
distinctions in practice. As we have already seen in Chapter 3, it was 
Justice Holmes to state that: ‘...while property may be regulated to a 
certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a 
taking’398, introducing the concept of regulatory taking in US 
 
397 For example between the going concern value and the net book value.  
398 Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 US 393 (1922). 
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jurisprudence. Since then, American courts, and especially the Supreme 
Court, have been grappling with how to define when regulation ‘goes too 
far’. While it was generally accepted that regulation which resulted in 
physical invasion of property was to be equated to a taking399, as well as 
regulation that eliminated all economically beneficial or productive use 
of land400, the problem arose with measures where not all beneficial use 
and value is taken (in which case it is accepted that a categorical 
inclusion in the purview of takings is warranted). We have already 
analysed the jurisprudence of the Court in great detail in Section 3.3.2. 
For the purpose of considering the extent to which regulatory 
expropriation clauses can be interpreted by tribunals, three approaches 
emerge: 
 
1. Measures partially affecting use or value are not takings at all, 
therefore no compensation is required. In this way regulatory measures 
partially affecting property rights are equated to a carve-out from 
expropriation, with a ‘categorical’ exclusion from the reach of the takings 
clause.  
2. Those same measures are ‘categorically’ included within the scope of 
takings and they are assessed with regards to their effect only; in the 
Supreme Court, Justice Holmes in Pennsylvania Coal v Mahon401, and 
Justice Scalia more recently402, have been proponents of this doctrine; in 
international investment law, the ‘sole effect’ doctrine is based on this 
 
399 Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982). Confusingly, 
this is also what the Court in Penn Central meant when it referred to the ‘character of 
the government’s action’ in determining if a partial regulatory taking required 
compensation; the Court stated that: ‘[takings] may more readily be found when the 
interference with property can be characterized as a physical invasion by government ... 
than when interference arises from some public program adjusting the benefits and 
burdens of economic life to promote the common good.’ 438 U.S. at 124. 
400 Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980); Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal 
Council, 505 US 1003, 1015, 1029 (1992). 
401 Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 US 393 (1922).  
402 In Lingle v. Chevron, 544 US 528 (2005) at 539. 
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principle. If applied, regulatory takings become ‘functionally equivalent’ 
to direct takings, with only a factual analysis separating compensable and 
non compensable governmental action, with all the difficulties in 
“drawing the line”403. 
3. Balancing or proportionality approach. This mixed approach can be 
seen as the middle ground between the two doctrinal approaches outlined 
above. In practice, rejecting either categorical inclusion or exclusion can 
result in the default acceptance of the categorical inclusion, balanced by 
the weight tribunals are willing to grant either to the investment-backed 
expectations on one side, or the public interest on the other. The risk is 
then that this approach collapses onto the second one. 
  
 
4.5.1 Expropriation 
 
We start from the 2004 US and Canadian Model BITs, because both of 
them introduced, by way of Annexes, clarifications on the extent of 
regulatory expropriation, in response to anxieties resulting from the first 
ten years of application of the NAFTA and its investment chapter404. 
Annex B of the US Model BIT is as following: 
 
 The Parties confirm their shared understanding that: 
1. Article 6 [Expropriation and Compensation](1) is intended to 
reflect customary international law concerning the obligation of States 
with respect to expropriation. 
 
403 See the difference in approach in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 US 
1003 (1992), where the Court required that: ‘when the owner of real property has been 
called upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the name of the common 
good,..., to leave his property economically idle, he has suffered a taking’. (at § 1019); 
and in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp, 458 US 419 (1982), where the 
Court held that: ‘When the “character of the governmental action” is a permanent 
physical occupation of real property, there is a taking to the extent  of the occupation 
without regard to whether the action achieves an important public benefit or has only 
minimal economic impact on the owner.’ 
404 As already discussed in Chapter 3. 
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2. An action or series of actions by a Party cannot constitute an 
expropriation unless it interferes with a tangible or intangible property 
right or property interest in an investment. 
3. Article 6 [Expropriation and Compensation](1) addresses two 
situations. The first is direct expropriation, where an investment is 
nationalized or otherwise directly expropriated through formal transfer of 
title or outright seizure. 
4. The second situation addressed by Article 6 [Expropriation and 
Compensation](1) is indirect expropriation, where an action or series of 
actions by a Party has an effect equivalent to direct expropriation without 
formal transfer of title or outright seizure. 
(a) The determination of whether an action or series of actions by a 
Party, in a specific fact situation, constitutes an indirect expropriation, 
requires a case-by-case, fact-based inquiry that considers, among other 
factors: 
(i) the economic impact of the government action, although the 
fact that an action or series of actions by a Party has an adverse effect on 
the economic value of an investment, standing alone, does not establish 
that an indirect expropriation has occurred; 
(ii) the extent to which the government action interferes with 
distinct, reasonable investment-backed expectations; and 
(iii) the character of the government action. 
      (b)  Except in rare circumstances, non-discriminatory regulatory 
actions by a Party that are designed and applied to protect legitimate 
welfare objectives, such as public health, safety, and the environment, do 
not constitute indirect expropriation.405 
 
The model treaty, as amended, provides the government the ‘regulatory 
space’ necessary to protect legitimate public welfare objectives, limited 
by some rare circumstances, meant to include measures that prima facie 
respect the standards set by the treaty. However, rather than explicitly 
setting out a carve-out to the compensation requirement, its purpose is 
declaratory, restating the principle of non-discrimination when the 
government goes about its business of regulating in the public interest406 
(in short, a restatement of the good-faith requirement). The re-wording 
also has to be read in the context of the political situation at the time it 
was devised, and, more specifically, the unease with which the US 
 
405 A similarly worded Annex is appended to the CAFTA’s Investment Chapter, Annex 
10-C. The model treaty was used for the US-Uruguay Treaty, entered into force in 2006, 
and the US-Rwanda Treaty, signed in 2008. 
406To paraphrase the SD Myers Tribunal (at § 282). 
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Congress considered the treatment of foreign investors vis-à-vis US 
investors407. There had also been pressure to include in the expropriation 
provision a restriction to measures affecting property rights, in line with 
the jurisprudence of the US Supreme Court408. More specifically, some 
of the participants of the Subcommittee on Investment at the US 
Department of State409, have recommended that: 
  
 
407 Especially as concerns the takings clause in NAFTA and its application (for 
example, in the Methanex Case) See the statements by Senators Max Baucus and Chuck 
Grassley, quoted by Schneiderman, 2008, at 73-74, and the conclusions of the 
Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002, that: ‘[foreign investors should] not 
[be] accorded greater substantive rights with respect to investment protections than 
United States investors in the United States.’ Schneiderman remarks, ibidem, 74, that 
‘All of this, ironically, is reminiscent of the discredited Calvo doctrine.’ This episode is 
also discussed in Chapter 3.  
408 For example, taxation measures have consistently been rejected by the Court under 
the Fifth Amendment (see County of Mobile v. Kimball, 102 U.S. 691, 703 (1880); 
recently, Empress Casino Joliet Corp. v. Giannoulias, 896 N.E. 2d 277, 293 (Ill. 2008), 
cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2764 (2009)) while under NAFTA a claim for expropriation 
arising from taxation measures can be brought, subject to the conditions detailed in 
Article 2103(6): ‘Article 1110 (Expropriation and Compensation) shall apply to taxation 
measures except that no investor may invoke that Article as the basis for a claim under 
Article 1116 (Claim by an Investor of a Party on its Own Behalf) or 1117 (Claim by an 
Investor of a Party on Behalf of an Enterprise), where it has been determined pursuant 
to this paragraph that the measure is not an expropriation. The investor shall refer the 
issue of whether the measure is not an expropriation for a determination to the 
appropriate competent authorities set out in Annex 2103.6 at the time that it gives notice 
under Article 1119 (Notice of Intent to Submit a Claim to Arbitration). If the competent 
authorities do not agree to consider the issue or, having agreed to consider it, fail to 
agree that the measure is not an expropriation within a period of six months of such 
referral, the investor may submit its claim to arbitration under Article 1120 (Submission 
of a Claim to Arbitration)’. The Tribunal in Occidental Exploration and Production 
Company v. The Republic of Ecuador, LCIA Case No. UN3467 (US/Ecuador BIT), 
Final Award, 1 July 2004, at § 85, stated that ‘Taxes can result in expropriation..’. 
409 Report of the Subcommittee on Investment of the Advisory Committee on 
International Economic Policy regarding the model bilateral investment treaty, of 30 
September 2009, at http://www.state.gov/e/eeb/rls/othr/2009/131098.htm.  
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....the administration [US] [should] consider clarifying in the 
Model BIT that an “indirect expropriation” occurs only when a host state 
seizes or appropriates an investment for its own use or the use of a third 
party, and that regulatory measures that adversely affect the value of an 
investment but do not transfer ownership of the investment do not 
constitute acts of indirect expropriation. 
 
This recommendation is in response not only to the risk that bona fide 
environmental regulation is caught in the provision, but also to American 
anxieties about the possibility that the ‘no greater rights’ principle is not 
respected and foreign investors under the NAFTA are granted more 
rights than US investors under the US Constitution. The American 
approach to limitations to regulatory expropriation finds support in the 
Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, 
which excludes from its reach ‘bona fide general taxation, regulation, 
forfeiture for crime, or other action of the kind that is commonly 
accepted as within the police powers of states’410. The Canadian Model 
BIT, while adopting similar language to the US Model, is even more 
specific on the nature of the carve-out, with the subparagraph (c) of its 
Annex B.13(1), corresponding to Annex B.4(b) of the US BIT: 
 
 Except in rare circumstances, such as when a measure or series of 
measures are so severe in the light of their purpose that they cannot be 
reasonably viewed as having been adopted and applied in good-faith, 
non-discriminatory measures of a Party that are designed and applied to 
protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such as health, safety and the 
environment, do not constitute indirect expropriation. 
 
As we can see, the Canadian BIT clearly establishes that the ‘rare 
circumstances’ exception has to be assessed against the good faith 
requirement411. Recent US FTA agreements spell out in further detail the 
 
410 Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, § 712. 
411 The first treaty signed by Canada using the new model treaty was the Canada-Peru 
treaty, signed in 2006 and entered into force in 2007; Canada has also signed new 
treaties with the Czech Republic, Romania, Latvia and Jordan, but these have entered 
into force yet. Negotiations for BITs with China and India are ongoing, at a more 
advanced stage for the treaty with India, see 
http://news.in.msn.com/international/article.aspx?cp-documentid=4383002.  
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criteria applicable to indirect or regulatory expropriation. For example, 
the US-Chile of FTA, also of 2004, contains, in addition to the 
clarification as per Annex of the Model BIT, the following provision412: 
 Nothing in this Chapter shall be construed to prevent a Party from 
adopting, maintaining or enforcing any measure otherwise consistent 
with this Chapter that it considers appropriate to ensure that investment 
activity in its territory is undertaken in a manner sensitive to 
environmental concerns. 
But again, this clause, a part from containing the usual ‘otherwise 
consistent with’ proviso, does not on its own relieve the state from its 
obligation to pay compensation for expropriatory regulation, even if, read 
together with the Annex provision, creates a presumption against it 
which has to be rebutted by the claimant against the high standard of bad 
faith413.  
We now consider two instruments that, while not adopted, move in the 
direction of a greater opening to non-investment obligations. The first 
one is the draft Norway BIT of 2007; in its Article 6 [Expropriation] the 
treaty provides as follows: 
1. A Party shall not expropriate or nationalise an investment 
of an investor of the other Party except in the public interest and subject 
to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of 
international law. 
2. The preceding provision shall not, however, in any way impair the 
right of a Party to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the 
use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the 
payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties. 
 
412 Article 10.12 of the US-Chile FTA 2004. 
413 The same argument is made with regards of similar provisions contained in the 
CAFTA; see for example Byrnes, art. cit., 8 U.C. Davis Business Law Journal (2007): 
103, where he argued that: ‘A shifting burden-of-proof would be the most appropriate 
procedural mechanism....[and] achieves the desired balance between investor protection 
and insulation of legitimate environmental regulation from improper challenges...by 
providing compulsory criteria, e.g. mandatory consideration of a government’s 
“regulatory intent” to distinguish between legitimate regulation and disguised trade 
protectionism’. 
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In the first paragraph, the criteria for a lawful expropriation are not 
spelled out, and this is particularly significant in relation to the standard 
for compensation, which is ‘pegged’ to general principles of international 
law. In light of the controversy on this standard414, the Article leaves the 
choice open to interpretation. The second paragraph is identical to the 
European Convention of Human Rights Article 1 of Protocol 1 on the 
right to property415 rather than on American-style expropriation 
provisions considered above. These represent two different ways in 
which carve-outs from expropriation can be conceptualised: the 
European model, based both on the language of the European 
Convention and on the jurisprudence of its Court, which gives a wide 
margin to states to act in the public interest and subjects the measures to 
a proportionality test; and an American model, already considered above, 
which looks at the jurisprudence on regulatory takings of the US 
Supreme Court for inspiration416 and conceptualises proportionality in 
the assessment of which measures are ‘least restrictive’ to trade and/or 
investment.  
 
The second non adopted instrument is the IISD model investment 
agreement, which holds, at Article 8(I): 
 
 Consistent with the right of states to regulate and the customary 
international law principles on police powers, bona fide, non-
discriminatory regulatory measures taken by a Party that are designed 
and applied to protect or enhance legitimate public welfare objectives, 
such as public health, safety and the environment, do not constitute an 
indirect expropriation under this Article. 
 
 
414 For which see Section 3.3. 
415 See for example Demerieux, M., ‘Deriving environmental rights from the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms’, 21 Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies (2001): 521, especially Section 5. 
416 With the attendant risks of conflict (or worse, cross-contamination) between the 
constitutionally protected right of compensation against takings guaranteed by the Fifth 
Amendment and the NAFTA expropriation clause.  
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This formulation takes into account most of the criteria already present in 
the previous adopted instruments, including: 
1. The recognition of the police powers application to prima facie 
expropriations; 
2. The good faith principle, accompanied by the non-discrimination 
provision; 
3. The straight carve-out clause (‘do not constitute an indirect 
expropriation’) as opposed to the simple exception. 
 
In summary, indirect or regulatory expropriations being theoretically 
difficult to differentiate, the exercise of ‘drawing the line’ between 
legitimate regulatory action and expropriation is better analysed in the 
context of the jurisprudence of international courts and investment 
tribunals. 
  
 
4.5.2 Standards of treatment 
 
All investment agreements contain standards of treatment clauses, 
typically comparative non discrimination standards, such as the national 
and most-favoured- comparative standards, and absolute standards such 
as the international minimum standard, or fair and equitable treatment 
standard. In Chapter 3 we have examined the substantive investment 
obligations contained in these clauses; here our concern is to discover if 
investment agreements contain express provisions conditioning the 
application of these standards to other, non-investment, obligations. The 
obvious entry point is the legitimate expectation of investors as to the 
kind of treatment he is entitled to receive. However, since the standards 
as articulated in the agreements do not list their constitutive elements, 
only through an examination of the jurisprudence of the tribunals it is 
possible to ascertain to what extent tribunals are taking environmental 
obligations into account when applying the standards. In short, the reality 
of investment agreements at present does not include the recognition of 
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non investment obligations directly linked to the content of the standards, 
leaving it to the tribunal to conduct the analysis necessary to establish, 
first the substantive content of the standards, and second to what extent 
this content includes balancing elements derived from general regulatory 
functions of the state417. There are however two non-adopted instruments 
which took into consideration these functions directly in drafting the 
standards of treatment clauses. The first one is the Norway 2007 Draft 
BIT, whose Articles 3 [National Treatment] and 4 [Most-Favoured-
Nation] qualify the ‘in like circumstances’ clause with the following 
footnote: 
 
 The Parties agree/are of the understanding that a measure applied 
by a government in pursuance of legitimate policy objectives of public 
interest such as the protection of public health, safety and the 
environment, although having a different effect on an investment or 
investor of another Party, is not inconsistent with national treatment and 
most favoured nation treatment when justified by showing that it bears a 
reasonable relationship to rational policies not motivated by preference 
of domestic over foreign owned investment.   
 
The second instrument is the IISD Model Investment Agreement for 
Sustainable Development, which contains, in its Article 5 on National 
Treatment418, the following subparagraph: 
 
 (E) For greater certainty, the concept of “in like circumstances” 
requires an overall examination, on a case by-case basis, of all the 
circumstances of an investment, including, inter alia: 
a) its effects on third persons and the local community; 
 
417 See for example the already mentioned function attributed to the ‘equitable’ element 
of the standard (footnote 227 in Chapter 3), McLachlan and others, 2009, at 206: ‘The 
inclusion of the reference to equitable treatment also provides a means by which an 
appropriate balance may be struck between the protection of the investor and the public 
interest which the host State may properly seek to protect in the light of the particular 
circumstances then prevailing.’ 
418 Applicable also, mutatis mutandis as per text, to Article 6 [Most-Favoured-Nation]. 
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b) its effects upon the local, regional or national environment, or the 
global commons419; 
c) the sector the investor is in; 
d) the aim of a measure of concern; 
e) the regulatory process generally applied in relation to a measure of 
concern; and 
f) other factors directly relating to the investment or investor in relation 
to the measure of concern. 
The examination shall not be limited to or biased toward any one factor. 
 
These measures are not exactly carve-out measures, as they only 
establish that regulatory measures, provided certain criteria are met, will 
not constitute a breach of the standards of treatment provisions and to 
this extent they can be categorized as exceptions. More precisely, they 
constitute a ‘non inconsistent with’ provision. In the Norway Model BIT 
the burden of proof is clearly on the state adopting the measures (...when 
justified by showing that it bears a reasonable relationship to rational 
policies not motivated by preference of domestic over foreign owned 
investment) to prove that the measures are not inconsistent with the 
standards guaranteed by the relevant articles, on the basis of establishing 
that they are not a form of disguised discrimination and that they are 
connected with the goal to be obtained. In the IISD Model Agreement, 
the onus is generally on the tribunal to conduct a case-by-case 
examination of the measures of concern to ascertain if they run afoul of 
the protections guaranteed by the articles, taking in consideration several 
factors, amongst which disguised discrimination (the bad faith element) 
is not mentioned. 
 
 
 
419 This is accompanied by the following footnote (7 in the text): ‘The Parties 
understand that such considerations can include the cumulative impacts of all 
investments within a jurisdiction, for example in the natural resources harvesting sectors 
or in relation to setting of ambient or specific pollution loads. Many jurisdictions do not 
allow new investments that will cause applicable environmental or human health 
tolerances to be exceeded.’ 
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4.6 Conflict clauses 
 
Some of the clauses classified as exception or regulatory clauses contain 
a conflict clause as well. There can be several ways of classifying 
conflicts, and therefore the clauses designed to deal with them. Express 
conflict clauses can relate to pre-existing treaties, to future treaties or 
regulate conflict of norms within the same treaty. Additionally, they can 
directly refer to conflicting environmental (or other, especially trade) 
obligations, or generally establish a hierarchy between treaties (by 
reference to technical conflict rules such as lex specialis or lex posterior). 
This section will be structured by presenting first a review of the conflict 
rules present in the main investment instruments, both multilateral and 
bilateral, then an analysis of their language and their function.  
 
 
4.6.1 Express conflict clauses in multilateral instruments 
 
Article 103 [Relation to Other Agreements] of the NAFTA establishes a 
general rule of precedence with respect to the GATT and other 
agreements: 
 
1. The Parties affirm their existing rights and obligations with 
respect to each other under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
and other agreements to which such Parties are party. 
2. In the event of any inconsistency between this Agreement and such 
other agreements, this Agreement shall prevail to the extent of the 
inconsistency, except as otherwise provided in this Agreement. 
 
Article 104 [Relation to Environmental and Conservation Agreements] 
sets up specific conflict rules for environmental instruments: 
 
  1. In the event of any inconsistency between this Agreement 
and the specific trade obligations set out in: 
     (a) Convention on the International Trade in Endangered Species of 
Wild Fauna and Flora, done at Washington, March 3, 1973; 
     (b) the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone 
Layer, done at Montreal, September 16, 1987, as amended June 29, 1990;  
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     (c) Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of 
Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal, done at Basel, March 22, 1989, 
upon its entry into force for Canada, Mexico and the United States; or  
     (d) the agreements set out in Annex 104.1,420 
such obligations shall prevail to the extent of the inconsistency, provided 
that where a Party has a choice among equally effective and reasonably 
available means of complying with such obligations, the Party chooses 
the alternative that is the least inconsistent with the other provisions of 
this Agreement. 
2. The Parties may agree in writing to modify Annex 104.1 to 
include any amendment to the agreements listed in paragraph 1, and any 
other environmental or conservation agreement. 
 
In Chapter Eleven, Article 1112 [Relationship to Other Chapters] 
regulates possible conflicts within the NAFTA: ‘In the event of any 
inconsistency between a provision of this Chapter and a provision of 
another Chapter, the provision of the other Chapter shall prevail to the 
extent of the inconsistency.’ 
 
Finally, Article 40 [Relation to Other Environmental Agreements] of the 
North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation regulates the 
interrelationship between this ancillary agreement to the NAFTA and 
other environmental agreements to which the NAFTA states might be 
parties: ‘Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to affect the 
existing rights and obligations of the Parties under other international 
environmental agreements, including conservation agreements, to which 
such Parties are party.’ 
 
The CAFTA contains a provision similar to Article 103 of the NAFTA in 
its Article 1.3 [Relation to Other Agreements]: 
 
 The Parties affirm their existing rights and obligations with respect 
to each other under the WTO Agreement and other agreements to which 
such Parties are party. 
 
420 Which include the Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the 
Government of the United States of America Concerning the Transboundary Movement 
of Hazardous Waste, signed at Ottawa, October 28, 1986. This agreement was relevant 
to the defence by respondent Canada in S.D. Myers, discussed in Chapter 7. 
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2. For greater certainty, nothing in this Agreement shall prevent the 
Central American Parties from maintaining their existing legal 
instruments of Central American integration, adopting new legal 
instruments of integration, or adopting measures to strengthen and 
deepen these instruments, provided that such instruments and measures 
are not inconsistent with this Agreement. 
 
Article 10.2 [Relation to Other Chapters] regulates the relationship 
between the Investment Chapter and the other chapters of the CAFTA: 
 
 1. In the event of any inconsistency between this Chapter and 
another Chapter, the other Chapter shall prevail to the extent of the 
inconsistency. 
2. A requirement by a Party that a service supplier of another Party post a 
bond or other form of financial security as a condition of the cross-border 
supply of a service does not of itself make this Chapter applicable to 
measures adopted or maintained by the Party relating to such cross-
border supply of the service. This Chapter applies to measures adopted or 
maintained by the Party relating to the posted bond or financial security, 
to the extent that such bond or financial security is a covered investment. 
3. This Chapter does not apply to measures adopted or maintained by a 
Party to the extent that they are covered by Chapter Twelve (Financial 
Services). 
 
Finally, Article 17.12 [Relationship to Environmental Agreements] 
contained in the Environment Chapter is similar to Article 104 of the 
NAFTA, in that it deals with specific conflicts with environmental 
agreements; however the article is not as explicit on the relationship 
between potentially conflicting obligations and does not set up a 
hierarchy of rules, using instead the soft law language of cooperation and 
consultation. The article states: 
 
 1. The Parties recognize that multilateral environmental 
agreements to which they are all party play an important role in 
protecting the environment globally and domestically and that their 
respective implementation of these agreements is critical to achieving the 
environmental objectives of these agreements. The Parties further 
recognize that this Chapter and the ECA can contribute to realizing the 
goals of those agreements. Accordingly, the Parties shall continue to seek 
means to enhance the mutual supportiveness of multilateral 
environmental agreements to which they are all party and trade 
agreements to which they are all party. 
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2. The Parties may consult, as appropriate, with respect to ongoing 
negotiations in the WTO regarding multilateral environmental 
agreements. 
 
The Energy Charter Treaty contains a complex system of conflict rules 
relating both to existing instruments and regulating intra-treaty conflicts. 
The first of these rules is contained in Article 4 [Non-derogation from 
GATT and related instruments]: ‘Nothing in this Treaty shall derogate, as 
between particular Contracting Parties which are parties to the GATT, 
from the provisions of the GATT and Related Instruments as they are 
applied between those Contracting Parties.’ 
 
Article 5 deals with trade related investment measures and their 
consistency with GATT obligations: 
 
 (1) A Contracting Party shall not apply any trade-related 
investment measure that is inconsistent with the provisions of article III 
or XI of the GATT; this shall be without prejudice to the Contracting 
Party’s rights and obligations under the GATT and Related Instruments 
and Article 29.  
(2) Such measures include any investment measure which is mandatory 
or enforceable under domestic law or under any administrative ruling, or 
compliance with which is necessary to obtain an advantage, and which 
requires…  
 
Both articles subject the ECT’s obligations to the parties’ obligations 
under the GATT, contrary to the equivalent NAFTA provisions 
considered above. Article 16 [Relation to Other Agreements] is contained 
in Part III [Investments] and states: 
 
 Where two or more Contracting Parties have entered into a prior 
international agreement, or enter into a subsequent international 
agreement, whose terms in either case concern the subject matter of Part 
III or V of this Treaty,  
(1) nothing in Part III or V of this Treaty shall be construed to derogate 
from any provision of such terms of the other agreement or from any 
right to dispute resolution with respect thereto under that agreement; and 
(2) nothing in such terms of the other agreement shall be construed to 
derogate from any provision of Part III or V of this Treaty or from any 
right to dispute resolution with respect thereto under this Treaty, where 
any such provision is more favourable to the Investor or Investment. 
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Finally, as already noted in the previous section, Article 13(1) of the 
PEEREA [Relation to the Energy Charter Treaty] establishes a hierarchy 
between the two instruments: ‘In the event of inconsistency between the 
provisions of this Protocol and the provisions of the Energy Charter 
Treaty, the provisions of the Energy Charter Treaty shall, to the extent of 
the inconsistency, prevail.’ 
 
 
4.6.2 Express conflict clauses in BITs and FTAs 
 
Neither the US nor the Canadian Model BIT contains a conflict clause 
modelled on the NAFTA; however, Article 16 [Non-Derogation] of the 
US BIT contains a prohibition to derogate from ‘international obligations 
of a Party’ to the extent that they grant a better treatment than that 
guaranteed by the Treaty421: 
 
 This Treaty shall not derogate from any of the following that 
entitle an investor of a Party or a covered investment to treatment more 
favorable than that accorded by this Treaty:  
1. laws or regulations, administrative practices or procedures, or 
administrative or adjudicatory decisions of a Party;  
2. international legal obligations of a Party; or  
3. obligations assumed by a Party, including those contained in an 
investment authorization or an investment agreement.  
 
Article 10(7) of the Canada Model BIT provides as following: 
 
 Any measure adopted by a Party in conformity with a decision 
adopted by the World Trade Organization pursuant to Article IX:3 of the 
 
421 A similar provision is contained in Article 7(1) of the 2008 German Model BIT: ‘If 
the legislation of either Contracting State or international obligations existing at present 
or established hereafter between the Contracting States in addition to this Treaty contain 
any provisions, whether general or specific, entitling investments by investors of the 
other Contracting State to a treatment more favourable than is provided for by this 
Treaty, such provisions shall prevail over this Treaty to the extent that they are more 
favourable. 
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WTO Agreement422 shall be deemed to be also in conformity with this 
Agreement. An investor purporting to act pursuant to Section C of this 
Agreement [Settlement of Disputes] may not claim that such a 
conforming measure is in breach of this Agreement. 
 
By and large, all instruments considered above seem to give greater 
weight to the resolution of potential conflicts with other trade 
agreements, and to intra-treaty conflicts, than to conflicts with treaties 
with a different subject matter. As usual, to find a more open recognition 
of the necessity to tackle conflicts between disparate areas of law we 
have to look at the two non-adopted instruments. The Norway 2007 Draft 
Model BIT contains the following provision in Article 29 [Relation to 
Other International Agreements]: ‘The provisions of this Agreement shall 
be without prejudice to the rights and obligations of the Parties under 
other international agreements.’ The IISD Model Agreement, given its 
sustainable development goal, contains very detailed provisions on the 
relationship between agreements. The general ones are contained in 
Article 33 and 34: 
 
 Article 33: Relation to other investment agreements and 
obligations 
(A) Upon the home and host states becoming Parties to this Agreement, 
all pre-existing international investment agreements to which they are a 
Party shall, as between such states, be deemed to be terminated by 
mutual consent and all the rights and obligations due shall be pursuant to 
this Agreement. 
Except as specified in Article 3(F), such termination shall be immediate 
notwithstanding any expiration period for the rights of investors or 
investments under such pre-existing agreements. 
(B) Where states Party to this agreement have an international investment 
agreement with a non-Party, they shall strive to renegotiate those 
agreements to make them consistent with the present Agreement or to 
ensure that all Parties to the other Agreement become a Party to this 
Agreement. 
(C) States Party to this agreement shall ensure that all future investment 
agreements to which they may become Party are fully consistent with the 
 
422 Article IX.3 of the WTO Agreement states: ‘The WTO shall administer the 
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes 
(hereinafter referred to as the “Dispute Settlement Understanding” or “DSU”) in Annex 
2 to this Agreement. 
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present Agreement, particularly with the balance of rights and obligations 
it establishes, and the principal features of the dispute settlement system. 
The Conference of the Parties may be called upon to assess compliance 
with this obligation on the request of a Party.  
(D) Notwithstanding any of the above, any disputes that have been 
formally initiated under prior international 
investment agreements shall be decided in accordance with the rights and 
obligations of that agreement. 
 
Article 34: Relation to other international agreements 
(A) The Parties agree that the provisions of other international trade 
agreements to which they are a Party are consistent with the provisions of 
this Agreement. The Parties shall seek to interpret such agreements in a 
mutually supportive manner. 
(B) In the event of any dispute arising on this issue, the Parties shall seek 
to resolve such dispute within the 
mechanisms of this agreement as a first step. 
(C) The Parties hereby re-affirm their obligations under international 
environmental and human rights agreements to which they are a Party. 
 
In addition, this instrument contains a separate section on the duties of 
investors, including the duty to comply with the host state’s laws (Article 
11(A)), to comply with environmental impact assessment criteria (Article 
12(A)), and not to circumvent environmental obligations in the post-
establishment phase (Article 14(D)). In Part 4, Host State Obligations, 
Article 21 sets minimum standards for environmental, labour and human 
rights protection, which include the obligation to comply with the human 
rights treaties to which they are parties and to the standards of the ILO 
Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights of Work; however no 
similar duty of compliance is established for international environmental 
agreements. To the contrary, Article 21(A) states as follows: 
 
 Recognizing the right of each Party to establish its own level of 
domestic environmental protection and its own sustainable development 
policies and priorities, and to adopt or modify its environmental laws and 
regulations, each Party shall ensure that its laws and regulations provide 
for high levels of environmental protection and shall strive to continue to 
improve those laws and regulations. 
 
Finally, Part 5 on Host States’ Rights, contains the following provision as 
Article 25(B) [Inherent rights of States]: 
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 In accordance with customary international law and other general 
principles of international law, host states have the right to take 
regulatory or other measures to ensure that development in their territory 
is consistent with the goals and principles of sustainable development, 
and with other social and economic policy objectives. 
 
The policy paper to accompany the model agreement423 stresses the 
presumption against conflict and the necessity for international 
instruments to be interpreted as mutually reinforcing424. To this extent, 
the inclusion of express conflict clauses in an investment instrument is 
seen as an admission of failure of international law to work as an 
integrated system of rules. An alternative view is that conflicts are 
sometimes inevitable and that express conflict clauses provide the best 
way to deal with them within the framework of the applicable treaty, 
reducing the power of arbitration tribunals to determine the extent of the 
regulatory powers of the host state. While the presumption against 
conflict is a legitimate principle when applied by international courts that 
necessarily take a generalist approach to the enforcement of international 
law, it can become a dangerous tool in the hands of investment tribunals 
which both by design (being restricted in their jurisdiction by the 
instruments under which they are being set up) and by choice (being 
made up typically by experts in investment and commercial law) might 
be inclined to interpret the principle as allowing for investment rules to 
trump non investment obligations and a fortiori non investment rights425. 
This problem is recognised in the ILC’s report on fragmentation as 
‘structural bias’426; the ILC added that: 
 
423 von Moltke, K., A model international investment agreement for the promotion of 
sustainable development, 1994: 26. 
424 As discussed in detail in Chapter 7. 
425 The classification of the treaties as dealing with the same subject matter, as per the 
VCLT, can be similarly viewed as ‘argumentative success’ in framing the dispute in an 
arbitrary manner under the instrument one wishes to be applied (see ILC’s Report on 
fragmentation, § 22).  
426 At § 280.  
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  The weakness of the strategy of seeking a “mutually supportive” 
interpretation lies in its open-endedness. By concluding this type of 
conflict clause, States parties transfer their competence to decide on what 
should be done in case of conflicts to the law-applier. This may work 
well in case the two treaties are part of the same regime. But if the 
conflict is between treaties across two regimes, then the solution works 
only if the law-applier is an impartial third party that approaches the 
conflicting instruments from beyond the regimes of which the treaties are 
a part. It might happen, however, that the law-applier will be a body or 
an administrator closely linked to one or another of the (conflicting) 
regimes. In such case, an open-ended conflict clause will come to support 
the primacy of the treaty that is part of the law-applier’s regime. 
 
 
4.6.3 Analysis 
 
The previous section provided some illustrative examples taken from 
investment instruments, listing clauses dealing with conflicts with pre-
existing treaties (such as Article 103 of the NAFTA), future treaties427, 
intra-treaty, especially when the investment obligations are contained in 
the investment chapter of an FTA (such as Article 1112 of the NAFTA). 
Considering the first two of these categories (namely excluding for now 
intra-treaty conflicts) and assuming that these clauses create a hierarchy 
between norms contained within the investment treaty (treaty A) and the 
other non-investment treaty (treaty B), they can either: 1) give 
precedence to norms of treaty A with respect to the norms of treaty B, or; 
2) give precedence to the norms of treaty B with respect to treaty A; or, 
3) allow for compliance with the non-investment treaty only by 
application of the ‘least inconsistent’ test to the measures adopted 
(Article 104(1) of the NAFTA). Indeed the possibility for non investment 
 
427 Clauses regulating a conflict with future treaties are subject to the contractual 
freedom of States as expressed in the lex posterior criterion and are therefore to that 
extent potentially ‘futile’, as remarked by Karl, W., ‘Conflicts between treaties’, in 
Bernhardt, R. (ed.), Encyclopaedia of Public International Law, Amsterdam, North-
Holland, 1984, VII, 468 at 471. Clauses of this kind are rare; the only exception is 
Article 103 of the UN Charter, which establishes the priority of the obligations of the 
Charter over any other obligation under an international agreement. 
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norms to prevail over investment obligations is contemplated in Article 
104 of NAFTA, but two observations need to be made: firstly, only 
‘specific trade obligations’ contained in a selected number of 
environmental instruments (albeit not a closed list, subject to agreement 
by the parties) can prevail over the obligations of NAFTA; secondly, the 
Party applying the inconsistent measure has to do so by choosing the 
least inconsistent alternative for complying with the measure, if a choice 
is available. One interpretation of this provision would result in general 
environmental measures not being given precedence over trade and 
investment obligations; equally however, the reference to ‘specific trade 
obligations’ might be interpreted as making a distinction between 
obligations of a reciprocal nature, such as those relative to trade relations, 
and the other obligations contained in the environmental treaty, which 
might be classified as integral obligations and for which compliance is 
required from all parties to the treaty and from which the NAFTA parties 
are not allowed to derogate, as we shall see in more detail in Chapter 
5428. In other words, Article 104 constitutes an exception to the general 
conflict rule set out in Article 103. While it is acknowledged in general 
that the insertion of express conflict clauses is the most efficient way to 
avoid normative conflicts, the wording of the clauses is of course 
paramount in determining their efficacy. To the extent that a specific 
hierarchy of norms is not established, and recourse to ‘mutual 
supportiveness’ and cooperation is mentioned (paradigmatic in this sense 
is Article 17.12 of the CAFTA), the conflict is not solved but only 
postponed and misplaced to the political level of interstate negotiation. 
Furthermore, as express conflict clauses are contained within the 
instrument being applied, they are subject to the rules of treaty 
interpretation, including whatever definition of conflict the tribunal 
chooses to apply. As we shall see in Chapter 5, the choice is between a 
 
428 To the extent that the second interpretation is correct, the NAFTA establishes a 
conflict clause in which the trade obligations contained in environmental treaty prevail 
even if the NAFTA, as a successive treaty of the reciprocal kind, could have allowed for 
the opposite without running afoul of the criteria of Article 41 of the VCLT. 
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strict definition, which considers conflicts to occur only between 
obligations, and a wider definition, which includes obligations and rights. 
If the text of the instruments expressly refers to either option (as 
exemplified respectively in Articles 104 and 103 of the NAFTA), the 
tribunal is bound to apply the appropriate definition, in compliance with 
Article 31(1) of the VCLT. If the clause simply refers to ‘provisions’, 
such as Article 1112 of the NAFTA, it is up to the tribunal to decide if a 
provision establishing a right can trump a provision establishing an 
obligation.  
 
 
4.7 Concluding remarks 
 
This brief overview intended to cover all the ways in which investment 
treaties can expressly refer to non-investment obligations in their text. 
The review shows that there is a wealth of provisions, expressed in 
different forms and with different ‘strength’. The clauses tend to recur 
more often in multilateral instruments, or in more recent BITs, often 
derived from the model treaties which in themselves have been 
influenced by the multilateral instruments (especially the NAFTA and its 
jurisprudence). The application of these provisions will be examined in 
Chapter 7; however we have already anticipated that many of them have 
been criticised for being ‘toothless’ and ineffectual. We have also already 
noted in Chapter 3 that the scope for interpretation by tribunals is directly 
proportional to the level of detail of substantive provisions of the treaty. 
In other words, the higher the level of abstraction and vagueness in the 
wording of the treaties, the higher the scope for tribunals to interpret 
them. We made this comment with reference to the investment 
provisions: in that case, we argued that the open-textured nature of the 
treaties, and the absence of specific procedural obligations, allowed for a 
generous, investment-centred approach to interpretation, which made 
extensive use of policy arguments in order to increase the level of 
protection granted to the investor.  
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The express provisions reviewed in this chapter act as a counterbalance 
to the openness of the investment protections guaranteed by the treaty. 
Each one in its way introduces, by means of policy commitments in the 
preamble, balancing clauses, expressed exceptions, carve-outs, and 
conflict clauses, a limitation and a closure. At the same time, to reprise 
the metaphor that opened this thesis, we argue that investment treaties 
already contain openings to non-investment obligations: the tools that we 
have examined in this chapter therefore act both to limit and to expand, 
as closures and as openings, in (once again) a relationship of inverse 
proportionality between competing interests. We have commented on 
their efficacy in abstracto, but only a review of the case law of 
investment tribunals will allow ascertaining to what extent these clauses 
can work to open up investment treaties to environmental legal 
commitments undertaken by host states.  
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Chapter 5: Conflict resolution in international law 
 
 
5.1 Introduction  
 
In this chapter we will examine how conflicting obligations can be taken 
into consideration by courts and tribunals in the absence of express 
provisions in the relevant instruments. The underlying assumption made 
in choosing to examine how this can be done is that, even in the absence 
of express provisions, tribunals still possess the power to balance the 
obligations of the host state so not as to exclude any legally binding 
obligations that have been undertaken in the environmental field and that 
are influenced either by the investors’ behaviour or by the state’s legal 
response. This analysis can be performed as investment law, regardless 
of its isolationism and substantive closure, is not alone in confronting 
these problems. Other areas of international law, and other courts and 
tribunals, have been confronted with similar problems and have adopted 
conflict resolution techniques that can be fruitfully analysed in order to 
assess their usefulness and efficacy. That is why, before examining how 
investment tribunals have used the tools available to them, we review 
some significant approaches and conflict resolution techniques as 
employed in other areas of international law.  
 
The chapter is structured as following: in the first part, a general 
classification of norms and conflicts is provided, as the way in which 
conflicts are defined has a bearing on their resolution. The chapter then 
moves on a discussion of the available conflict resolution techniques, 
starting with interpretation and integration and then moving on more 
technical rules, with more emphasis on rules based on specificity and 
temporality. Each section is accompanied by the discussion of some 
illustrative cases from international courts and tribunals. The choice was 
made to deal with interpretation first, as some conflicts might appear to 
be so, or might be presented as such by the parties, but might be capable 
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of being solved through ‘systemic integration’. We are not taking a 
position as yet on the value of such methods or the rationale underlying 
them, nor to their efficacy; nonetheless, it seemed best to approach the 
problem from the easiest, ‘apparent’ conflicts, to the most intractable 
conflicts which might result in the court or tribunal issuing a judgment of 
non liquet or pointing to a lacuna in the law. It was by choice that non-
investment cases were chosen as illustrative examples, as investment 
case law is going to be analysed separately. However, where possible, 
cases involving environmental law were chosen, to ascertain how other 
areas of law have dealt with the problem of conflicting obligations 
involving the environment. The scope of this thesis is to investigate how 
investment law can be ‘greened’; another way of putting it is that 
investment law does possess entry points, both procedurally and 
substantially, through which non-investment norms can be taken into 
account and form part of the development of the law and the practice of 
tribunals. Equally, other areas of law have been exposed to this form of 
cross-fertilisation and have reacted accordingly. One WTO Panel 
declared that ‘the General Agreement [GATT] is not to be read in clinical 
isolation from public international law’429. The opposite can also be said 
to be true, in the sense that investment law can be seen not as the self-
contained regime into which one tries to find the way in, but as the 
‘outsider looking in’ or as the bilateral obligation amongst parties also 
belonging to another, more complete system of rules. We are thinking 
specifically of the way in which the European legal system, a sui generis 
system of quasi-constitutional status, has dealt with the bilateral 
investment instruments undertaken by its member states430. At the end of 
 
429 United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, 29 April 
1996, WT/DS2/AB/R, p. 17. 
430 On the possible conflicts, see Wierzbowski, M. and Gubrynowicz, A., ‘Conflict of 
norms stemming from intra-EU BITS and EU legal obligations: some remarks on 
possible solutions’, in Binder et al., 2009: 544. 
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the chapter, three cases decided by the European Court of Justice431 will 
be analysed for this purpose. Inter-regime collisions are a matter of 
perspective of course. This thesis has chosen the perspective of 
environmental law interacting with investment law. These are two 
discrete regimes of rules that are specific to a particular field. To this 
extent they differ from general international law; the conflict between 
sub-regimes and general international law has been central in the 
development of the discourse on fragmentation and conflict resolution. 
The European legal system can be equated more to the public 
international law system as one that aspires at completeness. Its 
interaction with the investment law system, as represented by the 
bilateral investment obligations of the European member states, therefore 
represents the classic conflict between the general and the particular. At 
the end of the chapter we will draw some conclusions on how conflicts 
have been dealt with in international law generally before moving on to 
the specific case of investment tribunals in Chapter 7. 
 
 
5.2 Norms classification 
 
A conflict of obligations presupposes a conflict of norms432. It is a 
fundamental principle of legal logic that norms can be classified as 
prescriptive (imposing an obligation to do something), prohibitive 
(imposing an obligation not to do something), permissive (granting a 
 
431 Commission of the European Communities v. Republic of Austria, Judgment of the 
Court (Grand Chamber) of 3 March 2009, Case C-205/06; Commission of the European 
Communities v. Kingdom of Sweden, Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 3 
March 2009, Case C-249/06; Commission of the European Communities v. Republic of 
Finland, Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 19 November 2009, Case C-
118/07. 
432 On norms classification for the purpose of hierarchical order, see Shelton, D., 
‘Normative hierarchy in international law’, 100 AJIL (2006): 291; Weil, P., ‘Towards a 
relative normativity in international law?’, 77 AJIL (1983): 413. 
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right to do something) and exemptive (granting a right not to do 
something). This taxonomy is relevant both for the distinction between 
investment and non-investment norms and for the classification of 
conflicts. The main distinction is between norms imposing duties 
(positive or negative) and norms granting rights (again positive or 
negative). In the first case the state is obliged to act in a certain way 
(either performing a positive duty of action or a negative duty of 
restraint); in the second case the state retains its freedom of choice to 
exercise or not a right. In order for that right to be defined as a right 
however, it must be capable of being exercised. Limitations to the 
exercise of a right can be inherent, i.e. pertain to the nature of the subject 
possessing that right, or contingent to legal constraints (freedom of 
speech is contingent on limitations imposed by hate speech legislation for 
example). Finally, in the absence of any norms granting a right, either 
positive or negative, or establishing an obligation, the state retains the 
inherent right of action, as stated in the Lotus principle433. 
 
Investment treaties’ norms can be expressed as obligations of conduct or 
as rights granting norms. As an example of the first kind, prescriptive 
norms, most standards of treatment norms establish positive duties for 
host states in relation to the treatment afforded to the foreign investor. 
For example, Article 3 of the United States 2004 Model BIT is as 
following: 
 
Each Party shall accord to investors of the other Party treatment no 
less favorable than that it accords, in like circumstances, to its own 
investors with respect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion, 
 
433 The Case of the S.S. Lotus (France and Turkey), Judgment, 7 September 1927, PCIJ, 
Ser. A., No. 10, 1927, III: ‘International law governs relations between independent 
States. The rules of law binding upon States therefore emanate from their own free will 
as expressed in conventions or by usages generally accepted as expressing principles of 
law and established in order to regulate the relations between these co-existing 
independent communities or with a view to the achievement of common aims. 
Restrictions upon the independence of States cannot therefore be presumed.’ 
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management, conduct, operation, and sale or other disposition of 
investments in its territory.   
 
As an example of prohibitive norms, most norms on performance 
requirements prohibit the imposition of these requirements on foreign 
investor; Article 8 of the US Model BIT states: 
 
Neither Party may, in connection with the establishment, 
acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation, or sale or other 
disposition of an investment of an investor of a Party or of a non-Party in 
its territory, impose or enforce any requirement or enforce any 
commitment or undertaking:... 
 
Articles on denial of benefits in investment treaties constitute an example 
of exemptive norms, allowing the host state to exercise its right not to 
confer certain benefits to the foreign investor434. Article 17 of the US 
Model BIT provides: 
 
 A Party may deny the benefits of this Treaty to an investor of the 
other Party that is an enterprise of such other Party and to investments of 
that investor if persons of a non-Party own or control the enterprise and 
the denying Party:  
(a) does not maintain diplomatic relations with the non-Party; or  
(b) adopts or maintains measures with respect to the non-Party or a 
person of the non-Party that prohibit transactions with the enterprise or 
that would be violated or circumvented if the benefits of this Treaty were 
accorded to the enterprise or to its investments. 
 
This and other exception clauses contained in investment treaties do not, 
strictly speaking, confer original rights to state, but rather allow states not 
to be subject to negative or positive duties with regards to investors. 
Therefore, rather than creating new rights, they carve out exceptions to 
existing duties. But this should not necessarily be seen as symptomatic of 
a limitation of sovereignty. On the contrary, it is in principle a 
recognition of the continued validity of the Lotus principle to dictate that 
treaties can only impose obligations based on consent, and allow for the 
lifting of these obligations in a predetermined set of circumstances; 
 
434 See  Wälde, T., ‘Interpreting investment treaties: experiences and examples’, Binder 
et al., 2009: 724 
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beyond the area of legal duty created by the treaty, the state remains 
unfettered and capable of exercising its positive and negative rights 
without the necessity of the treaty spelling out precisely what these are.  
 
Investment treaties can also contain permissive rights norms; typically 
taxation measures (and the corollary right of imposition of these 
measures) are carved out from the area of applicability of the investment 
obligations. For example, according to Article 21 of the US BIT: ‘Except 
as provided in this Article, nothing in Section A shall impose obligations 
with respect to taxation measures.’ Finally, but importantly, 
expropriation receives a special treatment in investment treaties. In 
international law expropriation is considered a lawful exercise of 
governmental power, subject to conditions. The exercise of the right is 
contingent on the respect both of positive duties (payment of 
compensation) and negative duties (non-discrimination). Typically, the 
right is couched in negative terms, establishing a prohibition to 
expropriate unless certain conditions are respected, rather than as a 
positive right. For example, Article 6 of the US Model BIT states: 
 
 Neither Party may expropriate or nationalize a covered investment 
either directly or indirectly through measures equivalent to expropriation 
or nationalization (“expropriation”), except:  
(a) for a public purpose;  
(b) in a non-discriminatory manner;  
(c) on payment of prompt, adequate, and effective compensation; and  
(d) in accordance with due process of law and Article 5 [Minimum 
Standard of Treatment](1) through (3). 
 
This is a complex article, containing within itself duties and rights that 
need careful balancing: for the purposes of compliance, the state is tasked 
with assessing how to act without exceeding the limits imposed by the 
norm. The kind of normative conflicts that we are investigating in this 
chapter constitute an egregious case of what is contained within almost 
any norm reaching this level of complexity. The introduction of 
extraneous elements (environmental obligations in the specific case) 
simply triggers into action the balancing provisions contained in the 
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article with respect to the duties and rights on the basis of which the state 
acts.  
 
 
5.3 Conflicts classification 
 
Norms can either accumulate or conflict in their reciprocal interaction. 
The general presumption against conflict435 dictates that every treaty 
norm is to be interpreted with reference to general international law and 
in conjunction with it: it is presumed that successive norms will 
accumulate436, and states will be able to fulfil their international 
obligations without incurring in a breach of other obligations437. This 
approach is evident in the case law. In the Rights of Passage Case, the 
ICJ explicitly referred to the rule that interpretation must have as its 
purpose the accumulation, and not conflict, of norms, in the following 
terms438: ‘… it is a rule of interpretation that a text emanating from a 
Government must, in principle, be interpreted as producing and intended 
to produce effects in accordance with existing law and not in violation of 
it.’ And in the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros case the Court had this to say439: 
 
435 This principle was reaffirmed in Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64, 118 
(1804) at 6: ‘It has also been observed that an act of Congress ought never to be 
construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains.’ 
436 See the Arbitration Tribunal in the Southern Bluefin Tuna Case (Australia and New 
Zealand/Japan) Award of 4 August 2000 (Jurisdiction and admissibility) UNRIAA Vol. 
XXIII (2004) p. 23, § 38 (c). 
437 As summarised by Pauwelyn, 2003 at 207: ‘... when new law is created there is a 
presumption in favour of continuity or against conflict, in the sense that if a treaty does 
not contract out of a pre-existing rule, the pre-existing rule – being of the same inherent 
value as the new one (unless the new one is of jus cogens) – continues to apply. Only if 
it can be shown that the new treaty does, indeed, contradict a rule of general 
international law will that rule be disapplied in respect to the treaty in question.’ 
438 Case concerning the Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Preliminary 
Objections) (Portugal v. India), I.C.J. Reports 1957 p. 142. 
439 Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1997, p. 
7, § 100. 
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…the Treaty does not contain any provision regarding its 
termination. Nor is there any indication that the parties intended to admit 
the possibility of denunciation or withdrawal. On the contrary, the Treaty 
establishes a long-standing and durable regime of joint investment and 
joint operation. Consequently, the parties not having agreed otherwise, 
the Treaty could be terminated only on the limited grounds enumerated 
in the Vienna Convention. 
 
In the ELSI Case, discussing the applicability of the local remedies rule 
in a dispute involving the treatment of a US investor, the Court also 
noted440: 
 
…no doubt that the parties to a treaty can therein either agree that 
the local remedies rule shall not apply to claims based on alleged 
breaches of that treaty; or confirm that it shall apply. Yet the Chamber 
finds itself unable to accept that an important principle of customary 
international law should be held to have been tacitly dispensed with, in 
the absence of any words making clear an intention to do so. 
 
The presumption against conflict can be reinforced by concrete steps 
taken in order to minimise the occurrence of conflict. The express clauses 
that we have examined in the previous chapter are the main way in which 
states can try to avoid conflicts between successive treaties. Lacking 
express provisions, it is accepted that conflicts will have to be dealt with 
by means of general application, derived from the VCLT in the first 
instance or other general principles of law. In addition, to the extent that 
a treaty remains silent on an issue, it accepts that changes in customary 
law will influence its content. However, even without entering the debate 
on self-contained regimes441, investment tribunals are normally faced not 
with the potential incompatibility of investment law with general 
international law, but with the problem of the compatibility of different 
primary substantive rules of international law (investment and 
environment, human rights, etc.). Whatever the source or the content of 
the rules, it can be the case that norms will not accumulate and a genuine 
conflict will occur. This occurrence is dependent on the definition of 
 
440 Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (United States of America v. Italy), Judgment, ICJ 
Reports 1989, p.15, § 50. 
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conflict one has adopted. While there is agreement in terms of the 
objective elements of the sort of overlap that has to be present between 
the norms, not the same kind of agreement has formed on the subjective 
element of states’ behaviour. As for the objective element, there is 
agreement that there has to be an overlap in terms of ratione materiae, 
personae and temporis442; this means there must be overlapping in terms 
of subject matter, of state parties (in the sense that at least one party must 
be bound by both rules), and of the chronological coincidence.  
 
The subjective element does not meet with the same degree of consensus. 
According to Jenks’s definition443: ‘Conflict in the strict sense of direct 
incompatibility arises only where a party to the two treaties cannot 
simultaneously comply with its obligations under both treaties.’ 
Pauwelyn, in his work on conflict of norms within the WTO system444, 
adopted a broader, purposive definition of conflict, according to 
which445: ‘...two norms are...in a relationship of conflict if one 
constitutes, has led to, or may lead to, a breach of the other.’ If states are 
at liberty (have the right) to follow or not a certain behaviour, conflicts 
need not arise as long as states do not exercise their rights in direct 
violation of an express prohibition or command (what he defines as 
apparent conflicts). Courts and tribunals have interpreted conflicts 
differently too, sometimes adopting the stricter definition of a conflict of 
 
441 For which see especially ILC’s study on fragmentation. 
442 On the ratione materiae requirement, Pauwelyn, 2003, at 364-65: ‘…if there is a 
genuine conflict between two treaty norms, the two treaty norms must necessarily deal 
with the same subject matter. If not, there would be no conflict in the first place since 
there would be no overlap ratione materiae (that is, one of the preconditions for there to 
be conflict…).’ 
443 Jenks, W., ‘Conflict of law-making treaties’, 30 BYIL (1953): 401 at 426. 
444 Pauwelyn, 2003, especially 169 ff. 
445 Page 175-176. Hans Kelsen had adopted a similar approach in ‘Derogation’, in 
Klecatsky, H., Marcic, R. and Schambeck, H. (eds), Die Wiener Rechtstheoretische 
Schule (1968), ii, at 1429: ‘[a] conflict between two norms occurs if in obeying or 
applying one norm, the other one is necessarily or possibly violated’. 
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obligations and sometimes of rights and obligations. In the Lockerbie 
Case, Libya argued that Article 103 of the Charter as a conflict clause 
only establishes that the Charter prevails over other treaty obligations, 
but not over conflicting rights. The Court however endorsed the UK’s 
argument446 to the effect that in a situation of conflict, Article 103 is 
controlling, regardless of the type of conflict (strictly between 
obligations, or also between rights and obligations). 
 
A necessary or inherent conflict in Pauwelyn’s classification will always 
result in a breach. A potential conflict however will not materially 
happen until the state applies the permissive norm, triggering the conflict 
between its obligation to do X and its right to do Y. From the point of 
view of the proponents of a strict definition of conflict, there is no 
conflict until there is a material breach of an obligation, which is caused 
by a state being obliged to respect conflicting duties, or deciding not to 
perform one of the conflicting duties. For the classification of conflicts, 
the objective overlap and its consequences are only two of the elements 
that tribunals are asked to consider; additional elements are the sources 
of the conflicting obligations (between treaties, between different sources 
of international law, involving municipal law, including constitutional 
norms, or contractual obligations). Umbrella clauses in investment 
 
446 ‘The obligation to comply with Security Council decisions applies fully both to 
decisions affecting the rights and those affecting the obligations of States. The relevant 
provisions of the Charter are phrased broadly and are intended to be broad in effect. 
They must be in order to assure the effectiveness of the regime of Chapter VII and in 
interpreting this aspect of the Charter this Court has not recognized any distinction 
between ‘rights’ and ‘obligations’ …Moreover, this suggested limitation creates serious 
difficulties. Suppose a bilateral treaty gives the nationals of each party the right to invest 
in the territory of the other. Surely the Charter gives the Security Council the power in a 
Chapter VII situation to require that one party prohibit investments by its nationals in 
the territory of the other, notwithstanding these treaty provisions.’ Questions of 
Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the Aerial 
Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United Kingdom), Judgment, ICJ 
Reports, 1998, p.9. 
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treaties can function as a sort of conflict norm, by establishing the 
binding force of the contractual obligations of the host state as a matter 
of international law. However, to the extent that umbrella clauses cover, 
amongst the contractual obligations, a stabilisation clause freezing the 
regulatory environment at the time of the contract, they can constitute an 
effective way to ‘shut the door’ to non-investment obligations, or, more 
correctly, to any amendments to non-investment obligations that the host 
state might wish to undertake. Acting in this manner they can be used by 
investors as a countermeasure to any attempt to ‘green’ investment law. 
In this sense, umbrella clauses can also prevent the progressive 
development of law, including by harmonisation and systemic 
integration. 
 
Paradoxically, the multiplication of treaties has not been accompanied by 
an equally developing system of rules for dealing with conflicts and by 
case law developed by courts and tribunals. On the contrary, it has been 
noted that ‘There is relatively little – in fact, until recently, astonishingly 
little – judicial or arbitral practice on normative conflicts’447. In other 
words, the juridification of several areas traditionally associated with 
international relations and diplomacy or with national policy making has 
not been accompanied by a systematic approach to the resolution of the 
inevitable normative conflicts, which are still left to be solved politically 
or diplomatically by inter-state negotiations outside courts and tribunals.  
 
Regardless of the way in which conflicts are classified a priori, this 
thesis will approach the issue pragmatically, by looking at how courts 
and tribunals have been asked to deal with conflicts in the context of a 
defence presented by the state. To do so, we will review the conflict 
resolution techniques available to tribunal and look at selected non 
investment cases which are illustrative of the possible solutions.  
 
 
447 ILC Fragmentation Report, § 41. 
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5.4 Conflict resolution techniques 
 
International law presumption against conflict acts as a guiding principle 
of interpretation and harmonisation between norms. When faced with 
potentially conflicting rules, courts and tribunals can have recourse to 
several more or less technical tools to deal with the conflicting obligation 
in a manner that either avoids, harmonises or solves the conflict. The 
general rules of interpretation can be used in order to avoid the conflict 
by means of harmonisation, or systemic integration. Effectively, 
interpretation is a form of legal reasoning or legal logic. The ILC’s 
approach, encapsulated in the following statement, seems to reflect a 
reasonable way to consider the issue448 : 
 
 This Report adopts a wide notion of conflict as a situation where 
two rules or principles suggest different ways of dealing with a problem. 
Focusing on a mere logical incompatibility mischaracterizes legal 
reasoning as logical subsumption. In fact, any decision will involve 
interpretation and choice between alternative rule-formulations and 
meanings that cannot be pressed within the model of logical reasoning.  
 
If interpretation cannot provide the means to harmonise the rules so as to 
avoid a conflict, tribunals and courts have at their disposal a series of 
technical rules: lex specialis, lex prior, lex posterior and hierarchical 
rules (ius cogens, erga omnes obligations and Article 103 of the UN 
Charter). In the next section, we will consider how the general rule of 
interpretation as laid down in the Vienna Convention can be and has been 
used by tribunals. 
 
 
5.4.1 Interpretation and systemic integration 
 
Tribunals facing a dispute in which the possibility of a conflict is raised 
have recourse in the first instance to interpretation techniques. There is 
no instance in which any system of law, however complete, can be 
 
 
 
189
                                                                                                                                                   
considered as being ‘clinically isolated’ from the normative background 
upon which it is created, and there is no ‘contracting out’ from 
international law, at least in principle. The Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties (VCLT) lays down the main rule on treaty interpretation 
in Articles 31 and 32. Article 31 [General Rule of Interpretation] 
provides as follows: 
 
 1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the 
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context 
and in the light of its object and purpose. 
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall 
comprise, in addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes: 
 (a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the 
parties in connexion with the conclusion of the treaty; 
 (b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connexion 
with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an 
instrument related to the treaty. 
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context: 
 (a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the 
interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions; 
 (b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which 
establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation; 
 (c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations 
between the parties. 
4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the 
parties so intended. 
 
Article 32 [Supplementary Means of Interpretation] provides: 
 
 Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, 
including the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its 
conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the 
application of article 31, or to determine the meaning when the 
interpretation according to article 31: 
 (a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or 
 (b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable. 
As evinced by the articles, tribunals have at their disposal different 
techniques to aid in their interpretations of the treaty’s language: 
1) Interpretation in the context of all other treaty provisions (article 
31(1) VCLT); 
 
448 ILC Fragmentation Report, § 25. 
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2) Effective treaty interpretation (ut res magis valeat quam pereat)449; 
3) Interpretation with reference to norms outside the treaty (articles 
31 and 32 VCLT). 
 
As noted by Sands, ‘Article 31(3)(c) reflects a “principle of 
integration”’450; much has been written lately on ‘systemic integration’ 
as the solution for the perceived problem of the fragmentation of 
international law; we are not here entering on the theoretical debate on 
fragmentation, but we refer to Chapter 2 and to the Concluding Remarks 
section for some comments on the matter. A treaty can be interpreted 
with reference to other law; furthermore, its application always has to 
take place ‘in context’. According to the principle of ‘inter-temporal 
law’451, ‘...a juridical fact must be appreciated in the light of the law 
contemporary with it, and not the law in force at the time when a dispute 
in regard to it arises or falls to be settled.’452 From this doctrine, Waldock 
 
449 On the principle of effectiveness, see the Commentary of the ILC, YBILC (1966), II: 
219: ‘The Commission, however, took the view that, in so far as the maxim ut res magis 
valeat quam pereat reflects a true general rule of interpretation, it is embodied in Article 
31, Vienna Convention....When a treaty is open to two interpretations one of which does 
and the other does not enable the treaty to have appropriate effects, good faith and the 
objects and purposes of the treaty demand that the former interpretation should be 
adopted.’ 
450 See especially McLachlan, C., ‘The principle of systemic integration and Article 
31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention’, 54 ICLQ  (2005): 279-320; ILC Report on 
Fragmentation: 208 ff. For the way in which the Article 31(3)(c) has been interpreted 
by the ECtHR, see Tzevelekos, V.P., ‘The use of Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT in the 
case law of the ECtHR: an effective anti-fragmentation tool or a selective loophole for 
the reinforcement of human rights teleology?’, 31 Michigan Journal of International 
Law (2010): 5621. 
451 Island of Palmas Case (Netherlands v. US) (1928), PCA, sole arbitrator, Judge 
Huber, 2 RIAA 829. 
452 However, Judge Huber added: ‘....a distinction must be made between the creation of 
rights and the existence of rights. The same principle which subjects the act creative of 
a right to the law in force at the time the right arises, demands that the existence of 
right, in other words its continued manifestation, shall follow the conditions required by 
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derived, in his Third Report on the Law of Treaties453, the following 
Article [56 – The inter-temporal Law]: 
 
1. A treaty is to be interpreted in the light of the law in force 
at the time when the treaty was drawn up; 
2. Subject to paragraph 1, the application of a treaty shall be governed by 
the rules of international law in force at the time when the treaty is 
applied. 
 
By differentiating between the interpretation and the application, both the 
textual and the contextual approaches are taken into consideration, while 
the textual approach is given relevance (it is after all, the primary rule in 
Article 30 of the VCLT, which significantly refers to the ‘general rule’, 
not rules, of interpretation454). Textual interpretation has to be performed 
within the treaty as drafted at the time, while the norms have to be 
applied in the context at the time of application455. The ILC, in its report 
on fragmentation, stresses that interpretation and conflict resolution have 
to be seen as themselves not in conflict, but as contiguous forms dealing 
with normative overlap. In the introductory section on systemic 
integration, the Commission has this to say456: 
 
the evolution of law.’ For a history of the development of Article 42 of the VCLT, see 
also Klabbers, J., ‘Reluctant grundnormen: Articles 31(3)(c) and 42 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties and the fragmentation of international law, in 
Craven, M., Fitzmaurice, M. and Vogiatzi, M. (eds.), Time, History and International 
Law, Leiden, Brill, 2007: 141. 
453 Waldock, H., ‘Third report on the law of treaties’, II Yearbook of the International 
Law Commission (1964), at 
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/a_cn4_167.pdf.  
454 Aust, A., Modern Treaty Law and Practice, Cambridge, CUP, 2007. 
455 This distinction is not always kept; the ICJ itself, in the Case concerning the Dispute 
regarding Navigational and Related Rights (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua), General List No. 
133, Judgment of 13 July 2009, argues for the meaning to be given to treaty terms as 
open to evolutionary interpretation, albeit under certain circumstances, so that both 
kinds of fall back, interpretation and application, can be given an ‘evolutionary spin’. 
(See §§ 57 ff.). For a recent review of how the PCIJ and the ICJ have dealt with the 
issue of textual interpretation, see Simma and Kill, in Binder et al., 2009: 678, at 683 ff. 
456 ILC Fragmentation Report, § 412. 
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 ... conflict-resolution and interpretation cannot be distinguished 
from each other. Whether there is a conflict and what can be done with 
prima facie conflicts depends on the way the relevant rules are 
interpreted. This cannot be stressed too much. Interpretation does not 
intervene only once it has already been ascertained that there is a conflict. 
Rules appear to be compatible or in conflict as a result of interpretation. 
Sometimes it may be useful to stress the conflicting nature of two rules 
or sets of rules so as to point to the need for legislative intervention. 
Often, however, it seems more appropriate to play down that sense of 
conflict and to read the relevant materials from the perspective of their 
contribution to some generally shared - “systemic” - objective. 
 
In other words, it is through its interpretative work that the tribunal itself 
establishes the strategy to be adopted, be it through ‘technical rules’ of 
conflict resolution or through integration. Interpretation itself, as we have 
already hinted, can refer to different means to deal with potential 
conflict: either norms can be interpreted in the context of the treaty 
(including by application of the principle of effectiveness) or in the 
context of other norms, be they treaty or custom (either through renvoi or 
by means of systemic integration). For the purposes of conflict avoidance 
involving diverse sub-systems of law, such as investment and 
environment, the applicability of the third interpretative technique, as 
codified in Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention, has the strongest 
potential to allow for cross-fertilisation and integration of norms457. It is 
important however not to overstate the role of Article 31(3)(c). As noted 
by Simma and Kill458, it cannot be seen ‘as a sort of master key enabling 
the systemic integration of otherwise disparate legal regimes’. We have 
already remarked that the role of interpretation is symbiotically 
dependent to the action of conflict resolution. This dependency should 
not be confused with interchangeability. A tribunal tasked with 
interpreting a BIT together with the relevant (and applicable in the 
relation between the parties) rules of international law is not empowered 
to modify the treaty rules (not so by Article 31(3)(c) in any event) but 
 
457 The Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp, referred to Article 31(3)(c) directly, see § 
158 and footnote 157.  
458 Simma and Kill, in Binder et al., 2009: 678 at 694. 
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simply to have, as its telos, the application of the treaty rules so that the 
presumption of compliance is respected. If one were to envision the work 
of the tribunal as part of a network, it would be to interpret every norm so 
as to connect with any other norm that might be applicable459 to the facts 
in a network-compatible way. 
  
We will consider next two cases where the ICJ and the WTO Appellate 
Body dealt with the issue of interpretation460. The first dispute concerns a 
joint investment between Hungary and (then) Czechoslovakia for the 
construction of a dam on the Danube River, which was suspended by 
Hungary (together with the treaty that established it) on the grounds, 
amongst other things, of ‘ecological necessity’. The second case, brought 
in front of the Appellate Body of the WTO, also involves a conflict 
between the WTO agreement and environmental law461. 
 
  
5.4.1.1 The Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Case 
 
This case, brought by Hungary against Slovakia, concerned a 
construction project for a dam and a power plant on the Danube river; the 
agreement was sealed in a Treaty signed in 1977 and ratified in 1978 
(‘the 1977 Treaty’). Hungary, which suspended work on the project and 
terminated the treaty, argued that Slovakia had unlawfully undertaken the 
‘provisional solution’462 of damning up the river in its territory, with 
unfavourable consequences for Hungary as concerned water intake and 
navigation. For the purposes of our topic, what is of interest is one of the 
 
459 It is, as always, the application of the principle to be problematic: what is intended 
by ‘relevant’, ‘rules’ and ‘applicable in the relations between the parties’? 
460 Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. Slovakia), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1997, 
p. 7. 
461 United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products (12 
October 1998) WT/DS58/AB/R,DSR 1998. 
462 ‘Variant C’ in the text. 
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arguments put forward by Hungary as justification for non-performance 
and ultimately termination of the 1977 Treaty463: 
 
 Finally, Hungary argued that subsequently imposed requirements 
of international law in relation to the protection of the environment 
precluded performance of the Treaty. The previously existing obligation 
not to cause substantive damage to the territory of another State had, 
Hungary claimed, evolved into an erga omnes obligation of prevention of 
damage pursuant to the “precautionary principle”. On this basis, Hungary 
argued, its termination was “forced by the other party’s refusal to 
suspend work on Variant C”. 
 
While the Court did not accept Hungary’s contention that conflicting 
environmental obligations entitled it to terminate the 1977 Treaty, it did 
rely on the principle of integration to the effect that:  
 
 …newly developed norms of environmental law are relevant for 
the implementation of the Treaty and that the parties could, by 
agreement, incorporate them through the application of Articles 15, 19 
and 20 of the Treaty. These articles do not contain specific obligations of 
performance but require the parties, in carrying out their obligations to 
ensure that the quality of water in the Danube is not impaired and that 
nature is protected, to take new environmental norms into consideration 
when agreeing upon the means to be specified in the Joint Contractual 
Plan……By means of Articles 15 and 19, new environmental norms can 
be incorporate in the Joint Contractual Plan464. 
 
The Court did not strictly interpret the 1977 Treaty in light of evolving 
standards of international environmental law in order to harmonise its 
obligations, as much as stated that these standard could be taken into 
account through incorporation, thanks to specific provisions to that effect 
contained in the main treaty. It is therefore more correctly a case of fall-
back in application rather than in interpretation. Nonetheless, the Court 
also added that: 
 
 ...new norms and standards have been developed, set forth in a 
great number of instruments in the last two decades. Such new norms 
have to be taken into consideration, and such new standards given proper 
 
463 Judgment, § 97.  
464 Judgment, § 112.  
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weight, not only when States contemplate new activities but also when 
continuing with activities begun in the past465. 
 
The Vice-President of the Court, Judge Weeramantry, in his Separate 
Opinion, argued for the principle of sustainable development to ‘hold the 
balance’ between the conflicting principles of development and 
protection of the environment. In the Opinion, Judge Weeramantry 
stated:  
 
 If the Treaty was to operate for decades into the future, it could not 
operate on the basis of environmental norms as though they were frozen 
in time when the Treaty was entered into. This inter-temporal aspect of 
the present case is of importance to all treaties dealing with projects 
impacting on the environment. Unfortunately, the Vienna Convention 
offers very little guidance regarding this matter which is of such 
importance in the environmental field. The provision in Article 31, 
paragraph 3(c), providing that “any relevant rules of international law 
applicable in the relations between the parties” shall be taken into 
account, scarcely covers this aspect with the degree of clarity requisite to 
so important a matter. Environmental concerns are live and continuing 
concerns whenever the project under which they arise may have been 
inaugurated. It matters little that an undertaking has been commenced 
under a treaty of 1950, if in fact that undertaking continues in operation 
in the year 2000. The relevant environmental standards that will be 
applicable will be those of the year 2000466. 
 
 
5.4.1.2 The Shrimp-Turtle Case 
 
In this case, several East Asian countries requested a panel report in 
connection with their complaint on import restrictions of shrimp, which 
the United States had introduced in compliance of its Endangered 
Species Act of 1973467. In its Report, the Panel declared the import ban 
to be inconsistent with Article XI:1 of GATT 1994, and not justified 
under Article XX of GATT 1994. The United States appealed certain 
 
465 Judgment, § 140. 
466 Separate Opinion of Judge Weeramantry, page 114.  
467 For the relevant factual details, see United States – Import Prohibition of Certain 
Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Panel Report, WT/DS58/R, §§ 2.1-2.16. 
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sections of the Report. The Appellate Body (AB) expanded on the 
interpretative exercise to be performed on GATT XX. In line with 
‘systemic interpretation approach’, the AB embraced the concepts of 
evolutionary interpretation in light of conditions obtaining at the time of 
the dispute, including by application of the principle of sustainable 
development, although it referred to the principle of effectiveness more 
specifically when adopting a definition of ‘exhaustible natural resources’ 
as to include also living natural resources, rather than relying on similar 
interpretations adopted in international environmental instruments, 
quoted in the Report468. On the substance of the claim, the AB performed 
a balancing exercise between different provisions of the GATT (namely 
Article X.1 and XX469), in order to: ‘… [strike] a balance ... between the 
right of a Member to invoke an exception under Article XX and the duty 
of that same Member to respect the treaty rights of the other 
Members’470. We are here dealing with a possible intra-treaty conflict by 
application of Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT. The AB made explicit 
reference to this Article471, when it stated472: ‘our task here is to interpret 
 
468 The Appellate Body incorporated the criteria established by the CITES in order to 
ascertain the applicability of Article XX(g) to the species protected by the US 
legislation, specifically sea-turtles, and decided that, since sea-turtles are listed in 
Appendix 1 of the CITES they are to be considered an exhaustible natural resource for 
the purposes of Article XX(g). 
469 Where Article XX is the exception which would excuse the violation of Article X.1. 
470 Report, § 156. 
471 As recently did the Panel in United States – Definitive Anti-dumping and 
Counterveiling Duties on Certain Products from China (Report of 22 October 2010, 
WT/DS379/R), at § 7.1. The Panel, in the context of considering the applicability of the 
Draft Articles on State Responsibility for the purpose of attribution, as pleaded by 
China, and referrring to the use made of the Articles by previous panels, stated that: 
‘…the various citations to the Draft Articles have been as conceptual guidance only to 
supplement or confirm, but not to replace, the analyses based on the ordinary meaning, 
context and object and purpose of the relevant covered Agreements.’ (At § 8.87) The 
reference to other instruments as conceptual guidance in the interpretation of the 
covered agreements has to be seen in context here of a specific discussion on the role of 
the Articles rather than extended uncritically on the role of international law in general 
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the language of the chapeau [of Article XX GATT], seeking additional 
interpretative guidance, as appropriate, from the general principles of 
international law.’ However, on the merits of the appeal, the Appellate 
Body in the end did not accept that the measures had been adopted in a 
non-discriminatory manner473. The AB made the same distinction 
between substantive and procedural requirements adopted, as we have 
seen, in the Model US BIT, with respect to regulatory measures, by 
stating that:  
 
 … the application of a measure may be characterized as amounting 
to an abuse or misuse of an exception of Article XX not only when the 
detailed operating provisions of the measure prescribe the arbitrary or 
unjustifiable activity, but also where a measure, otherwise fair and just 
on its face, is actually applied in an arbitrary or unjustifiable manner. The 
standards of the chapeau, in our view, project both substantive and 
procedural requirements.  
 
 
5.4.2 ‘Technical rules’ of conflict resolution 
 
 
in interpretation: in other words, the Panel argued for the Articles not to be seen as 
‘rules of international law applicable in the relations between the Parties’, as per Article 
31(3)(c). Therefore, international law in general can serve as conceptual guidance when 
not explicitly applicable to the dispute, in confirmation of its role as normative 
background. On the facts, the Panel stated in no uncertain terms that: ‘… we do not find 
that the Draft Articles are “relevant rules of international law applicable to the relations 
between the parties”, such that we should “take them into account, together with the 
context” in the sense of Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention.’ (At § 8.91) 
472 Appellate Body Report, § 158; the reference to Article 31(3)(c) is actually contained 
in footnote 157. 
473 The Appellate Body placed great emphasis on the fact that the import ban measures 
were unilaterally imposed by the United States, and not based on a multilateral 
instrument for the protection of marine life. Simma, B., ‘Of planets and the universe: 
self-contained regimes in international law’, 17 EJIL (2006): 483, at 511: ‘…the 
Appellate Body referred to international environmental instruments outside the WTO to 
counter the image of the WTO as a cold-hearted trade-over-everything institution. 
Adopting such a unitary discourse did not even require the Appellate Body to reverse 
the recommendation of the panel in substance.’ 
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Faced with a potential conflict, courts and tribunals can resort to 
interpretation in order to allow for the integration of the conflicting 
obligations. A successful resolution in this respect would be the result of 
‘apparent conflicts’; however, as pointed out by Pauwelyn, 
interpretation’s function stops where the conflict’s result in an actual 
breach of one of the two obligations474. A genuine conflict can be solved 
by application of the relevant conflict rule which will determine the 
applicable law, or more precisely, which rule has priority of application. 
As noted by the ILC, there are three main criteria for the resolution of a 
conflict475:  
1. Specificity (lex specialis) 
2. Temporality (lex prior or lex posterior) 
3. Hierarchy (ius cogens or erga omnes obligations). 
The hierarchical criterion for the resolution of conflicts would result in 
one of the two norms being considered invalid or illegal (for example, by 
application of the ius cogens principle). Since this has never been the 
case in an investment dispute, it will not be dealt with extensively in this 
Chapter or in Chapter 7, and more attention will be paid to the first two 
criteria. The scope of this work does not allow us to delve into the more 
theoretical aspects of normative conflicts. Suffice to notice that conflict 
rules can themselves be in conflict (for example the application of the 
temporality criterion can result in the prior or the successive rule being 
selected, depending on the priority given to the criteria), being 
themselves subject to higher level principles such as the freedom of 
contract on the one hand and the sanctity of pacts on the other. Therefore 
the successive modification of a treaty can be the expression of the 
freedom of contract of the parties and be applicable to their relation (lex 
 
474 See Pauwelyn, 2003, especially page 272-3. 
475 § 412 ILC Fragmentation Report. 
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posterior) but not be opposable to parties to the first treaty but not the 
second (pacta sunt servanda)476.  
 
 
5.4.2.1 Specificity (lex specialis) 
 
The VCLT does not contain a specific provision on lex specialis, which 
constitutes the other major criterion for the resolution on normative 
conflicts based on the principle of specificity (as between general law 
and an interpretation or exception to it, or between two special 
provisions477). There is an inevitable overlap between the two criteria478, 
as a special provision will inevitably be successive to the general rule it 
claims to interpret or provide the exception for, or successive to another 
special rule (one can hardly believe that two treaties in potential conflicts 
would be ratified at precisely the same time therefore nullifying the 
applicability of the requirement of temporality479). This is not to say that 
the lex specialis rule is never applicable or it is subject to the lex 
 
476 And validity of inter se agreements, also encapsulated in the pacta tertiis nec nocent 
nec prosunt maxim. For an in-depth discussion of these principles, see Pauwelyn, 2003, 
Chapter 7; ILC Fragmentation Report, especially Sections C and D.  
477 See ILC Fragmentation Report, §§ 47 ff.  
478 For a case in which the relationship between the two principle was considered by the 
court, see the Lockerbie Cases, Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 
Montreal Convention arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya v. United States of America), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, 
I.C.J.Reports 1998, p. 115;  Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 
Montreal Convention arising from the Aerial Incident ut Lockerbie (Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya v. United Kingdom), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I. C.J. Reports 
1998, p. 9; see also Pauwelyn, 2003: 385 ff, especially at 396: The…lex specialis 
principle is only really put to the test in case it is not at the same time the lex posterior.  
479 Pauwelyn, 2003, 396, also notes the exceptional nature of this occurrence, but does 
provide a couple of examples, both concerning not two treaties, but two declarations 
and a treaty and a declaration. Equally interesting is the application of the principle for 
the resolution of a conflict between two norms contained in the same instrument (or 
more realistically, a series or related instruments, such as the WTO Treaty).  
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posterior rule480. However, while the lex specialis rule allows to 
establish an ‘informal hierarchy’481 in which the rule that is disapplied in 
the particular instance remains in the background, in the case of the 
temporality rule, the ‘losing’ rule loses its validity altogether, at least as 
concerns the relation between the parties to both rules, and it is not 
simply dis-applied in the specific dispute. Furthermore, the relational 
character of the general/special distinction482 does not allow, it seems, 
for an application of lex specialis as a discrete self-standing criterion for 
the resolution of a potential conflict, but points to its usefulness as an 
interpretative principle. The ILC goes as far as to say that this principle 
‘cannot be meaningfully codified’483. Surely at a high enough level of 
generality, any rule can always be conceptualised as special with 
reference to its normative background (and as general with reference to 
its application). It is also true that courts usually do not act at this level of 
generality, which is taken for granted. To this effect, lex specialis seems 
at its most useful and relevant the ‘closer to the normative ground’ it 
is484. On the other hand the risk is then that either the principle collapses 
into the lex posterior one or it is reduced to the application of legal logic 
rather than a specific method of resolution of a normative conflict. This 
is especially so as long as one attributes to the rule the double function of 
distinguishing between general and particular in a cumulative as well as 
in an exclusionary way. As an example one can look at the codification 
 
480 This is particularly relevant if the lex specialis is also lex prior: see Pauwelyn, 2003: 
405 ff.  
481 ILC Fragmentation Report § 85. 
482 ILC Fragmentation Report § 112. 
483 ILC Fragmentation Report § 119. 
484 Another way of putting it is that lex specialis functions more as a principle of legal 
logic when acting in a cumulative way, and more as a technical tool for the resolution 
(or better, recognition) of conflict when acting in an exclusionary way.  
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by the ILC in the Draft Articles on State Responsibility, at Article 55 
(Lex Specialis)485:  
 
 These articles do not apply where and to the extent that the 
conditions for the existence of an internationally wrongful act or the 
content or implementation of the international responsibility of a state are 
governed by special rules of international law. 
 
We will see next how the WTO has applied the lex specialis criterion 
with respect to an inter-systemic conflict between trade and 
environmental law486. The fact itself that what is defined as an informal 
hierarchical criterion can be employed to solve a conflict between two 
sub-systems of general international law begs the question of how 
exactly specificity is supposed to come into play in discerning the 
applicability of rules of international law that do not share the same 
subject matter.  The most straightforward application of the rule is in the 
context of two related treaties, one of which is of a more general nature 
and the other more specific: for example, a treaty implementing the 
obligations set out in the ‘framework’ treaty or a treaty that sets out in 
more detail the general terms of a previous agreement487, or more 
generally, when considering the obligations contained in a treaty in the 
context of international law, as stated by the ICJ in the Gabčikovo-
Nagymaros Case488: 
 
 It is of cardinal importance that the Court has found that the 1977 
Treaty is still in force and consequently governs the relationship between 
the Parties. That relationship is also determined by the rules of other 
 
485 International Law Commission, Report on the Work of its Fifty-third Session, 
Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-Sixth Session, Supplement No. 10 
(A/56/10), at 58. 
486 European Communities - Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products 
(Hormones) 13 February 1998, WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R (Beef Hormones 
Case). 
487 As in Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Jurisdiction), PCIJ, Ser. A, No.2 (1924) 
at 30, 31.  
488 ICJ Reports 1997, § 132. 
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relevant conventions to which the two States are party, by the rules of 
general international law and, in this particular case, by the rules of State 
responsibility; but it is governed, above all, by the applicable rules of the 
1977 Treaty as a lex specialis.   
 
In considering an application of the lex specialis principle not in the 
context of investment tribunals’ case law, once again we turn to a WTO 
Appellate Body Report, in which the status of the precautionary principle 
was discussed.  
 
 
5.4.2.1.1.1 The Beef Hormones Case 
 
The Appellate Body considered the appeal brought by the European 
Communities against the United States and Canada in 1997. This came 
from a long standing dispute on the ban of beef and beef products from 
cattle treated with growth promotion hormones. The Panel Report 
appealed by the defendants had found the European Communities to be 
acting inconsistently with the requirements of the Agreement on the 
Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement). 
The Appellate Body confirmed the conclusions of the Panel Report. Part 
of the Report dealt with the issue of the applicability of the 
‘precautionary principle’. For ease of analysis, we report the arguments 
from the disputing parties and the opinion of the Appellate Body. The 
European Communities’ position, as reported by the Appellate Body, 
was the following:   
 
 The precautionary principle is already…. a general customary rule 
of international law or at least a general principle of law, the essence of 
which is that it applies not only in the management of a risk, but also in 
the assessment thereof. It is claimed that the Panel therefore erred ….in 
suggesting that that principle might be in conflict with those Articles [5.1 
and 5.2 of the SPS Agreement]. 
 
The United States argued, on the status of the principle, as follows: 
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 …the claim of the European Communities that there is a generally-
accepted principle of international law which may be referred to as the 
“precautionary principle” is erroneous as a matter of international law. 
The United States does not consider that the “precautionary principle” 
represents a principle of customary international law; rather, it may be 
characterized as an “approach” – the content of which may vary from 
context to context.  
 
Canada agreed with the United States, but went a bit further in the 
direction of recognition, stating that: 
 
 The “precautionary principle” should be characterized as the 
“precautionary approach” because it has not yet become part of public 
international law. Canada considers the precautionary approach or 
concept as an emerging  principle of international law, which may in the 
future crystallize into one of the “general principles of law recognized by 
civilized nations”, within the meaning of Article 38(1)(c) of the Statute of 
the International Court of Justice. 
 
The Appellate Body rejected the argument of the European 
Communities. In its report it stated: 
 
The precautionary principle is regarded by some as having 
crystallized into a general principle of customary international 
environmental law. Whether it has been widely accepted by Members as 
a principle of general or customary international law appears less than 
clear. We consider, however, that it is unnecessary, and probably 
imprudent, for the Appellate Body in this appeal to take a position on this 
important, but abstract, question. We note that the Panel itself did not 
make any definitive reading with regards to the status of the 
precautionary principle in international law489 and that the precautionary 
principle, at least outside the field of international environmental law, 
still awaits authoritative formulation.  
 
 
489 The Panel had found that: ‘To the extent that this principle could be considered as 
part of customary international law and be used to interpret Articles 5.1 and 5.2 on the 
assessment of risks as a customary rule of interpretation of public international law…. 
we consider that this principle would not override the explicit wording of Articles 5.1 
and 5.2, in particular since the precautionary principle has already been incorporated 
and given a specific meaning in Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement [on provisional 
measures adopted ‘in cases where relevant scientific information is insufficient – the 
article was not invoked by the EC]. 
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The statement by the Appellate Body is ‘problematic’ in the words of the 
ILC’s report490 and not only because the delimitation between the 
different fields of law is not normative as much as descriptive and not 
settled. It is also because, by refusing to pronounce on the status of the 
principle, the Appellate Body effectively refused to acknowledge it as a 
principle of general international law, rather than environmental law, and 
actually stepped back even from the pronouncement of the Panel in its 
report, which had admitted that the principle had been incorporated in the 
SPS Agreement and therefore accepted by the WTO Members491. And, 
most importantly, the Appellate Body noted that the Members (of the 
WTO) might not have accepted this principle as pertaining to general 
international law: it is submitted that it is not for the Members to accept 
the customary status of this principle, but for states in general and that, if 
this status is confirmed, it is not for Members to decide if the customary 
status is to be recognised and applied within the context of the WTO 
Agreement 492 on a case-by-case basis, in the absence of a specific 
‘contracting out’. The Appellate Body took a clear position on the 
insularity of legal regimes, to the extent that it seemed to advance the 
view that principles might be ‘regime-specific’ and therefore not 
 
490 § 55. 
491 Even if it is debatable that general principles need incorporation to have effect: lex 
specialis requires explicit ‘contracting out’, not ‘contracting in’ (see ELSI case). 
492 In accordance with Article 3(2) of the Dispute Settlement Agreement, which states:  
‘The dispute settlement system of the WTO is a central element in providing security 
and predictability to the multilateral trading system. The Members recognize that it 
serves to preserve the rights and obligations of Members under the covered agreements, 
and to clarify the existing provisions of those agreements in accordance with customary 
rules of interpretation of public international law. Recommendations and rulings of the 
DSB cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered 
agreements.’ For how this has been interpreted for the relationship between the WTO 
treaty and general international law, see especially United States - Standards for 
Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, 29 April 1996, WT/DS2/AB/R, p. 17; Korea 
- Measures Affecting Government Procurement, 1 May 2000, WT/DS163/R, § 7.96. See 
also ILC report, §§ 165 ff.  
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applicable across regimes. It is as if the Appellate Body rejected the 
possibility of lex specialis being used to solve inter-systemic conflict; as 
if, in other words, the only way in which the lex specialis principle is 
operative is for an incompatibility between a special regime and general 
international law, but, as long the incompatibility is between two 
regimes, the adjudicating body is bound to apply only the regime-specific 
rules. It might be that, as a jurisdictional matter, this is the correct 
position to take  in the context of the WTO, because of the wording of 
Article 3(2) of the DSU493, or at least, that this is a defendable position. 
The distinction between jurisdiction and applicable law is well 
understood and does not need restating here494. The usual fall-back rule 
would not include treaty norms, in compliance of the pacta tertiis rule. 
To claim that a principle of law is only applicable in the regime in which 
it originated is to extend the pacta tertiis rule to cover customary and 
general principles (equalling it to regional custom) and begs the question 
of who decides on the ‘borders’ of each regime, as stated by the ILC 
when commenting that ‘the responses are bound to vary depending on 
which one [regime] one chooses as the relevant frame of legal 
interpretation’495. We will see in Chapter 7 how investment tribunals 
have dealt with the application of the lex specialis principle in an 
arbitration under the NAFTA regime496. 
 
 
493 ‘The dispute settlement system of the WTO is a central element in providing security 
and predictability to the multilateral trading system. The Members recognize that it 
serves to preserve the rights and obligations of Members under the covered agreements, 
and to clarify the existing provisions of those agreements in accordance with customary 
rules of interpretation of public international law. Recommendations and rulings of the 
DSB cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered 
agreements.’ Text available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dsu_e.htm#3.  
494 See for example the ILC’s Report on Fragmentation, §§ 44 ff. 
495 § 55. 
496 See Archer Daniels Midland Company and Tate & Lyle Ingredients Americas v. 
United Mexican States (ADM v. Mexico), Award, 21 November 2007. 
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5.4.2.2 Temporality (lex posterior and lex prior) 
 
Article 30 (Application of successive treaties relating to the same 
subject-matter) of the VCLT codifies the temporality principle:  
  
1. Subject to Article 103 of the Charter of the United Nations, the 
rights and obligations of States parties to successive treaties relating to 
the same subject-matter shall be determined in accordance with the 
following paragraphs. 
2. When a treaty specifies that it is subject to, or that it is not to be 
considered as incompatible with, an earlier or later treaty, the provisions 
of that other treaty prevail. 
3. When all the parties to the earlier treaty are parties also to the later 
treaty but the earlier treaty is not terminated or suspended in operation 
under article 59, the earlier treaty applies only to the extent that its 
provisions are compatible with those of the latter treaty. 
4. When the parties to the later treaty do not include all the parties to the 
earlier one: 
 (a) as between States parties to both treaties the same rule applies as in 
paragraph 3; 
 (b) as between a State party to both treaties and a State party to only one 
of the treaties, the treaty to which both States are parties governs their 
mutual rights and obligations. 
5. Paragraph 4 is without prejudice to article 41, or to any question of the 
termination or suspension of the operation of a treaty under article 60 or 
to any question of responsibility which may arise for a State from the 
conclusion or application of a treaty, the provisions of which are 
incompatible with its obligations towards another State under another 
treaty. 
 
A tribunal faced with a conflict between applicable laws, is facing two 
norms that, while both legal and valid, result in a breach in one of the 
two ‘regimes’ if applied at the same time. To reach this result, the 
tribunal should proceed in steps, to ascertain, first, if one of the two 
norms is invalid (by application of the relevant rules of the law of 
treaties); if both are valid, it could still be that one of them is illegal, for 
example because it conflicts with a norm of ius cogens (in which case the 
application of the norms on state responsibility is triggered, with the 
understanding that the ratification itself of an agreement which conflicts 
with a ius cogens norms constitutes an ‘act’ for the purposes of Article 1 
of the Draft Articles). If both norms are legal and valid, the tribunal 
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needs then to establish which norm prevails, by application in the first 
instance of Article 30 of the VCLT, that is, by applying the principle of 
temporality as the most accurate way of ascertaining the most current 
expression of states’ will, in accordance with the freedom of contract 
principle. In the last instance, the tribunal will apply the secondary rules 
of state responsibility if one of the two norms is breached and the other 
norm is said to prevail (with due regard to the application of special 
regimes of state responsibility such as the investment or the trade regime, 
especially as concerns countermeasures497); alternatively, the tribunal 
might find that it is impossible to establish which of the two norms 
prevails. For the tribunal to be able to apply the temporal rules for the 
resolution of the conflict, there has to be a temporal overlap between the 
instruments, and the conflict can be solved keeping in accordance to the 
chronology of the obligations entered by the parties, either by application 
of the lex posterior rule, or of the opposite lex prior rule. The two 
principles, themselves in conflict, find their most common application 
respectively in public law and in contract law498. Behind them, one can 
see looming the higher level principles of pact sunt servanda and 
contractual freedom respectively. However, as recognised by the ILC and 
as predicted, in practice, the same subject-matter restriction becomes the 
defining criterion. While for successive treaties by the same parties on 
the same subject (or within the same regime), the application of Article 
30 is relatively unproblematic, what of treaties in different regimes 
between different parties, concluded over time and containing no conflict 
resolution clauses or conflicting ones, or ambiguous ones? The pacta 
tertiis rule, as codified in Articles 41 and 58 of the VCLT can modify the 
outcome of the conflict, with the character of the obligations also bearing 
 
497 For this debate in the investment context, see especially ADM v. Mexico. 
498 If principles derived from domestic contexts can be applied by analogy to the 
international law context. See ILCFragmentation Report, 117 footnote 296. 
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on the selection of the prevailing norm499. When discussing the 
applicability of the lex posterior principle in the context of WTO law, 
Pauwelyn noted500: 
 
…in case the WTO rule can be defined as the later in time…, it 
could be seen as in inter se agreement modifying earlier integral human 
rights or MEA [multilateral environmental agreement] obligations…. If 
this is the case – that is, if the WTO rule deviates from earlier human 
rights or MEA obligations as between WTO members only – then the 
WTO rule would not only affect WTO members but also third parties… 
In addition, the later WTO rule could then even be seen as incompatible 
with the ‘effective execution of the object and purpose of the [human 
rights or MEA] treaty as a whole.’ Consequently, as between parties to 
the earlier MEA or human rights treaty,… the particular WTO 
provisions…, to the extent of the conflict, would then be illegal pursuant 
to Arts. 41/58 of the Vienna Convention. 
 
The technical intricacies related to the application of these principles 
when tribunals are faced with multilateral treaties with different parties 
are mostly restricted to the field of academic discussion, as normally 
conflicts of this kind rarely are left to courts to be resolved. To this 
extent, it seems superfluous to provide here a complete taxonomy of the 
possible combinations501. What interests us is to show what tools are 
available for tribunals that are willing to consider non-investment 
obligations, and as part of this, we are looking at how other international 
courts and tribunals have taken conflicting norms into consideration.  
 
Especially when dealing with inter-regime conflicts, or conflicts between 
treaties amongst different parties502, the usefulness of a technical rule 
such as the lex posterior rule decreases, or more precisely, the rule 
 
499 Respectively on Agreements to modify multilateral treaties between certain of the 
parties only, and Suspension of the operation of a multilateral treaty between certain of 
the parties only. 
500 322. 
501 For which we refer at recent treatments, such as the ones provided by the ILC in its 
report and by Pauwelyn, 2003. 
502 It is likely that successive treaties between different parties are also straggling 
between different regimes. 
 
 
 
209
                                                
becomes subject to other criteria, such as the distinction between 
‘integral’ and ‘reciprocal’ obligations. Typically, in an inter-regime 
conflict such as the one between environmental and investment 
obligations, the environmental obligations will be contained in a 
multilateral treaty of the integral kind, the investment obligations in a 
bilateral treaty of the reciprocal kind. As Pauwelyn noted503: ‘An inter se 
modification to a multilateral treaty is, in principle, only permissible 
when such modification relates to obligations of the reciprocal type.’ 
While he made this remark with reference to the possibility of later 
agreements deviating from WTO rules, what is relevant is the 
permissibility of modifications contained in a bilateral investment treaty 
of multilateral obligations contained in an environmental treaty. Article 
41 of the VCLT regulates the modification of multilateral treaties in the 
following fashion: 
 
 1. Two or more of the parties to a multilateral treaty may conclude 
an agreement to modify the treaty as between themselves alone if: 
 (a) the possibility of such a modification is provided for by the treaty; 
     or 
 (b) the modification in question is not prohibited by the treaty and: 
     (i) does not affect the enjoyment by the other parties of their rights 
under the treaty or the performance of their obligations; 
     (ii) does not relate to a provision, derogation from which is 
incompatible with the effective execution of the object and purpose of 
the treaty as a whole. 
2. Unless in a case falling under paragraph 1(a) the treaty otherwise 
provides, the parties in question shall notify the other parties of their 
intention to conclude the agreement and of the modification to the treaty 
for which it provides. 
 
The determination of incompatibility between the modifying provision 
and the object and purpose of the original treaty, while potentially 
difficult, might be rendered unnecessary by the application of the second 
condition, reflecting the pacta tertiis rule504.  Finally, the difference has 
 
503 Pauwelyn, 2003: 53. 
504 See also Pauwelyn, 2003, 306: ..there might be instances also where the inter se 
agreement ....relates to a provision derogation from which is against the ‘object and 
purpose’ of the treaty. However, in my view, those cases would then fall also under the 
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been noted between the criteria of temporality and specificity to the 
effect that, while the second one can be considered provision by 
provision, the first one is applicable only to treaties as instruments 
considered in their entirety. This for two reasons: logically, treaties have 
to be considered in toto with respect to their place in time (they are not 
agreed or ratified provision by provision); secondly, the VCLT regulates 
treaties as instruments, and therefore its articles are applicable to the 
treaties seen in their entirety, not to provisions considered singularly505. 
The most important criterion, that of sameness and relevance, can be 
applied restrictively, as proposed in the traveaux préparatoires of the 
Vienna Conference506, or more widely, as advocated by the ILC 
report507. In any case, the problem seems related more to the applicability 
of Article 30 than to the overlap of treaties on subject matter. It will be 
the case that either the treaties are successive and cover the same subject 
matter for the purposes of Article 30, which the court or tribunal can 
apply in order to establish which treaty prevails, or lex specialis is 
applicable between two provisions of different treaties, and in this case 
the wider approach can be adopted to the effect that:  
 
 
second ground of illegality under Arts. 41/58 (that is, illegality based on the pacta tertiis 
principle).’  
505 See S. Rosenne, Breach of Treaty, Hersch Lauterpacht Memorial Lectures, 
Cambridge, Grotius Publications 1985: 4-7; A. Gourgourinis, Lex Specialis in WTO and 
investment protection law, Society of International Economic Law Second Biennal 
Global Conference, Barcelona 2010, Online Proceedings Working Paper No. 2010/37: 
32.   
506 See United Nations Conference on the Law of Treatie: Second Session, Vienna 9 
April – 22 May 1960: Official Records: Summary Records of the Plenary Meetings and 
the Meetings of the Committee of the Whole (A/CONF.39/C.1/SR.86): 222: ‘The phrase 
in question [relating to the same subject-matter] should be construed strictly and should 
not be held to cover cases where a general treaty impinged indirectly on the content of a 
particular provision of an earlier treaty; in such cases, the question involved was one of 
interpretation or of the application of such maxims as generalia specialibus non 
derogant’. 
507 Section B generally and § 254 with specific reference to Article 30 of the VCLT. 
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 The requirement that the instruments must relate to the same 
subject-matter seems to raise extremely difficult problems in theory, but 
may turn out not to be so very difficult in practice. If an attempted 
simultaneous application of two rules to one set of facts or actions leads 
to incompatible results it can be safely assumed that the test of sameness 
is satisfied508. 
 
It stands to reason that, according to the general rules of interpretation, 
the words ‘relating to the same subject matter’ have to have a meaning, 
and that meaning is obviously supposed to circumscribe the applicability 
of the rule. In other words, if the problem is the application of successive 
treaties tout-court, there is no need to include the ‘relating to the same 
subject matter’ criterion. In its report on fragmentation509, the ILC argues 
that: 
 
 The criterion of “subject-matter” leads to a reductio ad absurdum. 
Therefore, it cannot be decisive in the determination of whether or not 
there is a conflict....The criterion of “same subject-matter” seems already 
fulfilled if two different rules or sets of rules are invoked in regard to the 
same matter, or if, in other words, as a result of interpretation, the 
relevant treaties seem to point to different directions in their application 
by a party. 
 
The commission argued that the criterion is not decisive; however, the 
wording of the Article itself seems to imply that it is a criterion not for 
interpretation, but for exclusion a priori, in other words an issue of 
classification rather than interpretation. Incompatibility between treaties 
relating to the same subject matter is to be solved in accordance with the 
rules provided in the first part of the article, but this is without prejudice 
to the possibility of state responsibility for concluding or applying a 
treaty whose provisions are incompatible with another treaty’s. In 
principle, a treaty on the protection of the environment and a treaty on 
 
508 E.W. Vierdag, ‘The time of the ‘conclusion’ of a multilateral treaty: Article 30 of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and related provisions’, BYIL 59 (1988): 
100; see also ILC report, §§ 22 ff. Vierdag’s comment is made in relation to Article 30 
though. 
509 § 22. 
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foreign investment do not have any overlap in terms of subject matter. 
However, their application can result in the violation of the norms of the 
respective other treaty. It is an often repeated argument that the conflict 
can be framed according to the interest of the respective parties, and also 
that, as stated by the ILC repeatedly, and to paraphrase, ‘subject-matter’ 
is neither a settled issue nor a standard classification in international law. 
It seems important to distinguish between the way in which the subject 
matter requirement and the temporality principle interact. In principle, we 
fail to see why a wider reading of the requirement is any help in applying 
the principle, as the principle’s application leads to random results. There 
is no reason why a human rights treaty follows or precedes a trade treaty 
or vice-versa, as treaties are concluded and ratified all the time, so 
temporality is not a good indication of intent510; to this extent the only 
possible way to apply the subject matter criterion is the strictest possible, 
as that is the only way in which the randomness of the temporality 
principle is tempered by the deliberateness of the subject matter criterion. 
It is certainly not within the scope of this thesis to solve this controversy, 
but some conclusions can be drawn which will be relevant for the way in 
which conflicts between regimes are dealt with: 
1. Article 30 of the VCLT covers the application of successive treaties 
relating to the same subject matter;  
2. To the extent that disputes arise because of an allegation of a breach 
and therefore involve state responsibility, Article 30 is not the applicable 
law (see Article 30(5)) for the purposes of attribution of responsibility, as 
evidenced by the fact that paragraph 5 refers to the ‘conclusion or 
application of a treaty’ rather than just the application of successive 
treaties which is the remit of Article 30 first four paragraphs511; 
 
510 Namely, the most recent treaty does not necessarily trump the older one as the most 
recent expression of intent. 
511 The distinction between conclusion and application points to the difference between 
conflicts in which one of the norms is illegal (Articles 41 and 58 of the VCLT) and 
conflicts in which both norms are legal, but their simultaneous application creates a 
conflict, which calls for a priority of applicability. Invalidity can result only from 
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3. Faced with a claim of a breach and a defence of conflicting 
obligations, a court or tribunal has to establish in the first instance which 
instrument prevails: let’s assume the dispute arises for a breach of 
instrument X and the State A (defendant) claims instrument Y required 
conduct which resulted in breach of instrument X. If the court establishes 
that instrument X prevails, it will find in favour of the State B (claimant); 
if the court finds that instrument Y prevails, there will be no breach for 
the purposes of the dispute; if both are found to apply, the court will 
adjudicate on the dispute which has been brought in front of it; this 
without prejudice to the responsibility for the breach of the other 
instrument resting with State A and involving possibly a State C (or the 
same state B which might have decided to bring a dispute only with 
respect to instrument X). In case of instruments belonging to the same 
regime, it might be that, even if it is within the jurisdiction of the court or 
tribunal to adjudicate on the possible breach, for reasons of judicial 
economy, it will not do so512. If both norms are valid and applicable to 
the respective parties (so A is bound to B by the first norm, and to C by 
the second conflicting norm), and there is no priority rule (see article 
30(4)(b)), then, according to Pauwelyn513: ‘It is then up to A to make a 
political choice as to whether it will comply with the AB norm or with 
the AC norm. The law of treaties does not direct A either way’514. This 
 
inherent normative conflicts (for example, a norm conflicting with a norm of jus cogens 
is invalid – Article 53 VCLT) while illegality can only result from conduct in breach of 
an international obligation: it then means that the conflicting norm does not constitute a 
valid defence for the offending behaviour. 
512 WTO panels often act this way; see for example Panel Report, United States – 
Customs Bond Directive for Merchandise Subject to Anti-Dumping/Countervailing 
Duties, WT/DS345/R, adopted 1 August 2008, as modified by Appellate Body Report, 
WT/DS343/AB/3, §§ 7.165-7.169. 
513 At 427. 
514 Or, as W. Karl put it [‘Conflicts between treaties’, in R. Bernhardt (ed.), 
Encyclopaedia of Public International Law, Amsterdam, North-Holland, 1984, VII, 
468, at 470-01]: ‘With the law stepping back, a principle of political decision takes its 
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of course does not eliminate the issue of State A responsibility for breach 
of its obligations with State C in compliance with its obligations with 
State B (or vice-versa) as per Article 30(5)515. If State A, in order to 
avoid a breach arising from a conclusion of a treaty with State C with 
respect to State B, ceases the existence of the offending norm, it will 
incur in international responsibility with respect to State C. If the conflict 
is in the applicable law, State A will engage in international 
responsibility as soon as it applies the treaty with respect to State C in 
violation of its obligations with respect to State B (or vice-versa). 
Therefore, either in the case of inherent normative conflict or conflict of 
applicable law, the state is internationally responsible for a breach, either 
because of concluding a treaty or for implementing a treaty. In the first 
case, the breach is consequent to the conclusion of the second treaty, so 
that in principle, the state is in breach only in respect of State C (as at the 
time of the conclusion of the first treaty, there could not be a violation, as 
the other treaty had not been entered into yet, and remembering that the 
offending norms are not illegal, but that the second one is invalid with 
respect to the first one); in the second case, the state can be in breach of 
its obligations with respect to either state, depending which obligations it 
decides to honour, and regardless of the priority of them (having being 
established that neither the lex posterior neither the lex prior, or the lex 
specialis apply to the conflict). State C could also incur in international 
responsibility for having aided state A in breaching its responsibility with 
respect to state B: this might reduce the quantum of damages to be paid 
to state B by state A516.  
 
place whereby it is left to the party to the conflicting obligations to decide which treaty 
it prefers to fulfil.’ 
515 As stated by Crawford: ‘…Thus it is no excuse under international law for non-
compliance with a subsisting treaty obligation to State A that the State was 
simultaneously complying with a treaty obligation to State B.’ Crawford, J., Second 
Report on State Responsibility, International Law Commission, A/CN.4/498., § 9. 
516 See Article 27 of the 1996 ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility; However, the 
2001 draft articles replaced article 27 with article 16, which states: 
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In any case, it seems that Article 30 is applicable when the defining 
relationship between instruments is their temporal contiguity, which is 
irrelevant for the purposes of lex specialis. If the application of Article 30 
were to lead to an ‘absurd outcome’517, then one could presume that 
Article 30 is not the applicable law and that the meaningful relation 
between the instruments is not based on temporality, but possibly on 
specificity or hierarchy or indeed that there is a lacuna in the law or, 
more precisely, an excess of law without the means to establish a useful 
hierarchy of applicability between the conflicting obligations. 
Pauwelyn518 has supported a positive reading of this outcome, by 
concluding that: 
  
 There is…one important benefit linked to declaring a non liquet in 
case of ‘non-resolvable’ conflict. States should then realise that it will not 
suffice to let potential conflicts linger without political solution. For 
negotiators to leave the interaction between treaty provisions ambiguous 
would hence imply a serious risk: if the conflict turns out to be an 
‘unresolvable’ one, the international judge may declare a non liquet and 
simply apply neither of the two rules, thereby nullifying the effect of 
both treaties or both treaty provisions. 
 
 
 
A State which aids or assists another State in the commission of an internationally 
wrongful act by the latter is internationally responsible for doing so if: 
(a) That State does so with knowledge of the circumstances of the internationally 
wrongful act; and 
(b) The act would be internationally wrongful if committed by that State. 
Clause (b) eliminates the issue of international responsibility of C in an AB/AC 
situation. 
517 Pauwelyn, 2003: 377. After all, it is the VCLT itself, at Article 32, to point to 
supplementary means of interpretation when Article 31 ‘leads to a result that is 
manifestly absurd or unreasonable’ and the VCLT, like any other treaty is subject to the 
basic rule of interpretation laid out in Article 31, including for the interpretation and 
application of Article 30. A consequence is that, by referring to the traveaux 
preparatoires, a stricter definition of the ratione materiae requirement is bound to be 
adopted.  
518 At 421. 
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5.5 Inter-regime conflicts involving investment law as ‘the 
outsider’ 
 
The relationship between the European legal order and international law 
in general, and bilateral instruments involving Member States and third 
countries in particular, has been the object of increased attention recently, 
not least because of the commitment in the Lisbon Treaty to include 
foreign investment amongst the Community competencies519. The 
relationship can be seen from the point of view of arbitral tribunals 
dealing with EC law520, but this would the subject more properly of 
Chapter 7, or of the Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ) 
dealing with BITs obligations of Member States. In 2009 the ECJ issued 
three judgments521 in the matter of the presumed incompatibility between 
certain provisions of bilateral investment treaties of the Member States in 
questions with third countries on the free movement of capital and Arts. 
57(2)EC, 59EC, 60(1)EC on capital movement restrictions and found the 
Member States to be in breach of Article 307(2) EC. Article 307 EC is 
worth quoting in full, as it functions as a subordination clause to solve 
 
519 See for example Vis-Dunbar, D., The Lisbon Treaty – Implications for Europe’s 
international investment agreements, November 2009, at 
http://ictsd.org/i/news/tni/59585/; Seattle to Brussels Network, EU Investment 
Agreements in the Lisbon Treaty Era: A Reader, 2010, at 
http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/eu_investment_reader.pdf.  
520 The first investment dispute to address this relationship was Eastern Sugar B.V. 
(Netherlands) v The Czech Republic, UNCITRAL ad hoc arbitration, SCC no. 
088/2004, Partial Award, 27 March 2007, available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca. See Potestá, 
M., ‘Bilateral investment treaties and the European Union. Recent developments in 
arbitration and before the ECJ’, 8 The Law and Practice of International Courts and 
Tribunals (2009): 225. See most recently AES Summit Generation Limited AES-Tisza 
Erömü KFT v. The Republic of Hungary (ICSID Case No. ARB/07/22), Award, 23 
September 2010, Section 7.2. 
521 Commission of the European Communities v. Austria, Commission of the European 
Communities v .Sweden, and Commission of the European Communities v. Finland, see 
infra.   
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incompatibilities between EC law and previous international agreements 
entered by Member States: 
 
 The rights and obligations arising from agreements concluded 
before 1 January 1958 or, for acceding States, before the date of their 
accession, between one or more Member States on the one hand, and one 
or more third countries on the other, shall not be affected by the 
provisions of this Treaty.  
To the extent that such agreements are not compatible with this Treaty, 
the Member State or States concerned shall take all appropriate steps to 
eliminate the incompatibilities established. Member States shall, where 
necessary, assist each other to this end and shall, where appropriate, 
adopt a common attitude.  
In applying the agreements referred to in the first paragraph, Member 
States shall take into account the fact that the advantages accorded under 
this Treaty by each Member State form an integral part of the 
establishment of the Community and are thereby inseparably linked with 
the creation of common institutions, the conferring of powers upon them 
and the granting of the same advantages by all the other Member States. 
 
 
In the first two cases, against Austria and Sweden, the ECJ performed a 
very short analysis of the facts before coming to its conclusions (based 
on the potential for the BITs provisions to impede the Community to 
exercise its powers to restrict capital flows) that those BITs were 
incompatible with EC law and that Sweden and Austria had failed to 
fulfil their obligations under Article 307 to take appropriate steps to stop 
the incompatibility. The judgments have been criticised for extending the 
concept of incompatibility to cover ‘potential future incompatibility’ and 
in so doing, extending the competencies of the Communities and making 
them exclusive, to the effect that Community law prevails even where 
‘the Community has not yet exercised the powers available to it under the 
Treaty’522. The ECJ endorsed a wide definition of conflict, along the 
lines of Kelsen’s and Pauwelyn’s definitions. It then applied the 
incompatibility with respect to the ‘conclusion’ of a treaty523, in this way 
rebutting the argument by the defendants that an hypothetical 
incompatibility is no incompatibility at all; secondly, reaffirmed that the 
 
522 Commission of the European Communities v. Finland, § 46. 
523 See Article 30(5) of the VCLT. 
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EC Treaty takes precedence to the extent of the conflict, so that the 
incompatibility has to be resolved in favour of the treaty, including 
possible denunciation and termination of the conflicting instrument; 
however, on the merits of the case, denunciation, suspension and 
termination were disregarded as feasible remedies if urgent measures for 
the capital flows restrictions (including in compliance of UN Security 
Council resolutions) needed to be implemented. This oblique reference to 
the Security Council524 hints at a hierarchy of obligations (namely by 
application of Article 103 of the UN Charter) that is not developed fully 
by the Court525. A certain criticism can be moved to the Court for its 
quick dismissal of renegotiation and termination as possible forms of 
resolution of the conflict, and for failing to distinguish and to give due 
regard to the differences between the relevant BITs. The Court placed 
great emphasis on the urgency of the measures to be adopted in 
regulating capital movement, while not all the relevant EC Articles 
concern urgent measures. Secondly, the Court considered the BITs as 
homogenous instruments, without taking into account the textual 
differences. This is particularly relevant, and came to be considered, in 
the Commission v. Finland Case, where the BIT between Finland and Sri 
Lanka contained the following clause: 
 
 Every contracting party guarantees under all circumstances, within 
the limits authorised by its own laws and decrees and in conformity with 
international law, a reasonable and appropriate treatment of investments 
made by citizens or companies of the other Contracting Party. 
 
Finland argued that, ‘by virtue of the direct effect of Community law’, 
the restrictive provisions that the Community might wish to implement 
 
524 Commission of the European Communities v. Finland, Case C-118/07, § 25. 
525 Essential for the pronouncements of the ECJ on the relationship between European 
and International Law is the Kadi Case, Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat 
International Foundation  v. Council of the European Union and Commission of the 
European Communities, Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, 2008. 
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form part of Finnish law and are covered by the aforementioned clause526 
which effectively solves the incompatibility in favour of Community law. 
The ECJ rejected this argument in the following terms: 
 
 It must be observed, as the Republic of Finland rightly submitted, 
that restrictive measures, which may be adopted by the Council... form 
part of the Finnish legal order. However, it is not clear whether such 
measures, in the light of the bilateral investment agreements at issue, 
may be regarded as part of Finnish law.  
 
The Court went on to say that, in compliance with the rule of treaty 
interpretation as codified in Article 30 of the VCLT, the BITs have to be 
interpreted as to require its parties to allow for free transfer of money and 
therefore the provisions relied upon by Finland ‘would not be sufficient 
to ensure the compatibility of the agreements challenged by the 
Commission with Article 307 EC’. One fails to see what are the 
implications of the distinction made by the Court between the Finnish 
legal order and Finnish law, to the effect that the EC restrictive measures 
might be part of the first one but not of the second and that this might be 
the case ‘in light of the bilateral investment agreements’.  
 
526 § 37. In any case the standard provisions on free transfer of currency, by ensuring 
freedom of transfer without ‘undue delay’ already allow for justified delay in 
compliance of restrictions imposed by Community measures, especially if dictated by 
UN resolutions under chapter VII; also, and as argued by Austria and Sweden, the rebus 
sic stantibus principle can be applied in order to excuse non-performance of certain BIT 
obligations. 
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5.6 Concluding remarks 
 
The application of conflict resolution techniques based on specificity, 
temporality or hierarchy, or systemic integration can help court and 
tribunals to avoid or harmonise conflicts, therefore maintaining the ‘unity 
of international law’. But a conflict is also the cause and the consequence 
of a breach, and as such has to be dealt with by application of the law of 
state responsibility. Investment law possesses its own secondary rules for 
violations of breaches of substantive or primary investment rules527. To 
the extent that a state is responsible for the violation of non-investment 
obligations in the pursuit of its investment obligations, the tribunals 
simply do not have jurisdiction to deal with the consequences of these 
breaches. While the ILC in its report on fragmentation rightly stressed 
that ‘although a tribunal may only have jurisdiction in regard to a 
particular instrument, it must always interpret and apply that instrument 
in its relationship to its normative environment,’528 it is the consequences 
of that application that are relevant. Inasmuch as the tribunals do not 
recognise conflicting obligations as an excuse for non performance of the 
state’s investment obligations, they are empowered to enforce the 
 
527 It is a ‘self-contained’ regime in the sense suggested by the Commentary to Article 
55 of the ILC’s Draft Articles on State Responsibility, see § 5 in Official Records of the 
General Assembly, Fifty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 10 (A/56/10), 2001) pp. 358-
359. The term ‘self-contained’ with reference to a system of rules is attributed to the 
PCIJ in the S.S. Wimbledon Case, PCIJ, Ser. A, No. 1, at 23. See also the ICJ in Case 
concerning the United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States of 
America v. Iran) I.C.J. Reports 1980 p. 41, § 86. The ILC in its fragmentation report, 
page 82, suggested to replace the use of the misleading term ‘self-contained regime’ 
with the more appropriate ‘special regime’, with reference either to a special system of 
secondary rules or to a more integrated system of primary and secondary rules. A third, 
even wider definition, of such a regime as equivalent to ‘branches’ of international law 
such as trade, environment, etc., is not advisable either. On self-contained regimes and 
the rules on State responsibility, see also Simma, B. and Pulkowski, D., ‘Of planets and 
the universe: self-contained regimes in international law’, 17 EJIL (2006): 483. 
528 § 423. 
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secondary rules of state responsibility contained in the investment 
instrument (by awarding compensation to the investor). However, the 
tribunal does not have jurisdiction for a breach of a non-investment 
obligation, in the widest sense of not being empowered to declare on the 
existence of the breach, and some would say, being an institution created 
within one of the two conflicting regimes, possessing a systemic or 
structural bias towards the regime that created it. The germane issue of 
the applicability of the rules on state responsibility for special regimes 
has been the object of academic and jurisprudential attention529; to 
summarise, the general rules of international law on state responsibility 
codified by the ILC remain as fall-back in case of failure or 
incompleteness of the special regime, as a ‘residual’ regime for dealing 
of breaches (the difficulties of defining what constitutes a failure, and 
what is residual in this context are beyond the scope of this work530). It is 
accepted, as we have said, that investment law constitutes a special 
regime in this sense, having its own rules for dealing with breaches of 
investment treaties and, more specifically, rules on locus standi. To this 
extent, the investment regime is similar to the human rights regime, 
which also allows for individuals complaints of human rights violations 
(the human rights regime of course does not offer as strong remedies as 
the investment regime531). There is no difference between the secondary 
 
529 See the ILC Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful 
Acts, with Commentaries, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2001, vol. II, 
Part Two;  ILC Report on Fragmentation, Simma and Pulkowski, supra. 
530 For example, Simma remarked that none of these so-called self-contained regimes 
contains specific provisions on the application of the general rules on state 
responsibility (501). 
531 A direct comparison between human rights obligations and investment obligations is 
not useful is because the human rights regime is a legal regime based on public 
international law, in its substantive and procedural aspects. The investment regime, on 
the other hand, is a sui generis regime, a hybrid sub-system of international law 
combining private, commercial and public elements, with overlapping municipal and 
international jurisdictions, in which, in short, horizontal and vertical planes intersect, 
and that cannot be reduced to its public international or private trans-national lex 
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rules on state responsibility and the presumption against conflict and the 
completeness of the international law system which guide the usual fall-
back mechanism. As Bruno Simma noted in his treatment of self-
contained regimes and state responsibility532, ‘Sociological regime 
differentiation does not preclude normative compatibility with general 
international law’533. In this thesis, vertical compatibility between 
investment law seen as a special regime and general international law, 
including its rules on responsibility is not the focus of the analysis534 as 
much as horizontal compatibility between discrete special regimes, 
investment and environment being an example.  
 
 
mercatoria elements. Furthermore, while the investment regime is international in its 
purpose and is supposed to protect foreigners from abuses of host states, the human 
rights regime it’s international in its character, but it is supposed to establish a system of 
protections mainly aimed at shielding citizens from the abuses of their own state. In this 
respect at least, the human rights regime is more innovative with respect to its 
substantive provisions, while the investment regime is more innovative with respect to 
its procedural provisions. In other words, the novelty of the human rights regime is that 
it creates a new category of rights opposable directly to one’s own state; the novelty of 
the investment regime is that it allows investors to exercise their rights directly against a 
foreign state, not their own. The source of the rights is always international, but the 
relationship between a human rights claimant and the state is normally not international, 
so that international law interposes itself in an essentially domestic context. In the case 
of the investment regime, the relationship itself is, or should be, international. 
532 See footnote above, page 485.  
533 As Teubner suggested, ‘Legal fragmentation cannot itself be combated. At the best, a 
weak normative compatibility [italics added] of the fragments might be achieved .... 
dependent upon the ability of conflicts law to establish a specific network logic, which 
can effect a loose coupling of colliding units’. Fischer-Lescano, A., and Teubner, G., 
‘Regime collision: the vain search for legal unity in the fragmentation of global law’, 25 
Michigan Journal of International Law (2004): 999 at 1004. 
534  And of course, investment treaties as a special regime are created specifically in 
order to allow for dispute settlement to be available to investor (customary rules of 
investor protection being subsumed as rules of aliens protection against injury and being 
restricted to diplomatic protection), and in this sense secondary rules constitute the 
raison d’être of the special regime of investment treaty law.  
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Chapter 6: Procedural means of incorporation 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
Non-investment obligations can be taken into account by state parties to 
an investment treaty in drafting the treaty, through the inclusion of 
express provisions. Additionally, when recourse to express provisions is 
not possible, because they are not available in the applicable instruments, 
tribunals still have at their disposal rules of conflict resolution deriving 
from general international law. In this chapter we will consider what 
procedural means are available to tribunals to incorporate the host states’ 
non investment obligations. While in the previous chapter examples of 
conflict resolution taken from other areas of international law were 
presented, this chapter will not be followed by a similar analysis of how 
procedural means of incorporation are tackled in other areas of law, as 
investment law constitutes a sui generis regime procedurally, therefore 
comparisons are not warranted. While the link between express 
provisions and conflict resolution techniques on the one side, and non-
investment (environmental) obligations on the other is immediately 
obvious, this is not necessarily so for procedural changes in the 
investment framework. How do openness, transparency, and third-party 
participation increase the visibility and the importance of environmental 
issues in investment arbitrations? The answer is to be found in the field 
in which foreign investors are traditionally been active (energy, mining, 
land development), which tend to have a significant environmental fall-
out, and in the emergence of disputes involving developed states, such as 
the United States and Canada, with a vocal and well organised civil 
society. It is the combination of the potential for environmental negative 
externalities and a community aware and weary of them, to have brought 
about the demand for an increase of this form of procedural openness. In 
turn, this procedural openness increases the likelihood that ‘green issues’ 
will be raised. It is, in other words, both for historical and for political 
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reasons that procedural openness has acquired its prominence in 
discussions about the status of investment law as a closed system. As 
often happens when discussion turns on ‘transparency’, it is easy to 
overestimate the importance of what is obtained, as we will argue later in 
the chapter. On the other hand, undoubtedly there will be behavioural 
changes in the parties as a consequence of their awareness that what is 
being said in the proceedings will be public knowledge.   
 
Investment disputes are characterised by confidentiality and privacy of 
the proceedings, not conducive to taking into consideration public 
interest issues. Additionally, traditionally these disputes have been 
strictly a ‘two-parties’ affair, with participation by third parties, 
interveners, amici curiae and other similar arrangements not being taken 
into consideration either by the parties or by the tribunals. Transparency 
of proceedings has therefore been demanded as a first step in 
guaranteeing that the public interest is adequately protected. Different 
institutional settings have tackled these demands differently, with more 
or less openness and publicity allowed. The distinction between 
confidentiality and privacy on the one hand, and transparency and 
inclusiveness on the other, which has been outlined elsewhere,535 refers 
to publicity and participation in investment arbitrations: in short, the 
circle of knowledge holders and of participants. Who has the right to be 
informed of investment disputes and how much should they know about 
it (awards, all documents)? Who has the right to participate in the 
proceedings and in which capacity (as passive listeners, with non-party 
status, as third parties)? These debates have been conducted with 
particular vigour in the last ten years and have brought about significant 
changes in the structure of investment disputes, with differing degrees of 
openness being achieved. A general argument can be made on the public 
 
535 See Asteriti, A. and Tams, C., ‘Transparency and representation of the public interest 
in investment treaty arbitration’, in Schill, S. (ed.) International Investment Law and 
Comparative Public Law, Oxford, OUP, 2010: 787.  
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interest of investment arbitrations and therefore the necessity of 
transparency; equally, a generic appeal to the necessity for certain public 
interest arguments to be heard by the tribunal can militate in favour of 
some form of participation to the proceedings. The first argument is 
couched in terms of procedural transparency; the second one relies on 
public interest standing discourses, familiar from domestic contexts. Both 
demands are bound to interact with the incorporation of environmental 
obligations in investment law and investment arbitration. This interaction 
can be conceptualised as a bijective function in which each element is 
connected to the other and acts on the other with a feedback loop. So 
more transparency allows for more information from investment disputes 
to be shared with third parties: the information received informs their 
participation to the proceedings and in turn affects the disputing parties 
and the tribunal and consequently, the information issuing from the 
disputes and so on. However, the feedback loop might not close: as there 
is no obligation for investment tribunals to act on the submissions 
received by the amici curiae (or indeed to read them), they might not let 
the information received influence or inform their awards536. The second 
problem, which is much more serious, is a problem of legitimacy and is 
only indirectly affected by these debates. The legitimacy of third parties 
participants has been questioned: if they raise issues of public interest 
and appeal to the public interest in order to obtain the right to participate 
and intervene in the proceedings, on what ground is their legitimacy 
based? How can they claim to speak for the public and what interests do 
they defend? To whom are they accountable?537 However interesting this 
 
536 Also states can be included in this information loop; for the effect on them, see 
through the prism of ‘normative expectations’  see for example Schill, S., ‘International 
investment law and comparative public law – an introduction’, in Schill, S. (ed.), 2010: 
3, at  19. 
537 See for example Thomas Wälde’s contribution to International Investment and the 
Protection of the Environment. The Role of Dispute Resolution Mechanisms, edited by 
the International Bureau of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, Papers emanating from 
 
 
 
226
                                                                                                                                                   
aspect of the legitimacy debate, it lies beyond procedural transparency538. 
The legitimacy of the tribunals is more closely connected to issues of 
transparency and representation. The fact that the members of the 
tribunals are chosen by the parties, while in accordance with the rules of 
commercial arbitration, sits uneasily with the guarantees of impartiality 
and respect of the nemo judex in causa sua principle. Systemic bias and 
substantive closure can only be strengthened where there is no possibility 
of appeal and where arbitrators come from a restricted group of experts 
in commercial and investment law539. 
 
 
6.2 Non-disputing parties participation 
 
Non-investment obligations are likely to concern issues that have a 
strong public interest element, such as the environment, or human rights, 
labour rights etc. Participation of third parties in investment proceedings 
constitutes the main procedural means to introduce non-investment issues 
in the dispute and therefore can be seen as one of the ‘entry points’ for 
environmental issues. Different stages can be distinguished in the way in 
which tribunals have accepted the participation of third parties to the 
proceedings, from total closure to relative openness. While in most 
municipal systems some form of public interest standing is allowed, 
 
the Second PCA International Law Seminar, May 17 2000, The Hague, Kluwer Law 
International, 2001, at 50 ff. 
538 Given their role as amici curiae, it is the task of the tribunal, in accordance with the 
procedural rules under which it is established, to ascertain the usefulness and the bona 
fide character of their submissions, and not of their democratic legitimacy as 
organisations and individuals.  
539 The issue of the permeability of the categories and resulting problems of conflicts of 
interest and self-serving development of the case law are obvious systemic problems 
that procedural transparency did not even attempt to address. For the role of arbitrators, 
see Malintoppi, L., ‘Independence, impartiality and the duty of disclosure of 
arbitrators’, Oxford Handbook, 2008: 789; Sheppard, A., ‘Arbitrator independence in 
ICSID arbitration’, Binder et al., 2009: 131. 
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investment law does not allow for more than participation as non 
disputing party, mainly in the form of amicus curiae submissions. The 
adversarial nature of the proceedings, modelled on common law systems, 
accounts for the preference for this form of participation. More direct 
forms of participation as a disputing party, or institutionally protected 
roles, such as the French rapporteur public, would not be possible within 
investment disputes as they are currently structured. Given the structural 
limitations, third parties are restricted to written submissions, in the form 
of amicus curiae briefs.  
 
Investment arbitration has moved from a complete denial of 
participation, through some limited forms of ad hoc participation540 to 
more open recognition (NAFTA, ICSID Convention). The original 
ICSID Convention Rules of Procedure did not allow any form of third 
party participation. Since tribunals have to follow the procedural rules of 
the institutional framework the parties have selected or the ad hoc set-up 
autonomously chosen, there is no bar to third parties participation if the 
parties consent to it. In the Aguas del Tunari Case, the Tribunal rejected 
the request to participate as amicus curiae made by the NGO Earth 
Justice,541 stating that it would have been beyond its powers to do 
otherwise, lacking consent of the parties or a provision to that effect 
either in the ICSID Convention as the governing framework for 
procedural matters or in the applicable BIT. But already at the time of the 
Aguas Del Tunari decision, things were changing; in its letter to Earth 
Justice, the Tribunal referred to the 2003 US-Singapore FTA, in which 
written submissions are contemplated by Article 15.19, which states as 
follows: ‘The Tribunal shall have authority to accept and consider amicus 
curiae submissions from a person or an entity that is not a disputing 
 
540 The Arbitration Rules of the main international arbitration seats, International 
Chamber of Commerce (ICC), London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA), 
Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCC), do not allow for amicus curiae submissions.  
541 See Aguas Del Tunari SA v. Republic of Bolivia (ICSID Case No. ARB/02/3), 
Decision on Respondent’s Objection to Jurisdiction, 21 October 2005, Appendix III.  
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party.’ This same clause is contained in the US Model BIT of 2004, as 
Article 28(3). In the same year, the Free Trade Commission issued a 
statement binding on NAFTA Parties on non disputing parties 
participation to proceedings initiated under the NAFTA. The statement 
clarified the procedure for submission, which included the submission of 
an application for leave to file and the submission itself, and elucidated 
the criteria for acceptance of briefs from non parties. These can be 
identified in the following terms: 
 
1. the submission has to provide the tribunal with knowledge or 
insight that is ‘different from that of the disputing parties’ which can help 
the tribunal determine factual or legal issues related to the dispute;  
2. the non disputing party has to have a ‘significant interest’ in the 
arbitration; and 
3. the subject matter of the arbitration has to have a public interest 
element. 
 
Similarly, and as a consequence of the developments in the NAFTA 
regime, the ICSID Member States introduced new arbitration rules in 
2006 which allow for third parties participation as non-disputing 
parties542, again through the submission of briefs543. Rule 37(2) of the 
Arbitration Rules is as follows: 
 
 After consulting both parties, the Tribunal may allow a person or 
entity that is not a party to the dispute (in this Rule called the “non 
disputing party”) to file a written submission with the Tribunal regarding 
a matter within the scope of the dispute. In determining whether to allow 
 
542 The first tribunal to apply the new rule with regards to submissions by amici curiae 
was Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Limited v. United Republic of Tanzania (ICSID Case No. 
ARB/05/22), Procedural Order No. 5, 2 February 2007.  
543 In AES Summit Generation Limited and AES-Tisza Erömü Kft. v. Republic of 
Hungary (ICSID Case No. ARB/07/22), Procedural order concerning the application of 
a non-disputing party to file a written submission pursuant to ICSID Arbitration Rule 
37(2), 26 November 2008 (not public), the Tribunal allowed the intervention of the 
European Commission under the modified ICSID Rules..   
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such a filing, the Tribunal shall consider, among other things, the extent 
to which: 
(a) the non-disputing party submission would assist the Tribunal in the 
determination of a factual or legal issue related to the proceeding by 
bringing a perspective, particular knowledge or insight that is different 
from that of the disputing parties; 
(b) the non-disputing party submission would address a matter within the 
scope of the dispute; 
(c) the non-disputing party has a significant interest in the proceeding.  
The Tribunal shall ensure that the non-disputing party submission does 
not disrupt the proceeding or unduly burden or unfairly prejudice either 
party, and that both parties are given an opportunity to present their 
observations on the non-disputing party submission. 
 
The ICSID rules do not go as far as the NAFTA ones, in that 
‘consultations’ with the parties are required (even if the final decision as 
to the possibility of admitting written submissions rests with the 
tribunal). The criteria are similar to those applicable within the NAFTA 
regime, minus the public interest element. But even before the NAFTA 
Parties and the Member States of the ICSID Convention introduced these 
changes formally, tribunals had adopted them by acting to accept 
submissions by NGOs in cases that had a strong public interest element. 
They did so by interpreting the arbitration rules under which they were 
acting as allowing non disputing parties submissions. For example, the 
Methanex Tribunal accepted submissions by several environmental 
NGOs even without an express rule authorising it to do so544. The claim, 
submitted for a violation of Chapter Eleven of the NAFTA, was 
governed by the UNCITRAL Rules. By its interpretation of Rule 15(1), 
the Tribunal established that it had the discretion necessary to authorise 
the submissions, provided it acted in accordance to ‘procedural equality 
and fairness’ towards the parties. The Tribunal clearly distinguished 
between granting non disputing parties substantive rights or party status, 
which was precluded, and granting them lesser procedural rights, which 
it considered to be within the scope of Article 15(1).  
 
544 See Methanex Corporation and the United States of America, Decision on Authority 
to Accept Amicus Submissions, 15 January 2001. This case will be analysed in Section 
7.6.1.  
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The Norway Model BIT and the IISD Model Agreement consolidate and 
augment the criteria for participation by non parties. Article 18(3) and 
18(4) of the Norway BIT are as follows: 
 
3. The Tribunal shall have the authority to accept and consider 
written amicus curiae submissions from a person or entity that is not a 
disputing Party, provided that the Tribunal has determined that they are 
directly relevant to the factual and legal issues under consideration. The 
Tribunal shall ensure an opportunity for the parties to the dispute, and to 
the other Party, to submit comments on the written amicus curiae 
observations. 
4. The Tribunal shall reflect submissions from the other Party and 
from amicus curiae in its report. 
 
While clause 18(3) does not differ from what already granted in ICSID 
and NAFTA, with Article 18(4) the draft establishes a novel duty for 
tribunals to take into consideration third parties submissions, which is a 
significant departure from the traditional position, according to which 
tribunals are under no obligation to take such submissions in any 
consideration at all (not even being under the obligation to read them, let 
alone reflect their content in their award). Article 8(1) of Annex A in the 
IISD Model Agreement does not go as far in its formulation: ‘The 
tribunal shall have the authority to accept and consider amicus curiae 
submissions from a person or entity that is not a disputing party (the 
“submitter”)’545.  
 
 
6.4 Openness of the proceedings 
 
Procedural transparency refers to the disclosure of information about 
investment disputes to third parties546. This can be accomplished by 
opening the hearings to the public, which is the topic of this section, or 
 
545 The other paragraphs of the Article detail the procedure to be followed in the 
submissions of amicus briefs. 
546 On third parties participation, see also Yannaca-Small, C., ‘Transparency and third-
party participation in investor-state dispute settlement procedures’, OECD Working 
Papers on International Investment, No. 2005/1, at http://www.oecd.org/investment.  
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through publication of the award and related materials, which will be 
reviewed in the next section. In this respect the last ten years have also 
witnessed a remarkable change in attitude, from complete closure to 
relative openness. 
 
Investment arbitration, modelled on private commercial arbitration, did 
not traditionally allow open proceedings. This approach is still followed 
by institutions that, while empowered to conduct mixed arbitrations 
(investor-state) developed their rules in a strictly private commercial 
environment. Institutional settings such as the International Chamber of 
Commerce (ICC) or the London Court of International Arbitration 
(LCIA) do not allow the participation of third parties in any form, unless 
by consent of the arbitral tribunal and the parties547, or by consent of the 
parties or order of the tribunal548. Even the revised UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules still only provide for hearings in camera unless the 
parties agree otherwise549. However, the UNCITRAL set up a Working 
Group on Arbitration and Conciliation tasked with the consideration of 
transparency as an urgent issue; it was decided though that this issue 
should not delay the revision of the generic rules, completed in 2010550. 
 
Institutional settings created for the express purpose of allowing investor-
state arbitrations, mainly ICSID, or instruments allowing for arbitration 
to take place in ad hoc tribunals but in compliance of certain rules, such 
as NAFTA, have undergone the most dramatic developments (though 
ICSID to a lesser extent).  
 
The un-amended ICSID Rule 32(2) did not allow participation to the 
hearings unless by consent of the parties; the debates following the 
 
547 Article 21(3) of the ICC Rules of Arbitration in force as from 1 January 1998.  
548 Article 19(4) of the LCIA Arbitration Rules effective 1 January 1998. 
549 Article 28(3) of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules as revised in 2010. 
550 See Report of the Working Group II (Arbitration and Conciliation) on the work of its 
fifty-third session, (Vienna, 4-8 October 2010), A/CN.9/712 
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publication of a Discussion Paper by the ICSID Secretariat in 1994551 
resulted in the approval by the ICSID Administrative Council of a 
revised set of rules in 1996, which still only contemplated open hearings 
by the parties’ consent552, even if more openness had been proposed in 
the debates preceding the vote553. Further amendments in 2006 have not 
changed the situation this regard, with the new Rule 32(2) providing as 
follows: 
 
 Unless either party objects, the Tribunal, after consultations with 
the Secretary-General, may allow other persons, besides the parties, their 
agents, counsel and advocates, witnesses and experts during their 
testimony, and officers of the Tribunal, to attend or observe all or part of 
the hearing, subject to appropriate logistical arrangements. The Tribunal 
shall for such cases establish procedures for the protection of proprietary 
or privileged information. 
 
The NAFTA has from the beginning set a higher standard with regards to 
transparency, thanks to the approach of its States Parties. Both United 
States and Canada issued a statement in 2003 in support of open hearings 
for all NAFTA Chapter Eleven arbitrations554, and were joined by 
Mexico in 2004555. This practice has been followed consistently and has 
taken place smoothly in institutional settings such as those provided by 
 
551 Possible Improvements of the Framework of ICSID Arbitration, 22 October 2004, at 
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=Ope
nPage&PageType=AnnouncementsFrame&FromPage=NewsReleases&pageName=Arc
hive_%20Announcement14.  
552 Rule 32(2) of the ICSID Arbitration Rules. Effectively the Parties still retain the 
power to block public participation to the hearings (but note the different procedure if 
the NAFTA or the CAFTA are the applicable treaties, below). 
553 ‘Watered-down changes to arbitration’ at http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/art-
547592.  
554 Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade News Release No. 152, 
NAFTA Commission Joint Statement,(7 October 2003), at  
http://w01.international.gc.ca/minpub/Publication.asp?publication_id=380398&Langua
ge=E. 
555 NAFTA Free Trade Commission Joint Statement, Decade of Achievement, 
(16 July 2004), at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/nafta-alena/JS-SanAntonio-en.asp. 
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the ICSID Secretariat. Equally, the United States and Canada Model 
BITs prescribe that hearings shall be open to the public and assign the 
tribunal the responsibility of any logistical arrangements556.  
 
The approach taken by the states parties to the NAFTA can be contrasted 
with the much more traditional approach taken in another multilateral 
instrument, the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) where those disputes 
arising under this instrument are not settled by ICSID557, in which case 
openness of hearings is in any case precluded. We will see in the next 
section how publicity is effectively precluded in this instrument as well. 
 
 
6.5 Publicity  
 
By publicity is intended the dissemination of information about the 
existence of a dispute (through registration) and its outcome (through 
publication of the awards and other dispute-related materials). While at 
the lowest level of openness (involving neither participation nor 
standing), it can be the most difficult to guarantee both as a matter of 
tribunal procedure, because it is difficult for tribunals to ‘police’ the 
conduct of the parties and unilateral disclosure is always a possibility558, 
and as a jurisdictional matter, because disclosure might be required by 
the lex situs559.    
 
556 Article 29(2) of the 2004 US Model BIT; Article 38 of the 2004 Canada Model BIT. 
See also Article 10.21(2) of the CAFTA. 
557 For example for disputes submitted to the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCC) 
under its Arbitration Rules; for the privacy of proceedings, see Article 27(3). See also 
next section.  
558 The problems raised in the Biwater Gauff dispute are emblematic, see especially 
Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Limited v. United Republic of Tanzania (ICSID Case No. 
ARB/05/22), Procedural Order No. 3, 29 September 2006. See also the language of the 
confidentiality rules of the ICC.  
559 Express rules on confidentiality are rare in arbitration statutes, but can be implied by 
reference to common law (see for example the UK Arbitration Act of 1996, Chapter 23 
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The same pattern that we have observed for third parties participation and 
privacy repeats itself for confidentiality. The rules of the ICC and the 
LCIA, and the UNCITRAL rules, guarantee the highest level of 
confidentiality, with no requirement of registration of the disputes560 and 
of publication of awards and documents561. The three sets of rules are not 
identical, with the tightest rules provided for by the ICC, while both the 
LCIA and the UNCITRAL rules make reference to disclosure in 
compliance with a legal duty or in pursuance of a legal right or for 
enforcement or appeal. Furthermore, the UNCITRAL rule is worded as a 
permissive rule (‘An award might be made public by consent of the 
parties…’) rather than as a prohibition562 (‘…copies shall be made 
available … to the parties, but no one else.’). 
 
The ICSID Convention originally did not allow the publication of the 
awards unless by consent of the parties563; however the rule was partially 
amended in 1984 to allow the publication of ‘excerpts of the legal 
 
or the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-16; in English law Emmott v. Michael 
Wilson Partnership [2008] EWCA Civ 184; WLR (D) 82 confirmed the principle that 
confidentiality is implied in an arbitration agreement). The recent Arbitration (Scotland) 
Act 2010 contains an express duty of confidentiality (Rule 26), unless by agreement by 
the parties, but also allows for a series of exceptions, including if the disclosure is ‘in 
the public interest’ or ‘necessary in the interests of justice’. One would imagine the first 
exception could be applicable in a mixed arbitration involving a state but of course this 
has not been tested yet.  Equally, freedom of information legislation might mandate 
disclosure of documents related to investment proceedings if held by the state. 
560 Article 4 of the ICC Rules of Arbitration and Article 6 of Appendix 1 and Article 1 
of Appendix II (with general rules on confidentiality); Article 30 of the LCIA 
Arbitration Rules (which covers all aspect of confidentiality); Article 17 of the 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.  
561 Article 28(2) of the ICC Rules of Arbitration; Article 30 of the LCIA Arbitration 
Rules; Article 34(5) of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. See also general 
confidentiality rules listed in footnote above. 
562 Article 28(2) of the ICC Rules. 
563 Rule 48(5) of the pre-1984 Rules.  
 
 
 
235
                                                
reasoning of the Tribunal’564; furthermore, all cases are registered and 
the list is publicly available on the ICSID website. In the most recent 
development, the ICSID Secretariat has announced that it will actively 
pursue a policy of getting all awards published and to this effect it will 
contact all parties to previously unpublished awards to request 
permission for publication565. The Secretariat also provides statistics 
about the caseload of the Centre566.  
 
The American instruments, including the NAFTA, the CAFTA and the 
US and Canadian Model BITs, allow the greatest degree of publicity, 
including mandatory registration of the disputes and publication of the 
awards and related materials, including party submissions and  transcripts 
of the hearings567. In contrast, disputes initiated under the ECT do not 
have to be communicated to the ECT Secretariat; even when they are, 
awards might not be publicly available568 and other materials never 
are569.  
 
 
 
564 Rule 48(4).  
565 See ICSID News Release of 5 May 2010, ‘Publication of ICSID’s Decisions and 
Awards with Parties’ consent’, at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet.  
566 See ICSID News Release of 3 February 2010, ‘The ICSID Caseload-Statistics now 
available on the ICSID website’, at 
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/ICSID/ViewNewsReleases.jsp.  
567 For the NAFTA: see Statement on Notices of Intent to Submit a Claim to 
Arbitration, 7 October 2003, at http://www.naftaclaims.com/disputes_us_methanex.htm 
and Article 1137(4); for the CAFTA, Article 10.21 (Transparency of Arbitral 
Proceedings); see also Article 29 of the US 2004 Model BIT and Article 38(3) and 
38(4) of the Canada 2004 Model BIT.  
568 However, of the 7 rendered awards listed on the website, all 7 were available, at 
http://www.encharter.org/index.php?id=213.  
569 A forum of choice for disputes arising from the ECT is the Stockholm Chamber of 
Commerce under the Arbitration Rules of its Arbitration Institute, as amended in 
January 2010; on the confidentiality of the award, see Article 46.  
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6.6 Concluding remarks 
 
In Chapter 2 we argued that procedural closure is the default position of 
investment arbitration; however, the citadel walls have been breached, 
and complete confidentiality and privacy are now increasingly unlikely. 
The reasons for advocating openness and transparency (governance, legal 
obligations, domestic systems analogy etc.) are manifold; here we are 
more interested in the consequences of this openness, rather than its 
justifications.  
 
It has been argued elsewhere that in its present shape, international 
investment law would have considerable difficulties in accommodating 
far-reaching public interest representation, borrowing what is available in 
some domestic legal systems with regards to ‘public interest standing’: 
investment tribunals would simply have no jurisdiction to entertain suits 
brought by NGOs or associations seeking to vindicate societal concerns 
in proceedings against states or investors. This is an argument for the 
limited validity of the domestic analogy rationale for advocating greater 
participation, because third parties have not only no option, but also no 
need to sue their own states in an investment tribunal, having access to 
better forms of public interest representation within their domestic legal 
system (through judicial review and administrative proceedings). 
Equally, actions against investors by private citizens within the 
framework of investment arbitration are precluded. In the end there is no 
possibility other than some forms of non-standing representation coupled 
with transparency, as means to open up investment arbitrations to outside 
interests, including environmental demands.  However, it is important to 
note that even provisions along the lines of Article 37 of the ICSID 
Rules, recognising the right of tribunals to receive amicus briefs, are a far 
cry from domestic law approaches accepting that representatives of 
public interests may acquire party status.  
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With respect to available information about proceedings, international 
investment law has traditionally been premised on confidentiality. This 
has important consequences on the various aspects of transparency and is 
particularly evident with respect to access to court, with the preservation 
of the power of veto to the opening up of proceedings. If the goal of 
investment law, as of any branch of law, is the balancing of competing 
interests, and if participation is the procedural tool necessary to allow this 
balancing, the power of veto is the power to impede any balancing of 
interests. In other words, if the argument rests on the possibility to allow 
entry points in investment law, the reality has to be acknowledged that 
two potentially powerful weapons for closing down these entry points are 
available to investors and investment tribunals: substantially, a wide 
application of umbrella clauses in order to ‘trigger’ stabilisation clauses, 
especially of the ‘freezing’ variety570; procedurally, the veto power of the 
parties to exclude third parties from the hearings and to limit knowledge 
of the awards and other materials.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
570 As we have seen in Chapter 2. 
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Part III: The application 
 
 
The final part is dedicated to the application of all the tools outlined in 
the second part in actual investment arbitrations. In Chapter 7, each of 
the express means of incorporation of non-investment obligations is 
tested in the context of disputes that arose where environmental 
obligations were either raised as defences by the state, or independently 
considered by the tribunal, or brought into the dispute by amici curiae 
submissions.  
 
The taxonomy presented in Chapter 4 constitutes a comprehensive 
review of all the possible ways in which express incorporation of non 
investment obligations can be accomplished. However, the potential has 
to be realised by the actors according to their powers and competencies. 
In the first instance, it is up to states when drafting investment treaties. 
Conflict avoidance by way of careful drafting is arguably the most 
efficient way to deal with potential problems of normative dissonance. It 
also restricts the power of tribunals to exercise discretion in their 
decision-making. Vague or insufficient provisions in investment treaties, 
on the other hand, will inevitably confer to tribunals more discretional 
power when adjudicating disputes with an environmental element.  
 
In Chapter 7 the focus is on the ‘judicial moment’ rather than the 
legislative one, i.e. on the way tribunals have interpreted the express 
provisions listed in Chapter 4, made use of the general conflict rules 
which form the topic of Chapter 5, and finally adopted, in their 
procedure, the open approach to arbitration outlined in Chapter 6. It can 
be anticipated in this introduction that what emerges is a mixed picture. 
The tools are there (as we have seen in Chapter 4), and the demands that 
they be used are pressing, especially in certain institutional settings and 
under certain instruments (the most obvious example being the NAFTA). 
On the other hand, the response of the tribunals has been somewhat 
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muted. It is also difficult to neatly distinguish awards on the basis of the 
taxonomy provided. It is still to be seen if this is a problem of the 
taxonomy itself or of the jurisprudence produced by the tribunals, not 
attentive enough to the language of the treaties and the intentions of the 
drafters. Finally, political considerations seem to come to the forefront 
with greater evidence. More detailed conclusions will be drawn after the 
analysis of the individual cases and in the concluding remarks of the 
chapter, and then of course, in the following, final chapter.  
 
The second chapter in this Part 3 is also the concluding chapter of this 
work. In it, the main conclusions reached through the analysis of the 
material are presented. The impetus for this thesis was, as is often the 
case, the recognition of a problem. We have referred to this problem 
several times in different ways, as a problem of isolationism, normative 
dissonance, normative or constitutional conflict, procedural closure. It is 
indeed rather a cluster of interconnected issues rather than a single, 
discrete problem, which undoubtedly accounts for the difficulties in 
identification and resolution. None of the proposed solutions can be said 
to be in themselves immune from criticism and negative 
repercussions571. In the thesis we have often remarked on the downsides 
of drawing too close a comparison between investment arbitration and 
judicial review of governmental conduct on the one hand, and on 
attributing to investment tribunals the power to conduct a proportionality 
analysis in order to assign priority to conflicting fundamental rights or 
between rights of individuals and the public interest on the other. 
However, these are two of the proposed ‘system-internal solutions’ to the 
normative conflicts arising from the collision of environmental and 
investment legal commitments of host states. To the extent that this 
project is intended to be essentially one of discovery, we are more 
 
571 We have concentrated in this work in legal, system-internal solutions, but many 
more have been proposed (a more developed appeal system, a permanent court, more 
express duties for investor in investment instruments, etc.). 
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in untested.  
interested in having reached a clear picture of the state of investment law 
with regards to its relationship with environmental law obligations than 
in proposing ‘solutions’ that inevitably rema
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Chapter 7: Conflicts in investment arbitration – investment 
and environment 
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
One of the defining characteristics of international investment arbitration 
is the fact that is modelled on commercial arbitration. The advantages 
that this model of dispute resolution presents for the parties are well 
known: confidentiality of the proceedings, speed in the resolution of the 
disputes, and the efficiency and ease of the process, coupled with the 
perception of it being ‘investor-friendly’. These are not the only reasons 
why investment arbitration has become a popular avenue for investors to 
address their grievances. There are historical, political and economic 
reasons behind the increased role of private investors in development 
programmes, the changes in international investment law in order to 
confer locus standi to investor in dispute against host states, and the 
‘depoliticisation’ of the investor-state relationship by way of avoidance 
of a direct  inter-state disputes. These developments have created almost 
ex-nihilo a field of law with its own substantive content, procedural rules, 
system of remedies, and a mobile and well-connected community of 
practitioners. However, all throughout this work, we have considered 
how this insular world can be opened to its outside, to its environment, 
and, more specifically, to issues arising from its interaction and effect on 
environmental legal obligations of the host states. Finally, in this chapter, 
we examine more closely how tribunals react to these stimuli, as they are 
brought into the dispute by the parties (normally by the states as defences 
for non-compliance of their investment treaty obligations, as part of the 
instruments that the tribunals are bound to apply, or by third parties 
through the device of amicus curiae submissions).                                                                  
 
In the next section we will consider how these conflicts have been 
tackled by tribunals when the applicable instrument contained express 
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provisions, as detailed in Chapter 4. Then we will consider how tribunals 
have made use of conflict clauses derived from general international law, 
and finally how they have availed themselves of procedural means of 
incorporation in disputes containing an environmental element. Each 
section is accompanied by an illustrative example.  
 
NAFTA jurisprudence is the natural starting point for an analysis of how 
arbitration tribunals have learned to deal with normative conflicts with an 
environmental element. One of the reasons for this is in the highly 
developed status of environmental law in two of the three state parties of 
the NAFTA, United States and Canada. The high level of sophistication 
of environmental law and jurisprudence in both countries, the penetration 
of this field of law in many areas of public intervention, and the 
considerable level of public interest all contribute to give raise to claims 
by investors alleging that environmental regulations by the host state 
violated their protected treaty rights. As NAFTA contains express means 
to deal with this kind of conflicts, as we have seen in Chapter 4, it is our 
task to assess what use state have made of them in order to construct their 
defences, and how tribunals have received their arguments. As a 
consequence, most of the cases considered in the following sections will 
be ones in which the tribunals were asked to apply Chapter Eleven of the 
NAFTA.  
 
 
7.2 Exception clauses 
 
Investment treaties do not normally contain express exceptions to the 
obligations contained therein. When they do, they are GATT-style 
exception provisions, which are problematic in their wording, having 
being imported from the different framework of the WTO572. While there 
 
572 As we have seen in Chapter 4, Article XX of the GATT applies to the trade in goods 
(allowing an ‘environmental’ exception, see Article XX(g) at 
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are no cases where this kind of exception clause was brought up in the 
proceedings, virtually all NAFTA tribunals have considered the 
jurisprudence arising from the WTO in their awards573, including where 
at issue was the application of the General Exception Article of the 
GATT (Article XX) albeit for taxation rather than environmental 
measures574. There are no investment arbitrations yet in which the 
tribunal applied the kind of exception clauses that we have listed in 
Chapter 4. Exclusions contained in Annexes have not been used 
extensively for environmental exceptions, neither have they been 
employed by states. The Tecmed Tribunal however, in considering a 
claim of regulatory expropriation by a Spanish investor in Mexico, 
conducted a thorough balancing exercise, as we shall see, which 
effectively allowed for the introduction of a police powers exception in a 
treaty that did not contain such a clause575, even if ultimately finding 
against the state and granting compensation. 
 
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/gatt47_01_e.htm); a similar provision is not 
contained in the GATS, which regulates the trade in services (of which investment can 
be an example, see Article I(2)(b) (Scope and Definition) and Article XIV (General 
Exceptions) of the GATS, at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/26-
gats_01_e.htm).  The NAFTA and the 2004 US Model BIT contain the specific 
environmental exception that is absent from the GATS. 
573 See Kurtz, in Schill, 2010: 244. (With reference to the national treatment clause, but 
the statement can easily be extended to all the early jurisprudence arising under the 
NAFTA).  
574 See Archer Daniels Midland Company and Tate & Lyle Ingredients America Inc. v. 
United Mexican States, ICSID/NAFTA (ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/04/05), Final 
Award, 21 November 2007, §§ 89 ff. These ‘sugar’ cases involving Mexico and the 
United States developed as state-state disputes under Chapter XX of the NAFTA; 
investor-states disputes under Chapter XI of the NAFTA; and finally as inter-state 
disputes under the DSU of the WTO.  
575 See Kingsbury, B. and Schill, S., ‘Public law concepts to balance investors’rights 
with state regulatory actions in the public interest – the concept of proportionality’, in 
Schill, S. (ed.), International Investment Law and Comparative Public Law, Oxford, 
OUP, 2010: 75, at 92. The police powers exception (which is recognised in CIL) had 
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7.2.1 The Tecmed Case   
 
Técnicas Medioambientales, TECMED S.A., is a company organised 
under Spanish law and the parent company of TECMED, TECNICAS 
MEDIOAMBIENTALES DE MEXICO, S.A. DE C.V. (Tecmed), 
incorporated under Mexican law, which held over 99% of the shares of 
CYTRAR, S.A. DE C.V. (Cytrar), the locally incorporated company 
through which the investment was made.  
 
The dispute arose out of the purchase by Tecmed in 1996 of a hazardous 
waste landfill in the municipality of Hermosillo in the state of Sonora. In 
1998 Tecmed applied for the renewal of the licence to operate the 
landfill, but this was rejected by the National Ecology Institute of Mexico 
(INE) (previously, when it had been owned by an agency of the 
municipality, the landfill had been granted a licence for an indefinite 
time). 
 
Tecmed claimed that there had been a violation of Mexican law, the 
Spain-Mexico BIT and international law. Specifically, it argued that 
representations made at the federal level were frustrated by the conduct 
of the municipal and state authorities, which, for political reasons, had 
incited the local population to oppose the operation of the landfill. It 
further argued that the federal authorities finally gave in and rejected the 
application for the licence in order to appease the local officials. Tecmed 
had committed certain violations in relation with the operation of the 
landfill and especially with transportation there of hazardous waste from 
another location, and it had been under investigation, but it argued the 
violations were minor (fines had been imposed) and did not warrant the 
refusal to renew the licence. Additionally there was widespread and 
                                                                                                                                                    
been argued by Mexico in its Counter-memorial and closing statements, see Award, § 
97 and footnote 76. 
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sustained local opposition to the operation of the landfill, because of its 
location in the proximity of the municipality of Hermosillo576. 
 
Tecmed claimed Mexico had breached the BIT’s Articles on national 
treatment, fair and equitable treatment, MFN, and expropriation, and 
requested remedies in the form of restitution (issuing the relevant 
licence) and compensation.  
 
This case developed shortly after the Metalclad Case577, and also 
involved Mexico, but arose out of a bilateral investment treaty between 
Mexico and Spain. As the Tribunal accepted that, by acquiring the 
landfill, Metalclad had also acquired vested rights in its operation, the 
reasoning of the Tribunal was dependent on the traditional international 
law doctrine of vested rights578. However, in applying Article V(1) of the 
Spain-Mexico BIT579, as requested by Tecmed, the Tribunal had to 
assess if the measures taken by Mexico (specifically the refusal to grant 
the licence), constituted an expropriation. To do so, the Tribunal first 
considered if the effects of the measure were severe enough as to be 
                                                 
576 According to Mexican law, landfills have to be located at a distance of 25 km from 
any town with a population exceeding 10,000 (such as in the present case); however the 
landfill was only 8 km from the city. This was not imputable to Tecmed, as the 
authorisation for locating the landfill was granted before the purchase (see § 106 of the 
Award) and at the time of purchase, the relevant law had not taken effect. The Tribunal 
repeatedly referred to this location problems as ‘socio-political’ issues (see for example 
§ 129 of the Award); however, if the location was indeed unlawful in Mexican law, the 
community protests should have been considered by the INE as the expression of a 
legitimate concern that law be respected by the municipality as well as by the company, 
and therefore well within its remit for consideration in the assessment of the licence 
renewal request. While laws cannot be applied retroactively, arguably the new 
regulation on landfill location could have influenced the renewal of a licence. 
577 See Section 7.3.1. 
578 At § 91. 
579 Article V(1) of the Spain-Mexico BIT refers to ‘medidas equivalentes a 
expropiación o nacionalización’ [measures equivalent to expropriation or 
nationalisation]. 
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defined as expropriatory580, and then assessing, on the basis of the 
‘characteristics’ of the measures, whether compensation was due or if the 
police powers exception applied581. The novelty of the reasoning, in 
investment law context at least, is that, in order to ascertain the 
applicability of the police powers exception582, the Tribunal performed a 
proportionality test, and made explicit reference to the jurisprudence of 
the ECtHR583. The Tribunal stated584: 
 
After establishing that regulatory actions and measures will not be 
initially excluded from the definition of expropriatory acts ... the Arbitral 
Tribunal will consider, in order to determine if they are to be 
characterized as expropriatory, whether such actions or measures are 
proportional to the public interest presumably protected thereby and to 
the protection legally granted to investments, taking into account that the 
 
580 Applying the usual standard of substantial and permanent deprivation, see § 116 of 
the Award.  
581 At § 115 of the Award the Tribunal cited Article 5(1) of the BIT incorrectly, stating 
that the Article mentioned also ‘...any other measure with similar characteristics or 
effects [emphasis in the original]…’ For the original text of the Article see footnote 579 
above. 
582 Again, not in compliance with the treaty, but with the customary law standard (as we 
have noted above, the reference to Article 5(1) is incorrect, as this Article does not 
make any reference to the criteria applicable to an indirect expropriation – specifically, 
the assessment of the ‘characteristics and effects’ of the measures, which the Tribunal 
nonetheless repeated at § 118 of the Award). The Tribunal also cited the Santa Elena 
Case incorrectly, in support of its statement that ‘regulatory administrative actions are 
per se excluded from the scope of the Agreement [the BIT], even if they are beneficial 
to society as a whole —such as environmental protection—, particularly if the negative 
economic impact of such actions on the financial position of the investor is sufficient to 
neutralize in full the value, or economic or commercial use of its investment without 
receiving any compensation whatsoever’ (at § 121). That award concerned a direct 
expropriation, where the dispute centred on the quantum of compensation, and it should 
not be used in support of awarding compensation for environmental measures alleged to 
have an expropriatory effect. 
583 Specifically to the Case of James and Others, Judgment of February 21, 1986, 50, 
pp.19-20, and 63, p. 24. For an analysis of this case, and its influence in investment 
jurisprudence, see Section 3.3.1.  
584 At § 122. 
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significance of such impact has a key role upon deciding the 
proportionality. [The] Arbitral Tribunal [will examine] the actions of the 
State in light of Article 5(1) of the Agreement to determine whether such 
measures are reasonable with respect to their goals, the deprivation of 
economic rights and the legitimate expectations of who suffered such 
deprivation. There must be a reasonable relationship of proportionality 
between the charge or weight imposed to the foreign investor and the aim 
sought to be realized by any expropriatory measure. [Italics added]
 
To 
value such charge or weight, it is very important to measure the size of 
the ownership deprivation caused by the actions of the state and whether 
such deprivation was compensated or not.
 
On the basis of a number of 
legal and practical factors, it should be also considered that the foreign 
investor has a reduced or nil participation in the taking of the decisions 
that affect it, partly because the investors are not entitle to exercise 
political rights reserved to the nationals of the State, such as voting for 
the authorities that will issue the decisions that affect such investors. 
[Citations omitted] 
 
It is important to note, before considering the significance of the 
approach adopted by the Tribunal, what was excluded from the 
assessment of the proportionality of the measures. The Tribunal 
repeatedly remarked that the INE was (improperly) ‘driven by socio-
political factors’585, when deciding on the renewal of the licence. It is 
true that, as a public agency, its powers were limited to the application of 
the relevant legal requirements586; a more general point can be made 
however, by contrasting the position taken by the Tecmed Tribunal on the 
issue of the political background of the dispute, with the comments made 
by the AES Tribunal, where the Claimant had similarly argued that 
measures introduced by the Hungarian government to reduce the profits 
made by the company in the energy sector were politically motivated587: 
 
 Having concluded that Hungary was principally motivated by the 
politics surrounding so-called luxury profits, the Tribunal nevertheless is 
of the view that it is a perfectly valid and rational policy objective for a 
 
585 At § 130 of the Award, for example. 
586 But we have already remarked that there were legal issues with the location of the 
landfill that might have warranted the refusal of the licence on legal grounds. The 
Tribunal however strictly applied the non-retroactivity principle, at § 141.  
587 AES Summit Generation Limited and AES-Tisza Erömü Kft. v. Republic of Hungary 
(ICSID Case No. ARB/07/22), Award, 23 September 2010, § 10.3.34. 
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government to address luxury profits. And while such price regimes may 
not be seen as desirable in certain quarters, this does not mean that such a 
policy is irrational. One need only recall recent wide-spread concerns 
about the profitability level of banks to understand that so-called 
excessive profits may well give rise to legitimate reasons for 
governments to regulate or re-regulate. [Italics added] 
 
While the AES Tribunal was willing to consider the political background 
of the measures as a legitimate reason for action, the Tecmed Tribunal 
only would have accepted to do so if, for example, the civil unrest 
consequent to the location of the landfill would have risen to the level of 
an emergency588. Taking into account that, in expressly relying on the 
ECtHR James Case, the Tribunal placed great emphasis on the 
‘vulnerability’ of foreign investors to domestic legislation, because they 
are ‘not entitled to exercise political rights reserved to nationals’589, it is 
interesting how in this case the political background of the dispute 
assumed great relevance both as an excuse for granting rights (to 
investors) and a reason to establish duties (of the state’s agencies), 
effectively raising the bar for testing the legitimacy of the governmental 
measures590.  
 
The Tribunal moved beyond the ‘least restrictive approach’ to an analysis 
that more explicitly engaged in proportionality stricto sensu591, that is, a 
balancing between the measure and the interest being protected (in our 
case, the expropriatory effect of the measure and its environmental 
protection goal). It is only in this case that an effective balancing takes 
place, in which, in other words, tribunals do not stop at assessing the 
legitimacy and necessity of the measures, but engage in a true 
constitutional exercise of balancing competing principles. The difference 
between least restrictive approach and proportionality stricto sensu is in 
 
588 See its reference to the ELSI Case, which had been presented by the Respondent, as 
the standard, not met in the present case, justifying uncompensated expropriation. 
589 At § 122. 
590 The first step in performing a proportionality analysis; see Schill, 2010: 86. 
591 Alexy, R., ‘On the structure of legal principles’, 13 Ratio Juris (2000): 294 at 298. 
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the ‘reflexive’ nature of the second approach, where tribunals are tasked 
with assessing competing principles against each other balancing effect 
and purpose, so that the higher the detrimental effect, the more 
fundamental the principle to be defended. In contrast, the ‘least 
restrictive approach’ betrays a more insular nature, where, once 
recognised that there is a legitimate interest to be protected, there is an 
obligation for the state to adopt the measure least restrictive of the right 
being affected. While on the face of it, this approach is more deferential, 
the balancing is performed within the range of the available measures 
(hence the insularity)592.  
 
The proportionality approach adopted by the Tecmed Tribunal is vitiated, 
in our opinion, by the initial high threshold imposed upon the state with 
regards to the legitimacy of the measures in light of the political 
background of the dispute. However, the Tribunal at least showed a 
willingness to engage with public and constitutional law concepts such as 
proportionality. The fact that it did so well beyond the limits imposed by 
the language of the treaty might be a reason for concern.    
 
 
7.3 Balancing clauses 
 
Clauses that allow non-investment obligations to be taken into account in 
order to assess if and to what extent the host state has breached its 
investment obligations are present in many treaties, especially post-
NAFTA ones, as we have seen in Chapter 4. Much of the literature 
dedicated to the issue of environmental measures and investment 
protection compliance develops the ‘balancing’ argument in one form or 
another. There is however, precious little case law by investment 
 
592 The suitability of the measures to the interest being defended is particularly 
problematic for environmental measures, where causality is not necessarily as clearly 
established as law requires. 
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tribunals in which balancing clauses have been explicitly referred to, 
both by states and by tribunals. This trend is not necessarily negative, as 
tribunals normally make reference to their obligation to balance different 
commitments that states have even when not expressly relying on a 
specific treaty clause, and equally states normally will appeal to their 
domestic regulatory role or international commitments in order to justify 
the alleged non-performance of an investment treaty obligation. 
Conversely, a tribunal might make specific reference to a clause such as 
Article 1114 of the NAFTA and yet fail to take into due account the 
environmental obligations of the state or perform a proper balancing 
exercise; even if it might not necessarily be unjustified in doing so, the 
following case can be seen as a failure of the tribunal to consider the 
facts in a balanced way, even if the award’s main conclusions might not 
be faulted.  
 
 
7.3.1 The Metalclad Case 
 
Metalclad is a US corporation which brought the first NAFTA arbitration 
against Mexico. Metalclad had intended to open a hazardous waste 
disposal facility in the municipality of Guadalcazar, in the State of San 
Luis Potosi, by acquiring a locally incorporated company, COTERIN, 
through its own locally incorporated subsidiary, ECONSA593. In 1993, 
when Metalclad exercised its option to buy COTERIN, this company was 
in possession of the federal and (conditional) state permits for the 
facility. The municipal permit upon which the state permit was 
conditional was missing, but the company had been reassured that it was 
not necessary to obtain one, as it was up to the federal authorities to grant 
permits for hazardous waste disposal. There followed a long period for 
                                                 
593 Metalclad claimed that it had been invited to run the facility; see Wagner, J. M., 
‘International investment, expropriation and environmental protection’, 29 Golden Gate 
University Law Review (1999): 465 at 488 footnote 91.   
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which conflicting accounts were given by the parties as to the conduct of 
the local authorities and to the necessity of this permit to be granted. 
Metalclad in its claim asserted that the federal authorities had advised it 
to obtain the municipal permit in order to ‘facilitate an amicable 
relationship’ with the municipality. In the end the city of Guadalcazar 
refused to grant the permit (and this formed the main issue of the dispute 
and informed the reasoning of the Tribunal to a great extent). The state 
governor at the end of his term in office, in September 1997, issued an 
Ecological Decree, which established a Natural Area for the protection of 
a local rare species of cactus, encompassing the site of the proposed 
landfill. At the time, Metalclad had already filed its Notice of Arbitration 
(January 1997); in its Notice, Metalclad claimed a violation of Article 
1102 (National Treatment), 1103 (Most-Favoured-Nation), 1104 
(Standard of Treatment) 1105 (International Minimum Standard), 1106 
(Performance Requirements) and 1110 (Expropriation). 
  
This case acquired a certain notoriety, as the first arbitration to be 
initiated under the NAFTA, the only successful claim for expropriation, 
and one with an environmental element. For all these reasons, the case 
initiated the debate (then fuelled by the trio of Canadian cases, Ethyl, 
Pope & Talbot and S.D. Myers) on the effect of Chapter Eleven on the 
regulatory powers of the NAFTA Parties, and more specifically for what 
concerns their power to implement environmental measures. We have 
chosen this case to be presented in the section dedicated to balancing 
clauses because of the reference the Tribunal made to Article 1114 
(Environmental Measures) of the NAFTA. In its Counter-memorial, 
Mexico’s counsel had argued that Article 1105, namely the ‘fair and 
equitable’ clause, had to be interpreted in the context of other provisions 
of the NAFTA, namely Article 1114, the Preamble, and especially the 
NAAEC594. In doing so, it sought to justify its actions with reference not 
                                                 
594 Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, Mexico’s Counter-memorial, 17 February 
1998, § 838.  
 
 
 
252
                                                
to conflicting international obligations595, but as a matter of treaty 
interpretation, precisely arguing that it is NAFTA itself to allow for 
environmental considerations to be taken into account in interpreting the 
state’s obligations towards foreign investors. 
 
The Tribunal, which placed great reliance, in its reasoning against 
Mexico, on the lack of transparency of the permit approval process, had 
this to say on the way Article 1114 should guide the interpretation of the 
substantive protections accorded by the NAFTA596: 
 
 The actions of the Municipality following its denial of the 
municipal construction permit, coupled with the procedural and 
substantive deficiencies of the denial, support the Tribunal’s finding, for 
the reasons stated above, that the Municipality’s insistence upon and 
denial of the construction permit in this instance was improper. This 
conclusion is not affected by NAFTA Article 1114, which permits a 
Party to ensure that investment activity is undertaken in a manner 
sensitive to environmental concerns. The conclusion of the Convenio597 
and the issuance of the federal permits show clearly that Mexico was 
satisfied that this project was consistent with, and sensitive to, its 
environmental concerns. 
 
The Tribunal did not so much say that Article 1114 was not applicable, 
but that the actions of the federal government proved that it was possible 
to take environmental concerns into consideration and allow the investor 
to proceed with its project. The fact is that this dispute, and the resulting 
award, stood uneasily in the middle of a conflictual relationship between 
 
595 It was the Claimant to appeal to Mexico’s international environmental obligations in 
order to construct its argument in support of its presence in Mexico, see Investor’s 
Reply, 21 August 1998, Section 3 (Respondent is a party to the Basel Convention), § 
21, and Section 4 (Respondent’s putative system and its Basel Convention obligations), 
§ 407 (more specifically on the possibility of municipalities to veto hazardous waste 
remediation in their territory and how this would conflict with Mexico’s obligations 
under the Convention). 
596 Award, §§ 97-98. (Paragraph numbers omitted). 
597 An agreement that had been reached by Metalclad and Mexican federal 
environmental agency, which was challenged in court by the municipality with an 
action of amparo; the action was eventually dismissed by the Mexican court. 
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the Mexican municipal authorities, exposed to the usual nimbyism 
associated with controversial hazardous waste disposal projects598 and 
the pressure of local and international environmental organisations599, 
and the federal authorities, eager to attract foreign investment and under 
the pressure exerted by the US officials supporting the project600.  
 
It is equally clear that the Tribunal accepted almost wholesale the 
reconstruction of the events and the legal analysis provided by Metalclad, 
including on Mexican constitutional law and how it applied to the actions 
of the municipality. This is not the place to dissect the legal reasoning of 
the Tribunal in detail601; rather, to consider how little the environmental 
background, which supposedly informed the actions of the investor602 
and of the municipality, was left by the wayside. Two statements of the 
Tribunal reveal how little it took the environmental obligations of 
Mexico into account, regardless of the way in which it reaffirmed the 
applicability of Article 1114. At §§ 70-75, the Tribunal listed the 
objectives of NAFTA as ‘transparency and the increase of investment 
opportunities’, ‘a predictable commercial framework’, and the prompt 
publications of law and regulations603, but failed to make any reference 
to the objective stated in the Preamble, ‘[to] strengthen the development 
 
598 Something a US company should have been very familiar with. 
599 The local Greenpeace started criminal proceedings against the Mexican government 
as a consequence of its approval of the Metalclad landfill operation. 
600 The US ambassador to Mexico threatened to put San Luis Potosi in a ‘black list’ for 
US investors, and several US congress representatives were involved at different stages 
of the dispute by Metalclad. 
601 But to take one small fact: Metalclad stated that, and it was reported in the contract, 
that when it acquired COTERIN it assumed also its liabilities. These must have 
included the environmental damage of which the company had been responsible in the 
past; however, at no time did Metalclad seem to undertake remediation action in order 
to mitigate the damage, even if this had been requested at different stages and by 
different parties; Metalclad went as far as to state that it had no obligation to do so. 
602 As its reference to the obligations of the Basel Convention proves. 
603 The objectives are taken from Article 102(1)(c), the Preamble and Article 1802(1).  
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and enforcement of environmental laws and regulations’. Equally, in the 
section of the award dedicated to the claim of indirect expropriation, the 
Tribunal stated: 
 
 The Tribunal need not decide or consider the motivation or intent 
of the adoption of the Ecological Decree. Indeed, a finding of 
expropriation on the basis of the Ecological Decree is not essential to the 
Tribunal’s finding of a violation of NAFTA Article 1110. However, the 
Tribunal considers that the implementation of the Ecological Decree 
would, in and of itself, constitute an act tantamount to expropriation.  
 
A similarly worded statement was given by the Santa Elena Tribunal in a 
case involving the direct expropriation of a parcel of real estate in Costa 
Rica604. This has often been misquoted in reference to indirect 
expropriation, to the effect that the environmental intent of the state does 
not matter605. As in that case the property was expropriated by decree, it 
was not a case of expropriatory environmental measures, as much as an 
expropriation motivated by environmental policy, and therefore the Santa 
Elena Tribunal correctly noted that an expropriation carries with it the 
 
604 Compañia del Desarrollo de Santa Elena S.A. v. Republic of Costa Rica (ICSID 
Case No. ARB/96/1), Award, 17 February 2000. The similarity is not coincidental, as 
Professor Elihu Lauterpacht was a member of both panels, as a President in the 
Metlaclad Tribunal; the Santa Elena Award was rendered on 17 February 2000, the 
Metalclad one on 2 September 2000. 
605 The Santa Elena Tribunal said this with respect to the expropriation (at §§ 71-2): 
‘While an expropriation or taking for environmental reasons may be classified as a 
taking for a public purpose, and thus may be legitimate, the fact that the Property was 
taken for this reason does not affect either the nature or the measure of the 
compensation to be paid for the taking. That is, the purpose of protecting the 
environment for which the Property was taken does not alter the legal character of the 
taking for which adequate compensation must be paid. The international source of the 
obligation to protect the environment makes no difference. Expropriatory environmental 
measures—no matter how laudable and beneficial to society as a whole—are, in this 
respect, similar to any other expropriatory measures that a state may take in order to 
implement its policies: where property is expropriated, even for environmental 
purposes, whether domestic or international, the state’s obligation to pay compensation 
remains.’ [paragraph numbers omitted] 
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obligation to pay compensation, regardless of the policy that motivated 
the state to take the property. In the Metalclad case, the Tribunal was 
instead confronted with measures that did not directly take the property; 
to equate them to a direct expropriation constitutes the most direct, and to 
date the only, application of the sole effect doctrine606.  This is what the 
Tribunal said607: 
 
 [...] expropriation under NAFTA includes not only open, deliberate 
and acknowledged takings of property, such as outright seizure or formal 
or obligatory transfer of title in favour of the host State, but also covert or 
incidental interference with the use of property which has the effect of 
depriving the owner, in whole or in significant part, of the use or 
reasonably-to-be-expected economic benefit of property even if not 
necessarily to the obvious benefit of the host State. 
 
It is the reference to incidental interference that created most anxiety, 
shared by Judge Tysoe in his judicial review of the award608; the 
impression was that this interpretation could cast a very wide net over 
bona fide regulation. While the language adopted by the Tribunal might 
be particularly infelicitous, it is submitted that this statement does no 
more than confirm the ‘sole effect’ doctrine with regards to 
expropriation, coupled with the understanding that it is substantial 
deprivation (‘in whole or significant part’) to be the controlling standard 
in defining what constitutes compensable expropriation.  
 
The award was appealed by Mexico in the Supreme Court of British 
Columbia. In his Judgment and Reasons for Decision,609 the Canadian 
Judge set aside the section of the award that granted compensation to 
 
606 This reiteration is to be considered an obiter dictum, as the Tribunal found the 
regulatory expropriation to have taken place before the Ecological Decree was issued. 
607 Award, § 103. 
608 For which see infra. For an analysis of the case and particularly for the review of the 
case by the British Columbia Court, see Prujiner, A., ‘L’expropriation, l’ALENA et 
l’affaire Metalclad, 5 International Law FORUM du droit international (2003): 205.  
609 The United Mexican States v. Metalclad Corporation, In the Supreme Court of 
British Columbia, 2 May 2001 (2001 BCSC 664). 
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Metalclad for the violation of Article 1105, as he considered that the 
Tribunal’s incorporation of the obligation of transparency into the 
standard was beyond its jurisdictional powers and that its analysis ‘of 
Article 1105 infected its analysis of Article 1110’610. In other words, its 
finding of a violation of Article 1105, in itself based on the purposed lack 
of transparency, incorrectly constituted the basis for the finding of 
conduct constituting indirect expropriation and a measure tantamount to 
expropriation (without clarification if these are equivalent or concurrent). 
 
The Metalclad award is significant for the history of the NAFTA. In 
retrospect, the anxieties that were raised by some sectors of the media 
and the environmental community might have been exaggerated. The 
dispute shed some light on the situation of the hazardous waste disposal 
 
610 At § 68: ‘On my reading of the Award, the Tribunal did not simply interpret Article 
1105 to include a minimum standard of transparency. No authority was cited or 
evidence introduced to establish that transparency has become part of customary 
international law. In the Myers award, one of the arbitrators wrote a separate opinion 
and surmised an argument that the principle of transparency and regulatory fairness was 
intended to have been incorporated into Article 1105. The arbitrator crafted the 
argument by assuming that the words “international law” in Article 1105 were not 
intended to have their routine meaning and should be interpreted in an expansive 
manner to include norms that have not yet technically passed into customary 
international law. However, the arbitrator did not decide the point because it had not 
been fully argued in the arbitration and he was not aware of the argument having been 
made in any earlier case law or academic literature. In my view, such an argument 
should fail because there is no proper basis to give the term “international law” in 
Article 1105 a meaning other than its usual and ordinary meaning.’ The Judge also 
rejected the interpretation of the standard given by the Pope & Talbot Tribunal, and 
accepted by the S.D. Myers Tribunal, again on the grounds that it added elements to the 
standard of treatment which are extraneous to the customary law standard, taken from 
treaty agreements, in contravention to the intention of the State parties.  
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regulatory system in Mexico, and as a consequence, new legislation was 
introduced to regulate the sector more effectively611.  
 
 
7.4 Carve-out and clarification clauses  
 
These clauses are a recent innovation in investment treaty law and in 
themselves, regardless of the use made by them by states in the context 
of an arbitration or tribunals in their awards, testify to a shift in the focus 
of investment law towards a more frank recognition of the context in 
which investors operate, and a move away from the ‘absolute protection’ 
approach of older treaties. However, their presence in investment treaties 
is not sufficient to guarantee a more balanced approach, if their 
effectiveness is not tested. It is often remarked that bilateral investment 
treaties function as ‘signalling devices’612, to signal that the ratifying 
country is investment-friendly. To that extent, even treaties signed 
between developing countries, which are highly unlikely to invest in each 
other’s territory, can fulfil this function. It is submitted that these clauses 
might be said to have a similar function within the treaty, to signal the 
state’s commitment to a certain level of environmental protection, not 
necessarily to be tested by arbitration tribunal (and not to be raised as a 
defence by the state). Furthermore, given the tendency of investors to 
‘usurp’ the role of their home state in claiming the observance of the 
treaty obligations on an international plane, and the substitutive role of 
the system of investment protection – which can be contrasted with the 
supplementary or subsidiary role of human rights protection – the 
tendency can develop, and arguably it has, for investors to dictate the 
 
611 See Gaines, S., ‘Environmental policy implications of investor-state arbitration 
under NAFTA Chapter 11’, at http://www.cec.org/Storage/58/5068_Final-Gaines-T-E-
Symposium05-Paper_en.pdf, at 14. 
612 As we have remarked elsewhere; the literature on the rationale for BITs signing is 
vast and has been summed up in the previous chapters. We are not aware of similar 
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development  of investment law’s substantive content (hence the self-
centred debates on the content of the fair and equitable treatment 
standard). The insertion of carve-out and clarification clauses in the 
treaties can then be interpreted as a way to shift the balance, not 
necessarily from investment to non-investment obligations, but certainly 
from investors to states.  
 
In the following case, the Tribunal gave a measured and balanced view of 
how contrasting obligations shape the way investment jurisprudence 
should develop and set up some helpful markers. 
 
 
7.4.1 Expropriation – The Chemtura Case 
 
The Chemtura Corporation (formerly Crompton Corporation) is a US 
corporation, producer of lindane, a pesticide used on canola (rapeseed) 
crops. Because of its toxicity level, lindane’s use has been restricted in 
many countries, including the United States, where lindane-based 
products cannot be used to treat canola crops. In 1998 the US 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) announced that import of 
lindane-treated canola was going to be allowed in the US only until 1 
June 1998613. In Canada, the use, import and export of lindane was 
                                                                                                                                                    
comments being made on the presence of ‘balancing’, ‘carve-out’ and exception clauses 
in investment treaties. 
613 This followed a communication about the export from Canada of lindane-treated 
canola seed, in contravention of the applicable legislation; the information was given to 
the EPA by a fully owned subsidiary of Chemtura, Gustafson, producer in the US of a 
lindane-replacement product, Gaucho. Chemtura requested that, in order to comply with 
the voluntary de-registration of lindane, the PMRA approve the use of Gaucho products. 
Chemtura’s strategy of getting a foothold in the market of lindane-replacement products 
ahead of its Canadian competitors can easily be evinced by these facts and finds 
confirmation in confidential correspondence disclosed by the Claimant and cited by the 
tribunal in its award, at § 177: ‘Gentlemen, please find attached a copy of a letter 
provided to PMRA regarding voluntary withdrawal of lindane. This letter is not to be 
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regulated through registration by the Pest Management Regulatory 
Agency (PMRA) in compliance with the Pest Control Products Act and 
Regulations.  
 
Following the EPA’s decision, the Canadian canola industry, worried 
about trade restrictions, requested a voluntary removal of canola from the 
list of lindane-treated products. Chemtura agreed, subject to conditions 
(including granting of registration to replacement products and a 
common removal policy for all producers of lindane). As a consequence 
of disagreements on the conditions, Chemtura withdrew its offer. In 
1999, the PMRA announced the beginning of a review of the use of 
lindane, which eventually resulted, in 2001, in the suspension or 
termination of all lindane registrations. Chemtura disputed the fairness of 
the review process and began a series of applications for judicial review 
of the Agency’s decision. A Board of Review was established, which 
submitted some recommendations to the PMRA, following which the 
Agency started a re-evaluation process; its conclusions were disputed by 
Chemtura. At the same time, the EPA in the United States was 
conducting a final review of lindane-treated products, which resulted in 
the cancellation in 2006 of the registration of all pesticides containing 
lindane. 
 
On 10 February 2005, Chemtura submitted a Notice of Arbitration under 
the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules in which it alleged that Canada had 
breached Article 1105 (Minimum Standard of Treatment), Article 1103 
(Most-Favoured-Nation) and Article 1110 (Expropriation) of the 
NAFTA. Chemtura requested remedies were restitution, by means of the 
reinstatement of registration of Lindane products, damages, and costs. 
                                                                                                                                                    
shared with the industry. We have requested several regulatory concessions [sic] and do 
not wish to share this with our competitors. The position we are talking [sic] publicly is 
“We have agreed to the voluntary withdrawal of lindane by January 31, 1999, at the 
request of the canola growers”. Upon input from growers and the industry we have 
requested expeditious registrations of our new Gaucho formulations’. 
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The Tribunal conducted a straightforward analysis of the facts in order to 
ascertain if there had been an Article 1110 violation614. When disposing 
of Chemtura’s claim of an Article 1105 breach, in which the corporation 
had argued that the PMRA initiated its review of lindane because the 
issue constituted a ‘trade irritant’, rather than for any environmental 
concern, the Tribunal had already rejected the claimant’s implied 
allegation of bad faith, also by reference of Canada’s international 
environmental obligations615. This also informed the analysis of the 
measures for the purpose of the Article 1110 claim. The Tribunal referred 
to the three-stepped approach generally adopted by NAFTA tribunals in 
Article 1110 claims, which required it to ascertain, in order, if there was 
an investment, if there had been an expropriation of this investment, and 
finally, if the criteria of Article 1110 had been met. On the first point, the 
Tribunal accepted an extensive reading of the definition of investment, to 
include elements such as goodwill, customer and market share (covered 
investments for the purpose of Article 1139 of the NAFTA616). Having 
 
614 Which is the focus in this section; the Tribunal also dealt with the Article 1105 claim 
in an interesting way: while confirming that the analysis of the facts has to be the 
guiding principle, it made reference to the ‘margin of appreciation’ that regulatory 
agencies inevitably will have in managing ‘specialized domains involving scientific and 
public policy determinations’ (at § 123); however, it also added that such margin cannot 
act as a legal doctrine ‘circumscribing’ the assessment of the facts. Additionally, it 
emphasised that, in order to ascertain if Canada had breached its due process obligations 
(which formed part of Chemtura’s Article 1105 claim), the Tribunal had to consider the 
review process (conducted by the PMRA) ‘as a whole’ (at § 145), adding that: ‘the 
mechanisms of review of regulated products ... are set out in a complex array of laws 
and regulations, the purpose of which is precisely that any decisions taken by the 
authorities in this context are subject to procedural checks and balances’.  
615 Specifically, the ratification by Canada of the 1998 Aarhus Protocol on Persistent 
Organic Pollutants to the Convention on Long Range Transboundary Air Pollution of 
1979. 
616 But, importantly, only as ‘accessories’ of an enterprise; the Tribunal did not clarify if 
it considered these elements to be investments per se (as it claimed that this argument 
had not been raised by Chemtura); consequently, it did not enter the ‘conceptual 
severance’ debate (but we have already noted in Section 3.3.1 that the Tribunal seemed 
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cleared the first requirement, the Tribunal moved on to consider if this 
investment had been expropriated. We have already noted in Chapter 3 
that, on the facts, the Tribunal did not consider that there had been a 
‘substantial deprivation’ of the investment, which is one of the most 
universally recognised criteria for an indirect expropriation. Having 
answered the second question negatively, the Tribunal did not need to 
consider if the criteria of Article 1110 had been met. However, the 
Tribunal went on to say the following617: 
 
 Irrespective of the existence of a contractual deprivation, the 
Tribunal considers in any event that the measures challenged by the 
Claimant constituted a valid exercise of the Respondent’s police powers. 
As discussed in detail in connection with Article 1105 of NAFTA, the 
PMRA took measures within its mandate, in a non-discriminatory 
manner, motivated by an increasing awareness of the dangers presented 
by lindane for human health and the environment. A measure adopted 
under such circumstances is a valid exercise of the State’s police powers 
and, as a result, does not constitute an expropriation.  
 
By adding this dictum, the Tribunal clarified that the claim could have 
been resolved (had the deprivation been substantial) by application of the 
police powers exception, which would have relieved Canada of its 
obligation to pay compensation. In this very measured and balanced 
award, the Tribunal seemed to want to ‘calm the waters’ and allay the 
fears and misconceptions that have been dominating the debate on the 
influence of the NAFTA on the power of states to regulate in the public 
interest and especially in environmentally sensitive areas of public 
 
to take position in the related denominator question). The same approach had been 
taken already by the Methanex Tribunal, which had similarly argued that these items do 
not represent ‘stand alone’ property rights capable of being expropriated, see Final 
Award, Part IV – Chapter D, § 17. Contra, see for example Sea-Land Services Inc. v. 
Iran, 6 Iran-USCTR, Rep. 149, 163 (1984): ‘The Court is unable to see in his original 
position – which was characterised by the possession of customers and the possibility of 
making a profit – anything in the nature of a genuine vested right’. 
617 At § 266. 
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intervention618. In effect, this dictum seems the straightforward 
application of Annex B of the 2004 US Model BIT, which was the 
outcome of those very same debates and anxieties generated by the first 
ten years of NAFTA jurisprudence. It is still to be seen if in this, as in the 
developments on the transparency of investment arbitration, NAFTA will 
set the tone for the coming years. On the other hand, for those who worry 
about the constitutionalisation of investment protections and the role of 
the state in the post-regulatory world, some sections of the award might 
raise further alarm. In response to the allegation by Chemtura that it had 
acted because lindane constituted a trade irritant and not because it had 
any real concern about the environment, the PMRA claimed (and the 
Tribunal readily accepted) that the Withdrawal Agreement (of lindane 
registration) was ‘industry-led’ and that the PMRA had only intervened 
as a ‘facilitator’619. We have briefly referred, in Chapter 2, to the role of 
the state in a post-regulatory environment, where political choice is 
replaced by economic rationale underpinned by a compliant legal system, 
and this frank admission by the PMRA, that it acted not because Canada 
was about 30 years late in taking regulatory measures to restrict the use 
of this highly toxic pesticide, but because the canola industry feared trade 
restrictions, is clear proof of this state of affairs.   
 
 
618 It ought to be stressed that some of these fears are unjustified on the facts; so far only 
one claim for expropriation under Chapter Eleven has been successful, Metalclad. 
Additionally the United States, where the critical voices have been particularly vocal, 
has yet to lose a NAFTA arbitration: the latest successfully defended claim is Grand 
River Enterprises, Six Nations Ltd. et al.,v.United States of America, NAFTA, notice of 
the 12 January 2011 award at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/01/154691.htm. . 
619 At § 167. Of course the Tribunal could not help but notice that Chemtura was part of 
the industry and consequently, the ‘ambiguity’ of its position with respect to the nature 
of the PMRA’s course of action. As for the economic rationale, suffice to remember 
that the Vice-President of the Canola Council of Canada is quoted as saying that lindane 
used in Canada is worth maybe $20 million, but the canola industry is worth $1.8 
billion, $600 million of which are in trade with the United States.   
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7.4.2 Standards of treatment – The Parkerings Case 
 
This case arose out of a contract for the construction of a parking lot in 
the city of Vilnius in Lithuania620. Parkerings-Compagniet AS, a 
Norwegian company, participated in a tender, through its wholly owned 
Lithuanian subsidiary, Baltijos Parkingas UAB (BP) (and together with 
another company, Egapris UAB), for the construction of a parking lot in 
the centre of Vilnius. The contract included the management of the on-
street parking system621. The consortium formed by Egapris and BP won 
the tender and was granted an exclusive, 13-year right to operate on-
street parking. Following changes in the regulatory system, the 
consortium lost the right to collect parking fees and was restricted in its 
ability to collect clamping fees622. Additionally, the National Monument 
Protection Commission objected to the plan for the construction of the 
multi-story-parking submitted by the consortium on environmental and 
cultural protection grounds, as did the local Environmental Protection 
Department and the State Monument Protection Commission. The city 
had granted approval for the construction at the disputed site but, 
                                                 
620 Parkerings-Compagniet AS v. Republic of Lithuania (ICSID Case No. ARB/05/8), 
Award, 11 September, 2007. 
621 The legality of the collection of part of the fee by the company (with the reminder to 
be corresponded to the municipality) was disputed, with conflicting advice from the 
legal counsels of the parties (see §§ 78 ff. of the award) and with the national 
government’s representative challenging the legality of the municipality’s decision to 
grant the consortium the right to collect the fees for the on-street parking. The petition 
was accepted by the Vilnius Administrative Court, but not on the grounds of the City of 
Vilnius acting ultra vires in granting the right to collect the fee, but because the hybrid 
parking fee (partly to be paid to the municipality, partly to the company) was 
inconsistent with current laws and regulations (§§ 124-125). The Supreme 
Administrative Court, to which the decision was appealed, repealed and sent the case to 
the Vilnius First County Court. 
622 And subsequently, also the power of municipalities to conclude contracts with 
private contractors. 
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following the opposition, it repealed its approval and stopped the project, 
allowing the construction only on one of the proposed sites. 
 
After protracted and increasingly fruitless negotiations, hampered by the 
changing regulatory framework in which both the municipality and the 
consortium were acting, the city of Vilnius decided to cancel the 
agreement on 27 January 2004, citing material breach by the consortium 
and seeking recovery: the Vilnius Regional Court did not grant and the 
decision was confirmed on appeal on 20 October 2005. 
 
On 11 March 2005, Parkerings filed a Request for Arbitration with the 
ICSID Secretariat, for breach of Article III (FET standard623), IV (MFN 
treatment standard) and VI (expropriation) of the Norway-Lithuania BIT, 
seeking damages in the amount of NOK 176.4 million, plus interest and 
costs. 
 
We have chosen this case for the way in which the Tribunal interpreted 
the standard of treatment obligations of the Respondent in light of other 
international obligations. Parkerings had argued discrimination with 
respect to another company, Pinus Proprius. The Tribunal deferred the 
discussion on the claim of discrimination to the MFN breach claim624. 
Both parking lots (the one proposed by Parkerings – and rejected –and 
                                                 
623 Which is defined as ‘equitable and reasonable’ in the applicable treaty; Parkerings 
argued this standard was higher than the usual FET standard but its argument was not 
accepted by the Tribunal. 
624 The Claimant had included it in its claim of FET violation; however, the Tribunal 
argued that ‘discriminatory conduct is in violation of the standard of fair and equitable 
treatment’ (at § 287), citing CMS Gas Transmission Company v. Argentine Republic 
(ICSID Case No. ARB/01/08), Award, 12 May, 2005, § 290, and therefore that, ‘in 
order to determine if there is discrimination.... one has to make a comparison with 
another investor in similar position (in like circumstances) (at § 288); the import of the 
‘in like circumstances’ criterion in the ‘absolute’ FET standard seems completely 
unwarranted. In any case, the Tribunal, as we said, deferred this analysis to the MFN 
claim, considering it ‘unnecessary’ to perform it also in the context of the FETclaim. 
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the one accepted by the municipality and proposed by its competitor 
Pinus Proprius) were to be located in the Old Town of Vilnius, which is a 
protected area designated by the UNESCO. However, the project 
proposed by Parkerings was much more intrusive; as we have already 
mentioned in the case summary, several cultural agencies had expressed 
their disapproval of the BP project. In particular, the State Monument 
Protection Commission stated625: 
 
 In case construction [sic] of underground garages in the old city of 
Vilnius embarked now, it can be stated that Lithuania failed to perform 
obligation undertaken upon signing in November 1999 of the Convention 
for the Protection of the Architectural heritage of Europe and the 
European Convention on the Protection of the Archaeological heritage. 
All legal acts concerning regulation of territorial planning, land 
relationship, heritage protection, environment protection and construction 
would be infringed […]. 
 
The Tribunal did take these circumstances into account, when it 
concluded: 
 
 ... the fact that BP’s MSCP project in Gedimino [the area of the 
Old Town chosen for the parking lot by Parkerings] extended 
significantly more into the Old Town as defined by the UNESCO, is 
decisive. Indeed, the record shows that the opposition raised against the 
BP projected MSCP [multi-story car parking] were important and 
contributed to the Municipality decision to refuse such a controversial 
project. The historical and archaeological preservation and environmental 
protection could be and in this case were a justification for the refusal of 
the project. The potential negative impact of the BP project in the Old 
Town was increased by its considerable size and its proximity with the 
culturally sensitive area of the Cathedral. Consequently, BP’s MSCP in 
Gedimino was not similar [emphasis added] with the MSCP constructed 
by Pinus Proprius. 
 
 
The Tribunal did not consider the issue of the potential breach of the 
other international obligations (so normative conflicts are not central 
here), even if the Respondent had used them as a defence, by presenting 
the evidence of the State Commission to that effect. Rather, the non-
investment obligations constituted a background criterion for the 
 
625 Cited at § 388 of the Award. 
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application of the MFN, specifically, environmental (widely intended) 
obligations were sufficient to render the investment ‘unlike’ another 
investment and to this extent, they constituted a defence for non-
compliance with the MFN obligation. This is potentially a way for 
conflicts to be solved in favour of non-investment obligations, at least as 
far as the MFN clause is concerned. It could still be found that the 
measures constitute a form of compensable indirect expropriation, but 
there would be no discrimination element626.  In this way, environmental 
obligations can be considered a legitimate element to allow differential 
treatment that would otherwise be considered in breach of the MFN or 
national standard of treatment627.   
 
 
7.5 General conflict rules 
 
The rules available in international law for the resolution of normative 
conflicts have been discussed in Section 5.4. These include the general 
rule of interpretation and systemic integration, and more technical rules 
for conflict resolution. These rules have been developed in international 
 
626 A similar approach, with regard to the assessment of the international minimum 
standard (which however, does not include the ‘in like circumstances’ clause) was taken 
by the Chemtura Tribunal, at § 123 of its Award: ‘In assessing whether the treatment 
afforded to the Claimant’s investment was in accordance with the international 
minimum standard, the Tribunal must take into account all the circumstances, including 
the fact that certain agencies manage highly specialized domains involving scientific 
and public policy determinations.’ 
627 See also the OECD International Investment and Multinational Enterprises: National 
Treatment of Foreign Controlled Enterprises, Paris, OECD, 1985, at 17: ‘As regards the 
expression “in like situations”, the Committee, first of all, agreed that comparison 
between foreign-controlled enterprises is valid only if the comparison is made between 
firms operating within the same sector. The Committee also agreed that more general 
considerations, such as the policy objectives of Member countries in various fields, 
could be taken into account in order to define the circumstances in which comparison 
between foreign-controlled and domestic enterprises is permissible inasmuch as those 
objectives are not contrary to the principle of National Treatment’.  
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law to deal with conflicts that arise in the course of inter-state disputes 
(where state A claims that its obligation X towards state C conflicts with 
its obligation Y towards state B, the alleged non-performance of which 
gave rise to the dispute). While it can be generally accepted that one of 
the functions of law is to allow the balancing of conflicting interests (as 
expressed in rules), investment law presents peculiar problems in 
accomplishing this balancing, related to its hybrid nature. The fact that 
one of the parties is not a state constitutes a problem when it comes to 
define standing and what rights and duties attach to the non-state actor; 
conversely, because one of the parties is a state, there are jurisdictional 
problems connected with the power of review of governmental measures 
by a tribunal selected by the parties according to the commercial 
arbitration model. Additionally, we have already seen how states seem 
reluctant to employ the clauses that are available in the applicable 
investment treaties when defending against a claim by the investor, and 
the argument has been advanced that this has partially to do with the 
normative weakness of these clauses628.  
 
In any case, states do often refer to their conflicting international 
obligations, and we will examine some cases when they have done so. In 
this case, it is incumbent upon the tribunal to apply the general conflict 
rules in order to decide the dispute. As we have previously remarked, a 
certain investment bias, borne out of the commercial arbitration 
framework adopted by investment tribunals, spills into the way in which 
tribunals conduct their interpretative work629. The following case 
constitutes an example of the recourse to the defence of conflicting 
 
628 Arguments that we have presented and discussed in Chapter 4.  
629 Wälde talked about a ‘struggle for the soul of investment arbitration between 
international commercial arbitration and (public) international law bars’: Wälde, T., 
‘Interpreting investment treaties: experiences and examples’, Binder et al., 2009: 724 at 
725. 
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obligations630 by the defendant state (Canada) where environmental 
measures were taken  
 
 
7.5.1 The S.D. Myers Case 
 
S. D. Myers Inc. (SDMI) is an American company based in Ohio and 
involved in remediation of polychlorinated biphenyl (PCB)631 from oil 
and related equipment. In the 1990s, as its market share in the US 
diminished, SDMI decided to expand its activities in the Canadian 
market, by importing PCB waste from Canada for treatment in its US 
facilities. The NAFTA claim was initiated because of a temporary ban on 
the export of the PCB issued by the Canadian government in 1995. 
SDMI had lobbied both in the US and Canada to lift import restrictions 
on PBA and had obtained an ‘enforcement discretion’ from the US 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) which would have allowed it to 
export the PCB from Canada. The EPA had acted without consulting 
with the Canadian authorities, which responded with the export ban. 
SDMI claimed the real reason for the ban was the desire of the Canadian 
government to protect the domestic PCB-disposal industry. The border 
was opened again for export of PCB into the US in February 1997, and 
then closed permanently in July of the same year, following a decision of 
the US Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal overturning the EPA enforcement 
discretion order.  
 
On 21 July 1998, SDMI served a Notice of Intent to submit a claim; in it, 
SDMI claimed that Canada had violated Article 1102 – National 
                                                 
630 Canada was prevented from using the conflict clause available in the NAFTA, 
Article 104, as not applicable to the invoked instrument. 
631 PCB, a highly toxic product, had been banned in Canada since 1977 and in the US 
since 1980; the ban included the import and the transportation across borders. 
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Treatment; Article 1105 – Minimum Standard of Treatment; Article 1106 
– Performance Requirements; and Article 1110 – Expropriation.  
 
This is one of the first NAFTA cases and one in which the tribunal had to 
deal with a defence based on conflicting environmental obligations632. 
The law applicable to the dispute included the United States and Canada 
1986 Transboundary Agreement, which contained the following 
passage633: 
 
 Recognizing that the close trading relationship and the long 
common border between the United States and Canada engender 
opportunities for a generator of hazardous waste to benefit from using the 
nearest appropriate disposal facility, which may involve the 
transboundary shipment of hazardous waste634. 
 
Additionally, in 1989 Canada had ratified the Basel Convention on the 
Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes (‘the 
Convention’); however the United States was not bound by it, having 
signed it but not ratified, so the exception clause contained in Article 104 
NAFTA (which mentions the Basel Convention) was not applicable, as 
this is triggered into function when all three NAFTA parties have ratified 
the Convention635. The Convention prohibits the export and import of 
                                                 
632 For commentaries on the case, see De Pencier, J., ‘Investment, environment and 
dispute settlement: arbitration under NAFTA Chapter Eleven, 23 Hastings International 
& Comparative Law Review (1999-2000): 409; Hodges, B. T., ‘Where the grass is 
always greener: foreign investors’ actions against environmental regulations under 
NAFTA’s Chapter 11, S.D. Myers Inc. v. Canada’, XIV Georgetown International 
Environmental Law Review (2001): 367; Schneiderman, 2008: 86 ff.. 
633 Quoted at § 103 of the Partial Award. 
634 Canada argued that this agreement did not cover PCB because PCB was not 
classified as ‘hazardous waste’ in the US (the US position, related by SDMI, was that 
the classification is not required by the Transboundary Agreement). 
635 In fact, Canada did not construct its defence on Article 104. 
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hazardous wastes from and to states that are not party to it – Article 
4(5)636.  
 
At a domestic level there was the US legislation prohibiting the trans-
border transportation of PCB637, against which the EPA had granted its 
‘enforcement discretion’638, and the 1995 Canadian Interim Order 
banning the export of PCB, confirmed later in the year by a Final Order. 
The EPA order was subject to judicial review proceedings, with the US 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals overturning the EPA enforcement 
discretion for being ultra vires, following a petition by the environmental 
NGO Sierra Club, in which SDMI participated as an intervener639. At the 
time SDMI served its Notice of Intent, it could not, as a matter of US 
law, have imported PCB in the United States for treatment640.  
 
636 See § 106 of the Partial Award. Article 11 of the Basel convention allows for  
shipment of hazardous waste to non parties if there are  bilateral, multilateral or regional 
agreements not less stringent than the Basel convention (such as the Transboundary 
Agreement). 
637 Chiefly, for the purposes of this case, the US 1976 Toxic Substances Control Act, 
U.S.C. §§ 2601-2692, which contains a categorical ban on the production and import of 
PCB, with very limited exceptions, and which was overridden, without authority, as 
established by judicial review, see infra, by the EPA through its enforcement discretion. 
In Canada, the government had added PCBs in 1977 to the list of toxic substances in the 
Environmental Contaminants Act (now superseded by the Canadian Environmental 
Protection Act or CEPA), supplemented by the PCB Waste Export Regulations 1990. 
638 The US EPA would not enforce the US regulation banning import of PCBs against 
SD Meyers, provided the company met the detailed conditions that were attached to the 
US EPA’s Oct 26 1995 letter (see § 119 of the Partial Award). 
639 Sierra Club v. EPA, 118 F.3d 1324, 1327 (9th Cir. 1997). 
640 In its Memorial on the Merits of 20 July 1999, at 15, SDMI claimed that ‘the Court’s 
decision did not affect the ability of the EPA to grant individual enforcement discretions 
to companies such as S.D. Myers, Inc.’. This is technically true, but the Ninth Circuit 
Court made it clear that the EPA only had the power to grant exemptions to the import 
ban of no more than one year, and given the ruling of the Court, it seemed clear that this 
would not be renewable (At section III: Thus the absolute ban on manufacturing PCBs 
includes an absolute ban on their import, and EPA may not promulgate a rule governing 
the disposal of PCBs that would violate this categorical ban. There is, however, a lone 
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Canada argued that its obligations under the Basel Convention relieved it 
of its duties towards SDMI to the extent that they existed at all (Canada 
raised a jurisdictional objection to the effect that SDMI was not an 
investor and that there was no covered investment, and that its Interim 
Order affected trade and not investment, so that Chapter 3 of the NAFTA 
was applicable, and, in case of conflict between Chapter Eleven and 
another Chapter of the NAFTA, the other chapter prevailed to the extent 
of the inconsistency).  
 
It is unfortunate that the Tribunal did not proceed by examining the 
applicable law and determining if there was a potential conflict between 
international and/or domestic obligations, what the nature of the conflict 
was and if it was possible to interpret the different treaty clauses in such 
a way as to avoid a conflict or if a breach of one or more of these 
obligations was to be found641. Instead, the Tribunal started its reasoning 
on the facts with the following statement642: 
 
exception to TSCA’s broad ban on the manufacture and import of PCBs. TSCA § 
6(e)(3)(B)(i) provides that the EPA Administrator may grant an exemption if the 
Administrator determines that “an unreasonable risk of injury to health or environment 
would not result.  Such exemption may not last for more than one year.”   EPA, 
therefore, may not promulgate-as it did here-a rule to dispose of PCBs which allows 
parties to “continue importing [PCBs] indefinitely without interruption.”  
641 As noted by Wälde, in Binder et al., 2009, at 730, ‘Interpretation of legal texts is 
often in judicial determination not the ex-ante way to reach a particular outcome, but 
rather a post-hoc rationalization of an outcome chosen for reasons of perceived equity, 
ideological and political preference, for bargaining and consensus dynamics within a 
tribunal ... or even because of the need of the arbitrators.... to develop and maintain a 
well-balanced profile.’ 
642 At § 162. Another case involving Canada in which the investor argued protectionist 
intent (and with an environmental angle) is Ethyl Corporation v. Government of 
Canada. In this case, from 1998, the company, producer and importer of the fuel 
additive MMT complained that the ban implemented by Canada had the goal of 
protecting the domestic industry. The measure had been subject to judicial review 
domestically as well, and the government had lost; Canada settled the claim with Ethyl 
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The evidence establishes that CANADA’s policy was shaped to a 
very great extent by the desire and intent to protect and promote the 
market share of enterprises that would carry out the destruction of PCBs 
in Canada and that were owned by Canadian nationals. Other factors 
were considered, particularly at the bureaucratic level, but the 
protectionist intent of the lead minister in this matter was reflected in 
decision-making at every stage that led to the ban. 
 
The determination that Canada acted because of protectionist intent (in 
the words of the minister, that PCB waste should be disposed of ‘in 
Canada by Canadians’643) ‘coloured’ the entire award, so that the finding 
of a breach came as no surprise644. Effectively, the Tribunal treated intent 
as a preliminary issue, before it even considered to what extent other, 
non-investment obligations, were applicable. The Tribunal established 
that, whatever the extent of these obligations, Canada was in breach of its 
investment obligations because there was also a protectionist element to 
its actions. What interest us here is how the Tribunal analysed Canada’s 
actions with respect to its environmental obligations, beside the fact that 
NAFTA would be breached because of the protectionist motive behind 
the actual ban to export. Would it have been possible for Canada to 
 
for $13 million, and repealed the ban. (Ethyl Corporation v. Government of Canada, 
UNCITRAL, Award on Jurisdiction, 24 June 1998). 
643 Quoted at § 169. 
644 The wisdom of such an approach is beyond our analysis here. Suffice to say that 
faced by a similar claim from Chemtura the Tribunal took a different position (or maybe 
Canadian ministers learned to keep certain thoughts to themselves), and that the US 
Supreme Court has rejected in the past the protectionist intent argument, stating for 
example that: ‘Few governmental actions are immune from the charge that they are “not 
in the public interest” or in some sense “corrupt.” . . . The fact is that virtually all 
regulation benefits some segments of the society and harms others; . . . . determination 
of “the public interest” in the manifold areas of government regulation entails not 
merely economic and mathematical analysis but value judgment, and it was not meant 
to shift that judgment from elected officials to judges and juries.’ (City of Columbia v. 
Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 377 (1991)). Of course in the Supreme 
Court case, it is the deference to the legislature to dictate this outcome: investment 
arbitration is not fettered by certain consideration, arguably to the detriment of public 
interest concerns.  
 
 
 
273
                                                
comply with its environmental obligations without harming the interest 
of the investor? And, would it had been possible for Canada to reconcile 
these three competing interests, that is, the American investor’s, the 
domestic PCB disposal industry’s, and the environment?  
 
The Tribunal considered all the different sets of obligations (the Basel 
Convention, the Transboundary Agreement, the NAFTA, and the 
NAEEC) and came to this conclusion645: 
 
 ... where a state can achieve its chosen level of environmental 
protection through a variety of equally effective and reasonable means, it 
is obliged to adopt the alternative that is most consistent with open trade. 
[Italics added] This corollary also is consistent with the language and the 
case law arising out of the WTO family of agreements. 
 
Quite clearly the Tribunal considered the measures taken by Canada not 
in absolute against the conflicting investment obligations, but relative to 
all the measures that could have been taken by Canada and would have 
been ‘less inconsistent’ with Canada’s obligations under the NAFTA646. 
In other words, the tribunal tested the proportionality of the measures not 
against the goal to be attained, but amongst themselves (where only the 
least restrictive one of trade and investment would do) in a procedural 
rather than substantive way, that is, without balancing the conflicting 
interests or rights. While this approach is justifiable under the NAFTA, it 
does raise the question of how the dispute was presented in the first 
place. If it was an unreasonable restriction on trade, Chapter Eleven 
arbitration should not have been available. If it was an investment 
dispute, was it possible for the investor to argue national treatment, for 
 
645 At § 221. 
646 See also the Separate Concurring Opinion to the Partial Award, at § 27: ‘On the 
standard by which environmental measures are to be judged, unnecessary ... means ... 
that the government could have accomplished the same environmental objective by an 
alternative measure that was reasonably available and that would have infringed less on 
those free trade norms.’ Specifically, the Tribunal suggested, as a legitimate measure, 
that Canada could have ‘[granted] subsidies to the Canadian industry’ (at § 255 of the 
Partial Award). 
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example, as the ban was general and included Canadian as well as 
American investors in the PCB remediation industry? What exactly was 
expropriated?  These questions go beyond the issue of conflict, which 
was solved by the Tribunal with reference to ‘systemic integration’ 
WTO-style, that is, with the ‘least restrictive of trade’ approach). 
 
 
7.6 Procedural means of incorporation 
 
We have remarked on a certain reluctance of defendant states to avail 
themselves of the kind of clauses included in investment treaties to 
account for non-investment obligations. These obligations are sometimes 
raised as defences, but rarely, as we have seen, is the defence constructed 
directly on these clauses. 
 
The introduction of procedural means of incorporation of non-investment 
obligations in the dispute environment, or at the very least of public 
interest issues and concerns, is consistent with the adversarial nature of 
investment proceedings. On the other hand, two observations ought to be 
made: firstly, and differently from the entry points we have considered so 
far, by allowing procedural incorporation of non-investment obligations, 
the tribunal, and in the last instance the parties, allow some form of third 
party participation in what had always been strictly a two-party 
confidential and private legal relationship. We have described this form 
of participation as weak, and to the extent that there is no obligation on 
the tribunal to take the amici submissions into account in its award, it 
might promise more than it delivers, or might even be seen as a way to 
placate certain sectors of the public with an ineffectual participation that 
is not picked up by a system of dispute resolution ill-equipped, legally as 
well as politically647, to do so648. Secondly, and coherently with the first 
 
647 And might say structurally, see following footnote. 
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observation, the very necessity of third party intervention might be read 
as a structural failure of the dispute system, a failure which the 
intervention of third parties can hardly be expected to remedy, because of 
the problems outlined above. In other words, the fact itself that certain 
arguments will not be raised by the defendant state, who is entitled and 
indeed duty-bound to do so, points in a deeper way to the democratic 
deficit intrinsic to investment arbitration649. Equally, the coincidence of 
interests between interveners and claimants in normal administrative or 
judicial review proceedings can be contrasted with the clash of interests 
in investment arbitration, where, as in the case outlined below, a 
Canadian environmental NGO intervened effectively against a Canadian 
investor650, in order to further an environmental argument ultimately 
carried by the United States as the defendant state. Additionally, the 
umbrella term ‘third parties’ conceals a considerable diversity of interests 
and demands. An undiversified approach to submissions risks 
underestimating the legitimate interests raised by the amici.  
 
We will now examine the first NAFTA case in which the Tribunal 
allowed the participation of environmental NGOs to the proceedings, via 
submissions of amici curiae briefs. 
  
 
7.6.1 The Methanex Case 
  
 
648 The value of an utterance is in its reception. Luhmann’s insight that communication 
constitutes the atom of social organisation is the starting point, but meaningful 
communication within a system (such as, in this case, the court room widely intended) 
is a communication that can be heard and that will be heard. (Luhmann: 1995). 
649 Simma, B., and Kill, T., ‘Harmonizing investment protection and international 
human rights: first steps towards a methodology’, Binder, C. et al., International 
Investment Law for the 21st Century, Oxford, OUP, 2009. 
650 Of course officially as a non-disputing party and as a ‘friend of the court’. 
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The Methanex Corporation is a Canadian corporation producing and 
selling methanol, a component of the petrol additive MTBE. Methanex 
claimed to be the largest supplier in California of MTBE. The dispute 
arose out of a series of measures taken by the government of California 
which resulted in the ban on the sale and use of MTBE as an oxygenating 
additive651. The measures included the California Senate Bill 521 of 9 
October 1997, which directed a University of California study on the 
effects on the environment of MTBE, to be followed by public hearings. 
The Bill established a duty of certification by the governor, who had to 
declare if MTBE posed or not a ‘significant risk to the environment’. All 
the other impugned measures depended upon this Bill, yet Methanex 
withdrew this Bill from the list of measures alleged to be in breach of the 
NAFTA652. Following the findings of the study and the public hearings, 
the governor declared (by Executive Order of 25 March 1999) that 
MTBE did pose a significant risk to health and the environment, mainly 
because of leakage from underground storage tanks into drinking water 
supplies. This certification, made pursuant to Section 3(e)(2) of the 
California Bill, obliged him to take further action, which took the form of 
the California Phase III Reformulated Gasoline Regulations and the 
Amended California Regulations of May 2003. The total effect of these 
regulations was to ban the use of MTBE as an oxygenating additive in 
gasoline sold in the state of California.  
 
On 3 December 1999, Methanex presented a first statement of claim, 
alleging violation by the United States of Article 1105(1) and Article 
1110(1) of Chapter Eleven, and sought damages of US$ 970 million, plus 
interest and costs. This was rejected by the Tribunal653, which 
                                                 
651 These additives are used to reduce carbon monoxide and other by-products of 
incomplete combustion that are dangerous to the environment and to public health. 
652 Second Amended Claim, Part III. 
653 The procedural history of this case is complex and disputed; it is not within the scope 
of this chapter to review it; all the relevant documentation is available at 
http://www.naftaclaims.com/disputes_us_methanex.htm.  
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nonetheless allowed a second amended claim, submitted by Methanex in 
November 2002. In it, Methanex also alleged a violation of Article 1102. 
The main thrust of Methanex’s argument was that, in banning MTBE, 
California had acted out of a protectionist intent, in order to support the 
largely US-based ethanol industry (ethanol being another oxygenating 
additive and, according to Methanex, a ‘like product’ to methanol), and 
had been swayed by donations made by ADM, the biggest US producer 
of ethanol (Methanex never did argue corruption as such654).   
 
This case is important in many respects. In this section we will consider 
its influence in establishing a trend towards greater transparency (it was 
the first Tribunal to allow open hearings) and participation by non-
disputing parties (by submission of amici curiae briefs made by several 
environmental NGOs). Before considering these elements, it is worth 
making a few observations on another two important aspects of the 
Award, namely its treatment of the claim of standards of treatment 
violations (specifically national treatment and international minimum 
standard) and of the claim of regulatory expropriation.  
 
As for the first element, Methanex had submitted that the Tribunal should 
consider GATT jurisprudence in order to determine ‘likeness’ for the 
purposes of applying Article 1102655 and specifically, the idea that the 
                                                 
654 As summarised by the Tribunal, Methanex argued that, by ‘connecting the dots’, that 
is, by considering the totality of the evidence provided, the ulterior motive of the 
defendant, the protection of the US ethanol industry, and the way in which this was 
accomplished (by undue influence, mostly through monetary donations to the relevant 
officials) would emerge (Final Award, Part III – Chapter B). The Tribunal did not reject 
in principle this strategy, but questioned the significance of some of these ‘dots’ and the 
relevance of their connection, in the end not finding in support of the claimant.  
655 Methanex had also claimed that, by implementing its ban, California had violated 
several provisions of the GATT, but this argument was rejected by the Tribunal, for 
lack of jurisdiction. 
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nt law’658. 
                                                
basic test for likeness is competition656. The Tribunal, in response, 
agreed that ‘[it] may derive guidance from the way in which a similar 
phrase in the GATT has been interpreted in the past’657. On the facts, 
however, the Tribunal did not find that, even by application of the test of 
likeness adopted in WTO case law, the ethanol and methanol industry 
would be ‘in like circumstances’ and that, where identical comparators 
exist (in this case, US methanol producers), it would be wrong to use 
‘less like’ comparators (US ethanol producers). Importantly, for the 
purposes of this Section, the Tribunal approvingly quoted a remark made 
by one of the NGOs which had submitted a brief, the IISD, to the effect 
that it is incorrect to assume that, ‘trade law approaches can simply be 
transferred to investme
 
On the second element, the Tribunal distanced itself somewhat from the 
approach taken by the Metalclad Tribunal, which had favoured a strict 
application of the sole effect doctrine. Instead, in rejecting the claim by 
Methanex, the Tribunal appealed to the ‘effect and purpose’ approach, 
defining indirect expropriation in the following terms659: 
 
In the Tribunal’s view, Methanex is correct that an intentionally 
discriminatory regulation against a foreign investor fulfils a key 
requirement for establishing expropriation. But as a matter of general 
international law, a non-discriminatory regulation for a public purpose, 
which is enacted in accordance with due process and, which affects, inter 
alios, a foreign investor or investment is not deemed expropriatory and 
compensable unless specific commitments had been given by the 
regulating government to the then putative foreign investor 
 
656 Final Award, Part IV – Chapter B. Methanex relied specifically on European 
Communities–Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products (Eur. 
Comm. v. Can.), WT/DS135/AB/R, (2001) 40 ILM 1408. For a critical appraisal of the 
use the Tribunal made of the GATT jurisprudence (as too restrictive), see Kurtz, J., in 
Schill, 2010: 243, at 258 ff. 
657 Final Award, 9 August 2005, §6. 
658 Final Award, Part IV – Chapter B, § 27. 
659 Final Award, Part IV, Chapter D, § 7.  It is worth noting that a violation of the same 
article of NAFTA Chapter 11 is claimed in both cases. 
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contemplating investment that the government would refrain from such 
regulation660.  
This case is one to have allowed for environmental instances to be 
introduced via the intervention of non-disputing parties. We have already 
remarked that, to the extent that what the interveners contribute to the 
proceedings is effectively disregarded, their significance is nullified. So 
the question to be asked is, what difference does the participation of third 
parties make to the outcome? There are indicators that help assess the 
effects of this participation, such as the response of the parties to the 
issues raised by the amici, or the way in which their submissions are 
acknowledged by the Tribunal and if they influence in any way the 
outcome of the dispute and if so, in what way. 
 
As we have already seen in Chapter 6, the Methanex Tribunal accepted 
the submission of amici briefs through interpretation of Article 15(1) of 
the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules661, against the stated wishes of the 
claimant. This first decision was superseded by the second amended 
statement of claim by Methanex, following which the petitioners (IISD, 
Communities for a Better Environment, Bluewater Network, and the 
Center for International Environmental Law) submitted a Joint Motion to 
the Tribunal662, requesting that the Tribunal establish the modality of 
 
660 This section of the award has attracted criticism with regards to its reference to 
stabilisation clauses: see Mann, H., The Final Decision in Methanex v. United States: 
Some New Wine in Some New Bottles, August 2005, at http://www.iisd.org. See also  
Weiler, T., ‘Methanex Corp. v. USA: Turning the page on NAFTA Chapter Eleven?’, 6 
JWI&T (2005): 903, at 918: ‘...compensable takings could only be found in cases of 
detrimental reliance on governmental promise?’. In its amicus submission, the IISD had 
argued that the distinction was between a categorical inclusion and a categorical 
exclusion of governmental measures within the purview of the takings clause: ‘... 
whether normal, non-discriminatory and bona fide regulations get defined as 
expropriations subject to compensation except in exceptional circumstances, or whether 
regulations are not expropriations and therefore not subject to compensation unless a 
complainant can show they are not bona fide. It is ... a binary choice for the Tribunal.’  
  661 Decision on Authority to Accept Amicus Submissions, 15 January 2001. 
662 On 31 January 2003. 
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their participation. The petitioners reiterated their request that hearings be 
open (which had been previously refused) on the grounds that another 
NAFTA tribunal had, in the intervening time, allowed open hearings663. 
This request provoked a statement by the Free Trade Commission on 
non-disputing parties’ participation on 7 October 2004, which set out the 
procedures for their participation and was used by the Tribunal as the 
blueprint for the rules regarding the written submissions. But, beyond 
such procedural matters, important as they are, stand the substantive 
issue of the effect of the submissions on the proceedings. The impression 
cannot be dispelled that the tribunal in Methanex could not, or maybe 
was not willing to, depart from conferring procedural rights to the amici 
without engaging with their submission at a substantive level664 
 
Since the Methanex Award, the submission of amicus curiae briefs has 
(almost) become commonplace in investment arbitration, and the time 
might have come to look back and consider what effect, if any, they have 
had in the decision-making process of investment tribunals. We take as 
an example on the one hand the statement made by the Glamis 
Tribunal665: 
 
 [...] inasmuch as the State Parties to the NAFTA have agreed to 
allow amicus filings in certain circumstances, it is the Tribunal’s view 
that it should address those filings explicitly in its Award to the degree 
that they bear on decisions that must be taken. [...] Given the Tribunal’s 
holdings, however, the Tribunal does not reach the particular issues 
addressed by these submissions. 
 
 
663 United Parcel Service of America, Inc. v. Government of Canada 
NAFTA/UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules Proceeding, ICSID Press Release, 
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/ups.htm 
664 See also Levine, E., ‘Amicus curiae in international investment arbitration: the 
implication of an increase in third-party participation’, 29 Berkeley Journal of 
International Law (2011): 101 at 114. 
665 Glamis Gold Ltd v United States of America, Award, June 8 2009, § 8. 
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On the other, the Foresti Tribunal’s decision to allow disclosure of the 
parties’ filings to the non-disputing parties666, despite the objections of 
one of the parties; additionally, the Tribunal established that both the 
parties and the interveners provide feedback, following the arbitration, on 
the procedure adopted by the Tribunal. However, since the proceedings 
were discontinued, these innovative steps were actually never 
implemented667. 
 
The risk, it is submitted, is that no substantive value is attributed to the  
contribution made by non-disputing third parties and that they are used as 
a way to demonstrate the alleged openness of the dispute to public 
interest concerns only in a very superficial way. The well-known 
argument that something needs not only be done, but ‘be seen to be done’ 
loses much of its value when the appearance (in this case the procedural 
opening) is not accompanied by the facts (the bona fide consideration of 
the issues raised by the third parties). Consider the statement made by the 
Methanex Tribunal668: 
 
 ... there is an undoubtedly public interest in this arbitration. The 
substantive issues extend far beyond those raised by the usual 
transnational arbitration between commercial parties. This is not merely 
because one of the Disputing Parties is a State: there are of course 
disputes involving States which are of no greater general public interest 
than a dispute between private persons. The public interest in this 
arbitration arises from its subject-matter, as powerfully suggested in the 
Petitions. There is also a broader argument, as suggested by the 
Respondents and Canada: the … arbitral process could benefit from 
being perceived as more open or transparent; or conversely be harmed if 
seen as unduly secretive. In this regard, the Tribunal’s willingness to 
receive amicus submissions might support the process in general and this 
 
666 See http://www.iisd.org/itn/2009/10/10/an-icsid-tribunal-introduces-innovative-
steps-into-non-disputing-party-procedure/.  
667 Piero Foresti, Laura de Carli and others v. Republic of South Africa (ICSID Case 
No. ARB(AF)/07/1), Award, 4 August 2010. The Tribunal delivered a decision on the 
discontinuance and costs. 
668 Decision on Petitions from Third Persons to Intervene as Amici Curiae, 15 January 
2001, § 49. 
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arbitration in particular, whereas a blanket refusal could do positive 
harm. 
 
The ‘perception’ of openness and transparency can or not be matched by 
substantial willingness to accept, if legitimate and relevant, the 
arguments advanced by the amici submissions669.  
 
 
7.7 Concluding remarks 
 
The case law reviewed in this chapter was illustrative of the different 
approaches taken by tribunals faced with conflicting environmental 
obligations. Two situations can arise from these potential conflicts, 
which impact the investor differently and result in distinct claims. The 
host state’s environmental measures may have an expropriatory impact 
on the investment; if the investor claims they do, and the host state does 
not provide compensation, a claim will be raised for a breach of the 
expropriation clause in the applicable treaty. In that case, the 
environmental obligations of the state might be used as a defence for 
non-performance. If the environmental measures do not have an 
expropriatory impact on the investment, but there is a claim for a breach 
of one of the standards of treatment, the host state can request that the 
tribunal use the environmental measure as a qualifier for the ‘in like 
circumstances’ clause (arguing that the likeness requirement is not 
 
669 The Biwater Tribunal explicitly stated that: [it] has found the Amici’s observations 
useful. Their submissions have informed the analysis of claims set out below, and where 
relevant, specific points arising from the Amici’s submissions are returned to in that 
context.’ (Award, § 392). However, the Tribunal did not return to any of the points 
made by the Amici in the remainder of its Award, except in footnote 208, with an 
oblique reference to a point made by them in support of the Goverment’s action, point 
that is defeated in the main body of the text. It could be argued that the arguments raised 
did inform the conclusions reached by the Tribunal, specifically its decision not to 
award damages even if it found Tanzania to be in breach of its treaty obligations; 
however the Tribunal did not acknowledge this and framed its decision strictly within 
the framework provided by the treaty and the arguments advanced by the parties. 
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satisfied because of the different regulatory framework the comparator 
investor is subject to). In most cases, as we have seen, it is not an 
‘either/or’ situation, as most investors claim that both clauses have been 
violated (expropriation and standard of treatment). In all cases, tribunals 
can adopt different approaches in order to deal with the claims raised by 
the investors and the defences adduced by the state. It is rare, especially 
in the post-NAFTA environment, for tribunals to adopt the inflexible 
stance of the Santa Elena and Metalclad tribunals with respect of the 
environmental objections raised by the state. While the cases differ on 
the merits, the first one involving a direct expropriation and the second 
one an indirect one, the tribunals similarly excluded in principle the 
influence of non-investment obligations both on the quantum of 
compensation (for direct expropriations) and on the obligation to provide 
compensation for measures having the effect of an expropriation. 
 
The balancing, or proportionality, approach is now the way in which 
most tribunals, implicitly or explicitly, deal with this sort of claims. The 
examined case law shows that tribunals usually show considerable 
deference to states’ power to regulate for the protection of the 
environment670, and that the presence of an international source for the 
obligation can support the presumption that the measure is a legitimate 
exercise of regulatory powers671. There is however a question of 
principle, which has showed recurrently in the course of this work, which 
 
670 See S.D. Myers, Partial Award, § 263; Glamis, Award, § 767. 
671 The Methanex Tribunal explicitly connected the highly regulated environmental 
sector in California with the legitimate expectations of the investor (Part IV – Chapter 
D, § 9: ‘Methanex entered a political economy in which it was widely known, if not 
notorious, that governmental environmental and health protection institutions at the 
federal and state level, operating under the vigilant eyes of the media, interested 
corporations, non-governmental organizations and a politically active electorate, 
continuously monitored the use and impact of chemical compounds and commonly 
prohibited or restricted the use of some of those compounds for environmental and/or 
health reasons. Indeed, the very market for MTBE in the United States was the result of 
precisely this regulatory process.’).  
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can be summarised as a question of competencies. Opening investment 
arbitrations to non-investment obligations inevitably means giving 
arbitrators the power to, at the very least, interpret these obligations (and 
‘interpretation is power’672). In this sense, deference and proportionality, 
which are often considered together (the first one the manifestation in 
outcome of the second as the approach taken), while constituting a 
solution for the problem of normative conflict or substantive 
isolationism, might create their own set of problems.  
 
Approach and results are two sides of the same analysis: at issue is what 
tribunals effectively accomplish when confronted with disputes in which 
the claim of violation of a treaty standard is based on the encroachment 
on the reserved domain of the regulatory powers of the state. The 
emerging picture is, as we have said at the beginning, mixed. In the 
following chapter, we will draw some conclusions based on the analysis 
conducted so far. 
 
 
 
672 Klabbers, J., ‘Reluctant grundnormen: Articles 31(3)(c) and 42 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties and the fragmentation of international law, in 
Craven, M., Fitzmaurice, M. and Vogiatzi, M. (eds.), Time, History and International 
Law, Leiden, Brill, 2007: 141. 
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Chapter 8: Conclusions 
 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
My research on this project started in the winter of 2007. Since then, 
many things have changed in the world of investment law. It was not 
long ago that one had to search hard for publications in the field that 
contained a comprehensive review of the law in the area and attempted to 
ground it firmly in international law theory and practice. Equally, one 
could count on awards being published regularly, but not as frequently as 
has been the case in the past years. There had been a longer trend of 
negotiation of investment instruments, and an increased willingness to 
litigate on the part of investors, underpinned by an increase in the amount 
and spread of foreign investment flows. Then all these trends accelerated 
and fed off each other, increasing the numbers of instruments, awards, 
disputes, to an unprecedented and unexpected level. It was a very 
exciting time to enter the field and embark into a project of this kind.  
 
Recent years have also seen the exponential increase of environmental 
legal instruments (in their turn underpinned by the raised level of 
environmental damage from industrial and services development, and the 
increased public awareness of the environmental risks at a local, national 
and indeed global level); therefore it was inevitable that, as investment 
law also grew in scope and content, it would encroach into other areas of 
international and domestic law: the collision and conflict of these two 
areas of production of legal norms at the international level was to be 
expected, yet it seemed to catch the investment community almost by 
surprise. What has become increasingly clear is that the days of 
investment arbitrations being cloaked in secrecy are gone forever, if 
indeed they ever existed under those extreme conditions. Equally gone 
are the chances for investment law to develop its substantive content in 
splendid isolation. On the contrary, at the centre of attention of this work, 
 
 
 
287
                                                
and of the investment community at large, there have been normative 
clashes, fragmentation, conflict resolution and a whole cluster of inter-
related issues which require legal, political and economic intervention.  
 
It was the Aguas del Tunari Tribunal’s definition of bilateral investment 
treaties as ‘portals’ which influenced the direction and the scope of this 
project673. At the conclusion of this work, we have to acknowledge that 
the questions we posed in that context – if investment treaties allow for 
environmental options to be considered, and who guards the doors, if 
such they are – cannot be answered very easily. A very mixed picture 
emerges from the analysis of the jurisprudence of the tribunals.  This 
outcome is to a certain extent structurally inevitable: the decentralised 
nature of investment law, both at the level of legal production (bilateral 
international investment agreements) and application (ad hoc tribunals, 
non-applicability of stare decisis, limited appeal avenues) constitutes an 
obstacle to consistency and coherence. Actually, it is the relatively high 
level of normative convergence, not dissonance, to be surprising. If this 
is to be imputed more to political consensus (for example, as to the level 
of protection to be granted to investor), rather than faithful application of 
the relevant instrument, is an open question. Certainly tribunals show a 
considerable deference to previous awards, even when, as is most often 
the case, those other panels were interpreting a different instrument than 
the one applicable to the dispute.   
 
 
8.2 Changes in the system 
 
 
673 Not least because of the linguistic and semantic implications of the use of this term, 
which has come to be identified exclusively with the language of technology, in the year 
2000, at the beginning of the internet mass revolution: the inference is that this might be 
a case in which we see a slippage between the old meaning (door) and the new (an 
internet site giving access to other sites). 
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Investment law has undergone significant changes in the last ten years, 
some of which have been investigated in the course of this work. To 
summarise, there are quantitative, procedural and substantive changes. 
The quantitative changes include the exponential increase of investment 
arbitrations (new instruments’ negotiations and ratifications, on the other 
hand, have slowed down, but the trend is still upward); procedural 
changes have moved in the direction of increased openness and third 
parties participation, and have also included the simplification of the 
conduct of the proceedings, e.g. by allowing for summary dismissal of 
claims patently without merit (amended Rule 41(6) of the ICSID 
Convention); finally, changes have been happening at the level of 
substantive obligations. These have not necessarily gone in the direction 
of an extension of the scope of protection of the treaty language. In fact, 
we have seen that states have intervened to limit and hedge the reach of 
investment protections, especially in the context of the NAFTA and 
model treaties originating from North America (United States and 
Canada). Additionally, new kind of clauses has been added, both to 
introduce exceptions to the substantive obligations guaranteed by the 
treaty and to allow for the balancing of conflicting obligations.  
 
These changes are reflected in the increased level of debate. The debates 
are taking place in different fora, expressing a variety of opinions and 
concerns. For ease of analysis, we can consider them as originating from 
three discrete sources: the states, the investment community (which 
includes both practitioners and academics) and the public at large. The 
debates taking place in the states’ community, at the level of policy- 
making and legislative activity (by way of treaty production and 
ratification) can be characterised as being ‘reactive’ in nature; in other 
words, states’ policy, with the accompanying debates, is dictated to a 
certain extent by the developments in investment jurisprudence and their 
reaction to it. This reaction can be conceptualised both as sign-posting 
and as claw-back. What we mean is that some states are, by way of 
clarifications of existing treaties and production of new, revised, model 
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treaties, attempting to circumscribe and clarify the extent and the content 
of the investment obligations. This attempt is directly connected to the 
accompanying exercise of clawing back some of the protections granted 
to investors and the power conferred to tribunals to interpret the treaties 
in favorem investor. These developments are connected to the perception 
that the jurisprudence arising from tribunals expresses an excessive 
interference with the regulatory powers of states and their freedom to act 
in the public interest without incurring in claims of violations of 
international legal obligations674.  
 
Equally reactive are the debates taking place in the public at large. To a 
certain extent, this reactivity is to be distinguished from the approach 
displayed by states, insofar as it is partially the consequence of an 
inevitable information deficit. Even taking into account the recent 
procedural changes, the investment world is still distinguishable for its 
insularity. The law is not well known outside the compact, and guarded, 
investment community, and the multiplication of instruments works 
against any attempt of rationalisation and classification, which would 
simplify and democratise knowledge. Additionally, there is a 
considerable level of polarisation around the terms of the debate, 
especially, again, in cases involving the NAFTA, dependent on the 
influence of the environmental community in those countries. 
 
Finally, the debates in the investment community are the most 
heterogeneous. The practitioners and the academics divide themselves on 
substantive issues and the need to situate investment law in the context of 
international law or maintain it firmly within the framework of 
 
674 As Schill noted, (Schill (ed.), 2010: 88), a good faith interpretation of the treaty will 
have to take into account that states cannot be presumed to have agreed to instruments 
that would delimit their decisional powers to such a great extent (and it should be 
added, in areas not covered by the treaty: in other words, it seems fanciful to presume 
that states would willingly reduce their power to regulate for the protection of the 
environment in a treaty on investment protection).  
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commercial arbitration. However, both groups share a similar theoretical 
concern and anxiety about the need to develop a sounder and more 
grounded theoretical basis for investment law. This is more likely to take 
the form of debates on the substance of certain aspects of the law (in the 
practitioners community), and of ‘contextual’ debates on the need to 
situate investment law within the general international law regime (in the 
academic community), with the germane issues of fragmentation, 
normative dissonance, balancing of obligations, etc., which we have 
considered in detail in the previous chapters. All in all, the impression is 
given of a ‘discipline in search of an identity’.  
 
All these debates share a considerable level of interconnectedness: this 
manifests itself both in the fact that the topics are shared, at least to an 
extent, and that these communities are not isolated from each other. The 
communication between them happens both at the level of the issues we 
have outlined (for example, academics critiquing the states and the 
practitioners legislative and legal production, or the practitioners, and the 
investors, availing themselves of the investment instruments) and 
through the fact that all these communities share a common interest in 
the jurisprudence originating from investment arbitral panels. The role of 
these tribunals in the debate, which they shape and influence to a 
considerable extent, has been investigated thoroughly in the course of 
this work.  
 
 
8.3 The role of tribunals 
 
One of the most significant developments in investment law has been in 
the role of arbitration panels. From acting merely as panels entrusted 
with the resolution of disputes modelled on international commercial 
arbitration, they have been reconceptualised, by a certain sector of the 
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nd internationally. 
2010 by a collection of critical investment and public international law 
                                                
academic community, as international judicial review panels675. 
Certainly the jurisprudence originating from arbitration tribunals676 has 
undergone a significant progression both in terms of quantity and of 
quality. From the concise, terse awards of the even recent past, which 
focussed very much on the facts of the case and limited the legal 
reasoning to a minimum, tribunals have come to give considerable 
attention to the law, more explicitly situating disputes in their 
jurisprudential and doctrinal context, trying to develop an informal rule 
of precedent and applying, explicitly or implicitly, the proportionality 
analysis normally associated with public law contexts, both dom
a
 
Part of the debates that we have summarised in the previous section has 
focussed on the role of the tribunals. Again, different actors have reacted 
differently. One can recognise the (mostly) positive reaction of the 
community of practitioners, unsurprisingly so, given that, through 
investment tribunals, the community itself undergoes a process of 
‘identity-making’. This ‘reflexive turn’ within the investment world is in 
itself part of the process of identity-making, accomplished through 
reflection on the theoretical basis of the discipline. Within the academic 
world, where the diversity of opinions cannot be easily subsumed under a 
general consensus on the investment law regime, the reflexive turn has 
taken a more explicitly political flavour. This is exemplified by the 
‘Public Statement on the International Investment Regime’ issued in 
 
675 See for example, in a critical spirit, Loughlin, M. and van Harten, G., ‘Investment 
tr
 
 
ross different instruments with different language, parties, and 
scope of application. 
eaty arbitration as a species of global administrative law’, 17 EJIL (2006): 121. 
676 Tribunals are creatures of a particular dispute at a particular point in time, ad hoc
bodies each delivering their own awards and not tied by any rule of precedent, and 
nonetheless displaying a considerable amount of deference and developing an overall
consistent case law ac
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scholars677. Conversely, states can be seen mostly as ‘reluctant 
participants’: traditionally, host states were passive participants in the 
production of treaty rules, normally adopting without significant 
modification the model provided by the developed states parties to the 
bilateral agreements. On the other hand, developed states were very 
much in control of the production of the rules: the modification of the 
role of tribunals has brought into focus for states the potential for 
discretion and decisional/creative power that arbitration panels might 
have vis-à-vis states in the arbitration context. However reluctantly, most 
states have kept pace with the thickening web of bilateral obligations, 
ratifying international investment agreements and acceding the ICSID 
Convention, at the same time reaffirming their sovereign power to steer 
the development of the law in this area. Investors are still to a 
considerable measure passive participants in the process. Their 
submissions do not contribute directly to the development of the law in 
this area (while state submissions do, as well as any statement made in 
connection with the disputes or the negotiation and ratification of the 
treaties, and of course, the content of the treaties itself). In common with 
the public at large, they share an information-deficit, albeit on different 
grounds (because of their status as outsiders in the host state). And, to the 
extent that investment panels are given the power to balance competing 
 
677 Clearly evident in § 5 of the Statement: ‘Awards issued by international arbitrators 
against states have in numerous cases incorporated overly expansive interpretations of 
language in investment treaties. These interpretations have prioritized the protection of 
the property and economic interests of transnational corporations over the right to 
regulate of states and the right to self-determination of peoples. This is especially 
evident in the approach adopted by many arbitration tribunals to investment treaty 
concepts of corporate nationality, expropriation, most-favoured-nation treatment, non-
discrimination, and fair and equitable treatment, all of which have been given unduly 
pro-investor interpretations at the expense of states, their governments, and those on 
whose behalf they act. This has constituted a major reorientation of the balance between 
investor protection and public regulation in international law.’ See 
http://www.osgoode.yorku.ca/public_statement/documents/Public%20Statement.pdf.   
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commitments, investors stand potentially to see the level of protection 
guaranteed by the treaties diminished, or at the very least tempered by 
the conflicting obligations undertaken by states in other fields, such as 
environmental protection, and taken into account by the tribunals. 
Finally, the public at large, and especially those sectors that take an 
active interest in environmental issues, including communities of experts, 
activists, NGOs, etc., have maintained a high level of critical anxiety. 
This anxiety is a reaction to the way investment law either isolates itself 
from its normative environment or encroaches upon the regulatory 
powers of states and reclassifies public interests measures as regulatory 
risk and compensable actions, open to challenge within the framework of 
investment arbitrations, still seen as biased, undemocratic fora, whose 
faults greatly outweigh the advantages.    
 
 
8.4 Greening investment law: what now? 
 
At the end of this work, we are left with no easy answers. Several 
conclusions can be drawn however, from the analysis of the activities of 
tribunal and the legislative production of states. The proliferation of 
instruments, awards, and also academic research and critical analysis, 
highlights the fact that we are not here witnessing a legal deficit, but, if 
anything, a legal overgrowth. What is lacking, arguably, is a systematic 
approach, interestingly both within and out-with the investment regime. 
In other words, both within the investment community, and outside of it, 
there is a general complaint about the vagueness and ambiguity of the 
law, the lack of consistency, the conflict and clash of provisions and 
obligations. It is a very modern phenomenon, in a way, a certain 
‘democratisation’ of the law, which runs counter to the discourse of 
constitutionalisation and entrenchment lamented by the critical voices. 
This state of flux, this ‘liquidity’ of the law, upon which we have already 
remarked, should not be underestimated. It is within this state that 
solutions to the normative dissonance between investment and 
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environment have to be found, unless one argues (and we haven’t) for a 
more hierarchical structure to be put in place (either ex novo, by creation 
of an international investment court, or by addition of a further layer of 
appeal above the tribunals). 
 
We have opened this work with a reference to ‘entry points’ for 
environmental legal obligations in the investment regime: the greening of 
investment law was to be accomplished precisely in this way. Arguably, 
in addition to the substantive and procedural entry points examined in the 
course of this work, each investment tribunal constitutes an entry point in 
itself. The modus operandi of investment tribunals can be contrasted, in 
order to explain its specificity, to the way in which the International 
Court of Justice functions as an agent of development of public 
international law. The ICJ is a highly centralised institution, which 
‘funnels’ international law jurisprudence; in contrast, investment law sets 
forth through a multiplicity of tribunals. The very existence of these 
decentralised loci of production of case law and precedent (the lack of 
stare decisis notwithstanding, investment law constitutes a case among 
many of co-evolution or diffusion678) testifies to an alternative model of 
development of the law along multiple lines which tend to converge and 
coalesce around certain basic principles, such as the principle of good 
faith, or abstract clusters of substantive rules, such as the fair and 
equitable standard. The inherently ‘democratic’ nature of this mode of 
legal production can lend itself to openness to the outside, where the 
outside is, in the context of this work, the environmental legal regime and 
the state as the source of norms, the defendant in arbitration, and the 
enforcer of the awards.  
 
 
678 We take these concepts and interpretative frameworks from the field of 
anthropology; see especially McCormick Adams, R., Evolution of Urban Society: Early 
Mesopotamia and Pre-Hispanic Mexico, Piscataway, Aldine Transaction, 2005 (1st ed. 
1966); Redman, C.L., The Rise of Civilization – From Early Farmers to Urban Society 
in the Ancient Near East, San Francisco, W.H. Freeman and Co., 1976.  
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There is only so much greening that can be accomplished through this 
‘osmotic’ process of diffusion and accretion of rules, and tribunals are, 
one should not forget, both entry points and guardians of the doors. We 
made a policy point to stress that the possibility to green investment law 
can be said to exist already in the law  ‘as is’, and that this was not a 
project of legal reform. Equally, we have stressed before the inherently 
political character of certain issues. At the end of this work, we return to 
politics to conclude that, while the investment law regime can be said to 
be open to its environment to a certain extent, decisions have to be taken 
at the political level, and at the level of norm production (internationally, 
through ratification of investment instruments that expressly contain 
environmental exceptions with ‘normative bite’) in order for investment 
law to be greened from within. 
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